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This thesis is the result of a rather unorthodox combination of fine art, law 
enforcement, and science. The enumeration of these disciplines reflects the 
development of my scientific career. 
 
In 1990, as a student at the Film Academy of the Amsterdam School of the Arts, 
I became engaged in a dispute with one of my lecturers over the metaphysical 
quality of narratives. He claimed that any imaginable narrative could be created 
by a handful of scenario components, and I was challenged to compile a 
limitative list of these components from all the narratives that were to be studied 
during the four-year course.  
 
In 2007, after a career as filmmaker and director of documentary films that 
spanned more than fifteen years, I applied for a Master of Criminal Investigation. 
To complete my study, I wrote a master thesis on the concept of applying a 
narrative approach (based on the aforementioned scenario components) to 
anticipate terrorist attacks. The publication of this dissertation resulted in an 
invitation by the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service (DB&B) of the Dutch 
National Police1, to pursue the proposed concept in operational and real-life 
situations.  
 
As the team leader of a covert unit, I was able to introduce an innovative method 
of close protection. Instead of re-acting to the moves of our adversaries and 
trying to withstand an attack, we predicted their moves and tried to prevent an 
attack. First, we analysed historical data to acquire “the narrative” of our 
adversaries. Next, we created a “counter-narrative” that would alter the 
developments to our benefit. Once we had defined the narratives in detail, we 
designed covert operations to intervene accordingly. 
 
The results of my team were thought provoking and prompted the interest of 
counter-terrorism and intelligence organisations. I was invited to demonstrate 
the method of operation to prominent members of Dutch Parliament and the 
Ministry of Security and Justice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  During the realisation of this Ph.D. research, the regional police forces of the Netherlands were 
incorporated into one national police force. In this thesis we consistently use the current nomenclature. 
Promotores:  
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My Ph.D. research has been accompanied by an advisory board, which I wish to 
thank for their critical and supporting advice.  
-­‐ Ms. P.M. Zorko (Chief constable of the Central division of the National Police 
of the Netherlands) 
-­‐ Mr. A.H. van Wijk LLM (Board of Prosecutors General) 
-­‐ Mr. E.C. Mac Gillavry LLM (Deputy director of Bureau for Criminal Law Studies 
Dutch Public Prosecution Service) 
-­‐ Mr. E.S.M. Akerboom (Secretary-general of the Ministry of Defence), who I 
would like to thank in particular, as he was (in his capacity of Chair of the 
NCTv) one of the first people to recognise potential in my attempts to thwart 
an attack on his life during the exercise Purple Haze III2.  
 
Moreover, I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee, for their 
preparedness to read this thesis and to assess it to the best of their abilities: 
Prof. dr. A. Plaat, Prof. dr. E.O. Postma, Prof. mr. T.A. de Roos, Prof. dr. B.A. de 
Graaf (Beatrice), and Prof. dr. B.G.J. de Graaff (Bob). 
 
Most importantly, I would like to thank my employer, Central division of the 
National Police of the Netherlands for allowing me the professional space to 
come up with new and unusual ideas. In particular, I would like to thank Mr. 
R.G.C. Bik (Deputy commissioner of the National Police of the Netherlands) and 
Ms. P.M. Zorko, (Chief constable of the Central division of the National Police of 
the Netherlands), for encouraging me on this journey. 
 
Apart from the organisations and people mentioned in this section, there is a 
number of people whose support has been essential in the completion of this 
thesis. Because my appreciation for them transcends the merits of a preface, I 
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Following one of these presentations, I was offered the opportunity to pursue 
the use of scenarios to anticipate crime, in a Ph.D. study at Tilburg University. 
The idea to converge art, law enforcement, and science in the development of a 
new scenario model was a thrilling perspective and became the start of a journey 
that ends here, with the completion of this thesis.  
 
Without the help of many organisations and people, this thesis would not have 
been possible. Here, I would like to take the opportunity to express my gratitude 
to them. 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors for their support and 
detailed advice during this Ph.D. research. I have had the honour to receive 
guidance from Jaap van den Herik, Jan Scholtes, and Pieter Spronck. Their 
support and belief in me have been a crucial factor in the completion of this 
thesis.  
 
Furthermore, I would like to extend my gratitude towards the following 
organisations. Tilburg University for granting me the opportunity to pursue my 
Ph.D. study. The Graduate School of Tilburg School of Humanities (TSH), and the 
Tilburg centre for Cognition and Communication (TiCC) for receiving me with 
hospitality, and for allowing me to work with their students. I would like to thank 
Utrecht University, in particular the department of History of International 
Relations, for entrusting me a talented Master student. Furthermore, I owe 
gratitude towards ZyLAB for their guidance and assistance in discovering the 
potential of text mining. Finally, I would like to thank The National Coordinator 
for Security and Counterterrorism, and the International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism for their support. 
 
Additionally, I would like to thank three students whose contributions have 
proven to be a valuable part of this thesis: Liesbeth van der Heide, Linda Stege 
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ONE | Finding the narrative
1
This chapter introduces the reader to the objectives 
and scope of the thesis. It formulates the problem 
statement, and four research questions, and constitutes 
the research framework for our study.
Where there is no narrative, there is no history.
Benedetto Croce3
3 Benedetto Croce (1866 - 1952), historian, humanist, and foremost Italian philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century. The quote of Croce cited above, 
appeared in A theory of Narrative (Altman, 2008). 
 
 21 
A narrative, according to the Oxford English dictionary, is any account of 
connected events, presented to an audience in a sequence of written or spoken 
words, or (moving) pictures. Narratives play an important role in human life. As 
soon as children learn to speak, they demand to be told stories in the form of 
narratives. They help us to understand the world around us, and to grasp complex 
concepts such as ethics and morality. From childhood onwards, a substantial 
amount of human life is spent listening to narratives, reading narratives, or 
watching them being acted out on television or cinema screens. Much of our 
conversation is taken up with recounting the events of daily life in the shape of a 
narrative. Narratives help us to remember past experiences and to relate them to 
other human beings (cf. Tulving, 1985).  
 
The need for narrative is rooted so deep in human existence that narratives are at 
the mainstay of entertainment, law, and politics. News is presented as narratives 
(cf. Booker, 2004), justice is administered because of narratives (cf. Van Koppen et 
al., 2002), and wars are waged on the basis of narratives (cf. Schwalbe, Silcock, & 
Keith, 2008). Moreover, history is recorded and related in the shape of narratives 
(cf. Booker, 2004). While the words of Croce cited at the beginning of this chapter 
might seem grotesque, the Latin word “historia” translates as "narrative of past 
events”4. 
 
The terrorist attacks in Washington and New York at the start of this millennium, 
fuelled an interest in using the narrative to anticipate criminal behaviour. US 
Government authorities invited film producers, scenario writers, and developers of 
computer games, to come up with the narrative of the next possible terrorist 
attack (cf. Edwards, 2001). More recently, the CIA declared its interest in finding 
the narrative in “big data”5 to be able to detect deviant behaviour (cf. Novet, 
2013).  
 
While the dictum of Croce “Where there is no narrative, there is no history”, 
emphasises the importance of the narrative, “Find the narrative and anticipate the 
future” seems to be the aphorism of the next decennium. Though, the issue of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 “history”; Online Etymology Dictionary. 
5 “Big data” is defined as “high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets that demand cost-
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The current chapter introduces the reader to the topic of anticipating criminal 
behaviour and provides the essential elements for our research. Section 1.1 
constitutes a brief introduction to the topic, while in section 1.2 the research 
objective is explained. Section 1.3 addresses the significance of the research, and 
section 1.4 defines the scope of the study. In section 1.5 the problem statement is 
formulated which will guide the investigation. Subsequently, four research 
questions are presented that partition the research in a proper way. Section 1.6 
delineates our research methodology and section 1.7 provides the structure of the 
thesis. Finally, section 1.8 calls attention to ten publications that are closely related 
to this thesis.  
 
1.1 Anticipating criminal behaviour 
The word “anticipate” originates from the Latin anticipare which translates as “to 
act in advance”. It is based on ante- “in advance” and capere “to take”6. The 
contraction of both words essentially reflects the central aim of this thesis; to 
create a model by which information can be used for analysis and proactive use. 
“Ante” in the context of this study represents pro-activity; behaviour that involves 
acting in advance of a future situation, rather than reacting. “Capere” in turn, 
represents the process of analysis; of breaking a complex topic into smaller parts 
in order to gain (“to take”) a better understanding of it. 
 
Because “anticipation” is a complex phenomenon that is rooted both in past 
experience, and in expectations of what is about to happen, we provide a 
stipulative definition below.  
 
Definition 1.1: Anticipation 
Anticipation is the concept of making decisions concerning future events in a 
timely and effective fashion, based on the interpretation of past events. 
 
Moreover, we define criminal behaviour as follows.  
 
Definition 1.2: Criminal behaviour  
Criminal behaviour is any human conduct that has the intent to (or results in the 
commission of) an unlawful act. 
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how a narrative can be generated and subsequently be used to anticipate criminal 
behaviour, is something that has yet to be investigated.  
 
In the creative sector, a narrative is generated by a scenario that describes the 
interactions between characters. It includes information about behaviour, goals, 
motivations, modi operandi, and resistances that have to be overcome (Saaltink, 
1990). Over the last decennia, commercial companies have adapted creative 
scenarios as a powerful tool to anticipate future behaviour and to foresee the 
actions and strategies of competing companies. Questions such as “What makes 
the competitor resilient?”, “What makes a company survive major technical or 
political shifts?”, and “Would it be possible to foil the next move of a competitor?” 
are successfully answered by the use of scenarios (cf. Porter, 1985; Ringland, 2006). 
 
Yet, while scenarios are widely used to help commercial organisations anticipate 
the next move of their competitor (cf. Hamel & Prahalad, 1994), little attention has 
been paid to the possibilities of scenario planning in anticipating the actions of 
illegal organisations. This guided us to the question: would a scenario model 
prove as useful a tool to anticipate the behaviour of a criminal organisation as it 
proved to be in anticipating the behaviour of a commercial organisation? 
 
We found many scientific studies that have been devoted to criminal behaviour in 
general (e.g., Matza & Sykes, 1961; Hacker, 1976; Cohen & Felson, 1979; 
Brantigam & Brantigam, 1981; Cornish & Clarke, 1986; Lissenberg et al., 2001; 
Boetig, 2006). Additionally, we found many scientific studies that have been 
devoted to scenario-based anticipation models in general (e.g., Kahn & Wiener, 
1967; Ducot & Lubben, 1980; Duncan & Wack, 1994; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; 
Godet & Roubelat, 1996; Van der Heijden, 1996; Kenter, 1998; Armstrong, 2001; 
Postma & Liebl, 2003; Ringland, 2006; Van Notten, 2006; Chermack, 2011). 
However, we found no evidence that scholarly research has been devoted to the 
use of scenario-based anticipation models in the anticipation of criminal behaviour. 
 
The research objective of this thesis is to investigate to what extent a scenario 
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Although the research presented in this thesis may be applicable to other domains 
such as regulatory agencies that act in the area of administrative law, cyber 
security, fraud detection, or financial regulations, the investigations were guided 
by the challenges faced by law-enforcement agencies in the anticipation of crime. 
Therefore, as a guideline for the reader, we will present a definition of law-
enforcement agency below. 
 
Definition 1.3: Law-enforcement agency  
A law-enforcement agency (LEA) is a government agency responsible for the 
enforcement of the laws. 
 
While the majority of studies of the use of scenarios are exploring the relationships 
between a set of concepts, testing hypotheses, and forming theories, we intend to 
contribute to the discussion on anticipating criminal behaviour by two specific 
research activities, viz. (i) studying the design, development, and use of an 
anticipative scenario model, and (ii) assessing its potential to analyse and 
anticipate criminal behaviour.  
 
1.3 Scientific relevance 
Attaining the research objective mentioned in section 1.2, will lead to at least 
three scientific contributions, viz. (1) developing a new specialised area of 
research, (2) identifying critical components of crime and correlating them, and (3) 
devising a new, practical methodology in which scenario planning is applicable. 
Below, we will briefly discuss these scientific contributions.  
 
1 Developing a new specialised area of research  
The possibilities of anticipative scenario models in law enforcement are emerging 
as a new domain in scientific research. So far, extensive research has been 
devoted to anticipating techniques and scenario mapping in general (e.g., Kahn & 
Wiener, 1967; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Godet & Roubelat, 1996; Van der Heijden, 
1996; Kenter, 1998; Armstrong, 2001; Postma & Liebl, 2003; Nekkers, 2006; 
Ringland, 2006; Van Notten, 2006; Chermack, 2011). However, the development 
of an anticipative scenario model within the domain of law enforcement is far from 
obvious. This thesis will investigate and summarise literature on scenario mapping 
and apply that knowledge in the development of a scenario model able to 
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Understanding crime is the subject of chapter two where we will define “crime” 
(definition 2.1), “organised crime” (definition 2.2), and provide a deeper 
understanding of the predicaments of criminal behaviour. However, for the 
appreciation of definition 1.2, and consequently the problem statement and 
corresponding research questions of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that “law” in 
our society is defined by social and legal institutions, not by technology or biology 
(cf. Koelewijn, 2009). 
 
With regard to the concept of a scenario model able to anticipate criminal 
behaviour, we would like to emphasise that by no means, we suggest that a 
scenario model will be able to predict (and react to the prediction of) criminal 
behaviour by itself. The scenario model that we propose, aims to assist human 
operators in the process of anticipating criminal behaviour. An illustration of the 
relation between the processing of crime-related data and the understanding of 
that data is given in box 1.  
 
 
Box 1: Digression on a computer scenario model  
 
A computer scenario model may be able to process large volumes of crime-related data, and rank 
scenarios on the basis of likelihood, but it will not be able to understand criminal behaviour. 
Obviously, to this day and age computers lack the common sense, or knowledge in the form of 
intuition, that domain experts possess. Moreover, as the early days of artificial intelligence have 
learned (see Russel & Norvig, 2010), such common sense or expert knowledge is quite difficult, if 
not impossible, to program into a computer algorithm. 
 
 
Therefore, we would like to proceed by stating that (a) the scenario model and 
corresponding algorithms that we propose and investigate, will merely be 
responsible for the tasks that require cognitive processing power, and (b) a human 
domain expert will ultimately be responsible for the interpretation of the output of 
the scenario model. Changes with respect to (a) and (b) may happen in the future, 
but they are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Research objective 
The general objective of this thesis is, as stated above, to investigate to what 
extent a scenario model can support law-enforcement agencies in the anticipation 
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1.4 Restrictions of research 
“Criminal behaviour” is a broad concept. In order to evaluate the design, 
development, and use of a scenario model able to anticipate criminal behaviour, 
we narrowed the scope of our study. This constitutes restrictions of our research. 
Below, we will narrow the scope of the study by addressing the following issues: 
the object of inquiry (subsection 1.4.1), the time of inquiry (subsection 1.4.2), the 
scale of inquiry (subsection 1.4.3), and the classification of information (subsection 
1.4.4). 
 
1.4.1 The object of inquiry 
In this thesis we assume that a scenario model can be designed that may be used 
to anticipate criminal behaviour. To test this assumption, we decided to document 
and evaluate the design, development, and usability of a scenario model able to 
anticipate criminal behaviour. To test the scenario model proposed in this thesis, 
we will create an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) in which the scenario model 
will be linked to a dataset that comprises a subset of criminal behaviour; that of 
terrorism. This data subset constitutes an important restriction of our research. 
 
Terrorism as we believe, is a phenomenon that is sufficiently complex to be used 
as a testing ground for the proposed scenario model. Yet, it is also suitably concise 
to extract a finite number of incidents relevant for the assessment of a scenario-
based anticipatory technique.  
 
1.4.2 The time of inquiry 
When addressing the subject of a scenario model able to anticipate future 
incidents, “the future” has to be specified. After all, the future is infinite by nature. 
For a realistic anticipation of future criminal incidents, this study uses a timeframe 
of up to (approximately) one year. For such a period, a certain amount of linearity 
and extrapolative forecasting can be assumed (cf. List, 2005).  
 
1.4.3 The scale of inquiry 
The proposed scenario model is not designed for anticipating behaviour on a 
global level such as behaviours of states or countries. Although the scenario model 
may be more generally usable, our inquiry focusses on anticipating behaviour of a 
relatively small social or cultural unit, e.g., a person or an organisation. 
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anticipate criminal behaviour. By developing a model that combines practical data 
from different criminal organisations with theoretical knowledge about criminal 
acts, this study contributes to the discussion of Intelligence Led Policing and 
Security7 and provides law-enforcement agencies with the design of a scenario 
model that can be used on strategic, tactical, as well as operational level.  
 
2 Identifying critical components of crime and correlating them  
Scholarly literature in the field of terrorism largely takes a fragmented approach, 
focussing on isolated aspects of terrorism or on single terrorist attacks. When 
addressing the problem statement, we will propose a design for a scenario model 
in which detailed information of different criminal incidents can be combined. By 
accumulating data from individual cases, this research can help to identify the 
crucial components of crime as well as to define the correlation between these 
components.  
 
3 Devising a new, practical methodology  
This study intends to devise a practical methodology in which historical data of 
criminal incidents can be collected for comparison and critical evaluation. As we 
will argue, a scenario model applied to the field of law enforcement can 
externalise and codify knowledge of individual cases and make that data readily 
available. Moreover, a scenario model may capitalise on this historical data to 
generate new and plausible scenarios of future criminal behaviour.  
 
Scientific studies in which anticipative scenario models are combined with criminal 
behaviour are scarce. Seemingly non-existent is scientific research that combines 
anticipative scenario models with the application of data- and text-mining 
techniques in order to anticipate criminal behaviour.  
 
By studying to what extent an anticipative scenario model can support law-
enforcement agencies in the analysis and anticipation of criminal behaviour, this 
research intends to (a) fill the lacunae of scientific research in the field, and (b) 
create a foundation for further research.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Intelligence-led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data analysis and crime 
intelligence are pivotal in an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem 
reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies 
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is fundamental in this research. This question brings us to the problem statement 
to be discussed in this thesis. It reads as follows. 
 
Problem Statement:  
To what extent can a scenario model support law-enforcement agencies in the 
anticipation of criminal behaviour? 
 
1.5.2 Four research questions 
To answer the problem statement, we formulate four research questions that 
guide our research work. We start establishing our point of departure by RQ1. 
 
Research Question 1: 
What does literature on scenario-based anticipation methods offer that is relevant 
for the development of a scenario model by which criminal behaviour can be 
anticipated? 
 
RQ1 aims to review the existing literature on scenario-based anticipation methods 
and to utilise the findings to guide the design and development of a new 
anticipative scenario model for use in law enforcement.  
 
To be able (a) to document the design and development of a scenario model able 
to anticipate criminal behaviour, and (b) to test the capabilities of such a scenario 
model accordingly, we formulate RQ2. 
 
Research Question 2: 
To what extent can a scenario model be designed by which criminal behaviour can 
be anticipated? 
 
The first step in the anticipation of future incidents is the analysis of historic 
incidents (see section 1.1). A scenario model by which historic criminal behaviour 
can effectively be analysed, would offer a valuable tool for law-enforcement 
agencies and can in virtue be used for any task in which it is important to study the 
communalities and differences between idiosyncratic criminal incidents. To test the 
analytical capabilities of a scenario model able to anticipate criminal behaviour, we 
formulate RQ3 as follows. 
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1.4.4 The classification of information 
Good practice of scientific inquiry requires that the data and the methodology are 
well documented and made public (see NWO, 2012). To evaluate the design, 
development, and use of the scenario model, we will create an ESP in which we 
will combine the scenario model with data obtained from open sources such as 
international studies, declassified reports, newspaper clippings, radio, and 
television reports. The fact that this data is not validated, has to be recognised in 
the evaluation of the ESP. This open-source environment allows us to focus our 
attention on the performance of the ESP and effectively, on the performance of 
the scenario model. 
 
1.5 Problem statement and research questions  
Our research is guided by a problem statement (PS) and four research questions 
(RQs). In subsection 1.5.1 we formulate the problem statement. Subsequently, in 
subsection 1.5.2 we articulate the four research questions. 
 
1.5.1 Problem statement 
Section 1.1 indicated that the use of scenarios models has proved to be valuable 
in anticipating future behaviour of commercial organisations. The section also 
indicated that the possibilities of a scenario model in aiding law-enforcement 
agencies to anticipate criminal behaviour, is a subject that apparently has been 
neglected, also by academic research.  
 
While relevant data and insights can be found in literature on crime and criminal 
organisations, information on the use of scenario models has not been collected 
and systematically analysed to assess its value in anticipating future events (cf. 
Jackson, 2005). Moreover, application of data- and text-mining tools may enhance 
the anticipation, prediction, and even prevention of crime (see McCue, 2007) and 
allow for a new form of law enforcement in which intelligence is gathered by data-
mining tools (see Vanderlooy, 2009). 
 
Therefore, the question mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, “would a 
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is fundamental in this research. This question brings us to the problem statement 
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1.4.4 The classification of information 
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1 Review and analyse the literature  
Literature review is at the base of our research. Studying the literature on 
predictive anticipatory techniques will provide an overview of scenario-based 
anticipation methods in the broadest sense of the word. Our literature review will 
include scholarly articles, books, and other sources (e.g., dissertations, industrial 
reports, articles on related research). We are interested in various techniques and 
approaches to scenario-based anticipation methods ranging from scientific models 
designed to calculate uncertainties in the future, to scenario models used in 
creative writing. Our goal is to offer an overview of significant contributions from 
the literature and to provide a solid basis for the design of a scenario model fit for 
anticipating criminal behaviour. Effectively, the literature review and analysis will 
be the foundation of the answer to RQ1. 
 
2 Design a new scenario model  
Based on the findings of our literature review, we will design a new scenario model 
by which (i) criminal behaviour may be modelled, and (ii) future criminal behaviour 
may be anticipated. The design of the scenario model will encompass (1) a 
conceptual design in which we will explore the hypothetical function of the model, 
and (2) an architectural design in which we will study the implementation of the 
modules that constitute the model and the processes that these modules facilitate.  
 
3 Create an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) 
To address RQ3 and RQ4 effectively, we require a test model or Experimental 
Scenario Platform (ESP). The ESP is based on the design of the scenario model 
proposed in the previous methodological stage and combines the conceptual 
design of the scenario model with an actual dataset that comprises a subset of 
criminal behaviour, viz. that of terrorism. Subjecting the ESP to experiments allows 
us to assess the robustness of the proposed design of the scenario model.  
 
4 Perform experiments with the ESP  
The fourth step of our methodology consists of subjecting the ESP to different 
experiments. These experiments provide the empirical results needed to evaluate 
the performance of the proposed scenario model. We will measure the effect of 
the scenario model by concentrating on (a) the analysis of historical incidents, and 
(b) the ability to anticipate future incidents, which effectively will lead to answering 
RQ2 and RQ3. The evaluation of the performance of the ESP will be done by two 
corresponding measurements that we will briefly describe below.  
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Research Question 3:  
To what extent can a scenario model be used to analyse historic criminal 
behaviour? 
 
The second step in the anticipation of future incidents is to use the findings from 
analysing historic incidents and to extrapolate these findings into the future. Data 
mining provides tools (classifiers) that can be used to facilitate this process and 
generalise observations to make predictions in the near future (see Vanderlooy, 
2009). To be able to test the extent to which a scenario model can be used to 
anticipate new and unseen incidents, we defined RQ4 that reads as follows. 
 
Research Question 4:  
To what extent are data-mining techniques applied to a scenario model able to 
enhance the ability of law-enforcement agencies to anticipate criminal behaviour? 
 
The answers to the four research questions will allow us to formulate an answer to 
the problem statement.  
 
1.6 Research methodology 
To document and evaluate the design, development, and usability of a scenario 
model able to anticipate criminal behaviour, we employ an inductive research 
methodology which consists of five stages: (1) review and analyse the literature, (2) 
design a new scenario model, (3) create an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP), 
(4) perform experiments with the ESP, and (5) analyse the obtained results. In table 
1.1 an X indicates which methodology stages are employed to address each of the 
four research questions and the problem statement of this thesis. Below we will 
discuss the five stages.  
 
Methodology stages RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 PS 
1 Review and analysis the literature X     
2 Design a new scenario model  X    
3 Create an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP)      
4 Perform experiments with the ESP   X X  
5 Analyse the obtained results     X 
 
Table 1.1 Overview of the research methodology. 
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Chapter 1 Finding the narrative 
Chapter one constitutes the introductory chapter. It sets the background and 
structure of the study. We define the concept of anticipating criminal behaviour 
and introduce our research objective. Subsequently we mention the scientific 
relevance and restrictions of our research. Based on these outlines, a problem 
statement and four corresponding research questions are formulated. Moreover, 
we describe the employed research methodology and provide an overview of the 
thesis. The chapter is concluded by an overview of the publications that are 
related to this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 Understanding crime 
Chapter two forms the theoretical basis for our study. It focusses on the 
overarching theme and provides a deeper understanding of crime in general and 
criminal behaviour in particular. Drawing on literature from (i) criminology, (ii) 
terrorism research, and (iii) organisational learning, the predicaments of criminal 
behaviour are studied. We start by defining the concept of crime and highlight 
three criminal theories that offer insight into the predicaments of crime relevant to 
the design of a scenario model able to anticipate criminal behaviour. 
Subsequently, we describe the relation between organised crime and terrorism, 
and provide definitions of both these terms. Next, we focus on “lone-operators”; 
criminals that operate without an organisational structure. Finally, because 
criminology indicates that a common denominator of both criminal and terrorist 
organisations is their ability to learn, we conclude chapter two by a description of 
the concept of organisational learning and the opportunities it offers to anticipate 
criminal behaviour. The output of this chapter will contribute to the design of an 
ESC12 scenario model in chapter five. 
 
Chapter 3 Using scenarios  
Chapter three aims to answer RQ1 and constitutes a literature review of scenario-
based anticipatory techniques. The chapter starts by defining the terms relevant to 
the use of scenarios in anticipating future behaviour. Next, we review the history of 
scenario planning and the development of scenarios. We focus on the use of 
creative scenarios and the concept of the twelve components by which a scenario 
may be constructed. Subsequently, three proactive models that are in use in law 
enforcement are discussed to illustrate the difference with an anticipative scenario 
model. Then, the limits of anticipating future events are addressed and the most 
valuable methods in relation to this thesis are highlighted. We conclude the 
 
 32 
Analysis of historical incidents 
To measure the capabilities of the ESP in the analysis of historic incidents, we 
measure its performance in detecting a “time-independent profile” for lone-
operator terrorism and evaluate the results. The evaluation of the performance of 
the ESP effectively will lead to the answer of RQ2. 
 
The ability to anticipate future incidents 
To measure the capabilities of the scenario model to anticipate future behaviour, 
we will add data-mining tools to the scenario model. Moreover, we will investigate 
how well the ESP performs in predicting new and unforeseen incidents based on 
historic cases. The evaluation of the performance of the ESP to anticipate future 
incidents, will lead to answering RQ3. 
 
5 Analyse the obtained results 
Having performed the aforementioned experiments, we will complete our research 
by analysing the obtained results. In this stage we will accumulate the outcomes of 
the previous stages and answer the problem statement. 
 
1.7 Structure of thesis 
The problem statement and the four accompanying research questions introduced 
in section 1.5 are investigated over the course of 11 chapters. In table 1.2 the 
chapters that address the research questions and problem statement are denoted 
by an X. Below we will provide a brief description of each chapter. 
 
Chapter RQ1 RQ2 RQ3 RQ4 PS 
1 Finding the narrative X X X X X 
2 Understanding crime      
3 Using scenarios X     
4 Modelling criminal behaviour: ESC12      
5 Designing an ESC12 scenario model  X    
6 Creating the ESP PANDORA      
7 Developing the ESP PANDORA      
8 Opening PANDORA‘s box   X   
9 Discovering PANDORA’s box    X  
10 Conclusions X X X X X 
11 Deleted scenes      
 
Table 1.2 Overview of the structure of the thesis. 
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design of the ESC12 scenario model. To assess this design, an experimental 
scenario platform needs to be constructed. This will be the subject of the chapter 
six. 
 
Chapter 6 Creating the ESP PANDORA 
Chapter six constitutes the creation of an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) 
named PANDORA in which data of criminal behaviour is added to the architectural 
design of the scenario model proposed in chapter five. In the creation of the ESP, 
we observe that the ESC12 represent categories too broad and general to 
encompass the relevant details of a criminal incident. Therefore, we subdivide the 
ESC12 into 98 variables and introduce four types of values for each variable (viz. 
dichotomous value, numerical value, categorical value, and text value).  
 
To be able to address RQ3 and RQ4 adequately, we require two separate ESPs. 
For RQ3 we aim to understand to what extent a scenario model may be used to 
detect a time-independent profile for lone-operators. For this experiment, we 
create ESP PANDORA I that contains detailed information on 157 lone-operator 
incidents. For RQ4, we aim to understand to what extent data-mining techniques 
applied to the scenario model may be able to enhance the ability to anticipate 
criminal behaviour. For this experiment, we create ESP PANDORA II that contains 
information of 53,289 terrorist incidents.  
 
Chapter 7 Developing the ESP PANDORA 
In chapter seven we explain the internal structure of the ESP and the process of 
data preparation. Eleven sections provide insight into the way data is 
deconstructed and implemented by 98 variables. Every section includes a detailed 
table that illustrates the Elementary Scenario Component, its internal structure and 
its corresponding variables. 
 
Chapter 8 Opening PANDORA‘s box 
Chapter eight aims to answer RQ3. We study how the ESP PANDORA I may be used 
to detect a time-independent profile for lone-operators. The chapter starts with an 
outline of the experiment and the process of case-selection. We introduce the four 
waves of modern terrorism concept of Rapoport (2004), to define the timeframe of 
modern terrorism and to divide this timeframe into four historic waves. 
Subsequently, we select 10 incidents of lone-operator terrorism per wave and 
extract the ESC12 and the corresponding variables from every incident. Next, we 
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chapter by answering RQ1, and by focussing on the relevant findings that 
emerged in our literature review. The outcome of chapter three will contribute to 
the modelling of criminal behaviour in chapter four, and to the design of an ESC12 
scenario model in chapter five. 
 
Chapter 4 Modelling criminal behaviour: ESC12 
The research required to formulate an answer to RQ2, is split over the chapters 
four and five. Chapter four builds on the input of chapter three. First, we propose 
a novel manner of modelling criminal behaviour based on the components by 
which creative scenarios are constructed. We focus on the relation between a 
criminal offence and a theatrical performance and present a definition of the 
twelve Elementary Scenario Components (ESC12). Next, we list the ESC12 and 
illustrate them by using two stories: (i) the early oral history of The epic of 
Gilgamesh and (ii) the blockbuster motion picture Jaws. Subsequently, we 
introduce the ESC12 to the area of law enforcement by relating them to “the 
Golden W’s”, a concept that is frequently used in the process of information 
gathering in law-enforcement investigations. We study the communalities and 
differences between the ESC12 and “the Golden W’s” and arrive at the conclusion 
that the ESC12 offer an effective and durable set of components to describe, 
characterise and model a criminal incident. Based on this conclusion, we will 
decide to implement the ESC12 in the design of a scenario model able to 
anticipate criminal behaviour, which constitutes the subject of chapter five. 
 
Chapter 5 Designing an ESC12 scenario model 
In chapter five we aim to answer RQ2 and present the design for an innovative 
scenario model, based on the ESC12. This chapter draws on the results of the 
chapters two, three, and four, and, in essence, forms the heart of the thesis. The 
chapter starts by proposing a definition of the ESC12 scenario model. 
Subsequently, we illustrate the conceptual design of the ESC12 scenario model by 
focussing on the use of the ESC12 in (i) the ability to learn, (ii) the ability to adapt, 
and (iii) the ability to anticipate. Next, we propose an architectural design of the 
ESC12 scenario model that constitutes four modules (viz. a data cruncher, a 
scenario matrix, a controller, and a scenario generator) and facilitates six processes 
(viz. Data pre-processing, Data warehousing, Facilitating differentiated output, 
Generating differentiated output, Feedback and Applying knowledge).	  
Subsequently, we explain how these modules and processes interact with one 
another. We conclude this chapter by presenting a blueprint of the architectural 
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seem to fit the Ph.D. research-, is believed to offer a valuable addition to this 
thesis.  
 
As we argued in the previous chapters, there seems to be a strong analogy 
between a theatrical performance and a terrorist act. This analogy provides us with 
the opportunity to add creative narratives to the ESC12 scenario model. Therefore, 
we designed an experiment in which we study two hypotheses: (1) Combining 
data from terrorist incidents with data from works of fiction would enhance the 
potential of the ESC12 scenario model. (2) Text-mining techniques would enable 
the automatic extraction of the ESC12 variables from works of fiction. To address 
the first hypothesis, we investigate the nexus between terroristic and creative 
narratives by drawing on related scientific studies. To investigate the second 
hypothesis, we conduct a text mining experiment in which we apply text-mining 
rules on thirteen novels that were written by Frederick Forsyth. Based on the 
results of our investigations, we arrive at the conclusion that adding the ESC12 
(variables) by means of text mining from works of fiction, would enhance the 
capabilities of the ESC12 scenario model. Based on this conclusion we build a 
sneak preview of the future of the ESC12 scenario model.  
 
1.8 Publications related to this research 
Parallel to the research described in this thesis, ten other academics have 
investigated aspects of the ESC12 scenario model8. The author of this thesis was 
co-involved in the guidance of these researches, and was able to employ the 
results obtained. Below we will list the ten scientific studies that are closely 
connected to the topic of this thesis.  
 
1. Prototype Case-based Reasoning – Aanslagen (Spronck, 2010).  
This report decribes a prototype Case-based Reasoning system that was designed 
to demonstrate the anticipative potential of an anticipative scenario model.  
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In this thesis the term “ESC12 scenario model” is introduced. Earlier, provisional versions of this model were 
named “Pandora”. Previous researchers who investigated different aspects the provisional scenario model 
refer to it accordingly. Later in this thesis we will introduce the Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) PANDORA. 
To distinguish the provisional scenario model “Pandora” from the ESP PANDORA, we have capitalized the latter. 
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analyse the communalities and differences between the different waves of 
terrorism. In a cross-wave analysis we accumulate the results of every wave of 
modern terrorism in a search for specific characteristics of lone-operator 
behaviour. From the results of the experiment, we conclude that a scenario model 
based on the ESC12 that accumulates different historic criminal incidents, provides 
an opportunity to analyse historic criminal behaviour in general by transcending 
the level of individual incidents.  
 
Chapter 9 Discovering PANDORA‘s box 
In chapter nine we address RQ4 by using the ESP PANDORA II that was created in 
chapter seven and eight. We aim to understand to what extent data-mining tools 
enhance the ability of the ESC12 scenario model to anticipate criminal behaviour. 
To this end, we set up a comparative experiment in which we compare the results 
of two classifiers applied to the ESP PANDORA II: We use (1) the ZeroR classifier (a 
straightforward classifier that predicts the majority category) to determine a 
baseline performance as a benchmark for (2) the J48 decision tree (a classifier that 
builds decision trees using the concept of information entropy). Next, we conduct 
three experiments that represent three operational law-enforcement situations: (1) 
the process of investigation of a (terrorist) incident that recently occurred, (2) an 
active threatening situation in which a strategic location, event, or important 
person needs to be protected from a possible (terrorist) attack, and (3) the 
anticipation of future incidents. Based on the accuracy percentages of the tests we 
conclude that data-mining tools, applied to the ESP PANDORA II do enhance the 
ability to anticipate criminal behaviour. 
 
Chapter 10 Conclusions 
In chapter ten the findings of our study are discussed and generalised to 
conclusions of the potential of an ESC12 scenario model to anticipate criminal 
behaviour. By reviewing the answers to the four research questions, we arrive at 
four conclusions. From these conclusions, we formulate an answer to the problem 
statement of this thesis. Finally, we suggest five directions for future research. 
 
Chapter 11 Deleted scenes 
Chapter eleven is added in accordance with a practice in the film industry in which 
deleted scenes are made available as a bonus feature during the commercial 
release of a motion picture. The possibilities of text mining -a subject that did not 
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seem to fit the Ph.D. research-, is believed to offer a valuable addition to this 
thesis.  
 
As we argued in the previous chapters, there seems to be a strong analogy 
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8. Matching and predicting of incomplete semi-structured textual information 
(working title) (De Rydt, 2014). This research is commissioned by ZyLAB 
Technologies9, and concludes the Master of Science in Artificial Intelligence by the 
University of Maastricht. De Rydt investigated how text-mining techniques can be 
used to extract complex patterns and variables from novels, movie scripts or case 
files to fill the variables of the ESC12.  
 
9. Advanced information extraction in text-mining (working title) (Thimister, 
2014). This research is commissioned by ZyLAB Technologies, and concludes the 
Master of Science in Artificial Intelligence by the University of Maastricht. Thimister 
investigated how statistics, combined with generally available knowledge, can 
assist the identification, derivation, and disambiguation of the ESC12 variables 
from texts. 
 
10. Visualisation and interactive navigation for search result lists in law enforcement 
applications (working title) (Trinnes, 2014). This thesis is commissioned by ZyLAB 
Technologies, and concludes the Master of Science in Artificial Intelligence by the 
University of Maastricht. Trinnes investigated in what way a visualisation based on 
the ESC12, affects the quality of the law enforcement agencies. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ZyLAB Technologies is a software company that provides software and services to law enforcement and 
government agencies around the world. ZyLAB’s technology is used for analyzing large and complex mult-
lingual data collections in criminal, security, intelligence and civil investigations. 
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2. Individual Terrorism: Indicators of lone operators (Van der Heide, 2011). 
This thesis was published as a result of the Master of International Relations by 
Utrecht University. Van der Heide investigated to what extent the Pandora model 
can be used to analyse lone-operator terrorism. 
 
3. Pandora in de strijd tegen liquidaties (Schreurs, 2012). 
This thesis was published as a result of the Master of Criminal Investigation of the 
Police Academy / School voor recherche in the Netherlands. Schreurs studied the 
deployment of the Pandora model in an operational investigation of lethal criminal 
violence. The thesis was classified as: “Law enforcement use / Secret” 
 
4. Anticipating terrorism with Pandora II (Stege, 2012). 
The thesis was published as a result of the Master Communication and Information 
Sciences at the Tilburg University. In this study, Stege investigated the addition of 
data-mining techniques to Pandora II and the effects that it has on the model’s 
ability to anticipate future behaviour.  
 
5. Pandora II, Improvements to a scenario model for investigation of terrorist 
behaviour (Bressers, 2012). 
This thesis was published as a result of the Master Communication and Information 
Sciences at the Tilburg University. It investigates the possibilities and limits of 
Pandora II. 
 
6. Narratieven en Homegrown Jihadistisch terrorisme (Overheul, 2014). 
This thesis was published as a result of the Master of Modern History by Utrecht 
University. Overheul investigated the value of a narrative model in the field of 
counterterrorism. 
 
7. Integrating fictional art into Pandora II (Von Bannisseht, 2014). 
This thesis was published as a result of the Master of Arts in Communication and 
Information Sciences by Tilburg University. Von Bannisseht investigated to what 
extent the anticipation of Pandora II would be improved by adding fictional art to 
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TWO | Understanding Crime
2
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for our study 
by focussing on previous research of criminal behaviour. 
What something is depends more on when something is than anything else. 
You can’t define something accurately until you understand when it is.
Frank Zappa10
10 Frank Zappa (1940 – 1993), American composer, guitarist, and satirist of the 1960s, ’70s, and ’80s. Zappa was a self-taught composer and performer, and his 
diverse musical influences led him to create music that was often difficult to categorise. 
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This chapter forms the theoretical framework for the thesis. It focusses on the 
overarching theme and provides a deeper understanding of crime in general, and 
criminal behaviour in particular, by drawing on literature from (a) criminology, (b) 
terrorism research, and (c) organisational learning.  
  
The chapter commences with an introduction to crime in section 2.1. In this section 
we provide a definition of crime that is used throughout the thesis (definition 2.1). 
In section 2.2 we present an overview of the three most applicable criminological 
theories. These theories present a clear and concise insight into the predicaments 
of criminal behaviour. In section 2.3 we review the organised crime-terrorism 
nexus, and study the communalities and differences between criminal and terrorist 
organisations. In this section we provide definitions for organised crime (definition 
2.2) and terrorism (definition 2.3). Section 2.4 is devoted to lone operators; a term 
we will adequately define (definition 2.4). Lone operators commonly referred to as 
“lone wolves”, have a particular set of characteristics that do not seem to fit the 
regular criminal theories. Yet, they are responsible for criminal behaviour that is 
significant both in nature and in extent. In section 2.5 we focus on the subject of 
organisational learning, as this seems to be a decisive factor in the success of 
criminal organisations. We provide definitions for learning (definition 2.5), adapting 
(definition 2.6), anticipating (definition 2.7), and organisational learning (definition 
2.8). Section 2.6 concludes this chapter by a summary of its contents.  
 
2.1 Crime 
The words by Frank Zappa at the beginning of this chapter suggest that definitions 
are prone to change over time. This seems to be particularly true for the definition 
of crime. Crime can be seen as an essentially contested concept. What used to be 
legal in the past can be considered a crime in the future. For instance, in October 
2010 squatting (i.e., the act of occupying an abandoned or unoccupied space 
without permission of the owner) became a criminal act in the Netherlands. Before 
that time, squatting was not defined as an unlawful act11. This is an illustrative 
example of how the definition of crime can change over time.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In October 2010 Art. 429sexies Sr. was replaced by Art.138a Sr. By this replacement, squatting became an 
illegal act in the Netherlands. 
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However, while Quinney’s definition of crime is suitable for understanding crime 
on a meta-level, it does not explain the nature of criminal behaviour. Therefore, we 
draw upon the research of criminologists to discover general patterns in the way 
criminals behave, in the next section.  
 
2.2 Criminological theories 
This section aims to provide a deeper understanding of criminal behaviour by 
building on theories from the field of criminology where sociologists and social 
anthropologists study the nature, extent, and control of criminal behaviour. 
Highlighting significant criminological theories will offer insight into the 
predicaments of crime relevant to the design of a scenario model able to 
anticipate criminal behaviour.  
 
The motivation behind criminal behaviour is explained by three theoretical 
approaches: (1) a psychological approach, (2) an economic approach, and (3) a 
sociological approach (cf. Cote, 2002). Below we briefly summarise these three 
approaches. In the subsections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3 we discuss a criminal theory from 
these three theoretical approaches. In subsection 2.2.4 we present a conclusion of 
this section. 
 
1: The psychological approach 
The psychological approach primarily aims at the individual level of the 
perpetrator. It addresses the question why one person indulges in criminal 
behaviour while another person does not.  
 
2: The economic approach   
The economic approach concentrates on the actual criminal act as opposed to 
criminality in general. The economic approach argues that criminals -like other 
individuals- weigh the costs (or risks) against the benefits when deciding whether 
or not to commit a criminal act. Criminals consequently think in economic terms. 
According to this perspective, prospective criminals will try to minimise the risks 
related to an offence by considering time, place, or other situational factors. 
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Referring to the words by Frank Zappa one could argue that “You can't define 
something accurately until you understand where it is” is equally true. Definitions 
are limited by time as well as by space. An act that is perfectly legal in one country 
can be a crime in another. While squatting may be a crime in some countries, in 
others countries it is merely seen as a civil conflict between the owner and the 
occupants of a property.  
 
Essentially, what is defined as a crime is constructed by social and political 
motivations. Because social and political circumstances change, the definition of 
crime changes accordingly. This axiom is strongly advocated by the American 
philosopher and criminologist Richard Quinney. In his book The Social Reality of 
Crime, Quinney (2008) proposes a definition of crime, which we adopt in the 
context of this thesis. 
 
Definition 2.1: Crime 
Crime is defined as a definition of human conduct that is created by authorised 
agents in a politically organised society. (Quinney, 2008) 
 
According to this definition -which itself is based on the concept of definition-, 
crime is a definition of behaviour that is bestowed on some persons by others. 
Agents of the law (legislators, police prosecutors, and judges), representing 
segments of a politically organised society, are responsible for formulating and 
administering criminal law. Persons and behaviour therefore, become criminal 
because of the formulation and application of criminal definitions. Therefore, crime 
is created (Quinney, 2008). 
 
The reason for adopting Quinney’s definition in this thesis is that it defines “crime” 
on a meta-level. It does neither clarify what is regarded as crime, nor does it 
enforce a moral component. It is a definition about a definition and therefore 
clearly emphasises the relativity of terms. In the light of this thesis, this is a 
valuable definition because (a) it embraces terrorism, (b) it transcends the moral 
component of what is good and what is bad, and (c) it successfully bypasses the 
essentially contested concept of crime. 
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2.2.2 The economic approach: Rational choice theory 
The theory of rational choice belongs to the economic approach (cf. Lissenberg, 
van Rullen, & Swaaningen, 2001). This theory adopts a utilitarian belief and 
advances on the idea that the behaviour of every individual (whether criminal or 
not) is essentially in pursuit of self-interest. Human decision-making is based on 
finding the most cost-effective way to achieve a specific goal without reflecting on 
the value of that goal. Whether it is about pleasure, health, wealth or social 
standing, one decides between the available alternatives and opts for the 
opportunity that is most cost effective. Costs in this case, are extrinsic to the 
individual rather than intrinsic (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). 
 
In rational choice theory, criminal behaviour is seen as the result of “free will” of 
the perpetrator who weighs means and ends, costs and benefits before coming to 
a rational choice. The theory focusses less on the background of the perpetrator 
and more on the primary objective for a certain crime. Rational choice theory puts 
the crime itself at the centre of attention as opposed to criminal behaviour in 
general. A question that is generally posed and answered from the perspective of 
this theory is: why does a criminal decide to commit a specific crime? The fact that 
the perspective of rational choice revolves around the principle of free will 
established a framework for situational crime prevention strategies: if the 
perpetrator’s primary objective for committing a crime is rational, and based on 
the aspects of a crime that render it attractive to particular offenders, it seems 
reasonable to believe that reducing the attractive aspects of a crime can lead to a 
significant decrease in crime rate (Lissenberg, van Rullen, & Swaaningen, 2001). 
Essentially, the rational choice theory values the importance of the primary 
objective of a crime. 
 
2.2.3 The sociological approach: Routine activity theory 
The routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) builds upon the control theory 
as well as the theory of rational choice and provides a macro-sociological 
explanation for criminal behaviour (cf. Lissenberg, van Rullen, & Swaaningen, 
2001). The routine activity theory explains crime in terms of crime opportunities 
that occur in everyday life. It argues that a criminal act results from coincidence as 
well as from the convergence of three requirements: 
(1) a motivated offender, 
(2) a suitable target or victim, 
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3: The sociological approach  
The sociological approach considers criminal behaviour from the perspective of 
the interaction between society and criminality. Following this approach, factors 
responsible for criminal activities can be found in (a) poverty, (b) communal 
deterioration, or (c) the dichotomy between what society expects of its citizens and 
what those citizens can actually achieve.  
 
The three theoretical approaches mentioned above, embrace theories that 
provide valuable insights into criminal behaviour. To provide an understanding of 
why people indulge in criminal behaviour, we will select and discuss a criminal 
theory from every theoretical approach, which we consider to be most appropriate 
for our research. 
 
2.2.1 The psychological approach: Control theory 
Control theory is a theory of motivation that postulates that behaviour is caused by 
the interest of a person rather than by a response to an outside stimulus (cf. 
Lissenberg, van Rullen, & Swaaningen, 2001). The control theory avoids 
addressing the question of why some people become criminal, by looking at the 
reason why some people do not become criminal. In doing so, it focusses on the 
context of a crime (or criminal) to understand criminal behaviour. In the control 
theory four ways are identified in which people can be committed to society: (1) 
"attachment to others" (e.g., friends and family), (2) "commitment to 
achievement" (e.g., work, school, or building a family), (3) "involvement in 
conventional activities" (e.g., sports, hobby, or communal activities), and (4) "belief 
in moral validity of rules" (e.g., belief in the biblical principle “Thou shallt not kill”) 
(Hirschi, 1969). The more a person is attached to one or more of these values, the 
less the person is prone to become deviant or indulge in criminal behaviour. 
According to the control theory deviant behaviour occurs where natural 
commitment to the values of society is compromised (cf. Lissenberg, van Rullen, & 
Swaaningen, 2001). Essentially, the control theory values the importance of the 
context of a crime. 
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2.2.2 The economic approach: Rational choice theory 
The theory of rational choice belongs to the economic approach (cf. Lissenberg, 
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individual rather than intrinsic (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). 
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a rational choice. The theory focusses less on the background of the perpetrator 
and more on the primary objective for a certain crime. Rational choice theory puts 
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Essentially, the rational choice theory values the importance of the primary 
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2.2.3 The sociological approach: Routine activity theory 
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well as from the convergence of three requirements: 
(1) a motivated offender, 
(2) a suitable target or victim, 
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3: The sociological approach  
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Law-enforcement officers and security guards represent formal guardians. 
Neighbours, friends, or (unwitting) citizens, represent informal guardians. Capable 
guardians do not necessarily have to be people; close circuit television, burglar 
alarms, or animals can function as guardians as well, although their capability may 
vary (see Boetig, 2006). 
 
Essentially, the routine activity theory values the importance of motivation, target, 
and resistance of a crime. 
 
2.2.4 Section conclusion 
The aforementioned approaches and corresponding criminal theories offer 
valuable insights into the predicaments of crime and criminal behaviour. The 
theories emphasise the importance of components such as context (Control 
theory), primary objective (Rational choice theory), motivation, target, and 
resistance (Routine activity theory), and the interdependent connection between 
them. It is clear that the design of a scenario model able to anticipate criminal 
behaviour can benefit from these insights, and should value these components of 
criminal behaviour. To distinguish criminal behaviour in general from terrorist 
behaviour, we will explore the crime-terrorism nexus in the next section.  
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(3) a lack of capable guardians.  
 
The factor “coincidence” refers to the chance that all three requirements converge 
in space and time. When the requirements do not unite in a finite location and a 
finite time, no crime will commence (see Cohen & Felson, 1979). The routine 
activity theory suggests that stemming the supply of motivated offenders, 
protecting or removing targets, and providing better guardianship, or at least 
making sure that these key factors do not coexist in time and place, can be 
deployed as interventions to help prevent crime. 
 
1: A motivated offender 
The first requirement emphasises the driving force of an offender. Although an 
individual is rarely motivated by a single objective, the motivations for criminal 
actions fall into three broad categories: Need, Greed, and Power. In the case of 
terrorism, one could add moral outrage and glory (cf. Borowitz, 2005). 
 
2: A suitable target or victim  
A motivated offender goes through a process of target selection. Brantigham and 
Brantigham (1981) created a model of target selection that identifies areas in 
which an offender is most likely to commit his or her crimes. The areas of “home”, 
“work” and “shopping and entertainment” constitute comfort zones that allow 
offenders to commit their crimes under a psychological blanket of protection (cf. 
Holmes & Holmes, 2009). This model obviously applies to offenders that exhibit 
some sort of spatial decision-making process. But every criminal that engages in 
target selection, contemplates the opportunities of a prospective location; 
assessing its accessibility, possible escape routes as well as the risk of 
apprehension (see Holmes & Holmes, 2009). 
 
3: A Lack of capable guardians 
The third requirement in the routine activity theory is the level of resistance. When 
a motivated offender identifies a suitable target, the level of resistance or “lack of 
capable guardians” becomes a determining factor in the process of committing a 
crime. A target with a capable guardian is less likely to be compromised by a 
potential offender than a target without a guardian. If the level of resistance 
appears weak, corrupt, or relatively incapable, little protection for the target is 
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2.3.1 Organised crime 
According to the army official who presented the IED, the English words “Use 
Duracell only” in the explosive box can be seen as a manual, a how-to guide, 
suggesting that the device was made by one person, to be used by another. 
Possibly, it even suggests that the piece of equipment was made outside of 
Colombia and, in effect, may be evidence of the ties between criminal 
organisations in Colombia and countries in which Spanish is not generally spoken. 
Whatever way it is seen, the note is a feasible indication that more than one 
person was engaged in the engineering and placing of the IED and therefore 
some form of organisation was involved, be it criminal or terroristic.  
 
“Organised crime” is a term that is generally used quite loosely and proves to be 
hard to define. Von Lampe (n.d.) collected over 150 different definitions of 
organised crime and comments on the problem of how to distinguish organised 
crime from various types of sources15 (von Lampe, n.d.). Some definitions are 
based on the structure of the organisation, others on their goals. Some definitions 
refer to the (international) connections with (criminal) organisations or people, 
others to the techniques that are supposedly used (such as violence, intimidation, 
and corruption). Although it is hard to classify or to find a consensus among the 
different descriptions, it can be said that the majority of definitions value “the 
cooperation between (groups of) people” as an essential factor in the term 
“criminal organisation” (cf. von Lampe, n.d.).  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, we adopt the definition of organised crime as 
defined by Chibelushi, Sharp, and Shah (2006). Our choice is motivated by the fact 
that this definition includes religiously and politically motivated crime as well as 
terrorism. 
 
Definition 2.2: Organised crime 
Organised crime is defined as a group of two or more people existing for a period 
of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes that are motivated by politics, religion, race, or financial gain. Organised 
crime can include terrorism, drug trafficking, fraud, gang robberies, and other 
group-oriented criminal activities 
(Chibelushi, Sharp, & Shah, 2006) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm. 
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2.3 The crime – terrorism nexus 
The crime - terrorism nexus is an intriguing connection that we illustrate by the 
example provided in box 2. 
 
 
Box 2: The Columbian12 illustration 
 
October 2006: On a muddy field in the jungle of Colombia, an official of the Ejército Nacional de 
Colombia (National Army of Colombia) showed some of the explosive charges he and his men 
seized from the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) in the mountains around 
Medellin13. One of the improvised explosive devices (IED) put on display was a small plastic box. 
The device was found when members of the Anti-Narcotics Brigade raided a cocaine laboratory. It 
was meant to detonate upon entry of a person who did not activate the safety catch. The explosive 
did not discharge however, so the army had dismantled it and put it on display for educational 
purposes14. Obviously, the box was self-made. It contained about half a kilogram of explosives, 
some electronics, a safety catch and a compartment for AA-type batteries. On the inside of the 





The discovery of the IED by the Ejército Nacional de Colombia is a small and 
scientifically insignificant incident but it illustrates beautifully some key elements of 
this chapter. For that reason it will be referred to several times throughout this 
chapter. First, it will be used to define organised crime (in subsection 2.3.1) and 
terrorism (in subsection 2.3.2). As the communalities and differences between 
crime and terrorism will prove to be essential in the structure of this thesis, we will 
refer to the Columbian9 illustration again in subsection 2.3.3 where we will explore 
the nexus between the two terms. We refer to box 2 in section 2.6, where it will 
serve as an illustration to be referred to in studying organisational learning.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The ethnic modifier “Columbian” is used here to refer to the example described in box 2. We are by no 
means implying that criminal behaviour can be understood by considering race, ethnicity, or national origin. 
13 As a documentary film director covering stories in conflict areas and war zones around the world, the author 
of this thesis was one of the delegates present.  
14 It should be noted here, that the claim that the device was put there by the FARC may be questioned. After 
all many organisations operate in the drug trafficking markets of Colombia, and the Colombian Army at the 
time was at war with leftist rebels of not only the FARC, but also FARC-EP (Ejército del Pueblo), with ELN 
(Ejército de Liberación Nacional), and EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación), as well as with right-wing 
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common denominator in the definitions of terrorism is the (intentional) use of 
violence combined with a political motivation (cf. Van der Heide, 2011). 
 
In her master thesis, Van der Heide concludes that the definition proposed by 
Schmid and Jongman (1988) provides a strong academic base and in addition 
follows what Van der Heide calls a “double victimisation principle”. This principle, 
which we will explain below, is of great value in the context of this thesis. 
 
In addition to the definition of crime given in section 2.1 (and that of organised 
crime in subsection 2.3.1), we will define terrorism as follows. 
 
Definition 2.3: Terrorism 
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by 
(semi)clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or 
political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of 
violence are not the main targets.  
(Schmid & Jongman, 1988) 
 
What distinguishes the definition by Schmid and Jongman (1988) from other 
definitions studied by Van der Heide, is the two different types of targets that are 
explicitly discriminated in the definition: (i) a “direct target” and (ii) a “main 
target”. This is called “principle of double victimisation” (Van der Heide, 2011). It 
refers to the concept that the direct target of the attack is distinguishingly different 
from the main target. 
 
The scope of this implication can be best explained by regarding a terrorist act as 
a mode of communication. Establishing a relation between terrorism and 
communication is not a new approach; it has been the subject of several studies 
since the 1980s (Decker & Rainey, 1980; Schmid & De Graaf, 1982; Schmid & 
Jongman, 1988; Weiman & Winn, 1994; Crelinsten, 2002; Weimann, 2008; De 
Graaf, 2011). While approaching the subject from different perspectives, all of 
these studies agree that terrorism is strongly related to the distribution of a 
message. Moreover, Schmid and De Graaf (1982) explicitly state that terrorism is 
communication. 
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 Chibelushi, Sharp and Shah (2006) define organised crime by describing what 
organised crime does, as well as by introducing the motivation of organised crime. 
We adopt their proposition because Chibelushi, Sharp and Shah explicitly state 
that “organised crime can include terrorism, drug trafficking, fraud, gang 
robberies, and other group-oriented criminal activities”. This is a valuable addition 
in relation to our thesis in which we will study a scenario model able to anticipate 
criminal behaviour, by developing an Experimental Scenario Platform in the narrow 
field of terrorism. 
 
Having defined organised crime, we will delineate the term terrorism in the next 
subsection. Subsequently, in subsection 2.3.3 we will focus on the relation 
between criminal and terrorist organisations in detail.  
 
2.3.2 Terrorism 
According to Alex Schmid, an internationally renowned scholar in the field of 
terrorism studies, there is neither an academic nor a legal consensus regarding the 
proper definition of the word "terrorism". Having studied more than one hundred 
definitions of terrorism, Schmid concludes that definitions generally tend to reflect 
the political interest and the moral judgement of those responsible for defining 
(Schmid, 2004). 
 
Although there might not be a consensus regarding the proper definition of the 
word "terrorism", several international organisations related to (the research of) 
counter terrorism created definitions to suit their specific needs.  
 
In Individual Terrorism: Indicators of lone operators, Van der Heide (2011) 
compares (a) the definition of terrorism used by the US state department, (b) the 
definition of the European Union, (c) the definition used under Dutch Law, and (d) 
the definition of the Global Terrorism Database with (e) a definition proposed by 
Schmid and Jongman (1988). Van der Heide concludes her comparison by stating
 that while certain broad elements of terrorism are generally agreed upon (i.e., the
intentional use of violence), many other factors (such as whether victims of 
terrorism must be (non)combatants; whether terrorism requires a political motive; 
whether states can be terrorist actors) continue to be debated. The biggest 
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terrorism must be (non)combatants; whether terrorism requires a political motive; 
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By disconnecting the “direct target” from the “main target” of a terrorist attack, 
Schmid and Jongman (1988) recognise the role of symbolism in a terrorist context. 
In other words, the direct target for a terrorist attack is selected for the symbolic 
relation it holds with the main target and/or with the goal of the terrorist 
(organisation). The person, group of people, or location that is targeted (i.e., direct 
target), can be seen as “message generators” or described as “the skin of a drum 
beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience” (see Schmid & de 
Graaf, 1982). According to Schmid and Jongman, this direct target of violence can 
be chosen randomly or selectively from a target population. Whatever way it is 
selected, the direct target carries the message and effectively is selected for its 
symbolic value.  
 
The role of the audience 
Schmid and Jongman (1988) include “an audience” in the main target group. 
However, we would prefer to exclude the audience from that group. An audience, 
in our view, is a fourth entity (viz. Terrorist organisation, Direct target, Main Target, 
and Audience), which also –and separately from the main target- interprets the 
message. When the role of the audience is regarded as a fourth entity and 
introduced in the linear model of communication, a new model emerges as is 
depicted in figure 2.2.  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Terrorism as form of communication. 
 
If the audience is seen as a separate entity, with an autonomous role (and a 
separate communicative environment –as represented by the ellipse-) it may be 
utilised to influence the main target. For terrorists, an audience can have an 
influential role in translating and disseminating the message. Concurrent with 
describing the main target as “message generator”, we argue that the role of the 
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Terrorism as a form of communication 
The fundamental nature of communication is included in the “linear model of 
communication” (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). According to this model, successful 
communication requires a sender, a message, and an -intended- recipient. Figure 
2.1 depicts the linear model of communication. The ellipses symbolise the 
communication environment and illustrate where the message is encoded or 
decoded. Where the ellipses overlap, the communicating parties need to share an 
area of communicative commonality. This is the crux of effective communication.  
 
Not depicted in figure 2.1 is “noise”, the general interference of effective 
transmission and reception of a message. Noise can be physical (environmental 
distractions), physiological (preconception bias), or semantic (confusing use of 
language), and can occur throughout the communication process.  
 
The overall goal of the sender is to communicate. The process of communication is 




Figure 2.1 The linear model of communication. 
 
When the linear model of communication is applied to a terrorist act, the terrorist 
(organisation) responsible for the violent act represents the sender of the message 
(see figure 2.2). The goal in “communication” for a terrorist act is to achieve 
influence, retaliation, intimidation, coercion or propaganda (see Schmid & 
Jongman, 1988).  
 
The recipient is represented by what Schmid and Jongman describe as “the main 
target”; it is the entity to whom the message is addressed. In a terrorist act, this 
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regarded as a terrorist organisation by most governments 17 . This close link 
between crime and terrorism brought forth the term “Narco-terrorism”, a word 
that is generally used to describe both the tactics of drug trafficking organisations 
as well as the means of funding for terrorist organisations. The intricacy of crime 
and terrorism and the nexus between them is illustrated in Crime and Terrorism 
(Grabosky & Stohl, 2010) where apparent examples are given of (1) terrorist 
organisations that engage in crime, (2) terrorist organisations that become criminal 
organisations, (3) terrorist organisations that are teaching criminal organisations, 
and (4) terrorist organisations that effectively are criminal organisations. While the 
focus of our discussion is primarily directed at terrorist organisations shifting 
towards organised crime, it has to be noted that the crime – terrorism nexus is 
recursive. In other words, the transition from organised crime towards terrorism is 
equally apparent. Below, we briefly describe the four examples of the crime – 
terrorism nexus. 
 
1: Terrorist organisations engage in crime 
Terrorists may engage in criminal behaviour to support themselves or their 
operations. For instance, Al Qaeda has engaged in credit-card fraud to generate 
revenues for their operations. Vice versa, criminal organisations may want to 
intimidate governments or citizens for political reasons. For instance, the 
assassination of Giovanni Falcone in 1992 was meant as political statement made 
by the Italian mafia to discourage further investigations. 
  
2: Terrorist organisations become criminal organisations 
Terrorists may abandon their ideology and turn to conventional criminals. A 
phenomenon described accurately by Grabosky & Stohl (2010) by the expression 
“Fighters turn fellons”. Vice versa, ordinary criminals may become increasingly 
politicised and convert to terrorism as was the case with Mohammed Bouyeri, the 
assassin of the Dutch Filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who started his criminal career as 
a petty thief before he turned to ideological criminal violence (Buruma, 2007). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 FARC are a violent non-state actor (VNSA), described as a terrorist organisation by (amongst others) the 
Colombian government, the US department of state, the Canadian government, the New Zealand 
government, and the European Union. The Venezuelan government is one of the governments less 
hostile towards the FARC. In January 2008 Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez publicly rejected the 





audience can be seen as a “message accelerator” (or “message decelerator”, for 
negative acceleration is deceleration).  
 
In counter-terrorism strategies, the role of the audience can offer possibilities for 
manipulation into a “message decelerator”. An example of this is given by 
terrorism researcher De Graaf (2011). In media coverage, she argues, the role of Al 
Qaeda is frequently enhanced because different kinds of successful terrorist acts 
are attributed to Al Qaeda. For an audience, this creates the image of a large and 
ubiquitous organisation. This enhancement effectively accommodates the 
ambition of Al Qaeda and provides them with the public theatre they strive for. 
However, guiding an audience in the direction of thought that Al Qaeda is a 
collection of loosely coupled small cells and random individuals with little coherent 
guidance, is equally true and creates a completely different picture of the 
organisation (De Graaf, 2011). 
 
We conclude this section by noting that literature suggest that in the violence-
based communication process between the sender (the terrorist (organisation)), 
and the recipient (the main target that the sender wants to manipulate), the 
message is attached to, and sent via, the direct target. By recognising that 
terrorists are primarily focussed on (a reaction of) another target than their direct 
victims, Schmid and Jongman (1988) include an essential and discriminative 
element of terrorism in their definition. While this allows for easy classification of 
organised crime and terrorism in real world situations, the discrimination might not 
be as clear, as we will illustrate in subsection 2.3.3.  
 
2.3.3 Crime and terrorism 
As the Colombian16 example in box 2 demonstrates, organised crime and terrorism 
have a significant overlap. Planting an explosive device to protect intruders 
entering a cocaine plantation is a criminal act. Its purpose has little, if anything, to 
do with what is widely regarded as terrorism. It has to do with protecting assets or  
interest, or perhaps with destroying contraband or evidence. Yet, the FARC (as 
well as the other criminal organisations mentioned in footnote fourteen) are 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See footnote 12.  
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A classification of terrorists is provided by Frederic Hacker (1976). On a personal 
and personality level, Hacker classifies three types of terrorists: criminals, crazies, 
and crusaders. “While criminals engage in terrorist activity for personal gain like a 
financial goal or vengeance, crusaders are oriented towards power and prestige in 
relation to a group ideology. Crazies, are simply emotionally disturbed individuals” 
(Hacker, 1976).  
 
As terrorism is usually viewed as a collective activity (COT, 2007), Hacker’s 
classification of terrorists has been used to explain the motive of individual 
terrorists within a terrorist organisation. However, over the course of the last years 
the threat of an individual terrorist action has reasserted the perceived threat of a 
terrorist who operates outside a network (COT, 2007). When criminals, crazies, or 
crusaders operate on an individual level, they represent a completely different 
category of terrorists; they become lone-operator terrorists. 
 
There are numerous ways in which lone-operator terrorism is described, and they 
are all context specific: lone-wolf terrorism, anarchism, revolutionary terrorism, 
individual terrorism, vanguard movements, leaderless resistance, guerrilla warfare, 
and phantom cell structures, being among them (cf. Van der Heide, 2011). In 
Individual Terrorism: Indicators of lone operators, Van der Heide (2011) studies the 
history of individual terror and compares different definitions of lone-operator 
terrorism. In her conclusion, Van der Heide proposes the term “lone operators”, a 
proposition which we will adopt in this thesis. 
 
Definition 2.4: Lone operators 
Lone operators are individuals who are not part of a larger network but who solely 
decide, plan, and perform their act, inspired rather than instructed. 
(Van der Heide, 2011) 
 
The definition by Van der Heide is applicable in the light of this thesis for two 
reasons. 
1. The definition of a lone operator embraces the traditional individual acting 
solely on his own initiative and in addition includes the smallest networks 
(such as two persons, autonomous cells, and leaderless jihadism).  
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3: Terrorist organisations teach criminal organisations 
The exchanging of knowledge between criminal and terrorist organisations is a 
different “marriage of convenience” (Mincheva & Gurr, 2010). Extensive research 
over the last decade brought to light many examples of knowledge distribution, 
the relation between the FARC and drug cartels in Colombia being one of them. 
 
4: Terrorist organisations are criminal organisations 
Hybrid organisations that engage in both terrorist and criminal activity have arisen 
too. For instance, the Indian organised crime syndicate D-company is allegedly 
involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, as well as a bombing in Mumbai 
that killed 257 people in 1993 (Grabosky & Stohl, 2010).  
 
As the aforementioned illustrations suggest, crime and terrorism can have a 
significant overlap, and may be hard to distinguish.  
 
Having elaborated on the communalities and differences between organised crime 
and terrorism, we will advance to a common denominator of the two: the ability to 
learn (cf. Jackson, 2005). However, before we do so we need to draw attention to 
a phenomenon that is apparent in crime as well as terrorism: individuals that are 
able to learn, yet work outside an organisation: the lone operators. 
 
2.4 Lone operators 
The reason for adding a separate section on lone operators lies in the fact that 
lone operators represent a special category of perpetrators with characteristics 
that are distinctly different from individuals operating in criminal or terrorist 
organisations. Still they represent a threat that is considered “more terrifying and 
volatile than their terrorist forbears” (Sageman, 2008). Moreover, the third research 
question of this thesis reads: To what extent can a scenario model be used to 
analyse historic criminal behaviour? To answer this research question, we will use 
an experimental scenario platform to assess to what extent a time-independent 
profile of lone-operator terrorism can be detected by analysing data of historic 
incidents contributed to the actions performed by lone-operator terrorists. 
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2: Lone-operator behaviour resembles behaviour of troubled people 
The second important reason that lone operators are hard to detect is the fact that 
they portray social behaviour which is similar to that of people who are alienated 
from, or angry or frustrated with, society. This makes it rather hard to discern 
potential lone-operator attackers from troubled people. “With such a large 
population of suspects, finding a lone-operator  terrorist is like finding a needle in 
a haystack” (Burton, 2007). 
 
Effectiveness of lone operators 
While lone operators lack the manpower, means, and organisational learning (see 
definition 2.8) that an organisation has, they do not necessarily have to be less 
efficient. A lone operator can easily acquire information from manuals, recipes, 
tactics, or instructional videos that are readily available. For instance, the manifesto 
of Breivik has circulated on the Internet since days before he detonated a bomb in 
the centre of Oslo and started his killing spree on the island of Utoya. Also, the 
manifesto of “The Unabomber” Ted Kazcynski, or the letters by Mohammed B 
who assassinated the Dutch filmmaker Van Gogh, can easily be aquired. 
 
Because of their hard-to-detect nature, lone operators have proved to be so 
effective in their actions, that it is stimulated as a tactic by terrorist organisations. 
For instance, shortly after the death of Osama Bin Laden the website Ansar al-
Mujahideen posted a video message by Al Qaeda’s chief spokesman, calling for 
local jihadists or “lone wolfs” in the United States to take up arms against 
Americans (cf. Van der Heide, 2011). 
 
Prevention of lone-operator attacks 
In 2010, an expert meeting called “Lone wolves” was organised by the 
International Centre for Counter-terrorism in The Hague, in which the notion was 
postulated that sharing experiences, data, and ideas between practitioners, policy 
makers, and academics is the key to understanding and preventing the 
phenomenon of lone-operator terrorism (cf. Bakker & De Graaf, 2010). Shone 
(2010) draws a similar conclusion in his essay Countering lone-wolf terrorism. He 
proposes that an effective counter-terrorism approach should be based on the 
capture and sharing of effective data and the exploitation of that data by efficient 




2. The definition proposed by Van der Heide is not inextricably coupled with 
terrorism. Disconnecting “operators” from “terrorism” opens a valuable 
avenue, making both definitions more operational in the broader field of 
crime.  
 
An illustration of the last argument can be found in the case of Ricardo López. In 
1996, López, an obsessed fan of Icelandic singer songwriter Björk, mailed her a 
parcel filled with acid which was meant to explode upon opening defacing or 
killing her. While this incident matches the criteria of “lone operator” as proposed 
by Van der Heide, it is generally not regarded a terrorist action. Classifying López 
as a “lone operator” and disconnecting this definition from terrorism, opens the 
possibility of comparing López’ Modus operandi to that of other lone operators, 
for example, that of the Austrian Franz Fuchs, who used letter bombs to kill 4 and 
injure 15 people. 
  
Detection of lone operators 
Lone operators by nature function individually, disconnected from any chain of 
command. Although “leakage”18 may occur, they generally do not communicate 
with others with regards to their intentions (Bakker & De Graaf, 2010). This gives 
them two critical strategic advantages over organisations in escaping detection: (1) 
lone operators do not communicate to other operatives and (2) lone-operator 
behaviour resembles the behaviour of troubled people. Below, we briefly discuss 
both reasons why lone operators are hard to detect. 
 
1: Lack of communication to other operatives 
Counter-terrorism and law-enforcement organisations rely heavily on intelligence. 
Operators that work outside a network or chain of command and do so without 
any form of communication, are hard to identify, and even much less to monitor. In 
The challenge of the lone wolf, Fred Burton (2007) argues that if militants operate 
in a cell consisting of more than one person, there is a chance that (a) one of them 
will get cold feet and reveal the plot to authorities, (b) that law-enforcement 
personnel will intercept a communication, or (c) that law-enforcement authorities 
will be able to introduce an informant into the group. 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Leakage in this context refers to any form of (un)intentional communication of intentions. 
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2. The definition proposed by Van der Heide is not inextricably coupled with 
terrorism. Disconnecting “operators” from “terrorism” opens a valuable 
avenue, making both definitions more operational in the broader field of 
crime.  
 
An illustration of the last argument can be found in the case of Ricardo López. In 
1996, López, an obsessed fan of Icelandic singer songwriter Björk, mailed her a 
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Detection of lone operators 
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1: Lack of communication to other operatives 
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in a cell consisting of more than one person, there is a chance that (a) one of them 
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personnel will intercept a communication, or (c) that law-enforcement authorities 
will be able to introduce an informant into the group. 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Leakage in this context refers to any form of (un)intentional communication of intentions. 
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Definition 2.6: adapting 
Adapting is the ability to take appropriate action to deal with new and unexpected 
situations. 	  
 
Definition 2.7: anticipating 
Anticipating is the ability to make decisions concerning future events in a timely 
and effective fashion, based on the interpretation of past events19. 
 
As Cohen and Gooch (1985) argue, single failures to learn, to adapt, or to 
anticipate, occur in organisations and military campaigns on a regular basis. They 
are part of organisational life. The resilience of a healthy organisation usually offers 
sufficient pliability to turn a single one of the aforementioned failures into a (major) 
setback. However, when two failures coincide, an “aggregate failure” occurs: a 
situation that, even for a healthy organisation, is hard to overcome.  
 
When an organisation experiences all three failures simultaneously or 
consecutively, there is often no escape from absolute disaster. Such a compound 
failure carries with it the risk of bringing about a total defeat or political collapse of 
an organisation. Only outside forces coming to the aid of the sufferer can offer a 
dim chance of escape. However, in the cases studied by Cohen and Gooch only 
catastrophe resulted. 
  
We note that the ability to learn, adapt, and anticipate, represent past, present, 
and future. Where the failure to learn has its roots in the past, the failure to adapt 
suggests the incapacity to handle present changes. The failure to anticipate finally, 
represents the inability to look into the future. 
 
Mapping the learning curve of an organisation, and using this information either (a) 
to learn, (b) to adapt tactics in order to prepare for unforeseen challenges, or (c) to 
anticipate their next move, seems (based on the literature described above) a 
viable way of anticipation. Consequently, for a scenario model designed to 
anticipate future behaviour, the ability to learn, adapt, and anticipate, may provide 
important building blocks.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Having elaborated on the subject of lone operators, a phenomenon that is 
apparent in crime as well as terrorism, we advance on organisational learning in 
the next section. 
 
2.5 Organisational learning  
An important common denominator of terrorist and criminal groups is their ability 
to learn; to disseminate knowledge within their organisation. “Learning is the link 
between what a group wants to do and its ability to gather the needed information 
and resources to actually do it“ (Jackson, 2005). As organisational learning will 
prove to be an essential element in this thesis, this section provides insight into its 
mechanisms. In subsection 2.5.1 we will study the critical elements responsible for 
failure in military campaigns, and in subsection 2.5.2 we will relate these terms to 
the organisational learning of a terrorist organisation. In subsection 2.5.3 we will 
describe the value of organisational learning in anticipating criminal behaviour. 
 
2.5.1 Learn, adapt, and anticipate 
The critical elements that befall competent military organisations are identified by 
the study Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (Cohen & Gooch, 
1985). The study investigates the failure of military strategies, a phenomenon that 
translates easily from the military world to the world of law enforcement and 
especially to that of counter-terrorism. To quote Cohen and Gooch: “Everyone in 
uniform lives with what has perceptively been called ‘the knowable possibility of 
disaster’.” 
 
To identify the critical elements responsible for the disaster of a military 
intervention, Cohen and Gooch selected five military campaigns in which, in terms 
of equipment and means, a relative equality existed between the opposing forces. 
In their study, three basic kinds of failures were identified: the failure to learn, the 
failure to adapt, and the failure to anticipate. As these failures hold valuable 
lessons in the design of a scenario model designed to anticipate future behaviour, 
we will define the critical elements learning, adapting, and anticipating as follows.  
 
Definition 2.5: learning 
Learning is the ability to absorb readily accessible lessons from history.  
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Definition 2.8: Organisational learning 
Organisational learning develops through the coevolution of three mechanisms: 
tacit accumulation of past experience, knowledge articulation, and knowledge 
codification.  
 
The three mechanisms upon which our definition of organisational learning is 
based, viz. (1) tacit accumulation of past experience, (2) knowledge articulation, 
and (3) knowledge codification, are explained below. 
 
1: Tacit accumulation of past experience  
Tacit accumulation of past experience refers to experiential wisdom; the outcome 
of trial and error and the selection and retention of past behaviours (Gavetti & 
Levinthal, 2000). The fact that the explosive device described in the introduction of 
this section did not function in the past, and the assessment that this could be 
traced back to inferior batteries (whether this observation is correct or not) can be 
seen as the tacit (or implicit) accumulation of past experience.  
 
We note that while some types of knowledge lend themselves to articulation (and 
codification), intuitive skills resist simplification into formal systems. Ingenuity, 
elusiveness, deceit, and manipulation techniques are among the skills that are hard 
to articulate and even harder to codify (cf. Kenny, 2007). 
 
2: Knowledge articulation  
Knowledge articulation is the process through which implicit knowledge is 
articulated. In organisations this occurs through collective discussions, debriefing 
sessions, and performance evaluation processes. It happens when individuals 
express their opinions and beliefs, engage in constructive confrontations, and 
challenge each other's viewpoints (cf. Zollo and Winter, 2002). The knowledge 
articulation in the example described in box 2, lies in a process that led to the 
formulated opinion that future mishaps could be prevented by the warning not to 
use an inferior type of batteries.  
 
3: Knowledge codification  
Knowledge codification is a step beyond knowledge articulation. Knowledge 
codification happens when individuals codify their experience in written tools, such 
as manuals, blueprints, spreadsheets, decision support systems, project 
management software. (cf. Zollo & Winter, 2002). Consequently, the fact that a 
 
 64 
2.5.2 Accumulation, articulation, and codification 
To address the subject of accumulation, articulation, and codification, we refer to 
the illustration provided in box 2, in which the discovery of the “Use Duracell only” 
note inside the improvised explosive device, suggests (one of) two implications.  
 
First, it suggests a heuristic method of obtaining knowledge. The army official who 
presented the explosive, suggested a trial-and-error way of obtaining knowledge 
and argued that the note was put there because in the past a similar IED failed to 
work for a specific reason: The errand boy who had been given money to buy 
batteries for the IED, saw himself confronted with a dilemma; to spend the money 
on expensive batteries or on a pack of cigarettes and cheaper batteries. His 
decision indirectly avoided human casualties because the device did not detonate 
when it was supposed to. The “Use Duracell only” note was supposedly attached 
to the IED to warn future users for inferior quality batteries. 
 
Secondly, the paper glued to the inside of the improvised explosive device may 
be seen as a way of distributing knowledge between people or cells. According to 
the army official the English note suggested the explosive was purchased from a 
criminal organisation outside of Colombia that traded knowledge, arms, and 
training with the FARC20. This specific explosive failed to detonate, as he argued, 
because the note was written in English, while the guerrilla’s responsible for 
placing the explosives could only read Spanish. 
 
Essentially, the English note may be seen as a user manual attached by a sender 
who intended to communicate a message to the receiver (see figure 2.1 The linear 
model of communication21). It distributes experience gained in the past to prevent 
mistakes in the future. This is a form of evidence of which Zollo and Winter (2002) 
describe as “learning mechanisms”; the combination of tacit accumulation of past 
experience, knowledge articulation, and knowledge codification. Based on Zollo 
and Winter (2010) we provide our definition of organisational learning below. 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See footnote 14. 
21 We note that the fact that the message was written in English, and found in a country in which English is not 
generally spoken, might suggest that the sender and the receiver did not share an area of communicative 
communality (see figure 2.1)  
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Jackson concludes his study by stating that investigating the way terrorist 
organisations learn can be a valuable addition to the intelligence and law-
enforcement “tool box”. One of the key findings of the study reads: “Apply 
models of terrorist organisations’ learning behaviours to the design of novel 
countermeasures that specifically target their ability to adapt and change.” 
(Jackson, 2005). 
 
By this conclusion Jackson explicitly underlines the importance of countermeasures 
that can be designed on the basis of modelled data. In addition, he concludes that 
targeting a terrorist organisation’s ability to change can be a valuable addition to 
law enforcement.  
 
2.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the predicaments of criminal behaviour by 
drawing on international studies. First, we defined crime and provided a general 
background on crime and criminal behaviour. Next, we examined theories from 
criminology to ascertain essential components of crime, and studied the 
interdependent connection between them. Based on these criminal theories, we 
found that criminals try to find the most cost-effective way to achieve a specific 
goal and that the motivation of an offender, as well as the availability and 
accessibility of a target are relevant in understanding criminal behaviour. 
Moreover, we ascertained essential components of criminal behaviour such as 
context, primary objective, motivation, target, and resistance that might prove 
valuable in the design of a scenario model, able to anticipate criminal behaviour. 
 
Subsequently, we defined organised crime and terrorism and studied the 
communalities and differences between them. We argued that although the 
definitions between crime and terrorism are clearly distinct, criminal and terrorist 
organisations show several forms of overlap.  
 
Focussing on terrorism, we explained the principle of double victimisation and 
proposed another look at the role of the audience in terrorist incidents. We argued 
that by distinguishing the direct target of a terrorist act from the audience that is 





note was attached to the explosive device can be regarded as codification of 
knowledge. 
 
2.5.3 Organisational learning and anticipating criminal behaviour 
The organisational learning of an organisation can offer valuable avenues of 
anticipating criminal behaviour. In The age of the unthinkable, Ramo (2009) 
exposes a direct link between the organisational learning of a criminal organisation 
and the way to anticipate their behaviour, when he quotes Aharon Farkash, former 
head of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). 
 
Farkash distinguishes two levels in terrorist organisations. The first is the surface 
level that is in charge of daily activities, such as funding, the recruiting of new 
members, and obtaining weaponry. The second, a deeper level of a terrorist 
organisation, is the level responsible for the resilient capabilities, i.e., the level 
where innovation and change is orchestrated. Although an organisation can have 
hundreds of members, only a few people facilitate organisational learning. Farkash 
named this the “innovational node” of the organisation, and he made a tactical 
decision to focus the attention of the MID to the elimination of this node. Farkash 
(as stated by Ramo (2009)): “The tactic, once it had been perfected seemed to 
have astonishingly effective results. The groups were unable to grow and change. 
Terror attacks plummeted”. 
 
The organisational learning of criminal groups has been the centre of focus of a 
growing number of studies. In Aptitude for Destruction: Organisational learning in 
terrorist organisations and its implications for combating terrorism (Jackson, 2005), 
the importance of understanding the process of organisational learning of a 
specific group is studied. “Continuing conflicts between violent groups and states 
generate an ever-present demand for higher quality and more timely information 
to support operations to combat terrorism. In particular, better ways are needed to 
understand how terrorist and insurgent groups adapt over time into more effective 
organisations and increasingly dangerous threats. To adapt, terrorist organisations 
must learn. A group’s ability to learn determines its chance of success, since 
learning is the link between what the group wants to do and its ability to gather 
the need of information and resources to actually do it. (…) While relevant data 
and insights can be found in the literature on terrorism, and terrorist organisations, 
this information has not been collected and systematically analysed to assess its 
importance from the perspective of efforts to combat terrorism.” (Jackson, 2005). 
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“Lone operators” represent a special category of criminals that do not blend in 
well with criminal or terrorist organisations. We therefore proposed a suitable 
definition and determined the specific characteristics of lone operators in relation 
to criminal behaviour. 
 
A common denominator of terrorist and criminal groups is their ability to 
disseminate knowledge within their organisation. We defined organisational 
learning and, building on research that investigated the failure of military 
strategies, we defined three critical success factors: learn, adapt, and anticipate. 
We subsequently related these factors to organisational learning and criminal 
organisations. Finally, we focussed on the possibilities that organisational learning 
can offer in anticipating criminal behaviour.  
 
In summary, we gathered knowledge of the specific characteristics responsible for 
criminal behaviour in general, and those of terrorist behaviour in particular. With 
this knowledge, that sets the theoretical basis of the thesis, we will advance to 
chapter three in which we will investigate scenario planning as a means of 
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THREE | Using scenarios
3
This chapter will focus on the use of scenarios in the 
anticipation of future events, and will answer the first 
research question of this thesis.
That which hath been is that which shall be, 
and that which hath been done is that which shall be done; 
and there is nothing new under the sun.
Ecclesiastes22
22 The book of Ecclesiastes (3rd century BC) is an Old Testament book of wisdom literature that belongs to the third section of the biblical canon, known as the Ketuvim. 
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In this chapter we will address the first research question of this thesis: What does 
literature on scenario-based anticipation methods offer that is relevant for the 
development of a scenario model by which criminal behaviour can be anticipated?  
To this end we will review the existing literature, and consider the critical points of 
current knowledge on scenario-based anticipation methods. We will try to identify, 
appraise, select, and synthesize high-quality research evidence relevant to the 
subject of our thesis. 
 
As Ecclesiastes’ words suggest, men have been trying to anticipate future 
incidents from the beginning of recorded history. Cyclical events such as the day 
and night cycle, the monthly fertility cycle, seasonal cycle, and even the biological 
cycle of life and death suggest that some sort of forecasting seems feasible. Cycles 
only need to be identified, in order to forecast future events (List, 2005). 
 
Forecasts are made on the basis of a collection of values observed sequentially 
through time. Extrapolation of that collection creates a tangent line at the end of 
the known data and extends it beyond. By its nature, forecasting will only provide 
good results when used to extend the graph of an approximately linear function or 
not too far beyond the data that is known (Gibilisco, 2004). For instance, 
population growth may only be forecasted adequately for a certain area and for a 
certain timeframe. 
 
However, what makes forecasts dangerous is that their strength is also their 
weakness; they are based on cyclicity. In other words, forecasts are frequently 
constructed on the assumption that tomorrow’s world will be much the same as 
today’s. Consequently, forecasts fail when they are needed the most, namely when 
major changes suddenly occur (Kenter, 1998). When the variables alter, even the 
most sophisticated forecasting techniques proved to be significantly inaccurate 
(Armstrong, 2001). 
 
The latter type of conclusions led to the search for new and innovative techniques 
to address the uncertainties of the future. It formed the basis of what was about to 
become the most widely utilised anticipatory technique: “scenario planning”.  
 
Scenario planning is designed to anticipate the type of uncertainties that also have 
to be addressed in anticipating criminal behaviour. Therefore the aim of this 
chapter is to identify the value of scenarios in the design of a new model able to 
 
 70 
	    
 
 71 
In this chapter we will address the first research question of this thesis: What does 
literature on scenario-based anticipation methods offer that is relevant for the 
development of a scenario model by which criminal behaviour can be anticipated?  
To this end we will review the existing literature, and consider the critical points of 
current knowledge on scenario-based anticipation methods. We will try to identify, 
appraise, select, and synthesize high-quality research evidence relevant to the 
subject of our thesis. 
 
As Ecclesiastes’ words suggest, men have been trying to anticipate future 
incidents from the beginning of recorded history. Cyclical events such as the day 
and night cycle, the monthly fertility cycle, seasonal cycle, and even the biological 
cycle of life and death suggest that some sort of forecasting seems feasible. Cycles 
only need to be identified, in order to forecast future events (List, 2005). 
 
Forecasts are made on the basis of a collection of values observed sequentially 
through time. Extrapolation of that collection creates a tangent line at the end of 
the known data and extends it beyond. By its nature, forecasting will only provide 
good results when used to extend the graph of an approximately linear function or 
not too far beyond the data that is known (Gibilisco, 2004). For instance, 
population growth may only be forecasted adequately for a certain area and for a 
certain timeframe. 
 
However, what makes forecasts dangerous is that their strength is also their 
weakness; they are based on cyclicity. In other words, forecasts are frequently 
constructed on the assumption that tomorrow’s world will be much the same as 
today’s. Consequently, forecasts fail when they are needed the most, namely when 
major changes suddenly occur (Kenter, 1998). When the variables alter, even the 
most sophisticated forecasting techniques proved to be significantly inaccurate 
(Armstrong, 2001). 
 
The latter type of conclusions led to the search for new and innovative techniques 
to address the uncertainties of the future. It formed the basis of what was about to 
become the most widely utilised anticipatory technique: “scenario planning”.  
 
Scenario planning is designed to anticipate the type of uncertainties that also have 
to be addressed in anticipating criminal behaviour. Therefore the aim of this 
chapter is to identify the value of scenarios in the design of a new model able to 
 
 70 
	    
 
 73 
subsection 3.1.4). In the years to follow, research institutes and commercial 
organisations embraced scenario planning as a way to anticipate the uncertainty of 
the future. The technological developments following the Second World War, and 
especially the processing powers of computers that developed in the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, increased the use of scenarios events even 
further. Yet, over the last 65 years the boundaries between many different terms 
related to scenarios became somewhat fuzzy. Several of the reviewed studies 
interchangeably use scenario, scenario model(ling), scenario learning, and scenario 
planning. Before we focus on the use of scenarios in the anticipation of future 
events, we attempt to make a clear distinction between the different 
terminologies. In other words, in the subsections 3.1.1 to 3.1.4 we attempt to 
define the concepts used in this study properly. 
 
3.1.1 Scenario 
There is neither a single definition for scenario, nor for scenario planning (see 
3.1.4). The word scenario originates from the Italian language and is best 
translated as “that which is pinned to the scenery”. In the Commedia dell'arte it 
was an outline of entrances, exits, and actions that described the flow of a play. 
The scenario was quite literally pinned to the back of the scenery. The basic idea 
behind a scenario is, that when the crucial components of a stage play are set, the 
“flow” of the story between them follows a relatively fixed path.  
 
Nowadays, the word scenario is used in different contexts, and therefore with 
different definitions. For example, in the creative industry the term scenario is used 
in relation to art forms that are led by a narrative such as stage plays, fiction films, 
and novels. In this context, a scenario is defined as a description of the process of 
cause and consequences responsible for the (dramatic) plot of a story (cf. Nekkers, 
2006). Another area in which scenarios are commonly known is that of computing. 
In the design of computer systems or applications, scenarios are employed to 
represent the use of a system or application and make that use explicit. In this 
context scenarios are used to orient design and analysis towards a broader view of 
computers (cf. Carroll, 2000). In corporate management circles scenarios are used 
to anticipate the uncertainties of future events. Even in this rather confined area, 
there seems to be no unison of definition. For instance: A scenario is an internally 
consistent view of what the future might turn out to be (Porter, 1985), Scenarios 
constitute a disciplined method for imaging possible futures in which 
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anticipate criminal behaviour. We will do so by (a) reviewing the literature on the 
use of scenarios in the anticipation of future events, and (b) discussing the 
techniques that hold significance in the light of this thesis. Effectively, this chapter 
will address RQ1 and will provide a literature review of scenario-based anticipation 
methods. 
 
An important remark in this context, is that our research is limited by language 
barriers. In our literature review, we only focussed on publications written in 
English, Dutch, German, and, to a lesser extent, Spanish. Additionally, it is 
conceivable that new scenario methods are (being) implemented in the domain of 
law enforcement without being documented (yet). We are aware that, being based 
on only limited literature, some recent initiatives might have escaped our 
attention.  
 
The chapter starts by delineating the terminology associated with scenarios in 
section 3.1. We provide definitions for scenario (definition 3.1), scenario model 
(definition 3.2), scenario learning (definition 3.3), anticipatory technique (definition 
3.4), and scenario planning (definition 3.5). In section 3.2 we discuss the specific 
usability of scenario planning, and in section 3.3 we examine the effectiveness of 
scenarios. In section 3.4 we elaborate on methods by which scenarios are 
developed, and the different approaches to scenarios in relation to the 
anticipation of future events. Two examples illustrate the variety of situations in 
which scenario planning can be applied. In section 3.5 we examine the use of 
scenario models in creative scenario writing, and introduce twelve material 
elements that constitute a creative scenario. In section 3.6 we take a closer look at 
some of the models that are used in the field of law enforcement. Although these 
are not scenario methods in the classical sense of the word, they can be seen as 
anticipatory techniques. Moreover, they offer valuable insights into the needs of 
law-enforcement agencies for a model able to anticipate criminal behaviour. In 
section 3.7 we focus on the limitations of working with scenarios. Section 3.8 
concludes this chapter by providing an answer to RQ1.  
 
3.1 Terminology 
The first use of scenarios as a way to anticipate future behaviour, is attributed to 
Herman Kahn in the 1950s, Kahn developed a technique of describing the 
future in scenarios, that could have been written by people in the future (see 
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3.1.3 Scenario learning 
Van der Heijden (1996) supports the view that the main virtue of scenario learning 
lies in the flexible approach to a situation in which strategic decisions are made 
and not as much in the specific outcome of the scenarios (cf. Mercer, 2001). We 
define the concept of “scenario learning” as follows. 
 
Definition 3.3: Scenario learning 
Scenario learning is the process of (organisational) learning that occurs during the 
process of scenario development. 
(Van der Heijden, 1996) 
 
3.1.4 Scenario planning 
The term scenario planning was adopted during the last century by people who 
were engaged in what was called “future research”. The main objective of future 
research was to create a “framework for speculation” (cf. Kahn & Wiener, 1967) 
that, in the course of the century, proved to be quite effective in guiding the 
decision-making process of an organisation. The name “scenario” was embraced 
to link this approach to that of the creative (film) industry of Hollywood (Ringland, 
2006). This indirectly linked scenario planning with its origin, namely with the 
historical definition of “that which is pinned to a scenery”. It is therefore not 
surprising that the use of scenarios in strategic planning is considered by some 
more of an art form than a formal methodology. The book titles “The art of the 
long view” (Schwartz, 1996) and “The art of strategic conversation” (Van der 
Heijden, 1996) hint at this interpretation. Schwartz plainly states: ”Scenario 
thinking is an art, not a science. But the basic steps are the same.”  
 
A search for a clear definition of “scenario planning” within the relevant literature 
leads to a series of definitions of “scenario” (as described above) as well as a 
number of generic definitions for “planning”. In most literature, rather than 
defining “scenario planning”, the process of scenario planning is described. 
Chermack (2001) addresses this lacuna: “Even among the most prolific writings on 
scenarios, it was difficult to find crisp definitions that capture the true meaning of 
scenario planning”. 
 
Ringland (2006) defines scenario planning as “that part of strategic planning that 
relates to the tools and technologies for managing the uncertainties of the future”. 
This definition is rather broad and implies that any tool and technique can be used 
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organisational decisions may be played out (Shoemaker, 1995) and Think of a 
scenario as a fairytale or story (Ringland, 2006). 
 
Based on the aforementioned examples, it is safe to conclude that a scenario is 
neither a prediction nor forecast23, but rather a response to the question “what 
could possibly happen?” In this thesis we define scenario as follows. 
 
Definition 3.1: Scenario 
A scenario is a narrative (or a story) that describes foreseeable interactions 
between characters and the system. A scenario includes information about 
behaviour, goals, motivations, expectations, actions and reactions, successes and 
problems.  
 
3.1.2 Scenario model 
As argued by Peterson et al. (2002), a scenario model can be used to consider a 
variety of possible futures that include many of the important uncertainties in the 
system, rather than to focus on the accurate prediction of a single outcome. To 
depict this variety, one single scenario is often not sufficient. Therefore scenarios 
are more often than not used in combination with one another. We define 
“scenario model” as follows. 
 
Definition 3.2: Scenario model 
A scenario model is an arrangement of two or more scenarios that depicts how 
information about past scenarios (that include information about behaviour, goals, 
motivations, expectations, actions and reactions, successes and problems), work in 
an interconnected way to generate an outcome with respect to possible future 
scenarios. 
 
Scenario modelling evidently is the act of designing a scenario model, or 
combining different scenarios, in a certain environment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The difference in meaning between prediction and forecast is rather subtle and both words are often 
interchangeably used. A prediction is a statement about the way things will happen in the future, often but not 
always based on experience or knowledge and closely related to uncertainty (Hazem & Mastorakis, 2008). A 
forecast relies mainly on data from the past and present an analysis of trends. It is an extrapolation of the past 
into the future (cf. Armstrong, 2001). 
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To distinguish scenario planning from scenario learning (see 3.1.3), List (2005) 
proposes to focus on where the knowledge is stored. “Scenario planning is 
recorded on paper while scenario learning is recorded in people’s heads”. 
Because the focal point of this thesis lies on the design of a scenario model that 
allows anticipating criminal behaviour, we will primarily direct our attention 
towards the development of scenario planning. We will elaborate on this subject in 
the next section. 
 
3.2 Scenario planning 
The basic idea of scenario planning is the understanding that the future cannot be 
predicted (accurately) by forecasting especially when anticipating an 
unprecedented event. Forecasting distinctly extrapolates historic values onto 
future situations by assuming that existing trends will continue or similar values will 
be applicable. Scenario planning offers a different approach to assess the 
uncertainties of the future and is particularly useful in situations where changes in 
the environment are recognised but not well understood.  
 
Scenario planning relies on the identification of (a) significant events, (b) the main 
actors, and (c) their motivations. Moreover, scenario planning relies on recognising 
(dis)continuity and on creating scenarios that focus on the possible consequences 
thereof. Because generally there is no single scenario that spans all the 
consequences of discontinuity, scenario builders create sets of scenarios in which 
each scenario respects the aspects of the future that are likely to persist, but 
describes a different way in which an uncertainty could play out.  
 
Below we will focus on the value of scenarios in managing uncertainties (in 3.2.1) 
and the role of creativity in working with scenarios (in 3.2.2).  
 
3.2.1 Managing uncertainties 
For more than thirty years, the Royal Dutch/Shell group has used scenario planning 
as a fundamental tool in their approach to anticipate the uncertainties in the 
petrochemical industry. “When we reflect on situations of the future, we see the 
world through our own frames of reference. The purpose of scenario work is to 
uncover what these frames are, respecting differences rather than aiming for a 




for scenario planning, as long as it is used for managing the uncertainties of the 
future. With this definition, Ringland establishes a direct link between scenario 
planning and strategic planning. Yet, it is difficult to continue this route. For 
instance, instead of delivering a “crisp” definition, Kirsch (2004) separates scenario 
planning from forecasting in the following way: “Scenario planning differs from 
other forecasting techniques in its underlying epistemology. Whereas mechanistic 
forecasting techniques try to derive knowledge about the future from objective 
facts, scenarios try to make sense out of different subjective assumptions about 
how the world works.”  
 
Although the reviewed literature was sometimes more obfuscating than clear, and 
did not deliver a crisp definition, we found relative consensus in the description of 
scenario planning. It reads as follows: scenario planning is an anticipatory 
technique that attempts to describe what possible futures there might be, rather 
than a tool to predict the future. Although this description of scenario planning 
relies heavily on anticipatory technique, yet another term that needs defining, it 
concurs with the fundamentals of our research. Reverting to the original meaning 
of the word, a scenario can be seen as the boundaries between which the actors 
can improvise. Abiding by that analogy, possible futures can only lay within the 
boundaries that are set by scenario(s).  
 
Based on the aforementioned findings, we will first define anticipatory technique. 
Next we will build our definition of scenario planning on that of anticipatory 
technique. 
 
Definition 3.4: Anticipatory technique 
An anticipatory technique is a technique that assists the process of decision-
making about future events, based on the interpretation of past events. 
 
Subsequently, “scenario planning” is defined as follows. 
 
Definition 3.5: Scenario planning 
Scenario planning is the combination of anticipatory techniques that attempts to 
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any reason by the other) would retaliate with equal or greater force. The 
expected result would be an immediate escalation resulting in both combatants’ 
total and assured destruction. The best recipe for peace, as suggested by the 
MAD doctrine, would therefore be a built-up of nuclear weaponry sufficiently 
powerful to destroy the enemy state completely (Parrington, 1997). Evidently, this 
equilibrium or “Mexican standoff” can only exist when the enemy is not allowed to 
defend itself against nuclear missiles.  
The MAD doctrine was generally seen as the key argument for the nuclear arms 
built-up during the cold war era. The general public perceived the scenarios 
generated by Kahn, as the root of all evil and the future-now method was held 
accountable in public debate. Kahn responded, stating that his scenarios were to 
be seen as descriptions of a possible future and not as predictions. “Remember 
it’s only a scenario, the kind of thing that is produced by Hollywood writers” (Kahn 
& Pepper, 1979). 
 
In the 1970s, the use of scenarios was rediscovered by the corporate sector. One 
of the more prominent companies that introduced scenario models in their 
decision-making process was the Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Shell’s think-tank 
detected trends and cycles from data about historical events, combined them with 
creative powers and projected them into the future. From that projection, certain 
scenarios were distilled that were introduced in the strategic decision-making 
process of the company. These scenarios anticipated (i) the energy crises of 1973 
and 1979, (ii) the growth in the use of energy, (ii) the rise of the political green 
movements, (iv) the decline in oil demand, and even (v) the fall of the Soviet 
Union. By outlining the possible future scenarios, Shell was able to contemplate 
situations that proved to be crucial for the petrochemical industry. It allowed them 
to anticipate changes more rapidly and adequately than competing oil companies.  
 
Shell’s success indicated the potential of scenario models in a strategic decision-
making process. As a result, many companies adopted scenario models as a 
means to anticipate future behaviour. Nowadays, scenario models are as common 
in the financial sector as they are in the scientific context, or in educational systems 
as well as in corporate or governmental use. In all, scenario models have become 
widely accepted to combine historical trends with creative powers in order to 





The value of scenario planning, or “alternative futures” as it was originally referred 
to, is clearly described in The year 2000 (Kahn & Wiener, 1967). “Alternative 
futures can be used for generating additional scenarios for setting forth and 
discussing criteria, for the systematic comparison of various alternative policies (or 
alternative combinations of assumptions and objectives), or for the analysis and 
examination of specific issues. They are also of interest in making assumptions and 
context explicit, as should be done, for example in any analysis of ‘directions and 
destinations’. With a set of alternative futures and scenarios that lead to them by 
alternative routes, one may see better what is to be avoided or facilitated, and one 
may also gain a useful perspective on the kinds of decisions that may be 
necessary, and the points in time after which various branching-points will have 
been passed” (Kahn & wiener, 1967). 
 
The first scenario model that consisted of “Future scenarios” is attributed to 
Herman Kahn (see Ringland, 2006). Kahn was working for the RAND Corporation, 
a non-profit and global organisation initially formed to offer research and analysis 
to the United States armed forces. Kahn was assigned to the military-strategic 
think-tank that was working on the relation between weapons of mass destruction 
and US military strategy. He developed “future-now scenarios”, a method in which 
detailed analysis and human creative power were combined, leading to reports 
(scenarios) that could have been written by people thirty years ahead in time. 
 
Scenarios that were generated by the future-now process foresaw in 1967 that 
computers (“as easy to operate as a car”) would, by the end of the twentieth 
century, be so sophisticated that they could be used for financial transactions, 
weather forecasts, and even crime prevention24 (Kahn & Wiener, 1967). Kahn’s 
findings were taken seriously, not only by the RAND Corporation for which he was 
working, but also by the US Government who based their military strategy on 
Kahn’s scenarios.  
 
The most prominent scenario model was that in which Kahn reflected on the 
relationship between the development of nuclear weapons and the possible 
military response to it. It became renown as the doctrine of “Mutually Assured 
Destruction” (MAD). This doctrine assumes that when two opposing sides have 
sufficient nuclear weaponry to destroy the other side, either side (if attacked for 
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(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004). Notably, 
the recommendations of the 9-11 Commission regarding imagination and 
creativity did not become more concrete than this.  
 
3.3 An effective scenario model 
For a proper discussion on the application of scenario, it is essential to investigate 
more closely the elements that define an effective scenario model. In 
Scenarioplanning, Ringland (2006) mentions two elements of a successful scenario 
model: 
(1) the ability to anticipate unexpected real world behaviour which may happen 
through (a) exploring the constraints or changes in the external environment, or (b) 
the relationship between forces; 
(2) the creation of a mental model that may allow the user to look for early 
confirming or disconfirming evidence. 
 
Schoemaker (1995) argues that by constructing a series of scenarios (e.g., a 
scenario model), a decision-maker is able to identify basic trends and 
uncertainties, enabling him to compensate for the usual errors in decision-making: 
overconfidence and tunnel vision. 
 
Schoemaker (1995) and Ringland (2006) agree that by combining a series of 
scenarios, a model may be created that facilitates the decision-makers in exploring 
the existing forces in a field or domain. A scenario model would enable them to 
anticipate -unexpected- future (“real world”) behaviour, and helps them to validate 
confirming or disconfirming evidence and to compensate for possible errors in 
decision-making. 
 
Nekkers (2006) advances on this notion. By creating scenarios on the relationship 
between (a) the constraints or changes in the external environment and (b) the 
forces responsible for the dynamics of the external environment, attention is drawn 
to the underlying structure. This structure in turn can be used to anticipate future 
behaviour. Nekkers exemplifies his statement by pointing at the solar system. Only 
since we charted the limitations, the changes, and the correlation of forces 
between interdependent planets, we are able to predict accurately when and 




3.2.2 The role of creativity 
From the reviewed literature (Kahn & Pepper, 1979; De Geus, 1997; Kenter, 1998; 
Armstrong, 2001; List, 2005; Ringland, 2006), we may conclude that the role of 
creativity and imagination is closely connected with anticipatory techniques in 
general, and with the use of scenarios in particular. Although it might seem that 
“anticipating criminal behaviour” and creativity do not blend well, we found 
evidence that the role of imagination and creativity can prove to be of great value. 
Below we will briefly discuss our findings. 
 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade towers in New York on September 11, 
2001, jolted “creativity” in the process of counter terrorism. Shortly after the 
attacks, US Government authorities gathered Hollywood film producers, scenario 
writers, and developers of computer games and challenged them to put forward 
imaginative scenarios for possible attacks in the future. “However accurate, 
inaccurate, responsible, or irresponsible films may be in portraying terrorists or 
terrorist events, there is no doubt that action films bear predictive power” stated 
Richard Lindhelm of the Institute for Creative Technologies in an interview with 
Bob Edwards (October 15, 2001). Lindhelm continued: “Since September 11, top 
army officials have held two teleconferences with top filmmakers. Together they 
brainstorm possible scenarios involving terrorists, and come up with ideas on how 
to foil real-life foes. The ad hoc group of moviemakers emerged from a program 
that has been under way for nearly two years at the University of Southern 
California. The peacetime purpose of the Institute for Creative Technologies is to 
set the best minds of the entertainment industry to the task of creating state-of-
the-art training exercises for soldiers”. In the interview, Lindhelm went on to state 
that “fortunately or unfortunately, art has often led the way to reality, and that art, 
motion pictures, and ideas coming from writers, have often been the inspiration 
for reality” (Edwards, 2001). 
 
With these brainstorm sessions, the US Government advanced on the conclusions 
of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(commonly referred to as “the 9-11 Commission”), which led to the conclusion that 
the US Intelligence community lacked imaginative powers in the period leading up 
to the 9-11 attacks. “Imagination is not a gift usually associated with 
bureaucracies. (...) It is therefore crucial to find a way of routinizing, 
even bureaucratizing, the exercise of imagination. Doing so requires more than 
finding an expert who can imagine that aircraft could be used as weapons.” 
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Box 3: A “future now” illustration 
 
To what extent Kahn and Wiener were able to predict the future accurately is hard to ascertain but 
they adequately predicted technical innovations that helped shape the modern world. In The 
year 2000 (Kahn & Wiener, 1967) a table was included titled "One Hundred Technical Innovations 
Very Likely in the Last Third of the Twentieth Century." Below we single out eight predictions from 
this table as thought-provoking examples. 
 
1. Extensive and intensive worldwide use of high altitude cameras for mapping, prosecuting, 
census, land use, and geological investigations. 
2. Extensive use of cyborg techniques (mechanical aids or substitutes human organs, senses, 
limbs, or other components). 
3. Three dimensional photography, illustrations, movies and television. 
4. New techniques for very cheap, convenient and reliable birth control. 
5. Automated universal (real time) credit, audit, and banking systems. 
6. Simple inexpensive home video recording and playing. 
7. Other widespread use of computers for intellectual and professional assistance (translation, 
teaching, literature search, medical diagnosis, traffic control, crime detection, design, 
analysis, and to some degree as intellectual collaborator in general). 
8. Personal “pagers” (perhaps even two-way pocket phones) and other personal electronic 
equipment for communication, computing, and data processing program. 
 
 
3.4 Scenario development 
In the scholastic literature a number of different processes are described in which 
scenario models can be developed (see, e.g., Ducot & Lubben, 1980; Duncan & 
Wack, 1994; Heugens & Van Oosterhout, 2001; Postma & Liebl, 2003; Van Notten, 
2006). The typology offered by Van Notten is the most recent of these studies. 
Moreover, his work draws on earlier research. In this thesis we will therefore adopt 
the typology offered by Van Notten. By incorporating earlier typologies, he 
captures the full range of contemporary scenario development. In subsection 
3.4.1, we will focus on the typology of approaches proposed by van Notten. In 
subsection 3.4.2 we will illustrate this by two examples.  
 
3.4.1 A typology of approaches 
Van Notten (2006) proposes a typology of scenario development, by which he 
identifies three broad “macro-characteristics” that are argued to be central in the 
development of scenarios: (1) the project goal, (2) the scenario process, and (3) the 
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Combining the conclusions by Schoemaker, Ringland, and Nekkers, we 
characterise an effective scenario model as follows.  
 
An effective scenario model should satisfy three conditions: 
1. Offer the possibility to learn from historic criminal behaviour. 
2. Offer the possibility to adapt the chosen strategy on the basis of indicators 
that are found. 
3. Offer the possibility to anticipate (unexpected) future real-world behaviour. 
 
An example of how a complex structure of changes in the external environment 
can be made visible, is given by Kahn & Wiener (1967). In 1967 Kahn tried to make 
assumptions about a situation more than thirty years ahead in time, the year 2000. 
He was challenged to study the underlying system of global forces responsible for 
the changes of the earth and its technological innovations. Kahn devised a method 
in which he envisioned himself in the year 1900, challenged by the task to 
“predict” the future of 1933 on the basis of the information that existed in 1900. 
He then assessed to what extent his predictions deviated from the actual situation 
in 1933, studied this “offset” and tried to explain the factors responsible for the 
deviation. Subsequently he repeated the exercise, and imagined himself in 1933 
making predictions about 1966. With the data he collected in his previous 
experiment combined with the offset he calculated, the predictions for 1966 
turned out to be reasonably accurate. Again Kahn devoted all his attention to what 
he did not predict (correctly) in order to be able to assert the dynamics of the 
underlying system.  
 
Kahn and Wiener (1967) describe the characteristics of this underlying system as 
follows: “the current and future pace of change and the likelihood of unexpected 
developments, significant clusters of events, qualitative changes in the 
combination of trends and emergent properties, such as the increasing self-
consciousness of time and history.”  
 
Only after Kahn had valued the underlying system (in which he now incorporated 
the offset), he dedicated his attention to the actual task of predicting the future of 
the year 2000 (see box 3). 
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intuitive approaches are generally used for exploratory purposes. Moreover, Van 
Notten (2006) distinguishes (2c) a hybrid approach. 
 
2a An analytical approach 
Within the analytical approach Van Notten recognises model-based techniques 
and desk research. Model-based techniques tend to be based on quantified 
knowledge and often rely on computer models in the development of scenarios. In 
desk research, scenarios are developed through data analysis or research. This is a 
less formalised and systematic approach than the model-based forms, but may be 
just as rigorous (cf. Van Notten, 2006). 
 
2b An intuitive approach 
The intuitive approach relies heavily on qualitative knowledge and insights as 
sources for scenario development. Creative techniques such as the development 
of narrative stories (in workshops) are good examples. In the intuitive approach, 
scenario development is often regarded as a form of art in which coherent stories 
are generated from, e.g., associations and creative input. 
 
2c A hybrid approach 
According to Van Notten (2006), there have been attempts to combine the 
analytical and the intuitive approach to the extent that intuitive approaches 
support a mainly analytical approach. Genuine hybrid approaches, in which both 
analytical and intuitive approaches are merged, are highly exceptional and 
experimental. 
 
3 Scenario content 
The third macro-characteristic addresses the question of the composition of the 
scenarios. It examines the nature of variables and dynamics in a scenario, and how 
they interact. Van Notten (2006) distinguishes (3a) straightforward scenarios and 
(3b) complex scenarios.  
 
3a Straightforward scenario  
Straightforward scenarios are composed of a limited number of variables and are 
limited in scope.  
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scenario content. Essentially, these three macro-characteristics represent the why, 
how, and what of a scenario model. Below, we will describe them briefly. 
 
1 Project goal 
The first macro-characteristic that Van Notten (2006) deems to be central in the 
development of scenarios is the goal of the project. According to Van Notten, 
there are two poles of the spectrum in relation to the project goal: (1a) 
exploration, and (1b) pre-policy research. However, a project goal may consist of 
(1c) a fusion of these types of goal.  
 
1a Exploration 
The goal of the scenario study may be the exploration of possible future situations. 
Exploration in this case constitutes learning, awareness raising, stimulation of 
creative thinking, and investigating the relationship between societal processes. 
When dealing with an exploratory scenario, the process of coming to scenarios is 
as important as the scenarios themselves.  
 
1b Pre-policy research  
Scenarios that are generated with the goal of pre-policy research constitute 
concrete options for strategic decision-making. These scenarios are used to 
examine paths to future situations that vary according to their desirability, and are 
often valued as (a) desirable, (b) conventional, or (c) undesirable. 
 
1c: Fusion of goals 
In practice, the two types of goal (exploration and pre-policy research) are often 
coalesced into a fusion. In such a scenario method, exploratory scenarios are 
developed initially to investigate a field that is too general to serve as the basis for 
decision-making (for instance, when there are uncertainties on a global level). 
Subsequently, case-specific scenarios are developed that help focus on pre-policy 
research and strategy development. 
 
2 Process design 
The second macro-characteristic of Van Notten’s typology addresses the 
methodological aspects of scenario development. A basic distinction, Van Notten 
argues, is that between (2a) analytical, and (2b) intuitive approaches to the process 
design. Analytical approaches are commonly used for pre-policy processes while 
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scenario content. Essentially, these three macro-characteristics represent the why, 
how, and what of a scenario model. Below, we will describe them briefly. 
 
1 Project goal 
The first macro-characteristic that Van Notten (2006) deems to be central in the 
development of scenarios is the goal of the project. According to Van Notten, 
there are two poles of the spectrum in relation to the project goal: (1a) 
exploration, and (1b) pre-policy research. However, a project goal may consist of 
(1c) a fusion of these types of goal.  
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Exploration in this case constitutes learning, awareness raising, stimulation of 
creative thinking, and investigating the relationship between societal processes. 
When dealing with an exploratory scenario, the process of coming to scenarios is 
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1b Pre-policy research  
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examine paths to future situations that vary according to their desirability, and are 
often valued as (a) desirable, (b) conventional, or (c) undesirable. 
 
1c: Fusion of goals 
In practice, the two types of goal (exploration and pre-policy research) are often 
coalesced into a fusion. In such a scenario method, exploratory scenarios are 
developed initially to investigate a field that is too general to serve as the basis for 
decision-making (for instance, when there are uncertainties on a global level). 
Subsequently, case-specific scenarios are developed that help focus on pre-policy 
research and strategy development. 
 
2 Process design 
The second macro-characteristic of Van Notten’s typology addresses the 
methodological aspects of scenario development. A basic distinction, Van Notten 
argues, is that between (2a) analytical, and (2b) intuitive approaches to the process 
design. Analytical approaches are commonly used for pre-policy processes while 
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The scenario methodology used in The limits to growth of presenting various 
future options, appeared incomprehensible to many readers, who therefore paid 
attention only to the disastrous “growth scenario” (see Nørgård, 2010). As a result, 
The limits to growth was criticised by many prominent economists, scientists, and 
political figures. It became one of the most famous and controversial examples of 
the use of scenario models. The report sold 12 million copies in more than 30 
translations, making it the best-selling environmental book in world history 
(Meadows et al., 2004). 
 
2: An intuitive approach 
Scenario models can also be generated in a much more intuitive way. This is 
exemplified by the Mont Fleur scenarios, which were used against the backdrop of 
a rather critical political power change in South Africa.  
 
In 1992, a diverse group of 22 prominent South Africans -politicians, activists, 
academics, and businessmen, from across the ideological spectrum- came 
together at the Mont Fleur conference centre with the aim to develop and 
disseminate a set of stories about what might happen in their country over the 
decade spanning 1992 to 2002. The purpose of Mont Fleur was “not to present 
definitive truths, but to stimulate debate on how to shape the next 10 years.”  
 
From strongly different perspectives, they set out to build a shared map of South 
African reality. After considering many possible stories, the participants agreed on 
four scenarios that they believed to be plausible and relevant. They were called 
Ostrich, Lame duck, Icarus, and Flight of the flamingos.  
1. Ostrich is characterised by the fact that a negotiated settlement to the crisis 
in South Africa is not achieved, and the country’s government continues to 
be non-representative. 
2. Lame duck is characterised by the fact that a settlement is achieved but the 
transition to a new dispensation is slow and indecisive. 
3. Icarus is characterised by the fact that a transition is rapid but the new 
government unwisely pursues unsustainable, populist economic policies. 
4. Flight of the Flamingos is characterised by the fact that the government’s 





3b Complex scenarios  
Complex scenarios are composed of an intricate web of many related variables 
and dynamics. Complex scenarios distinguish alternative patterns of development 
and can use multiple temporal or spatial scales.  
 
3.4.2 Two examples 
The three macro-characteristics (viz. project goal, project design, and scenario 
content) are strongly correlated. The project goal dictates to a certain extent the 
process design, which in effect influences the content of the scenario model. To 
illustrate the way the macro-characteristics proposed by Van Notten can interact, 
we discuss two distinctly different scenario models that were created in contrasting 
environments. The particular examples illustrate the broad field in which scenario 
models can be applied, and additionally demonstrate the close relation between 
(a) the environment in which the scenario process is set and (b) the final design of 
the scenario model.  
 
Below we will present (1) an example of a scenario generated by an analytical 
approach and (2) a scenario generated by an intuitive approach. We conclude this 
subsection by discussing their impact. 
 
1: An analytical approach  
An example of a scenario model that was generated through an analytical 
approach is The limits to growth report (Meadows et al., 2004). The Club of Rome, 
an international group of business people, state officials, and scientists, essentially 
commissioned The limits to growth for explorative purposes, to be used for pre-
policy decision-making. The two-year study behind the report took place at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology with the objective to predict the 
consequence of the rapidly growing world population and the finite resource 
supplies, particularly oil. It was based on a computer simulation (named “World3”) 
that explored the interactions between population, industrial growth, 
food production, and the limits in the ecosystems of the Earth. The computer 
model consisted of several interacting parts. Each of these dealt with a different 
system of the model. Calculations of the outcomes of the model were based on 
data retrieved from the past. The main systems were: (a) the food system (dealing 
with agriculture and food production), (b) the industrial system, (c) the population 
system, (d) the non-renewable resources system, and (e) the pollution system.  
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became one of the basic maxims of creative scenario writing: A scenario 
represents the unities: action, place, and time. In addition to this concept, Aristotle 
proposed a model of six essential parts that constitute tragedy and subsequently 
drama: “Every Tragedy, therefore, must have six parts, which parts determine its 
quality, namely, Plot, Character, Diction, Thought, Spectacle, Song. Two of the 
parts constitute the medium of imitation (Plot, Character), one the manner 
(Diction), and three (Thought, Spectacle, Song) the objects of imitation. And these 
complete the list.” (Aristotle, trans. 1987) (Terms in italic are added by the author 
of this thesis). 
 
The Golden W’s 
Hermagoras of Temnos (first century BC), the Ancient Greek rhetorician and 
teacher of rhetoric in Rome, divided “a topic” into “seven "circumstances". He 
defined these circumstances as the loci of an instance: Quis, quid, quando, ubi, 
cur, quem ad modum, quibus adminiculis. These sources can be translated as: 
Who is it about? What did happen? When did it take place? Where did it take 
place? Why did it happen? In what way did it happen? By what means did it 
happen? These seven circumstances provided the roots of the "Golden W's" that 
are nowadays used in journalism, education, and police investigation where they 
are supposed to ensure thoroughness in the coverage of a particular incident or 
subject matter.  
 
We note that the Golden W’s are frequently referred to as “5W’s” (Who, What, 
When, Where, Why), “5 Ws and an H“ (Who, What, When, Where, Why and How), 
or “7 W’s” (Who, What, When, Where, Why, In what Way, and With what) 
(Robertson, 1946). In this thesis we will use the term “Golden W’s”. 
 
The seven basic plots 
In Seven basic plots, Booker (2007) suggests that narratives serve to pass along 
moral lessons and models from the older generation to their children and 
successors. As a result the basic lessons have coalesced over time into seven basic 
symbolic “plots” that have formed the primary model for storytelling into the 
present day. The seven plots Booker defines are as follows: 
1. Overcoming the Monster; Stories in which a hero must defeat a monster and 




The group developed each of these scenarios into a brief logical narrative. The 
participants subsequently presented and discussed the scenarios with more than 
fifty other groups, including political parties, companies, academics, trade unions, 
and civic organisations. Because of reasons of accessibility to a large audience, the 
stories were disseminated via newspapers, cartoons, and a short film (Beery, 
Ednow, & Murphy, n.d.). 
 
3: Impact  
While the value of both The limits to growth models and the Mont Fleur scenario 
models are hard to objectify (much less to compare), both models did have a 
significant impact on the public debate. In that respect both the models met the 
criteria for effective scenario planning set in section 3.3: They clearly provided an 
exploration of the relationship between the constraints or changes in the external 
environment and the forces responsible for the dynamics of the field of 
investigation. 
 
3.5 Creative scenarios 
Scenarios generated in the creative industries (e.g., film, theatre, and fictional 
literature) have no relation whatsoever with (strategic) planning and have no need 
to be predictive in any way. However, they do have to be plausible. “Actions 
should be logical and follow naturally from actions that precede them. They will be 
more satisfying to the audience if they come about by surprise or seeming 
coincidence and are only afterward seen as logical, even necessary.” (Aristotle, 
trans. 1987).  
 
Below we will focus on the theory of creative scenarios by referring to (i) Poetics, 




The earliest surviving work of dramatic theory is Aristotle’s Poetics (335 BCE). 
Aristotle is credited for being the first to analyse creative literature and to describe 
the set of principles responsible for dramatic construction (Janko, 1987). “Poetics” 
in Aristotle's opinion, includes drama (comedy, tragedy, and satyr) and is 
essentially a “mode of imitation” or representation of “our world of appearance”. 
From chapter VII of Poetics (The Plot must be a Whole), a paradigm is derived that 
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relate to the style or the way a story is told, such as “diction”, Saaltink referred to 
Aristotle’s Poetics. 
 
In the course of four years, the discourse led to a list of twelve material scenario 
components, compiled by the author of this thesis. This result postulated the 





5. Antagonist  
6. Motivation  
7. Primary objective  
8. Means 
9. Modus operandi  
10. Resistance 
11. Symbolism 
12. Red herring 
  
Ever since the compilation of this list in 1990, the author of this thesis has been 
challenging these scenario components by disparate narrative works of fiction27 
such as films, books, theatre plays, and verbal stories from different cultural origin. 
From these observations, very prudently, the conjecture was formulated that every 
narrative can be disassembled into twelve material scenario components.  
 
It has to be noted though, that while a story or scenario can be composed from 
the twelve material components, not every element has to be present in a 
scenario. 
 
Here we would like to remark that the material scenario components listed above, 
encompass the components of criminal behaviour offered by the criminal theories 
highlighted in subsection 2.2.4 (viz. context, primary objective, motivation, and 
resistance). The scenario component Antagonist refers to the component of 
criminal behaviour that in the Routine activity theory is named Target.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 We regard as work of fiction any work that deals, in part or in whole, with information or events that are 
not real but rather imaginary and theoretical - that is, invented by an author. 
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2. Rags to Riches; Stories that feature modest, generally virtuous but 
downtrodden characters, who achieve a happy ending when their special 
talents or true beauty is revealed to the world at large.  
3. The Quest; Stories in which a hero, often accompanied by sidekicks, travels 
in search of a priceless treasure and fights against evil and overpowering 
odds, and ends when he gets both the treasure and the girl.  
4. Voyage and Return; Stories of normal protagonists who are suddenly thrust 
into strange and alien worlds and must make their way back to normal life 
once more.  
5. Comedy; Stories (not necessarily humorous in nature) that involve some kind 
of confusion that must be resolved before the hero and heroine can be 
united in love.  
6. Tragedy; Stories that relate the terrible consequences of human 
overreaching and egotism.  
7. Rebirth; Stories which focus on a threatening shadow that seems nearly 
victorious until a sequence of fortuitous (or even miraculous) events lead to 
redemption and rebirth, and the restoration of a happier world. 
 
The material scenario components 
Studying the rules of Aristotle’s Poetics, the quality of imitation (see the 
description of Poetics above) became the source of debate among scholars of 
drama in the beginning of the 1990s. At that time, the author of this thesis was a 
student at the Film Academy25 in Amsterdam, the Netherlands.  
 
In a metaphysical search for the basic ingredients of a scenario, one of the 
lecturers of the Film Academy, claimed that the number of components from 
which a scenario can be built is finite, but was yet to be determined (Saaltink, 
1990). Saaltink challenged the author to use the process of “reverse 
engineering”26 in order to compile a list of material components of all the films 
and books that were to be studied during the four-year course. To demarcate (a) 
material components such as character, place, and time, from (b) elements that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Netherlands Film Academy (NFA): Amsterdam School of the Arts.  
26 “Reverse engineering” refers to the method of analysing a subject system to create representations of the 
system at a higher level of abstraction (Chikofski & Cross, 1990). In this case, stories were “taken apart” in 
order to discover the components they were built from. 
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The reactive use of scenarios does neither describe foreseeable interactions (they 
merely describe plausible interactions), nor do they relate to the scenario 
components listed in section 3.5. Derksen (2009) argues that the use of the word 
scenario in a reactive context is clearly a contradictio in terminis, for scenarios are 
used to look forward. However, the term scenario in law-enforcement context is 
sometimes used to describe situations that took place in the past. To distinguish 
scenario as defined in our thesis from [scenario] used in a reactive context, we 
have placed the latter between brackets. (Something that exclusively happens in 
this subsection.) 
 
To exemplify the reactive use of scenarios in law enforcement, as well as to 
illustrate the difference between a [scenario] and a hypothesis, we adopt an 
example given by Derksen (2009). Let us assume a body is found in a way that 
raises suspicion of homicide. Investigative services will immediately draw their 
attention to the situation that might have led to that specific point in time. When 
avenues of investigations fail to lead to a plausible case, or when tunnel vision is 
expected, an investigative team might resort to the use of [scenarios] and 
hypotheses.  
 
An explanation for the term hypothesis that is viable for the use in the context of 
law enforcement is given by McDowel (2009) in his book Strategic Intelligence. It 
reads as follows. “A hypothesis may be thought of as a conclusion or assumption 
you may reach about anything at all. It doesn’t have to be right; it only has to be 
realistic and reasonable in terms of being able to be right! In other words, a 
hypothesis is a plausible explanation. The hypothesis doesn’t represent the end of 
your problem solving activity; it is just a point en route to formulating your final 
interpretation.” (McDowell, 2009) 
 
Going back to the previous example where human remains have been found, 
there can (only) be four hypotheses. 
1. The person died of natural cause(s) 
2. It is a case of suicide 
3. The person died as a result of an accident 




 In chapter four we will elaborate on the aforementioned scenario components, as 
they will be implemented in the conceptual design of the scenario model. For now 
it is sufficient to note that creative scenarios are built on the notion that there is a 
finite number of “essential components” from which scenarios are created. 
 
3.6 Proactive models in law enforcement 
In spite of extensive research into the models that are in use in law enforcement 
worldwide, we failed to find evidence that scenario methods are used to anticipate 
criminal behaviour. However, we did discover models (not based on scenarios) that 
were either used, or specifically designed for proactive purposes. In these models 
data is collected that (apart from being saved for analytical reasons) can be put to 
proactive use.  
 
Additionally, we found that scenarios in law enforcement are primarily used in a re-
active way, in other words, to reconstruct a situation that occurred. To distinguish 
the reactive use from the anticipatory (proactive) use, we describe the two 
different approaches to crime separately in subsections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, 
respectively. In subsection 3.6.1 we will focus on the reactive way by which 
scenarios are used within the domain of law enforcement. In subsection 3.6.2 we 
will focus on law-enforcement models that are designed, or may be utilised, for 
anticipating future incidents. As these models offer insight (both with respect to 
structure and content) into the possible desires for anticipation in law enforcement, 
we studied three of these models (International Bomb Data Centre Working 
Group, Terrorist Planning Cycle, and the IRIS model) explicitly. 
 
3.6.1 Reactive use 
Within the domain of law enforcement, scenarios that are used in a reactive way 
are exploited to reconstruct a situation that took place in the past. We would like 
to emphasise that this approach does not concur with the definition of scenario 
that is used in our thesis. We define a scenario as “a narrative describing 
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trend detection. The “International Bomb Data Centre Working Group” which we 
will discuss below, is an example of this.  
 
Ad 2: Other models, such as the Terrorist Planning Cycle described below, are 
created to gain insight into, for instance, the path that leads from motivation to 
violence. This type of models seeks to describe generic cycles, and is not 
designed for data collection.  
 
Ad 3: The IRIS model reviewed below, is an example of a model created to 
quantify variables of a complex and current situation in order to suggest 
prospective actions.  
 
Below we will describe the three examples given above, in more detail. 
 
1 International Bomb Data Centre Working Group 
The International Bomb Data Centre Working Group (IBDCWG) is a working group 
of law-enforcement bomb data centres from around the world. Over 25 countries 
accumulate information about incidents involving arson and the criminal use of 
explosive materials. 
 
At the heart of the IBDCWG is a intuitive database that allows any member law-
enforcement agency to store, maintain, and share securely all of its data relating to 
critical incidents involving incendiarism and explosive materials (retrieved from 
xpect-software.com on 23-02-2011). 
 
The information included in the database is quite detailed. Every explosive that is 
found is carefully scrutinised and dissected. Each cable, resistor or battery is 
separately logged and added to the dataset. This offers the possibility of linking 
(parts of) devices over time and space. Every day, between 60 and 70 items are 
included in the database. Apart from details about the explosives themselves, 
media clippings, manuals, and open-source information are added. When first 
responders such as bomb technicians, come across an explosive device, they can 
upload a picture of it to the IBDCWG where it will be analysed and matched 
against the database in “near real time”. In this way emergency services can 
obtain a better understanding of the nature of a device and its components, and 




In essence, the four hypotheses concern with what might have happened while 
[scenarios] are concerned with how the specific hypotheses might have come 
about (Derksen, 2009). 
 
For every hypothesis several [scenarios] can be constructed. These [scenarios] are 
generated as a result of a creative process. Often, participants in the process 
engage in brainstorm or mind-map sessions. In these sessions, experts and 
professionals study a specific situation in detail, after which [scenarios] are 
developed intuitively. For every specific hypothesis, an ensemble of [scenarios] is 
developed. This method, by nature, lacks a standard procedure. The [scenarios] 
are limited by imagination only, and may seem far-fetched. For instance, in the 
case of the aforementioned hypothesis 4, [scenarios] could include a situation in 
which (a) the deceased was murdered as a result of mistaken identity, or (b) 
someone aided the deceased in committing suicide (Derksen, 2009). 
 
Two points of critique on this method are: (i) the way these [scenarios] are 
generated is limited by the visions and creativeness of the participants, and (ii) 
there is no transparency in the way they are generated. Although these points of 
critique might be true, the use of intuitive scenarios in reactive use, is reported to 
have good results when compared to actual outcomes (cf. Van der Heijden, 1996; 
List, 2005). 
 
3.6.2 Proactive use 
Within the domain of law enforcement, many different models are being used 
globally (cf. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007; Berenschot, 2010; 
Koeman, 2010). In our review we distinguish three broad categories: (1) models 
that are designed for data collection, (2) descriptive models that are designed to 
discover or describe a generic development, and (3) models that are designed to 
quantify variables. To demonstrate the differences between these models and to 
expose the virtues they can offer in the light of this thesis, we carefully selected 
three specific models as specimen of these categories. 
 
Ad 1: The majority of models that are designed for data collection in the domain 
of law enforcement is designed to log and compare incidents in a specific problem 
field. Although originally built for analytical purposes, they can be used in a 
proactive way. For instance, mining the data accumulated in a model can lead to 
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Figure 3.1 The Terrorist Planning Cycle. 
 
Stage 1. The Broad target selection encompasses the process of selecting a target 
that correlates with the objective of the terrorist (organisation). The target may be 
selected specifically (e.g., a specific person such as a tsar or king), or generally 
(e.g., a government building). The symbolic value of the target may be a decisive 
factor in the process of broad target selection. (To illustrate the importance of 
symbolism, we refer to subsection 2.3.2 where we explain terrorism as a form of 
communication.)  
 
A second objective of a terrorist (organisation) may be the level of grievance that 
can be achieved by a terrorist attack, the media attention it may generate, or the 
elimination of an opponent. Every single objective (or a combination of objectives) 
leads to another, broad target selection. Only when the overall aim of the attack is 
defined and the process of broad target selection has been completed, a terrorist 
(organisation) moves to Stage 2. 
 
Stage 2. In this stage of Intelligence gathering, intelligence has to be collected 
about the different possible locations that suit the overall objective. Intelligence 
can be gathered in many different ways: From surveillance to OSINT, HUMINT28, 
or solicitation. In most cases however, intelligence is gathered by a combination of 
techniques.  
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The power of a working group like this may be illustrated by an example. 
Following the London attacks of July 7th 2005, several house searches were 
conducted by investigators of New Scotland Yard. In one of these premises, a 
number of chemical ingredients were found together with a note that, to the 
investigators, looked like a recipe of some sort. On the list was the word 
“maganese”. When analysts ran this word against the IBDCWG database, it 
became clear that almost certainly “manganese” was meant, an ingredient often 
used to create an explosive mixture. More importantly, the database came up with 
a handwritten note containing a recipe for explosives that was seized from a well-
known terrorist organisation in the 1980s. The list of ingredients not only matched 
the chemicals found in London, a remarkable spelling error marked one of them: 
“maganese”.  
 
Thus, a seemingly random list of chemicals found in London in 2005 could actually 
be linked to a recipe for home made explosives of a terrorist organisation from the 
1980s. This link proved to be valuable in providing evidence of malicious intent as 
well as in proving a criminal connection between two terrorist organisations 
(Berenschot, 2010).  
 
2 Terrorist Planning Cycle 
Terrorist operations are typically prepared to minimise risk and achieve the highest 
probability of success. Terrorists avoid an adversary’s strengths and concentrate on 
its weaknesses. It normally means minimising the number of attackers needed to 
conduct an operation successfully, while providing them with the most effective 
weapons available. Usually, terrorists act according to the Terrorist Planning Cycle 
(TPC) that consists of seven stages that are described below and depicted in figure 
3.1. The description of the TPC and its seven stages is based on the US Army 
Training and Doctrine Command (2007). 
  
The Terrorist Planning Cycle assumes that the people who are planning a terrorist 
attack follow a fixed path. A potential terrorist first has to define the objective of 
an attack. Although not mentioned as separate stage in the TPC, this is a rather 
defining step in the process of planning an operation. For the objective of the 
terrorist(s) is closely linked to other stages in the TPC such as Stage 1, the broad 
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can bring favourable attention and (financial) support to the terrorist organisation. 
However, in some cases there is no need for exploitation. One can imagine that 
when the primary objective of an operation is to eliminate an opponent, the 
organisation is benefitted by as little attention as possible (US Army Training and 
Doctrine Command, 2007; Berenschot, 2010). 
 
3 The IRIS model 
The IRIS model is used by the Royal and Diplomatic Protection Service in the 
Netherlands (In Dutch: Dienst Bewaken & Beveiligen; DB&B). The IRIS model is a 
proactive model that quantifies the risk of a protected person being subjected to 
an attack. The overall model consists of three basic models.  
 
The first basic model contains the actual profile of the protectee. In this model, the 
behaviour of the protectee, his or her recent media appearances and the political 
pressure are taken into account. The second basic model is an attack model that 
contains possible opposing forces: (groups of) people that might pose a threat to 
the protected person. The third basic model focusses on the possible 
opportunities that a potential attacker has in approaching the protectee. The latter 
quantifies, for instance, the agenda of the person that is protected and addresses 
questions concerning the publicity of schedules and appointments.  
 
Every model generates a specific risk profile that is visualised in a colour ranging 
from low risk (green), via medium risk (orange) to high risk (red). The combinations 
of the three models are gathered in an overall matrix that suggests possible 
interventions.  
 
In the time that the IRIS model has been used, it became obvious that the attack 
model offers the greatest challenge. Two questions are prevalent: (i) which group 
uses which Modus operandi? and (ii) how to project emerging trends on a future 
incident? The answers of this model resembled an “educated guess” (Koeman, 
2010). 
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Stage 3. In this stage the Specific target selection takes place. The explicit 
elements that define the target selection, are contemplated. Three prevailing 
factors are: (a) the accessibility of a target, (b) the (financial) resources that the 
terrorist organisation has, and (c) the level of training it takes to carry out the 
attack.  
 
Stage 4. The stage of Pre-attack surveillance & planning. At this stage the 
definitive target is put under (close) surveillance and observation and the final 
planning of the attack commences. This stage can be crucial in the detection of a 
terrorist attack as, for the first time in the cycle, there is a direct connection 
between the target and the terrorist (organisation). 
 
Stage 5. This stage encompasses the Attack rehearsal. To improve the odds of 
success, terrorists conduct rehearsals to confirm planning assumptions and to 
develop contingencies. In this stage (often for the first time) the actual operators 
are brought directly into the specific arena. This stage may include the actual 
testing of the security or vulnerability of the target. 
 
Stage 6. The stage of planning Escape & evasion addresses the issues of safe 
exfiltration and the possible evasion of reacting forces. Even in those cases where 
the self-chosen death of an attacker is believed to enhance the impact of a 
terrorist attack, exfiltration and evasive plans may be made for the support 
personnel and possible handlers.  
 
Stage 7. Once terrorists reach the final stage, called Actions on objective, 
undetected, they are sufficiently prepared to turn the odds favouring a Successful 
incident against the target. Because of the extensive preparation through 
surveillance and reconnaissance, the terrorists now possess the advantage of the 
initiative as well as the choice of time, place, and conditions of an attack. Still two 
matters are important: (i) security measures will be planned for and possibly 
neutralised, and (ii) employment of support positions will be arranged to neutralise 
possible reaction forces. 
 
A stage that is sometimes overlooked and not directly linked to the TPC is that of 
the exploitation of an attack. Exploitation relates to the primary objective of the 
operation. Some successful operations need to be claimed to achieve the 
intended effect. Depending on the objective of the operation, Successful incidents 
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Ringland, 2006; Chermack, 2011). In a Harvard Business Review article from 1971, 
scenario techniques were defined as “Subjective guess work and imagination; in 
general the methods used are non-scientific” (Chambers et al., 1971). While this 
notion is likely to have surrendered under the augmentation of scenario planning 
over the last four decades, a persistent concern associated with the role of 
creativity is oversimplification. 
 
As illustrated by the examples of The limits to growth and Mont Fleur scenarios, 
every model can possess its own virtue. However, both these scenarios merged 
historic trends with creative powers and this combination proves to be emblematic 
for an effective scenario model.  
 
However, the danger of scenarios that oversimplify real-world dynamics is 
illustrated by an example by Nekkers (2006). On the basis of historical data and 
population growth rates, predictions were made about the future number of 
inhabitants of New York. In the mathematical calculations, a certain margin of error 
was built to compensate for possible inaccuracies, yet no intuitive or imaginative 
scenarios were included in the model. The mathematical margin of error could not 
exclude that, nine months after a power outage in large parts of New York, all 
predictions were rendered useless (cf. Nekkers, 2006). On the basis of this 
example, Ringland (2006) argues that combining historic trends with the power of 
creative minds, reduces the chance of oversimplifying the future. 
 
3.7.3 Inaccurate data 
The accuracy of scenario models seems to be a persistent ground for disapproval. 
Ringland (2006) states: “The predictions for real life are only as good as the ability 
to contain enough of the rules and constraints of real life”. The data brought in the 
system can be regarded as the building blocks of prospective scenarios. It seems 
evident that corrupt or inaccurate data ultimately will lead to inaccurate 
projections. Obviously, inaccurate data is a limitation of scenarios. 
 
Nevertheless, many theorists dispute the suggestion that accuracy of future 
situations is the main objective of a scenario method (cf. Kahn & Wiener, 1967; 
Nekkers, 2006). They argue that scenarios are not to be seen as predictions, but 
merely as an instrument for strategic discussions. Inaccuracy therefore, does not 
have to be a reason to criticise the use of scenarios. The project goal effectively 
will define the level of acceptable inaccuracy (see Van Notten, 2006). 
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3.7 Limitations of scenarios 
Below we discuss three limitations of scenarios: (1) limited availability of 
information, (2) oversimplification, and (3) inaccurate data. 
 
3.7.1 Limited availability of information 
First and foremost, it seems that information about the effectiveness of scenario 
methods is generally not published (cf. Kirsch, 2004; List, 2005; Chermack, 2011). 
As this chapter is based on a literature review, it can only study published 
literature, which generally directs its attention to the methodology rather than 
review the specific outcomes of completed scenarios.  
 
Concerning the availability of information on scenarios, List (2005) states: “details 
about the usage, application and effectiveness of the methods are generally not 
available.” Chermack (2011) explains the lack of information by stating “none of 
the existing texts on scenario planning provides a theoretical explanation of how 
scenario planning works, and none provides detailed accounts of inquiry into what 
the outcomes of the experience really are. Nor do any cover a variety of methods 
for putting scenarios to use and checking to see that they were effective.” This 
could suggest that either scenario planning is generally regarded as quite 
successful, or that negative results have not been published.  
 
Kirsch (2004) concludes that the overwhelming majority of literature is in favour of 
scenario planning. Little critical contributions have been published with regard to 
the theory of the technique itself, nor have failed scenario attempts been reported. 
Therefore, it seems likely that the information on the use of scenarios is 
suppressed. “Scenario planning, developed in practice and proprietary in nature, 
is gaining exposure to academic examination, but has not been thoroughly 
documented as a discipline or process” argues Chermack (2011). Clearly, 
suppression of information for whatever reason is a limitation of scenarios that has 
to be taken seriously and that deserves closer investigation. 
 
3.7.2 Oversimplification 
While publications on the effectiveness of scenarios are scarce, we found evidence 
of a limitation of the use of scenarios that can best be described as 
oversimplification. It is speculated that planners over-simplify the use of scenarios, 
confusing the nature of storytelling with forecasting (see Godet & Roubelat, 1996; 
 
 101 
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Observation 4: Scenario development literature offers important lessons in the 
design of a new scenario model as it reveals the relation between (a) the project 
goal, (b) the design of the scenario process, and (c) the contents of the scenarios 
(see section 3.4).  
 
Observation 5: Study of creative scenarios reveals twelve material components (viz. 
Arena, Time(frame), Context, Protagonist, Antagonist, Motivation, Primary 
objective, Means, Modus operandi, Resistance, Symbolism, and Red herring) by 
which a story or scenario may be built. These components suggest an analogy 
between the way a criminal investigation is conducted and the way a creative 
scenario is built. The scenario components encompass five components that were 
highlighted in the discussion of the criminal theories in subsection 2.2.4 (viz. 
Context, Antagonist, Motivation, Primary objective, Resistance) (see section 3.5). 
Moreover, the elements Symbolism, and Red herring may emerge as valuable 
elements in the design of a new scenario model. Therefore, the twelve material 
components may offer important opportunities in the design of a scenario model 
able to anticipate criminal behaviour 
 
Observation 6: An investigation into the literature about models used in law 
enforcement reveals no examples that scenario methods have been used in an 
anticipative, proactive way. However, it does reveal three models that may be 
used for anticipating future incidents but these models are not based on scenarios. 
6a: The model that is used by the IBDCWG illustrates (i) the value of 
comparing different, seemingly unattached incidents, and (ii) the accumulation of 
detailed information, and (iii) illustrates the need for a structural anthology of data 
(cf. Berenschot, 2010).  
6b: The Terrorist Planning Cycle is used to exemplify the value of identifying 
general patterns of behaviour in the conduct of criminals. Patterns of behaviour 
that can be detected from historic incidents, offer opportunities of anticipation of 
prospective incidents (cf. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2007). 
6c: The IRIS model underlines the importance of defining progression in the 
development of a criminal act. It offers the opportunity to think ahead and to 
devise plans to intervene on stages that might occur in the future (cf. Koeman, 
2010). This is the essential component for a model able to anticipate criminal 
behaviour (see section 3.6).  
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 One way of dealing with the aforementioned limitations of scenarios (viz. 
suppressing information, oversimplification, and inaccurate data) is to allow access 
to the original data source. 
 
3.8 Answer to research question 1  
In this chapter we addressed the first research question (see section 1.5) [What 
does previous research on scenario-based anticipation methods offer that is 
relevant for the development of a scenario model by which criminal behaviour can 
be anticipated?]. To address this RQ, we conducted a review of the literature on 
scenario-based anticipative techniques.  
 
Our literature review leads to the following six observations. They are followed by 
a general conclusion and a specific conclusion.  
 
Observation 1: In the literature related to scenario-based anticipation methods, we 
have observed different definitions of terms. From the reviewed literature, we 
formulated definitions of scenario, scenario model, scenario learning, anticipative 
technique, and scenario planning (see section 3.1). 
 
Observation 2: From the reviewed literature we may conclude that scenario 
planning relies on (a) the identification of significant events, (b) the main actors, 
and (c) their motivations. Moreover, (d) scenario planning relies on recognising 
(dis)continuity and (e) on creating scenarios that focus on the possible 
consequences thereof (see section 3.2). 
 
Observation 3: Based on the reviewed literature on scenario development, we 
conclude that an effective scenario model should satisfy three conditions: 
1. Offer the possibility to learn from historic criminal behaviour. 
2. Offer the possibility to adapt the chosen strategy on the basis of indicators 
that are found. 
3. Offer the possibility to anticipate (unexpected) future real-world behaviour. 
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General Conclusion:  
Based on the literature studied, we may conclude that an effective scenario model 
is able to accumulate different historic criminal incidents in a systematic way.  
 
Specific conclusion:  
From the general conclusion and the six observations listed above, we further 
conclude that an effective scenario model will (i) store knowledge and experience 
gained from previous situations, that in turn can be used for (ii) detecting and 
analysing trends and unexpected relations. Subsequently, these trends and 
relations can be extrapolated towards the future to (iii) assist in anticipating future 
incidents. 
 
The findings of the literature review discussed above will guide the design of a 
scenario model fit for anticipating criminal behaviour in chapter five. Moreover, we 
will argue that the material scenario components offered by creative scenarios will 
be used in a novel way of modelling criminal behaviour. This will be the subject of 
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will argue that the material scenario components offered by creative scenarios will 
be used in a novel way of modelling criminal behaviour. This will be the subject of 
the next chapter. 
 
  
FOUR | Modelling criminal 
behaviour: ESC12
4
In this chapter we will propose a new way of modelling criminal behaviour 
based on the twelve components that are essential in creating a scenario.
“Crime is behaviour. Like many other patterns of behaviour, even the 
most serious violent crime frequently can be characterized, categorized, 
anticipated, and hopefully even predicted. (…)
 If it were not predictable, we would not have the field of criminal profiling. 
We would also not have as many interesting movies or books.”
Data Mining and Predictive Analysis29
29 In Data Mining and Predictive Analysis (2007), Colleen McCue describes the possibilities for data mining to assist law-enforcement professionals. 
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As indicated by the words at the beginning of this chapter, McCue (2007) states 
that criminal behaviour, like other human behaviour, needs to be characterised 
and modelled, in order to be used for predictive analysis. Moreover, McCue 
relates predicting criminal behaviour to creative writing.  
 
Elaborating on the study by McCue (2007) we will argue that the twelve material 
components of a scenario derived from the field of creative writing (see section 
3.5), may offer significant advantages in the categorisation and anticipation of 
criminal behaviour. Therefore, we will adopt the material scenario components 
that were introduced in section 3.5, and introduce the term “Twelve Elementary 
Scenario Components” (ESC12).  
 
For clarity and adequate understanding we will provide a definition of the term 
ESC12 that will be used frequently from this point onwards in this thesis.  
 
Definition 4.1: ESC12  
The ESC12 is the set of twelve Elementary Scenario Components that are the 
building blocks of each imaginable scenario. Every individual component of the 
ESC12 is characterised by meaning and by relation, and each component has a 
dynamic relation with other components. Since this relation is dynamic, it may 
happen that in some scenarios components have a null-relation. 
 
In this chapter, we will propose to model criminal behaviour by using the ESC12. 
In section 4.1 we will focus on the relation between a criminal offence and a 
choreographed production. In section 4.2 we will describe the use of the ESC12 in 
modelling human behaviour. Section 4.3 provides a chapter summary. 
 
4.1 A choreographed production 
Literature suggests that both a theatrical performance and a criminal offence are 
choreographed productions, and that there is a strong analogy between the ways 
a theatrical performance and a criminal offence develop (see Karber, 1971; Sloan, 
1981; Stohl, 1988; Weimann & Winn, 1994; Ayers, 2001; Tsfati & Weimann, 2002; 
De Graaff, 2007; Weimann, 2008). Based on this analogy, we will discuss that the 
elements that make up a scenario and those that make up a terrorist act, are 
correlated. Below we will describe how tools designed to create a theatrical 
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4.2 The twelve Elementary Scenario Components 
In chapter three, we defined a scenario as a narrative describing foreseeable 
interactions between characters and the system. By definition, a scenario includes 
information about behaviour, goals, motivations, expectations, actions and 
reactions, successes and problems (see definition 3.1). In this section we will 
elaborate on the use of the ESC12 in modelling human behaviour in creative 
scenarios.  
 
The art of creating and recounting scenarios plays a significant role in human 
existence. All over the world, from a young age, children are told narratives that 
introduce them to the realm of imagination. It prepares them to understand the 
world, its morals and ethics. These narratives are based on scenarios, just as 
history books, novels, films, and theatre plays are based on scenarios. Moreover, 
news-items are presented in the form of narrative (and quite literally based on 
scenarios), and much of our conversation is taken up by recounting every-day 
events in the form of scenarios (cf. Booker, 2004). 
 
In popular perception, the variety of stories that are told throughout the world 
(and that have been told over the ages) is as infinite as the human imagination. 
However, as diverse as the stories might be, the scenarios on which the stories are 
built (a) follow a fixed pattern (see Booker, 2004) and (b) are based on elementary 
components. Box 4 presents an illustration of the universality of stories. 
	  
 
Box 4: The universality of stories  
 
“Imagine we are about to be plunged into a story – any story in the world. A curtain rises on a 
stage, a cinema darkens. We turn to the first paragraph of a novel. A narrator utters the age-old 
formula ‘once upon a time…’. 
On the face of it, so limitless is the human imagination and so boundless the realm at the 
storyteller’s command, we might think that literally anything could happen next. But in fact there 




The opening of seven basic plots: why we tell stories (Booker, 2004) cited above, 
effectively exposes the notion that a story is built around fixed components.             
In creative scenarios these components are effectively characterised by the ESC12. 
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production might offer valuable advantages in the anticipation of criminal 
behaviour. 
 
The relationship between a creative scenario and a criminal offence has been 
studied in detail by renowned experts in the field of terrorism and that of theatre. 
The book Simulating Terrrorism (Sloan, 1981) describes the relation between 
scenario writing and terrorism. It suggests that terrorists follow the same path as 
scenario writers do: “An act of terrorism is like a theatrical performance. The 
terrorists write the scenario.”  
 
Stohl (1988) relates terrorism to a theatrical act: “Political terrorism is theatre. It is 
profound and often a tragic drama for which the world is the stage. Violence, 
death, intimidation, and fear are the theatrical ingredients. The plot often involves 
hostages, deadlines, and high-level bargaining. (…) But while the central 
ingredients are present in all forms of terrorism, as in the legitimate theatre, only 
certain plays are given prominent reviews and fewer still become hits. Likewise, 
only a few actors and directors achieve stardom.” 
 
De Poot et al. (2004) emphasise the relation between scenario writing and criminal 
investigation when they postulate: “Criminal investigation is about creating a story 
of a specific event. When all the components of a story can be connected, the 
story of a criminal offence is of sufficient quality to be handed over to the 
prosecutor” (De Poot et al., 2004). 
 
In conjunction with Sloan and Stohl, Weimann (2008) compares terrorism to a 
choreographed production by stating: “Terrorism operates through symbolic 
expression, just as how dramaturgy works. From the theater-of-terror perspective, 
the September 11 attack on America was a perfectly choreographed production 
aimed at American and international audiences.”  
 
Based on the examples above, it may be argued that the connection between the 
art of scenario writing and committing a criminal offence or a terrorist act might 
not be as far fetched as may seem at first glance. Below, we will elaborate on the 
studies by Sloan (1981), Stohl (1988), McCue (2007), De Poot et al. (2004), and 
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Stanley Kubrick) a psychopathic delinquent named Alex is the protagonist of the 
story. Alex’ pleasures are classical music, rape, and so-called “ultra-violence”. In 
accordance with the “rules” of the creative scenario, the story is entirely told from 
Alex’ perspective. The respectable writer Alexander -who is assaulted by Alex and 
his gang- consequently becomes one of the antagonists of the story. The 
relationship between the protagonist and the antagonist is an essential driving 
force of a scenario and the antagonist is as much responsible for the plot as the 
protagonist is. This has nothing to do with moral judgements or culpability, but 
everything with the relationship between the basic elements that are responsible 
for the development of a story or a crime. 
  
Creative writing (as well as terrorism, as we argued in chapter two) may be 
regarded as a mode of communication. In subsection 2.3.2 we introduced a model 
that explained “terrorism as a form of communication”. This model of 
communication emphasises the role of the audience as a separate entity. In 
harmony with this model, creative scenario writers regard the audience as a crucial 
but external part of the story. To orchestrate a story in such a fashion that it 
captivates and maintains the audience’s interest, the ESC12 can be divided into 
three categories: (1) objective, (2) subjective, and (3) interpretable components. 
Below we briefly discuss these categories. 
 
1 Objective components  
Objective components constitute observable phenomena and are not related to 
the protagonist’s individual feelings, imaginations, or interpretations. The 
objective components are Arena, Time(frame), Context, Protagonist, Antagonist, 
Means, Modus operandi, and Resistance. 
 
2 Subjective components  
Subjective components, in contrast, pertain to the conception of the protagonist 
of the story. They reflect his individual interpretations of experiences consisting of 
emotional, intellectual, and spiritual perceptions as well as misperceptions. The 
subjective components are Motivation and Primary objective. 
 
3 Interpretable components  
Interpretable components are components that do not have a meaning until they 
are given an interpretation by a third party, i.e., the audience. The interpretable 
components are Symbolism and Red herring.  
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These twelve Elementary Scenario Components are used to understand, explain, 




 Component Description 
1 Arena The location where the story takes place. 
2 Time(frame) The time(frame) in which the story takes place. 
3 Context The set of circumstances that surround the story. 
4 Protagonist The main character of the story around whom the plot evolves. 
5 Antagonist The opposition against whom/which the protagonist must contend. 
6 Motivation The psychological features that drive the protagonist. 
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8 Means The methods or instruments by which the protagonist achieves his primary 
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9 Modus operandi The method of operation of the protagonist.  
10 Resistance The obstacles the protagonist has to overcome to be able to achieve his objective. 
11 Symbolism It occurs when a component carries a symbolic value for the protagonist, 
antagonist, or the audience. 
12 Red herring A misleading occurrence or indicator used to lead someone in the wrong direction 
of thought. 
 
Table 4.1 Description of the ESC12. 
 
Emblematic for a creative scenario is the fact that a story is told from the 
perspective of the protagonist. The protagonist (from the Greek πρωταγωνιστής; 
“the one who plays the first part, the chief actor”30) is the central character in the 
series of events (cf. Booker, 2004; Lisle, 2010). More importantly, the ESC12 relate 
to one another in a series of events that move the protagonist and the story 
forward.  
 
To appreciate creative scenario writing, one has to understand that the 
protagonist of the story does not necessarily have to be the “good guy”. For 
instance, in A clockwork orange (Burgess, 1962) (adapted for film in 1971 by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 “protagonist”; Online etymology dictionary 
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Stanley Kubrick) a psychopathic delinquent named Alex is the protagonist of the 
story. Alex’ pleasures are classical music, rape, and so-called “ultra-violence”. In 
accordance with the “rules” of the creative scenario, the story is entirely told from 
Alex’ perspective. The respectable writer Alexander -who is assaulted by Alex and 
his gang- consequently becomes one of the antagonists of the story. The 
relationship between the protagonist and the antagonist is an essential driving 
force of a scenario and the antagonist is as much responsible for the plot as the 
protagonist is. This has nothing to do with moral judgements or culpability, but 
everything with the relationship between the basic elements that are responsible 
for the development of a story or a crime. 
  
Creative writing (as well as terrorism, as we argued in chapter two) may be 
regarded as a mode of communication. In subsection 2.3.2 we introduced a model 
that explained “terrorism as a form of communication”. This model of 
communication emphasises the role of the audience as a separate entity. In 
harmony with this model, creative scenario writers regard the audience as a crucial 
but external part of the story. To orchestrate a story in such a fashion that it 
captivates and maintains the audience’s interest, the ESC12 can be divided into 
three categories: (1) objective, (2) subjective, and (3) interpretable components. 
Below we briefly discuss these categories. 
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the protagonist’s individual feelings, imaginations, or interpretations. The 
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Subjective components, in contrast, pertain to the conception of the protagonist 
of the story. They reflect his individual interpretations of experiences consisting of 
emotional, intellectual, and spiritual perceptions as well as misperceptions. The 
subjective components are Motivation and Primary objective. 
 
3 Interpretable components  
Interpretable components are components that do not have a meaning until they 
are given an interpretation by a third party, i.e., the audience. The interpretable 
components are Symbolism and Red herring.  
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remaining Elementary Scenario Components. In subsection 4.2.3 we will relate the 
ESC12 to the “golden W’s”. 
 
4.2.1 The ESC12 in a creative scenario 
Below, we will provide two examples for studying the ESC12; (1) The epic of 
Gilgamesh, one of the earliest surviving written stories, and (2) the American 
blockbuster movie Jaws. 
 
Example 1 
The epic of Gilgamesh originates from Ancient Sumeria (modern Iraq), and was 
originally written on 12 clay tablets in cunieform script, between 2750 and 2500 
BCE (Carnahan, 2001).  
 
The epic of Gilgamesh centres on Gilgamesh, the King of Uruk, and his friend 
Enkidu. At the time the story takes place the kingdom of Uruk is threatened by a 
great and mysterious evil; a monster named “Humbaba the Terrible”. In order to 
gain fame and renown, Gilgamesh proposes his friend Enkidu to go on a journey 
to the Cedar Forest to slay Humbaba. Gilgamesh is equipped with special 
weapons and, together with Enkidu, sets out on a long and hazardous journey to 
find the monster’s lair. When they finally face Humbaba, Gilgamesh tricks the 
monster in letting his guard down and, after a fierce and titanic struggle, kills his 
evil opponent. The threat to the Kingdom of Uruk is eliminated and Enkidu and 
Gilgamesh return home as triumphant (cf. Carnahan, 2001; Booker, 2004). 
 
The epic of Gilgamesh is a classic example of an “overcoming the monster“ plot. It 
is one of only seven basic plots upon which stories can be built32 (cf. Booker, 
2004). The essence of the “Overcoming the monster“ plot is rather simple. The 
protagonist of the story is made aware of the existence of some sort of 
superhuman embodiment of evil power. Be it in human shape (e.g., a giant or a 
witch), the form of an animal (e.g., a dragon or a shark), or in the shape of some 
sort of civilisation (e.g., an oppressing regime, or opposing belief), the monster is 
most often mortally dangerous. It represents everything which seems dark and 
sinister and is most inimical, threatening, and dangerous to the protagonist (and 
the audience) of a story (cf. Booker, 2004).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 According to Booker the seven basic plots are: Overcoming the monster, Rags to riches, The quest, Voyage 
and return, Comedy, Tragedy, and Rebirth (cf. Booker, 2004). 
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Table 4.2 lists the objective, subjective, and interpretable Elementary Scenario 
Components. In section 4.2.1 we will illustrate every individual scenario 
component by an example. 
 
 
 ESC12 Objective Subjective Interpretable 
1 Arena X   
2 Time(frame) X   
3 Context X   
4 Protagonist X   
5 Antagonist X   
6 Motivation  X  
7 Primary objective  X  
8 Means X   
9 Modus operandi X   
10 Resistance X   
11 Symbolism   X 
12 Red herring   X 
 
Table 4.2 ESC12: the objective, subjective, and interpretable components. 
 
The order in which the ESC12 is presented within a scenario may vary from the 
order depicted in table 4.2. However, in a linear scenario, this is the most typical 
order for the ESC12 to be presented. For instance, the opening of the synopsis of 
Apocalypse now (Zoetrope, 1979) would read: “Saigon, 1973. It is the height of 
the war in Vietnam. U.S. Army Captain Willard is sent out a mission to locate 
renegade Colonel Kurtz who apparently went insane and now commands his own 
illegal guerrilla troop inside neutral Cambodia. Willard’s objective is to terminate 
the colonels command….”  
 
In the works of fiction that have been studied by the author of this thesis since 
199031, the ESC12 appear to be presented, most commonly, in this sequential 
order. For that reason we will maintain the order of the ESC12 depicted in table 
4.2 throughout our thesis. 
 
In subsection 4.2.1 we will provide a brief explanation of the way the ESC12 are 
used in creative scenarios, by relating them to existing stories. In subsection 4.2.2 
we will describe possible relations between Symbolism, Red herring, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Ever since the compilation of the ESC12 in 1990, the author of this thesis has been challenging the 
Elementary Scenario Components by disparate narrative works of fiction such as films, books, theatre plays, 
and verbal stories from different cultural origin. 
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The objective Elementary Scenario Component Time(frame) refers to the time or 
timeframe in which an incident takes place. For instance, a story can evolve within 
a timeframe of seconds as well as over a period of many years. In The epic of 
Gilgamesh, the timeframe is not noted (perhaps because some of the 12 tablets 
on which the story was written, were damaged). In Jaws, the timeframe is defined 
as “a summer season”.  
 
3 Context 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Context refers to the set of 
circumstances that surround the incident. It provides for actions to be appreciated 
within a social, cultural, or political background. In The epic of Gilgamesh, the 
Context is the threat that befalls the Kingdom of Uruk by a mysterious evil. In 
Jaws, the Context is the holiday season and the possible threat to the primary 
source of income of Amity Island; tourism.  
 
4 Protagonist 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist refers to the main 
character in the scenario. According to the rules of creative scenarios, the plot 
revolves around the Protagonist, the central component within the ESC12. King 
Gilgamesh and police chief Martin Brody are examples of the Protagonist in the 
stories mentioned above.  
 
5 Antagonist 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist represents the 
opposition against which the Protagonist must contend. The Antagonist in a 
scenario can be a person, a group of people, an institution, or a society, but also a 
situation, an animal, or an object. The monster Humbaba and the man-eating 
shark Bruce are examples of the Antagonist in the exemplified stories. 
 
6 Motivation 
The subjective Elementary Scenario Component Motivation refers to the 
psychological features that drive the Protagonist toward a desired goal. Motivation 
may be rooted in a basic impulse to optimise well-being, to minimize physical 
pain, or to maximize pleasure. Motivation generally can be classified into five 
categories: Need, Greed, Power, Moral outrage, and Glory (see subsection 2.2.3). 
Gilgamesh is driven by “fame and renown” (which may be classified as Glory). In 
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“Overcoming the monster“ stories generally have such a profound symbolic 
significance that they transcend time and space. 4500 years after The epic of 
Gilgamesh was narrated in Ancient Sumeria, audiences in the Western world 
gathered to be terrified by the story of a giant man-eating shark that threatens 
Amity Island; which brings us to example 2. 
 
Example 2 
The 1975 blockbuster motion picture Jaws (Spielberg, 1975) is set in a small 
fictitious community that thrives on tourism during the summer season. The story 
precipitates when a monstrous man-eating shark named “Bruce” starts attacking 
offshore swimmers. Police chief Brody, determined to prevent more casualties, 
sets out with two companions to confront the shark. After a tremendous climatic 
fight, Bruce is finally slain. The threat to Amity Island has been lifted and the 
community comes together in universal jubilation (cf. Spielberg, 1975). 
 
These two examples of “overcoming the monster“ stories show that different 
narratives, separated by time and place, can be based on the same basic plot. 
Evidently, these examples are selected to illustrate adequately the twelve 
individual Elementary Scenario Components.  
 
Illustrating the ESC12 
The twelve Elementary Scenario Components were already briefly explained in 
section 3.5. To deepen the understanding of the ESC12, we will illustrate the 
significance of every individual scenario component by relating it to the examples 
mentioned above. In the descriptions that we give below, we do not aspire to 
analyse the two exemplified stories extensively. We merely aim to illustrate the 
role of the ESC12 in an adequate and effective manner.   
 
1 Arena 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Arena refers to the physical 
location where an incident takes place. It may refer to a geographic location or a 
type of environment such as an urban or rural surrounding. For instance, in The 
epic of Gilgamesh the Arena of the story is The Kingdom of Uruk, while the story 
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The objective Elementary Scenario Component Resistance refers to all the 
obstacles that the Protagonist has to overcome to attain his goal. In The epic of 
Gilgamesh, the Protagonist has to undertake “a long and hazardous journey” to 
be able to face Humbaba. In Jaws, police chief Brody first has to overcome the 
opposition of the town’s Mayor, who fears that reports of a shark attack will 
interfere with the town's primary source of income.  
 
11 Symbolism  
The interpretative Elementary Scenario Component Symbolism stands for one 
thing represented by another (by means of association, resemblance, or 
convention). Symbolism needs interpretation by (a member of) the audience. To 
put it in other words, Symbolism lies in the eye of the beholder. An interesting 
example of this is the Marxist Symbolism that Fidel Castro attached to the 
blockbuster film Jaws. In an interview with Coppola, Castro explains that the film 
symbolises “that businessmen are ready to sell out the safety of citizens rather 
than close down against the invasion of sharks” (Beekman, 2012).  
 
12 Red herring 
The interpretative Elementary Scenario Component Red herring can be regarded a 
false clue, designed to mislead the audience33. While we were not able to find a 
Red herring in The epic of Gilgamesh, the scenario of Jaws contains a prototypical 
false clue: When a large tiger shark is caught by fishermen, the townspeople (and 
more importantly the audience) are led to believe the problem has been solved. 
The beaches are re-opened and tourists are encouraged to go swimming again. It 
is only after Brody and a marine biologist secretly had opened the tiger shark's 
stomach and did not find any human remains that it becomes apparent that the 
threat to the tourists of Amity Island still exists. 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The figurative use of the term Red herring can be traced back to William Cobbett, who published a story in 
1807 about how a Red herring was used to deflect hounds chasing after a hare. Cobbett used this story as a 
metaphor to decry the press, which had allowed itself to be misled by false information about a supposed 




addition, Police chief Brody may well be motivated by moral outrage after he is 
forced by the town’s mayor (who fears that reports of a shark attack will ruin the 
summer tourist season) to attribute publicly the death to a boating accident, 
instead of a shark attack.  
 
7 Primary objective 
The subjective Elementary Scenario Component Primary objective refers to the 
primary objective of the Protagonist. It may be seen as a way by which the 
Protagonist attains his motivation. For instance, while the Motivation of Gilgamesh 
is classified as “Glory”, the way to achieve that is to eliminate the threat to the 
Kingdom of Uruk and to return home as triumphant. The Elementary Scenario 
Component Primary objective is subjective in the sense that it is often not explicitly 
expressed, but rather related to the motivation of the Protagonist. For instance, 
when one would classify Brody’s motivation as moral outrage, one could argue 
that Brody can only manifest his outrage by (i) determining the real cause of the 
death of the victim, and (ii) eliminating the man-eating shark. 
 
8 Means 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Means refers to the method(s) or 
instrument(s) of the Protagonist to obtain a result or achieve an objective. Means in 
scenario writing generally is closely connected to the primary objective of the 
Protagonist. For instance, Gilgamesh is provided with special weapons that help 
him achieve his Primary objective. Similarly, Brody equips himself with shark-
hunting equipment that helps him reach his Primary objective.  
 
9 Modus operandi 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi refers to the 
method of operation of the Protagonist. The Modus operandi often constitutes an 
elaborate set of manners employed by the Protagonist. This is the case in both the 
exemplified stories. For reasons of brevity, we will summarise for each exemplified 
story, one (strongly simplified) Modus operandi. In The epic of Gilgamesh, 
Gilgamesh tricks Humbaba to let his guard down by offering his sisters as 
concubine. This allows Gilgamesh the crucial advantage of surprise when he 
delivers the first blow. In Jaws, Brody kills the shark by shoving a pressurised scuba 
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thing represented by another (by means of association, resemblance, or 
convention). Symbolism needs interpretation by (a member of) the audience. To 
put it in other words, Symbolism lies in the eye of the beholder. An interesting 
example of this is the Marxist Symbolism that Fidel Castro attached to the 
blockbuster film Jaws. In an interview with Coppola, Castro explains that the film 
symbolises “that businessmen are ready to sell out the safety of citizens rather 
than close down against the invasion of sharks” (Beekman, 2012).  
 
12 Red herring 
The interpretative Elementary Scenario Component Red herring can be regarded a 
false clue, designed to mislead the audience33. While we were not able to find a 
Red herring in The epic of Gilgamesh, the scenario of Jaws contains a prototypical 
false clue: When a large tiger shark is caught by fishermen, the townspeople (and 
more importantly the audience) are led to believe the problem has been solved. 
The beaches are re-opened and tourists are encouraged to go swimming again. It 
is only after Brody and a marine biologist secretly had opened the tiger shark's 
stomach and did not find any human remains that it becomes apparent that the 
threat to the tourists of Amity Island still exists. 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The figurative use of the term Red herring can be traced back to William Cobbett, who published a story in 
1807 about how a Red herring was used to deflect hounds chasing after a hare. Cobbett used this story as a 
metaphor to decry the press, which had allowed itself to be misled by false information about a supposed 




addition, Police chief Brody may well be motivated by moral outrage after he is 
forced by the town’s mayor (who fears that reports of a shark attack will ruin the 
summer tourist season) to attribute publicly the death to a boating accident, 
instead of a shark attack.  
 
7 Primary objective 
The subjective Elementary Scenario Component Primary objective refers to the 
primary objective of the Protagonist. It may be seen as a way by which the 
Protagonist attains his motivation. For instance, while the Motivation of Gilgamesh 
is classified as “Glory”, the way to achieve that is to eliminate the threat to the 
Kingdom of Uruk and to return home as triumphant. The Elementary Scenario 
Component Primary objective is subjective in the sense that it is often not explicitly 
expressed, but rather related to the motivation of the Protagonist. For instance, 
when one would classify Brody’s motivation as moral outrage, one could argue 
that Brody can only manifest his outrage by (i) determining the real cause of the 
death of the victim, and (ii) eliminating the man-eating shark. 
 
8 Means 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Means refers to the method(s) or 
instrument(s) of the Protagonist to obtain a result or achieve an objective. Means in 
scenario writing generally is closely connected to the primary objective of the 
Protagonist. For instance, Gilgamesh is provided with special weapons that help 
him achieve his Primary objective. Similarly, Brody equips himself with shark-
hunting equipment that helps him reach his Primary objective.  
 
9 Modus operandi 
The objective Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi refers to the 
method of operation of the Protagonist. The Modus operandi often constitutes an 
elaborate set of manners employed by the Protagonist. This is the case in both the 
exemplified stories. For reasons of brevity, we will summarise for each exemplified 
story, one (strongly simplified) Modus operandi. In The epic of Gilgamesh, 
Gilgamesh tricks Humbaba to let his guard down by offering his sisters as 
concubine. This allows Gilgamesh the crucial advantage of surprise when he 
delivers the first blow. In Jaws, Brody kills the shark by shoving a pressurised scuba 





quintessential in the validation of information (cf. Van den Herik, 2007) 34 . 
Additionally, the Antagonist in a narrative carries a responsibility for the plot, just 
as a victim does in a violent crime. Moreover, the criminal theories highlighted in 
section 2.2 indicate that the components Context, Primary objective, Motivation, 
Resistance, and Antagonist are essential in the understanding of criminal 
behaviour. Therefore, it seems peculiar that exactly these components seem to be 
missing in the concept of “the Golden W’s”.  
 
Next to the Elementary Scenario Components Context, Antagonist, Motivation, 
and Resistance two more components of the ESC12 are missing in the Golden 
W’s, viz. Symbolism, and Red herring. These components effectively carry an 
added value in crime research. Appreciating the role of Symbolism, and Red 
herring in describing a criminal act might provide valuable insights into the 
predicaments of criminal behaviour. To illustrate the value of both these 
components, we have included a separate subsection 4.2.3 “Symbolism and Red 
herring in criminal behaviour”.  
 
One may note that “Plot” appears to be missing from the ESC12. Essentially and 
most simply put, a plot is what the characters do to deal with the situation they are 
in. It is a logical sequence of events that grows from an initial incident and alters 
the status (quo) of the characters (see George, 2004). In a  narrative, the plot is the 
causal relation of the ESC12. For instance, in Escape from Alcatraz (Paramount 
Pictures, 1979), the Arena of the narrative explains the relation between the 
Protagonists (inmates that became befriended) and the Antagonist (the physical 
obstacles represented by the prison of Alcatraz, its guards, and -to a lesser extent- 
San Franscisco Bay). Also, the elaborate Modus operandi, which constitutes the 
use of spoons to dig through concrete walls as well as the fabrication of a Red 
herring (dummy heads created from a mixture of soap, paper, and real hair), has a 
causal relation to the limited Means the prisoners had. As the example of Escape 
from Alcatraz indicates, the plot is not an Elementary Scenario Component in itself 
but merely refers to the causal relation of the individual ESC12. Although the plot 
of a narrative is usually quite elaborate, we have compared the plot in figure 4.3, 
to the question “What did happen?” 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 In chapter five we will argue that “context” is valuable in the process of turning information to knowledge. 
(See definition 5.1 and 5.2) 
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4.2.2 The ESC12 in relation to the “Golden W's” 
Insiders might have noticed that the ESC12 carry a remarkable resemblance with 
what is widely known as “the Golden W’s” (Gross, 1908); a concept that, both in 
research and police investigations, is used for information gathering. Originally, 
the maxim of the Golden W’s stems from classical rhetoric in which the 
relationships between separate elements can be found by obtaining arguments 
from various sources of information. The ancient rhetorician Hermagoras of 
Temnos (first century BCE) defined the following sources: Quis, quid, quando, ubi, 
cur, quem ad modum, quibus adminiculis. These sources can be translated as: 
Who is it about? What did happen? When did it take place? Where did it take 
place? Why did it happen? In what way did it happen? By what means did it 
happen? 
 
The way information is connected in a criminal investigation carries a strong 
resemblance with the way information is connected in a scenario. The relationship 
between the Golden W’s create a plausible scenario as well as a plausible ground 
for prosecution (see De Poot et al., 2004). In table 4.3 we have brought the 




















Table 4.3 Comparison of ESC12 and Golden W’s. 
 
We note that six components of ESC12 are not included in the Golden W’s. Four 
of the most obvious ones are: Context, Antagonist, Motivation, and Resistance. 
One might argue that these components do not seem to offer added value to the 
description of a criminal act. However, in our view, the Context of an incident is 
 ESC12 Golden W’s 
1 Arena Where did it take place? 
2 Time(frame) When did it take place? 
3 Context  
4 Protagonist Who is it about? 
5 Antagonist  
6 Motivation  
7 Primary objective Why did it happen? 
8 Means By what means did it happen? 
9 Modus operandi In what way did it happen? 
10 Resistance  
11 Symbolism  
12 Red herring  
 (Plot) What did happen? 
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To illustrate the possible relation between Symbolism, Red herring, and the 
remaining ten Elementary Scenario Components, we present table 4.3. An X 
indicates that a relation may exist. 
 
 ESC12 (11) Symbolism  (12) Red herring  
1 Arena X X 
2 Time(frame) X X 
3 Context   
4 Protagonist  X 
5 Antagonist X X 
6 Motivation   
7 Primary objective   
8 Means X X 
9 Modus operandi X X 
10 Resistance   
 
Table 4.4 The role of Symbolism and Red herring. 
 
4.3 Chapter summary 
In this chapter we argued that criminal behaviour may be characterised and 
modelled by the ESC12, a list of material components that are used to model 
human behaviour in creative scenarios.  
 
First, we referred to research that studied the relation between terrorism and 
theatre. Based on this research35, we support the claim that both a theatrical 
performance and a criminal offence are choreographed productions and that there 
is a strong analogy between the ways a theatrical performance and a criminal 
offence develop. Extending on this research, we propose a new way of modelling 
criminal behaviour that is based on the way human behaviour is modelled in 
creative scenario writing. 
 
Second, we focussed our attention on the contents of the ESC12 components. We 
explained that the Protagonist is the central component of the ESC12 and that a 
scenario is created from the perspective of the Protagonist. Furthermore we 
related the role of the audience to a scenario, and explained that the ESC12 may 
be divided into three categories (viz. objective, subjective, and interpretable 
scenario components.).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Earlier researchers who voiced similar a claim are: Karber, 1971; Sloan, 1981; Weimann & Winn, 1994; Ayers, 
2001; Tsfati & Weimann, 2002; De Graaff, 2007; Weimann, 2008. 
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We like to remark that the fact that six Elementary Scenario Components are not 
included in the “Golden W’s”, does not suggest that they are likely to be ignored 
by investigators in an enquiry. It merely suggests that the critically acclaimed 
“Golden W's” may miss important components when used to model criminal 
behaviour. Consequently, the comparison between ESC12 and the “Golden W's” 
indicates that the ESC12 offer durable components to describe, characterise, and 
model a criminal act. 
 
4.2.3 Symbolism and Red herring in criminal behaviour 
Both the Elementary Scenario Component Symbolism and Red herring require 
additional explanation. These interpretable components do not exist within a 
creative scenario as autonomous components. Symbolism and Red herring are 
used in conjunction with other scenario components (see also subsection 4.2.1). To 
illustrate the value of the Elementary Scenario Components (1) Symbolism and (2) 
Red herring in criminal behaviour, we include two brief examples of these 
components in a terrorist incident.  
 
1: Symbolism in a terrorist incident 
In the attacks of September 11th 2001, the symbolic value of the targets 
(Antagonists) may have most likely been an important factor in the process of 
target selection. The World Trade towers were seen as a symbol for the financial 
and economic power while the Pentagon was regarded as a symbol for the military 
power of the USA.  
 
2: Red herring in a terrorist incident 
The videotape that was found after the bomb attack on Rafiq Hariri in Lebanon on 
February 14th 2005, suggested an Al Qaeda related Terrorist organisation was 
responsible for the attack. However, weeks later it turned out that the Modus 
operandi of the Protagonist had included a Red herring and no Al Qaeda related 
cell carried responsibility for the attack (cf. Mehlis, 2005). 
 
As illustrated by the aforementioned examples, the Elementary Scenario 
Components Modus operandi or Antagonist may include a symbolic value or a 
Red herring. However, not every Elementary Scenario Component can be affected 
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 Third, to exemplify the universal shape of narratives that occurred over time and 
space, we introduced two examples of “overcoming the monster” scenarios. 
These examples were used to elaborate and illustrate the role of the twelve 
Elementary Scenario Components and their internal structure.  
 
Fourth, we related the ESC12 to the “Golden W's”, a concept that, both in 
research and police investigations, is used for information gathering.  
 
Fifth, from the findings above, we may provisionally conclude that the ESC12 offer 
a durable set of components to describe, characterise, and model a criminal 
incident. Strengthened by this conclusion, we will proceed to design a new 
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Fourth, we related the ESC12 to the “Golden W's”, a concept that, both in 
research and police investigations, is used for information gathering.  
 
Fifth, from the findings above, we may provisionally conclude that the ESC12 offer 
a durable set of components to describe, characterise, and model a criminal 
incident. Strengthened by this conclusion, we will proceed to design a new 
scenario model potentially able to anticipate criminal behaviour in the next 
chapter. 
  FIVE | Designing an ESC12 
scenario model
5
This chapter constitutes the start of a new approach to 
anticipate crime. We will address the second research question 
of this thesis and propose a novel design for a scenario model 
able to anticipate criminal behaviour.
“The map is not the territory”36
Alfred Korzybski37
36 The expression “the map is not the territory” first appeared in print in a paper by Alfred Korzybski at a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in New 
Orleans, Louisiana, December 28th 1931. Reprinted in Science and Sanity, 1933, pp. 747–61
37 Alfred Korzybski (1879 - 1950), Polish-born American scientist and philosopher. Korzybski argued that many people do confuse maps with territories, that is, confuse models of reality 
with reality itself. With the dictum “the map is not the territory”, Korzybski encapsulates his view that an abstraction derived from something, is not the thing itself.
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While the area of criminal behaviour has been explored and described by 
researchers from different fields of expertise, we found no evidence that previous 
efforts attempted to map criminal behaviour with tools from scenario planning. As 
a result we cannot draw on previous knowledge in this field and will have to 
approach what lies ahead as “uncharted territory”.  
 
In this chapter we will address the second research of this thesis: To what extent 
can a scenario model be designed by which criminal behaviour can be 
anticipated? To this end we will document the design for a novel anticipative 
scenario model based on the ESC12 that were introduced in chapter three and 
defined in chapter four. 
 
In section 5.1 we will study the process of data extraction using the quote by 
Alfred Korzybski above. Here we will introduce the graphics that will be used to 
explain the design of the ESC12 scenario model. In designing a new scenario 
model, we separate the conceptual design of the model, from the architectural 
design. The conceptual design encompasses the exploration of the concept of 
using ESC12 as a common denominator of the scenario model. This will be the 
subject of section 5.2. The architectural design encompasses the implementation 
of the modules that constitute the scenario model and their functional 
construction. This will be the subject of section 5.3. Conclusively, the results are 
discussed in section 5.4 in which we will answer RQ2. 
 
As a guideline for the reader we will include a definition of the term ESC12 
scenario model, which from this chapter onwards will be used frequently in this 
thesis.  
 
Definition 5.1: ESC12 Scenario model 
The ESC12 scenario model is an arrangement of modules and processes that 
accepts unstructured data as input, and presents structured scenarios as output. 
The data in the ESC12 scenario model is structured according to the ESC12, and 
the scenarios that are presented by the model, are constructed from the ESC12. 
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Below we will elaborate on (1) the territory, (2) the map, and (3) the difference 
between the two. 
 
1 The territory 
Figure 5.1a is to be considered as a representation of the complex territory of 
criminal behaviour, showing data that contains all the information related to a 
criminal incident. For instance, this data would include the social and professional 
connections that any of the people involved in a criminal act ever had with other 
individuals. It would also include information of the victims (and the people to 
whom they are related), the history of locations relevant to the incident, as well as 
tips from third parties, records of telephone conversations, and financial 
transactions made by any of the people involved. While the depicted territory 
contains all the crucial information for investigative purposes, the amount of data 
would clearly be too complex for analytic objectives39. It requires a process of 
extraction by which the essential components from the data collection are 
separated in such a way that the relationships between these components can be 
studied.  
 
2 The map 
In the example depicted in figure 5.1, the individual characters that make up the 
word “scenario” represent the essential components. Although these components 
were already present in the complex territory, they were hard to discern from the 
less relevant data.  
 
Figure 5.1b can be regarded as a “map” that singles out the essential characters. 
The separation of the essential components of a crime allows for studying the 
relation between them. For instance, the specific size, orientation, or spatial 
distribution of the components can be studied and brought into relation with the 
complex territory of criminal behaviour.  
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 In this thesis we refrain from big data techniques. While big data has been around since the 1950’s, the 
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suggests big data techniques are still in their infancy. However, we predict a big future for narrative science 




5.1 The territory and the map 
In the previous section we mentioned that by designing a novel ESC12 scenario 
model, we are entering “uncharted territory”. This approach hints at the analogy 
between the creation of a scenario model and that of a map. Both scenario 
modelling and cartography build on the premise that reality can be modelled so 
that future events can be anticipated. Creating a model means simplifying 
intricacies and eliminating irrelevancies without losing the essential components.  
 
 
    Fig 5.1a: the “territory”    Fig 5.1b: the “map” 
 
Figure 5.1 Creating a map from a territory. 
 
To clarify the relation between the territory and the map we created figure 5.1 in 
which a complex territory (figure 5.1a) is reduced to a map (figure 5.1b). The map 
retains data or information (or knowledge) that is relevant for a particular purpose.  
 
In this thesis we refrain from a discussion on information and knowledge. For 
details on this topic we refer to Van den Herik (2007) and Vis (2012). As we will use 
both the terms “information” and “knowledge” in this thesis, we will provide two 
definitions relevant for our work. They are based on Van den Herik  (2007).  
 
Definition 5.2: Information 
Information is data with a meaning.38 
 
Definition 5.3: Knowledge 
Knowledge is information within a context.35  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Combining definition 5.1 and 5.2, one may note that Knowledge is data with a meaning, within a context. 
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Below we will elaborate on (1) the territory, (2) the map, and (3) the difference 
between the two. 
 
1 The territory 
Figure 5.1a is to be considered as a representation of the complex territory of 
criminal behaviour, showing data that contains all the information related to a 
criminal incident. For instance, this data would include the social and professional 
connections that any of the people involved in a criminal act ever had with other 
individuals. It would also include information of the victims (and the people to 
whom they are related), the history of locations relevant to the incident, as well as 
tips from third parties, records of telephone conversations, and financial 
transactions made by any of the people involved. While the depicted territory 
contains all the crucial information for investigative purposes, the amount of data 
would clearly be too complex for analytic objectives39. It requires a process of 
extraction by which the essential components from the data collection are 
separated in such a way that the relationships between these components can be 
studied.  
 
2 The map 
In the example depicted in figure 5.1, the individual characters that make up the 
word “scenario” represent the essential components. Although these components 
were already present in the complex territory, they were hard to discern from the 
less relevant data.  
 
Figure 5.1b can be regarded as a “map” that singles out the essential characters. 
The separation of the essential components of a crime allows for studying the 
relation between them. For instance, the specific size, orientation, or spatial 
distribution of the components can be studied and brought into relation with the 
complex territory of criminal behaviour.  
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We will build the design of a novel scenario model on the research conducted in 
the previous chapters.  
 
In chapter two, we listed the three critical elements that are responsible for the 
failure of military campaigns (cf. Cohen & Gooch, 1985). 
1. The failure to learn (see definition 2.5) 
2. The failure to adapt (see definition 2.6) 
3. The failure to anticipate (see definition 2.7) 
 
We argued that these three elements correlate with the domain of law-
enforcement agencies in which (1) learning is required in the analysis of historic 
incidents, (2) adaptation is required in the process of investigation of a crime, and 
(3) anticipation is required in foreseeing (and adequately responding to) future 
criminal behaviour.  
 
In chapter three, we studied the literature on scenario-based anticipation methods 
to value what previous research offered in the design of a novel scenario model. 
Based on this literature review, we defined a scenario model in chapter three as an 
arrangement of two or more scenarios that depicts how information about past 
scenarios (…) work in an interconnected way to generate an outcome with respect 
to possible future scenarios (see definition 3.2).  
 
Moreover, in chapter three we stated that an effective scenario model should 
satisfy three conditions: 
1. Offer the possibility to learn from historic criminal behaviour. 
2. Offer the possibility to adapt the chosen strategy on the basis of indicators 
that are found. 
3. Offer the possibility to anticipate (unexpected) future real-world behaviour. 
 
In chapter four, we defined the ESC12 that include “information about behaviour, 
goals, motivations, expectations, actions and reactions, successes and problems” 
(see definition 3.3.2). We arrived at the provisional conclusion that the ESC12 may 
offer a durable set of components to describe, characterise, and model a criminal 
act.  
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3 “The map is not the territory”  
The words by Korzybski at the beginning of this chapter reflect an essential 
concept. The map, by definition, is an abstraction of the territory. Just as the map 
should never be confused with the territory, models of reality should not be 
confused with reality itself. By definition, a model is less accurate than the territory 
it reflects. In fact, a perfect model (i.e., being accurate in all the original details) 
would be tragically ineffective. This paradox is based on the maxim that the more 
accurate a model is, the more it resembles the territory. Therefore, the most 
perfect model would be the territory itself. Such a model would obviously render 
itself perfectly useless.  
 
The map is an important concept in the context of our thesis. In order to identify 
and separate the “essential components” of crime, we will have to go through a 
process of extraction comparable to that which cartographers execute. This 
process raises the possibility that information, vital for an investigation, may get 
lost in abstraction. To ensure that our findings and outcomes are evaluated with 
the appropriate level of caution, it is crucial to identify the danger of losing 
essential information in the process of abstraction as a potential shortcoming of 
our scenario model. 
 
Our objective is to create a scenario model that allows human operators to 
navigate through the complex territory of criminal behaviour, in order to anticipate 
future incidents. Therefore, the scenario model requires a level of abstraction that 
maps out the essential components of criminal behaviour, yet does not reject 
relevant information. The scenarios that constitute the outcome of the model are 
to be appreciated as abstractions of the territory and will need to be “translated” 
to actual situations by domain experts in the field of criminal behaviour. Without 
this translation, the model is as useful as a map without somebody to relate it to 
the territory. 
 
5.2 The conceptual design of the ESC12 scenario 
model 
In this section, we focus on the conceptual design of a scenario model able to 
anticipate criminal behaviour. The conceptual design aims to give precedence to 
the hypothetical function of the model. Additionally, the conceptual design 
explores the value of modelling criminal behaviour by using the ESC12.  
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Our point of departure in the conceptual design is the process of pre-processing. 
This process relies on a breakdown of historical data in the Elementary Scenario 
Components (i.e., the ESC12). To clarify the process of pre-processing, figure 5.2 
is drawn in which figure 5.2a represents all the available and heterogeneous raw 
data related to criminal behaviour. Figure 5.2b represents the extracted ESC12 




Fig 5.2a The heterogeneous data.          Fig 5.2b The ESC12. 
Figure 5.2 Extracting the ESC12 from the heterogeneous dataset. 
 
Pre-processing data into the ESC12 provides “building blocks” by which 
classification, ranking, and combination of individual Elementary Scenario 
Components is made possible. Extracting these components from the raw dataset 
is an essential part of the scenario model, as the ESC12 will provide the common 
denominator that facilitates the flow of information between the different stages of 
the scenario model.  
 
Additionally, pre-processing raw data into the ESC12 allows criminal incidents to 
be described in a structured and systematic manner. It facilitates (1) the analysis of 
individual scenarios, (2) the analysis of multiple, idiosyncratic scenarios, and (3) the 
analysis of idiosyncratic ESC12. Below we will briefly describe these three types of 
analysis. 
 
1 Analysis of individual scenarios 
Having identified the ESC12 related to a specific incident (as depicted above), 









In the design of a novel scenario model able to anticipate criminal behaviour, we 
take the information of the previous chapters as our point of departure.  
 
To be able to explore the concept of the ESC12 in a conceptual design of the 
scenario model, we introduce a graphical representation that will guide us through 
this chapter. In this representation we restrict ourselves to an example set of 
letters, and portray the ESC12 as the components that are substantiated by 
elements of the following characters [S,C,E,N,A,R,I,O]. When put in the right order, 
they form the word SCENARIO. 
 
To each of the characters, three discernable features are related, viz. 
1. Orientation: characters with identical orientation are part of the same 
historic scenario, 
2. Size: the size of a character reflects its importance within a scenario, 
3. Spatial distribution: the distance between individual characters of a scenario 
reflects the strength of their relation. 
 
The aforementioned features will be used to clarify the conceptual design of the 
ESC12 scenario model. We will explain how storing the ESC12 components in a 
structured way, may be used for (1) the ability to learn (subsection 5.2.1), (2) the 
ability to adapt (subsection 5.2.2), and (3) the ability to anticipate (subsection 
5.2.3). 
 
5.2.1 ESC12 and the ability to learn 
In chapter two we have defined learning as the ability to absorb readily accessible 
lessons from history. Traditional law enforcement does not value lessons from 
history mainly because history is not stored in a way that makes it readily 
accessible (cf. McCue, 2007). Criminal incidents are investigated as separate 
events; as individual scenarios that are not brought into relation with previous 
criminal incidents. According to McCue (2007) law-enforcement agencies regard a 
criminal incident as a unique event that consists of a set of specific, idiosyncratic 
characteristics. However, as she argues, analysis of similar historic incidents may 
offer an important added value. Therefore, to enable researchers to absorb readily 
accessible lessons from history, the conceptual design of the ESC12 scenario 
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3 Analysis of idiosyncratic ESC12 
Accumulating the ESC12, identified from different incidents, in a systemised way 
will create a “scenario matrix”, or a two-dimensional array of Elementary Scenario 
Components, arranged in rows and columns. This is depicted in figure 5.5.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Creating a two-dimensional scenario matrix. 
 
Storing the ESC12 in a structured way creates a new perspective on the data. For 
instance, it allows for comparing Elementary Scenario Components from incidents 
that are seemingly not related. An example is given in figure 5.6a, where the 
letters N from different scenarios are compared with each other.  
 
Additionally, it allows for analysing the Elementary Scenario Components that 
appear to have the same size. In figure 5.6b the letters that appear to have the 
same size can be compared with each other.  
 
              
 
5.6a Analysis of one ESC12.        5.6b Analysis of same-sized ESC12. 
Figure 5.6 The ability to learn. 
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For example, based on figure 5.3, one may note that the characters “E” and “R” 
have the same size, or that “A” is the largest character of all.  
 
These observations might reveal meaningful relations that are relevant in this 
specific scenario. However, they might also prove to be useful in discovering 
meaningful relations that transcend the level of individual criminal incidents.  
 
2 Analysis of multiple, idiosyncratic scenarios 
While an individual scenario may be analysed for the size and spatial distribution of 
its particular ESC12, comparing these observations to other scenarios may offer an 





Figure 5.4 Extracting multiple scenarios from the dataset. 
 
Studying the size and spatial distribution of the ESC12 in the three different 
scenarios may render new relations about the way the ESC12 are related. These 
new relations may (dis)prove earlier ones. For instance, from the three scenarios 
depicted in figure 5.4 one may conclude that the size of the characters “E” and 
“R” are the same within each individual scenario (which confirms the relation that 
was discovered in the aforementioned analysis of the individual scenario). 
Moreover, analysis of the three scenarios reveals that the characters “S” in all three 
scenarios have the same size. Additionally, one could note that concerning the 
spatial distribution of the characters, the two letters “I” and “O” show an overlap 
in all three scenarios.  
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The scenarios depicted on the top three rows of figure 5.7 were taken from the 
examples described in subsection 5.2.1. Analysis of these scenarios revealed three 
meaningful relations. 
1. The size of the characters “E” and “R” are the same within each of the 
individual scenarios 
2. The characters “S” have the same size in the three scenarios.  
3. In the three scenarios the characters “I” and “O” overlap (see subsection 
5.2.1).  
 




Box 5: A practical illustration 
 
If we were to translate the three relations mentioned above to an operational law-enforcement 
situation, the analysed scenarios may indicate that  
1. in the three incidents different types of weapons (Means) were used, these weapons, 
correlate with the Resistance the protagonist had to overcome; 
2. the Motivation for executing the incident in all three scenarios was the same; 
3. the Arena in which the antagonist was killed, correlates strongly with Symbolism. 
 
 
Based on (a) the scenarios on the top three rows of figure 5.7 and (b) the relations 
they reveal, the scenario on the fourth row might be generated. Comparing this 
scenario to (the scenario of) the incident that recently occurred, might disclose 
unexpected similarities, suggesting or prioritising areas of investigation40.  
 
5.2.3 ESC12 and the ability to anticipate 
In chapter two, we have defined “anticipating” as the ability to foresee and adjust 
in a timely and effective fashion to future challenges. Anticipation in this context 
encompasses the analysis of current and historical facts to make predictions about 
future events. It relies on meaningful relationships, captured from past 
occurrences, to predict future trends and behaviour (see Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, 
& Smyth, 1996). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Notably, the newly generated scenario (fourth row of figure 5.7) may be added to the scenario matrix, 




As the aforementioned examples indicate, the process of pre-processing historical 
data in ESC12 and storing these components in a systemised manner, might unveil 
meaningful findings about the way data is related that could not have been found 
by traditional analysis of individual scenarios. 
 
Referring to our definition of information (see definition 5.1), we may state that the 
discovery of relations in crime-related data gives meaning to that data. This 
meaning essentially provides information, which subsequently becomes 
knowledge when it is put into the context of criminal behaviour (see definition 5.2). 
This process is quite valuable, both in predictive analysis as well as in intelligence. 
 
5.2.2 ESC12 and the ability to adapt  
In chapter two, we have defined adapting as the ability to take appropriate action 
to deal with new and unexpected situations. A scenario model that breaks down 
incidents in ESC12 may be of significant importance in the process of adapting to 
(and taking appropriate action to deal with) developing criminal behaviour. For 
instance, when an incident has recently occurred, historic scenarios can be studied 
for similarities to the present incident, suggesting or prioritising areas of 
investigation. Below we provide an example. To illustrate the process of 
adaptation, we created figure 5.7. 
  
 




The scenarios depicted on the top three rows of figure 5.7 were taken from the 
examples described in subsection 5.2.1. Analysis of these scenarios revealed three 
meaningful relations. 
1. The size of the characters “E” and “R” are the same within each of the 
individual scenarios 
2. The characters “S” have the same size in the three scenarios.  
3. In the three scenarios the characters “I” and “O” overlap (see subsection 
5.2.1).  
 




Box 5: A practical illustration 
 
If we were to translate the three relations mentioned above to an operational law-enforcement 
situation, the analysed scenarios may indicate that  
1. in the three incidents different types of weapons (Means) were used, these weapons, 
correlate with the Resistance the protagonist had to overcome; 
2. the Motivation for executing the incident in all three scenarios was the same; 
3. the Arena in which the antagonist was killed, correlates strongly with Symbolism. 
 
 
Based on (a) the scenarios on the top three rows of figure 5.7 and (b) the relations 
they reveal, the scenario on the fourth row might be generated. Comparing this 
scenario to (the scenario of) the incident that recently occurred, might disclose 
unexpected similarities, suggesting or prioritising areas of investigation40.  
 
5.2.3 ESC12 and the ability to anticipate 
In chapter two, we have defined “anticipating” as the ability to foresee and adjust 
in a timely and effective fashion to future challenges. Anticipation in this context 
encompasses the analysis of current and historical facts to make predictions about 
future events. It relies on meaningful relationships, captured from past 
occurrences, to predict future trends and behaviour (see Fayyad, Piatetsky-Shapiro, 
& Smyth, 1996). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Notably, the newly generated scenario (fourth row of figure 5.7) may be added to the scenario matrix, 




As the aforementioned examples indicate, the process of pre-processing historical 
data in ESC12 and storing these components in a systemised manner, might unveil 
meaningful findings about the way data is related that could not have been found 
by traditional analysis of individual scenarios. 
 
Referring to our definition of information (see definition 5.1), we may state that the 
discovery of relations in crime-related data gives meaning to that data. This 
meaning essentially provides information, which subsequently becomes 
knowledge when it is put into the context of criminal behaviour (see definition 5.2). 
This process is quite valuable, both in predictive analysis as well as in intelligence. 
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p(xi) in which i = [1..12] 
 
Assume that p is not one historic scenario but a collection of historic scenarios. 
Each scenario of the collection may be denoted as pj in which j = 1 to m, and m 
refers to the total amount of different scenarios in the collection. (In the 
aforementioned illustrations we have represented this collection of historic 
scenarios as the rows of the scenario matrix. See figure 5.5). Consequently, a 
collection of historic scenarios may formally be denoted as follows. 
 
pj(xi) in which j = [1..m] and i = [1..12] 
 
Assume that the scenario q refers to a new or future incident, which evidently 
comprises the same set of Elementary Scenario Components, which we will denote 
as y1 to y12 . Consequently, the new scenario q may be described as follows. 
 
q(yi) in which i = [1..12] 
 
So far, we represented one Elementary Scenario Component for a scenario by 
pj(xi). The next step is to evaluate the Elementary Scenario Component xi under the 
scenario pj (In the aforementioned illustrations we have given value to orientation, 
size, and distribution). This can be done by evaluating the function E. So, we then 
arrive at  
 
E(pj(xi)) in which E denotes the function Evaluate 
 
Instead of evaluating one Elementary Scenario Component xi under a scenario pj, 
we can also evaluate all Elementary Scenario Components under the scenario pj. 
This leads to  
 
EA (pj(x)) in which EA denotes the function Evaluate all, and x means (x1, x2, … x12) 
 
An interesting question can be posed on the relation between  
EA (pj(x)) and 
i=1
n
∑ E (pj(xi)) 
as well as the relation between  
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In figure 5.8 the character “E” represents an essential component of a criminal 
incident. Given this character, the ambition could be to predict the size, 
orientation, and spatial distribution of missing characters related to this scenario. 
Having extracted useful relations between the ESC12 in subsection 5.2.1 (viz. (1) 
size of the characters “E” and “R” are the same within each individual scenario, 
and (2) the characters “S” in all three scenarios have the same size), and applying 




Figure 5.8 The ability to anticipate. 
 
The process of anticipation may be exploited to generate actionable output in a 
law-enforcement context. In Data mining and predictive analysis, McCue (2007) 
describes this process in drug-related homicide. By analysing data from historical 
incidents, a useful relationship was determined between the residence of victims 
and their subsequent murder location. Based on this “meaningful” relation, 
analysts were able to predict the likely location of an incident that was about to 
take place. Implementing this relation, the behaviour patterns of the potential 
victim could be modelled and used to anticipate the nature of future events (see 
McCue, 2007).  
 
5.2.4 Formalisation of the conceptual design  
In this section we will present a formalisation of the principles of the conceptual 
design that were explained above.  
 
Formally, we can refer to a historic scenario as p. As we have argued, every 
scenario consists of the same set of Elementary Scenario Components. We will 
refer to the ESC12 of scenario p as x1 to x12. (In the aforementioned figures we 
have limited x1 to xn to the 8 characters of the word scenario). Consequently, the 
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Components that appear in x and not in y, to anticipate scenario q by the following 
rule. 
 
Find all pj(x) for a given y in which d(x,y) < r, with r being the threshold41 
 
Moreover, we may use the Elementary Scenario Components x that appear 
frequently in the historic scenarios pj, to anticipate the current scenario q by the 
following rule. 
 
Of all retrieved pj(x) determine per Elementary Scenario Components xi, which 
values appear frequent. 
 
We reiterate here that many interesting questions emerging from the formalisation 
are not discussed in this thesis as we focus on a first implementation of ideas and 
not on the development and implementation of an extended formal framework.  
 
5.3 The architectural design 
Anticipating future events on the basis of historical incidents requires studying 
large sets of complex data as well as elaborate knowledge about the world (see 
McCue, 2007). In order to anticipate future events, and to produce operationally 
actionable output in a law-enforcement context, the ESC12 scenario model must 
be able to process large sets of complex data. The architectural design of the 
ESC12 scenario model therefore needs to encompass a configuration of modules 
that facilitate specific processes. For clarity and adequate understanding we will 
provide definitions for both the terms module and process below. 
 
Definition 5.4: Module 
A module is a structural component of the ESC12 scenario model that (i) 
accommodates the infrastructure for a process to be performed, and (ii) controls 
the process.  
 
Definition 5.5: Process 
A process is a series of actions, changes, or functions bringing about a result.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 In this example, a relative high threshold r would result in more recall, while a relative low threshold r would 
amount to more precision. 
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Here, we remark that the investigations involved are beyond our research topic. 
 
Below, we briefly discuss the plain application of the formalisation for (1) the ability 
to learn, (2) the ability to adapt, and (3) the ability to anticipate below. 
 
1: The ability to learn 
The ability to learn as described in subsection 5.2.1 refers to (1) the analysis of 
individual scenarios, (2) the analysis of multiple, idiosyncratic scenarios, and (3) the 
analysis of idiosyncratic ESC12. The formal description of the individual scenarios 
is fairly straightforward: p(xi) in which i = [1..12]. The formal description of the 
analysis of multiple, idiosyncratic scenarios is the next step. It refers to the analysis 
of pj(xi) in which j = [1..m] and i = [1..12]. For instance, one could analyse any 
i=1..12 of the components xi of the scenarios pj present in the collection p (as 
depicted in figure 5.6a), or one could analyse the sets of equal values xi of every 
i=1..12 of the scenarios pj present in the collection p (as depicted in figure 5.6b). 
 
2: The ability to adapt  
The ability to adapt as described in subsection 5.2.2 refers to the situation in which 
appropriate action is required to an actual situation. In this case, historic scenarios 
may be studied for similarities to the present (unfolding) scenario, called g.  
 
To measure the similarity between (the Elementary Scenario Components of) two 
scenarios, one could, for instance, analyse the Euclidean distance (i.e., the 
"ordinary" distance) between two points, provided that measurement rules have 
been designed and applied. Moreover, in that case, one might measure the cosine 
of the angle between two vectors pj(xi) and q(yi) with j = 1..m and i=1..12. 
Subsequently, a new area of research is to be developed.  
 
3: The ability to anticipate 
The ability to learn as described in subsection 5.2.3 is based on analysing the 
scenario collection p for similar values for their respective ESC12. When a new 
scenario arises (i.e., when an incident recently took place), a number of ESC12 may 
be known, while the remaining Elementary Scenario Components remain unknown. 
In such a new case, we may identify the Elementary Scenario Components of 
historic scenarios p, that resemble the new scenario q, by selecting the scenarios pj 
in which d(x,y) is minimal. In the scenarios pj, we may use the Elementary Scenario 
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Subsections Four modules Six processes 
1 2 3 4 A B C D E F 
5.3.2 x    x      
5.3.3  x    x     
5.3.4   x    x    
5.3.5    x    x   
5.3.6         x x 
 
Table 5.9 The four modules and six processes. 
 
For adequate understanding, we include figures in the subsections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 
and 5.3.5 that were introduced in the discussion of the conceptual design in 
section 5.2. Moreover, we frequently refer to figure 5.13 in which the four modules 
and six processes are brought together in the blueprint of the design of 
architectural model.  
 
5.3.1 The dataset 
The dataset essentially is an external part of the scenario model. It is therefore not 
labelled as one of the components of the model. However, the ESC12 scenario 
model is not able to operate without a specific dataset. Moreover, the model 
needs to be able to accommodate different sets of criminal incidents (e.g., data on 
lethal criminal violence, gang related data, etc.).  
 
As argued by McCue (2007) a dataset of historical criminal incidents is “generally 
very large, heterogeneous, often incongruous in nature and includes unsystematic 
and incomplete data”. To be made usable in the ESC12 scenario model, data 
needs to be crunched into components which the model can process. For this 
purpose the first module is created. 
 
5.3.2 Module 1: Data cruncher 
Describing criminal incidents in such a way that information becomes readily 
available as well as operational for its use in law enforcement requires that the 
heterogeneous data of historical criminal incidents is broken down into 
homogeneous components that the model can process. For this purpose the 
module Data cruncher is designed.  
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Based on the conceptual design discussed in the previous section, we arrived at an 
architectural design that encompasses four modules facilitating six processes. For 
convenient reading, we separate the modules from the processes by italicising the 
latter. 
 
The four modules of the scenario model are 
(1) Data cruncher 
(2) Scenario matrix 
(3) Controller 
(4) Scenario generator 
 
The six processes are 
(A) Data pre-processing  
(B) Data warehousing  
(C) Facilitating differentiated output 
(D) Generating differentiated output 
(E) Feedback 
(F) Applying knowledge 
 
As we will discuss below, four of the processes are accommodated by a single 
module (viz. the process of Data pre-processing is accommodated by the module 
Data cruncher, the process of Data warehousing is accommodated by the module 
Scenario matrix, the process of Facilitating differentiated output is accommodated 
by the module Controller, and the process of Generating differentiated output is 
accommodated by the module Scenario generator.). Both the remaining two 
processes (viz. Feedback and Applying knowledge) are accommodated by two 
modules (viz. Scenario matrix and Scenario generator). 
 
Below we will elaborate on the architectural design in detail. For convenient 
reading, we include table 5.9 that indicates the subsections (5.3.2 to 5.3.6) in which 
we will discuss the four modules (indicated by the numbers 1 to 4) and the six 
processes (indicated by the letters A to F). Combining the four modules and six 
processes, we will provide a blueprint of the architectural design in subsection 
5.3.7. 
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relational grid. Figure 5.11 is a graphical representation of the scenario matrix. It 
represents the data of several criminal incidents (depicted in rows), categorically 
stored in a consistent format.  
 
 
Figure 5.11 The Scenario matrix. 
 
The module Scenario matrix is designed to store data in such a fashion that it 
becomes readily available for analysis. Effectively, this second module of the 
architectural design facilitates the process of Data warehousing. 
 
Process B: Data warehousing 
The process of Data warehousing offers four advantages.  
1. The storage of data in a consistent format allows for rapid comparison of 
individual historic scenarios.  
2. In warehousing the data, the Scenario matrix stores knowledge about the 
way data is related (i.e., the relation between the ESC12 within an specific 
scenario).  
3. Warehousing the data in the ESC12 format preserves the data history, which 
permits studying the disassembled ESC12 for new and unforeseen 
correlations, without losing the relation they have with the original context 
(i.e., the original scenario).  
4. The process of warehousing the data stored by category, allows for (i) 
complex queries, and (ii) the retrieval of information (or meaningful data) 
from the dataset. For instance, from the data in the Scenario matrix, 
information on the development of different organisations can be retrieved 





Figure 5.10 is a graphical representation of the Data cruncher. It represents the 
heterogeneous data of historical criminal incidents (see subsection 5.3.1) on the 
left side of the figure, and the relevant Elementary Scenario Components of three 
separate incidents on the right side of the figure. 
 
Figure 5.10 The Data cruncher. 
 
Effectively, the Data cruncher extracts the Elementary Scenario Components from 
the large and heterogeneous dataset that is in use by law-enforcement agencies. 
As such, the first module controls the process of Data pre-processing. 
 
Process A: Data pre-processing 
The process of Data pre-processing refers to the extraction of the ESC12 from the 
dataset. Data pre-processing is an essential part of the scenario model as the 
ESC12 provide the common denominator that facilitates the flow of information 
between the different stages of the scenario model.  
 
In chapter six the process of Data pre-processing will be explained more in detail. 
To appreciate the role of the Data cruncher in the architectural design of the 
ESC12 model, it is sufficient to understand that the Data cruncher serves the 
process of Data pre-processing and extracts the relevant data of a criminal act 
from the dataset. 
 
5.3.3 Module 2: Scenario matrix 
Once the ESC12 are extracted from the dataset, the separate Elementary Scenario 
Components may be introduced into the Scenario matrix, where they are stored 
by category. From this point onwards the scenario model includes homogeneous 
data that is consistently coded, grouped in several tables, and positioned in a 
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request, the ESC12 scenario model has to be able to produce an output in the 
form of an ESC12 scenario.  
 
For instance, the first row of figure 5.12, represents the output related to an 
incident that actually occurred in the past42. Additionally, the fourth row of figure 
5.12 represents a scenario that has no manifest relation to a situation that actually 
occurred, but is constructed from a combination of ESC12 related to different 
incidents43. The third row of figure 5.12 refers to a situation in which, at a certain 
point in time, four components of an incident are known (represented by the 
characters S,E,R, and I), and the ESC12 scenario model is requested to suggest 
options for the remaining components44. All these three outputs are presented in 
the form of a scenario (of different nature) that consists of a collection of 
Elementary Scenario Components. However, the Scenario generator may also 
present output in a different form as is illustrated by the second row of figure 5.12. 
This row represents the outcome of a request to compare one single Elementary 
Scenario Component between different individual scenarios. 
 
As diverse as the output can be, the product of the Scenario generator will be 
based on the ESC12. Proposing an output that is formatted in congruence with the 
way information is stored in the Scenario matrix, offers advantages both in the 
process of Feedback as in the process of Applying knowledge that are described 
below.  
 
5.3.6 Feedback and Applying knowledge 
Feedback and Applying knowledge are two processes that are not connected to 
one single module of the scenario model. Both these processes take place in 
between the modules Scenario matrix and Scenario generator (see figure 5.13). 
While the Controller bridges these two modules, the output that is generated by 
the scenario model may flow back from the Scenario generator into the Scenario 
matrix, either by the process of Feedback or by the process of Applying 
knowledge. 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Note that the orientation of the separate ESC12 in this scenario is the same. 
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5.3.4 Module 3: Controller 
The Controller in the scenario model is a required interface that receives user input 
and initiates a response by making calls for data or information in the Scenario 
matrix. The Controller module essentially links the user to the ESC12 scenario 
model and is responsible for the process of facilitating differentiated output. 
 
Process C: Facilitating differentiated output  
The process of Facilitating differentiated output is the process by which 
commands are issued to the scenario matrix, and an output is commissioned 
based on the users’ request.  
 
5.3.5 Module 4: Scenario generator 
The Scenario generator is instructed by the Controller and represents the module 
that is responsible for delivering the final product of the ESC12 scenario model. 
Based on the users’ request, the output of the Scenario generator can be 
presented in a variety of formats as will be discussed below in the process of 
Generating differentiated output. Figure 5.12 is a graphical representation of the 




Figure 5.12 The Scenario generator. 
 
Module 4 of the architectural design of the ESC12 scenario model executes the 
process of Generating differentiated output. 
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request, the ESC12 scenario model has to be able to produce an output in the 
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For instance, the first row of figure 5.12, represents the output related to an 
incident that actually occurred in the past42. Additionally, the fourth row of figure 
5.12 represents a scenario that has no manifest relation to a situation that actually 
occurred, but is constructed from a combination of ESC12 related to different 
incidents43. The third row of figure 5.12 refers to a situation in which, at a certain 
point in time, four components of an incident are known (represented by the 
characters S,E,R, and I), and the ESC12 scenario model is requested to suggest 
options for the remaining components44. All these three outputs are presented in 
the form of a scenario (of different nature) that consists of a collection of 
Elementary Scenario Components. However, the Scenario generator may also 
present output in a different form as is illustrated by the second row of figure 5.12. 
This row represents the outcome of a request to compare one single Elementary 
Scenario Component between different individual scenarios. 
 
As diverse as the output can be, the product of the Scenario generator will be 
based on the ESC12. Proposing an output that is formatted in congruence with the 
way information is stored in the Scenario matrix, offers advantages both in the 
process of Feedback as in the process of Applying knowledge that are described 
below.  
 
5.3.6 Feedback and Applying knowledge 
Feedback and Applying knowledge are two processes that are not connected to 
one single module of the scenario model. Both these processes take place in 
between the modules Scenario matrix and Scenario generator (see figure 5.13). 
While the Controller bridges these two modules, the output that is generated by 
the scenario model may flow back from the Scenario generator into the Scenario 
matrix, either by the process of Feedback or by the process of Applying 
knowledge. 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Note that the orientation of the separate ESC12 in this scenario is the same. 
43 Note that the orientation of the separate ESC12 in this scenario is different. 
44 Note that the known components S,E,R, and I, in this scenario are presented in black, and that the 
components suggested by the ESC12 scenario model, appear in grey. 
 
 144 
5.3.4 Module 3: Controller 
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Figure 5.13 The blueprint of the ESC12 scenario model. 
 
5.4 Answer to research question 2 
In this chapter we addressed the second research question of our thesis [To what 
extent can a scenario model be designed by which criminal behaviour can be 
anticipated?]. To address this RQ, we documented the conceptual and 
architectural design of a novel scenario model that allows human operators to 
anticipate future criminal behaviour.  
 
The design parameters of the scenario model are based on the research 
conducted in the previous four chapters. We synthesised information from the 
theoretical basis of our thesis (chapter two), with the literature review (chapter 
three), and our study of the ESC12 (chapter four) into a definition of an ESC12 
scenario model. Moreover, we ascertained that an effective scenario model 
facilitates (a) the storing of knowledge and experience gained from previous 
situations, which will be used for (b) detecting and analysing trends and 
unexpected relations. Successively, these trends and relations are to be 




Process E: Feedback 
As argued above, the output of the scenario model is presented in ESC12 format 
(i.e., in the form of scenarios that constitute a combination of the ESC12 
components). This format allows for a seamless introduction of the outputted 
scenario back into the Scenario matrix to accumulate the number of scenarios 
present in the matrix (see figure 5.13). The process of introducing newly generated 
scenarios into the ESC12 scenario model is defined as the process of Feedback.  
 
Process F: Applying knowledge 
The process of Applying knowledge refers to exploiting knowledge (i.e., data with 
a meaning and information, within a context (see definition 5.2)) that is latently 
present within the ESC12 scenario model. For instance, when the analysis of 
historic scenarios produces additional, and previously unknown knowledge, this 
knowledge may be fed back into the system (see figure 5.13). The process of 
introducing newly ascertained knowledge into the ESC12 scenario model is 
defined as the process of Applying knowledge.  
 
In essence, the processes of Feedback, and that of Applying knowledge, provide 
for a scenario model that is in a continuous state of learning, augmenting the data, 
the information, and the knowledge.  
 
5.3.7 The blueprint 
Combining the modules and processes described above leads to an outline of an 
ESC12 scenario model by which criminal behaviour may be anticipated. To 
illustrate this outline, we create figure 5.13 which can be seen as a blueprint, a 
graphical representation documenting the architectural design of the ESC12 
scenario model. The blueprint integrates and synthesises the four modules (viz. 
Data cruncher, Scenario matrix, Controller, and Scenario generator) and six 
processes (viz. Data pre-processing, Data warehousing, Facilitating differentiated 
output, Generating differentiated output, Feedback and Applying knowledge) into 
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Subsequently, we separated the conceptual design (in which the hypothetical 
function of the model is explored), from the architectural design (in which the 
modules and processes that constitute the model are studied). 
 
To guide the process of conceptual design, we defined three factors that are 
deemed quintessential in military and law-enforcement campaigns; the ability to 
learn, the ability to adapt, and the ability to anticipate (Cohen & Gooch, 1985). As 
we determined, the ESC12 scenario model needs to contribute to these abilities in 
order to be effective in law-enforcement context. With specially designed graphics 
we explored the role of the ESC12 in the scenario model. To answer RQ2 we 
investigated whether ESC12 offers a durable set of components that enables (a) 
learning from criminal behaviour, (b) adapting to developing criminal behaviour, 
and (c) anticipating future criminal behaviour. 
 
Our exploration of the conceptual design of the ESC12 scenario model served as 
the foundation for the architectural design in which we studied the modules and 
processes that would amount to a scenario model able to anticipate criminal 
behaviour. We integrated four modules (viz. Data cruncher, Scenario matrix, 
Controller, and Scenario generator) and six processes (viz Data pre-processing, 
Data warehousing, Facilitating differentiated output, Generating differentiated 
output, Feedback and Applying knowledge) into a proposal for an architectural 
design of an ESC12 scenario model. The resultant design has been presented in 
the form of a blueprint, a graphical representation of the architectural design of 
the ESC12 scenario model. 
 
Effectively, this blueprint constitutes the answer RQ2. By this constructive 
approach we have made plausible that an ESC12 scenario model can be created 
to the extent that it is in principle able to combine observations and indications in 
a classified way, which may lead to a realistic scenario of a criminal act.  
 
To assess the actual potential of the ESC12 scenario model to anticipate criminal 
behaviour, we will combine the design proposed in this chapter with an actual 
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to the extent that it is in principle able to combine observations and indications in 
a classified way, which may lead to a realistic scenario of a criminal act.  
 
To assess the actual potential of the ESC12 scenario model to anticipate criminal 
behaviour, we will combine the design proposed in this chapter with an actual 
dataset of criminal behaviour. This will be the subject of the next chapter.  
 
  
SIX | Creating the ESP PANDORA
6
This chapter constitutes the realisation of the Experimental 
Scenario Platform ”PANDORA” by which we will assess the 
potential of the ESC12 scenario model.
“Hope, which whispered from Pandora’s box, 
after all the other plagues and sorrows had escaped, 
is the best and last of all things. 
Without it, there is only time.”
The Rule of Four45




To be able to test the capabilities of the ESC12 scenario model designed in 
chapter five, we will build an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP). The ESP is 
expected to allow us to answer RQ3 and RQ4 adequately. We will answer RQ3 in 
chapter seven, and RQ4 in chapter eight. This chapter will constitute the 
realisation of the ESP. 
 
As a guideline for the reader we define the term Experimental Scenario Platform 
(ESP) that from this chapter onwards will be used throughout this thesis. We define 
ESP as follows. 
 
Definition 6.1: Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) 
The Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) is the combination of the ESC12 
scenario model as proposed in this thesis combined with an arbitrary dataset of 
criminal behaviour. An ESP is used to enable the further development and testing 
of the ESC12 scenario model46.  
 
To discern the conceptual ESC12 scenario model proposed in chapter four from 
the Experimental Scenario Platform we will assemble in this chapter, we have given 
the latter a name: PANDORA. Pandora is an obvious reference to Pandora’s box, an 
artefact from classical Greek mythology. Pandora, according to the myth, was the 
first woman on earth. She was sent by the gods and given a container that she was 
urged never to open for it contained all evil of the world. However, impelled by 
curiosity, Pandora opened the container and released its evil contents. The one 
item that remained at the bottom of the container was Hope (Hesiod, 700 BCE). 
 
Advancing on this analogy, one may regard the architectural design of the ESC12 
scenario model proposed in chapter five as the “box”, and the dataset that will be 
attached to the model, as its “contents”. By adding data from terrorist incidents to 
the scenario model we aim to create the ESP PANDORA that contains violent historic 
incidents that caused harm and grief to many people. Opening this “box” will 
unleash its “evil contents”. However, it will also allow us to study the predicaments 
of criminal behaviour; something that, when related to Greek mythology, can be 
seen as the item that remained at the bottom.  
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To be able to test the capabilities of the ESC12 scenario model designed in 
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and criminals is based on a relatively small amount of information gathered from a 
small population of criminals, generally the unsuccessful ones. Obviously, (a) 
criminals who were not arrested, and (b) crimes that were not detected, 
undeniably hold valuable information for analysis, but are usually not identified 
and documented, and therefore not included in criminal research (cf. McCue, 
2007).  
 
In the field of terrorism research the situation is different. Because of the impact on 
society, the research of terrorist attacks is neither limited to the successful ones, 
nor to the incidents in which the terrorist were arrested. However, this does not 
imply that the available information is fully representative. Typically, much of the 
data concerning terrorist incidents is gathered in retrospect and it is only after the 
incident that behaviour is identified and linked. Even in the cases in which 
researchers have had access to people involved in, or associated with, terrorism 
(e.g., Merari, 2010; Soibelman 2004) the bias of the information is hard to 
ascertain. After all, the personal accounts of the respondents are likely to be 
distorted by their own views of the success or failure of their actions, as well as the 
situation in which their actions are reviewed. We conclude by stating that the 
sampling of crime-related data is a difficult challenge as retrospective 
identification, characterisation, and analysis is suspected to have a negative effect 
on the reliability and validity of the data.  
 
6.1.2 Limitations of using open-source data 
In creating an ESP we will add open-source data to the ESC12 scenario model. 
Open-source data brings about three issues that need to be considered: (1) the 
reliability of data, (2) the consistency of data, and (3) the fuzziness of data.  
 
1 The reliability of data 
In law enforcement, there is a strong correlation between verified and classified 
information. The process of verification of information (i.e., the reliability of data) 
inevitably leads to restrictions, such as the ones concerning safety, accessibility, 
and levels of classification. 
 
Good practice of scientific inquiry requires that data and methodology are 
documented and made public. This full disclosure, by definition, excludes the use 
of classified information. Therefore, in creating the ESP PANDORA we decided that 
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Since RQ3 and RQ4 are formulated to assess two distinctly different capabilities of 
the ESC12 scenario model, we will create two different ESPs: PANDORA I and 
PANDORA II. 
 
This chapter advances on the studies by two Master students, viz. Van der Heide 
(2011) and Bressers (2012) who extensively tested and improved the ESP PANDORA, 
as well as its Elementary Scenario Components and their corresponding variables 
(see also section 1.8 “Publications arising from this thesis”).  
 
The chapter will start with a brief outline of the data gathered in ESP PANDORA 
(section 6.1). In section 6.2 the ESC12, the variables they comprise, and their 
internal structure will be discussed. Section 6.3 will elaborate on the ESP PANDORA I 
that we use to provide an answer to RQ3 in chapter seven, and the ESP PANDORA II 
to answer RQ4 in chapter eight. Section 6.4 summarises this chapter. 
 
6.1 Data in PANDORA  
Both the ESP PANDORA I and ESP PANDORA II combine the conceptual design of the 
ESC12 scenario model proposed in chapter four, with a dataset of terrorist 
incidents (see definition 6.1). Adding data to the model brings about two 
limitations that need to be considered: sampling of crime-related data (subsection 
6.1.1) and the limitations of using open-source data (subsection 6.1.2). To ensure 
that our findings and outcomes are evaluated with the appropriate level of 
caution, it is crucial to identify these limitations as potential shortcomings of the 
ESP PANDORA. 
 
6.1.1 Sampling of crime-related data 
In this thesis we will work with a sample of information: data from the field of 
terrorism as a subset of the entire population of criminal data. Based on the 
principle of inferential statistics, a sample of data from the narrow domain of 
terrorism will be collected. This data will be added to the ESC12 scenario model to 
create the ESP PANDORA, and will be used to draw inferences about the general 
population from which it was drawn.  
 
The bias of such a sample is something that is hard to establish, but can be 
suspected to be noteworthy. Emblematic for data from the field of law 
enforcement, is that access is limited. It is said that everything we know of crime 
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internal structure of the ESP PANDORA and the variables that were selected for 
inclusion in our ESC12 scenario model. 
 
To crunch the data and to distinguish relevant data from less relevant data with 
respect to historical criminal incidents, we arrived at 98 variables. In subdividing 
the ESC12, we used four types of values: (1) dichotomous values (such as yes/no 
and male/female), (2) numerical values, (3) categorical values, and (4) text values. 
Table 6.1 presents the value of the variables related to the ESC12. (We remark that 
the two Elementary Scenario Components Symbolism and Red herring are related 
to the remaining 10 Elementary Scenario Components (see subsection 4.2.2 and 
table 4.3). Therefore, Symbolism and Red herring do not possess idiosyncratic 
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In chapter seven “Developing the ESP PANDORA” we will further elaborate on the 
variables of the ESC12 scenario model and on their internal structure. For now it is 
sufficient to know that the ESC12 constitute 98 variables.  
 
6.3 Creating two platforms  
To answer RQ3 [To what extent can a scenario model be used to analyse historic 
criminal behaviour?] we required an experimental scenario model that is able to 
hold detailed information about terrorist incidents. For this specific reason we 
created the ESP PANDORA I, which holds elaborate and detailed information about 
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the practice of scientific inquiry prevailed over the use of more reliable, classified 
information. However, this may imply that the potential of the model is negatively 
influenced by the data. Moreover, we reiterate that the extent to which the 
outcome of the model is biased, remains something that is hard to assess. 
 
2 The consistency of data  
The second issue related to open-source data collection is the consistency of 
information. Different sources do not always provide the same data on the same 
topic. In creating the ESP PANDORA, we used the following two rules.  
1. When contradictory information in different sources was found, we opted to 
accept the facts supported by the majority of the sources.  
2. In cases where there was no majority, we adopted the facts that seemed 
most plausible for us as researchers. 
 
3 The fuzziness of data  
The third issue that relates to open-source data collection is the fuzziness of data. 
For instance, data on variables as Motivation, Primary objective, Symbolism, and 
Red herring is non-objective and open for interpretation (see figure 4.2). To 
address the issue of the fuzziness of data adequately, we used the following two 
rules.  
1. When data from sources was unclear, or fitted multiple alternative 
explanations, the term “miscellaneous” was used.  
2. When no data was found, the field was left blank or listed “Unspecified”. 
 
6.2 Subdividing the ESC12 
The ESC12 are the main categories on which the ESC12 scenario model is based. 
Taken together, they form the narrative or scenario of an event. However, as 
argued in chapter four, the ESC12 represent categories too broad and general for 
analysis.  
 
In order to be made suitable for the ESC12 scenario model, we subdivide every 
Elementary Scenario Component into a set of variables. Effectively, these variables 
and their internal structure will guide the pre-processing of data that takes place in 
the module “the data cruncher” (see subsection 5.3.2). Below we briefly introduce 
the variables that are included in the ECS 12 scenario model. Moreover, we 
provide the classification of the variables. In chapter seven we will describe the 
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internal structure of the ESP PANDORA and the variables that were selected for 
inclusion in our ESC12 scenario model. 
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Box 6: An operational illustration 
 
When adding data from the assassination of Van Gogh to PANDORA I, we learned that the note, by 
which the protagonist claimed the responsibility, was left in a rather peculiar manner. It was knifed 
to the chest of the antagonist. Instead of adding the categorical value “Note knifed to chest of 
antagonist” to the existing list of categorical values of the variable “Mode of claim of 
responsibility”, we decided to introduce a new variable; “Description of Claim of responsibility”. 
This variable allows adding specific details (as text value) to the ESC12 scenario model.  
 
Arguably, when knifing letters to the chest of an antagonist becomes characteristic, this method of 
claiming responsibility could or should be added to the categorical values of the variable “Mode of 
claim of responsibility”. 
 
 
Throughout the process of adding data to the ESP PANDORA I, the variables of the 
ESC12 empirically advanced and improved. During the development of the ESP 
PANDORA, minutes of the changes have been kept; so, future users can trace the 
modifications and use this information to explore or enhance the model (cf. 
Bressers, 2012).  
 
PANDORA I contains 157 individual terrorist incidents, deconstructed into 12 
Elementary Scenario Components (rows) and subdivided into 98 variables 
(columns) per incident. With its 15,386 fields this constitutes the most elaborate, 
unclassified database of terrorist incidents in the Netherlands at the time of 
publication of this thesis.  
 
While 157 unique terrorist incidents might contain sufficient information for 
qualitative research, this number of records is not sufficiently large to guarantee 
the reliability of the results in a quantitative analysis.  Therefore, to approach the 
fourth research question [To what extent are data-mining techniques applied to a 
scenario model able to enhance the ability of law-enforcement agencies to 
anticipate criminal behaviour?], we needed to expand the ESP PANDORA I 
significantly.  
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a relatively small number of terrorist incidents. Subsection 6.3.1 will further 
elaborate on PANDORA I. 
 
To be able to answer RQ4 [To what extent are data-mining techniques applied to 
a scenario model able to enhance the ability of law enforcements agencies to 
anticipate criminal behaviour?] we required a model that primarily encompasses a 
large number of terrorist incidents. For that reason, we enhanced the ESP 
PANDORA I with terrorist incidents taken from a third party database. The database 
that was created accordingly was named PANDORA II. While the incidents recorded 
in PANDORA II are recorded in much less detail that the incidents recorded in 
PANDORA I, it holds general information about a relatively large number of terrorist 
incidents. However, in answering RQ4, the number of incidents prevails over the 
level of detail per incident. Subsection 6.3.2 will further elaborate on the ESP 
PANDORA II. 
 
Below we will explain both the ESPs and how they were created. For a perception 
of the chronological order of the development of the platform, we refer to the 
papers (listed in section 1.8) that were published on the progress of the PANDORA 
models. 
 
6.3.1 PANDORA I  
We created the ESP PANDORA I by adding data from 157 terrorist incidents to the 
ESC12 scenario model. We accumulated terrorist incidents from OSINT data, 
extracted the relevant information, and added it to one of the variables of the 
ESC12 (see Van der Heide, 2011).  
 
Apart from dichotomous values, numerical values, and text values, the model 
contains categorical values. Obviously, a number of the categorical values could 
be determined in advance (e.g., the variable ”Day of the week” consists of seven 
values). However, other categorical values grew empirically. For instance, when we 
were adding data to the model, we determined different manners in which 
incidents are claimed. To be able to include this information in the ESC12 scenario 
model, we introduced the variable “Mode of claim of responsibility”, and created 
categorical values from the different ways in which incidents are claimed. When we 
found a manner of claiming responsibility that did not seem to fit the categorical 
values that were created, we added a new categorical value. Box 6 illustrates how 
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a relatively small number of terrorist incidents. Subsection 6.3.1 will further 
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In total, the GTD supported only 24 of the 98 variables of the ESC12 scenario 
model. However, we established that this would be a good start to address RQ4 
adequately. Therefore, we decided to merge the PANDORA I with GTD in a new and 
expanded ESP that we named PANDORA II.  
 
PANDORA II was formatted in an Open Office file. As Open Office files are restricted 
to a maximum of 65,000 records, we did not use all the incidents recorded in the 
GTD. We commissioned cases from the year 1991 until the year 2010.  
 
Notably, as only 22 of the 98 PANDORA variables were logged in the GTD, 76 fields 
were left blank in the ESP PANDORA II. Additionally, variables of the GTD that did 
not fit within the scenario concept were excluded from PANDORA II. For a detailed 
description of the merging of the ESP PANDORA I, and the GTD, we refer to 
Pandora II, Improvements to a scenario model for investigation of terrorist 
behaviour by Bressers (2012). Together with the 157 cases of PANDORA I, the total 
number of cases in the ESP PANDORA II accumulates to 53,289.  
 
6.3.3 Section conclusion 
With the creation of the ESPs PANDORA I and PANDORA II, we believe to be 
adequately equipped to address RQ3 and RQ4. We include table 6.2 to provide a 
convenient comparison of the number of incidents, and number of variables in 
PANDORA I and PANDORA II. 
 
ESP RQ Number of incidents Number of variables 
PANDORA I 3 157 98 
PANDORA II 4 53,289 24 
 
Table 6.2 A comparison of the ESPs PANDORA II and PANDORA II. 
 
6.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we argued that the conceptual idea of the ESC12 scenario model 
able to anticipate criminal behaviour, as proposed in chapter five, needs to be 
assessed through the creation of an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP). This 
chapter described the development of the ESP named PANDORA.  
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6.3.2 PANDORA II  
In Short-term forecasting of crime, Gorr et al. (2003) stated that one of the main 
problems with crime anticipation is that the models are using small-scale data 
series. Brown et al. (2004) argued that since terrorist attacks are relatively rare, 
they have only a few data points to make their forecast models. As forecast errors 
increase as data aggregations become smaller (Gorr & Harries, 2003), the ESP 
PANDORA I needed to be expanded in order to address these challenges 
adequately.  
 
PANDORA II is first described in Pandora II, Improvements to a scenario model for 
investigation of terrorist behaviour by Bressers (2012). She suggested to expand 
the ESP PANDORA I considerably in order to make it usable for statistical analysis. 
Following this suggestion we (i.e., our team; supervisors, advisory board, and 
students) investigated to what extent PANDORA I could be merged with the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), an open-source database including more than 104,000 
records on terrorist events throughout the world (National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2012)47. The GTD includes cases 
from 1970 and can be accessed through an online interface. Although the data of 
each individual terrorist incident is limited, the GTD constitutes the largest number 
of incidents in an unclassified dataset on terrorist events in the world. 
  
After comparing all variables of PANDORA I with those of the GTD, it appeared that 
the two databases had some fundamental differences. Most importantly, PANDORA I 
is based on the classical scenario components of the creative industry and 
therefore incorporates some very specific variables such as Symbolism and Red 
herring. These components were not found in the GTD, neither were other more 
straightforward variables such as “time” that describes the exact time an incident 
took place or “leakage” that describes whether there was a leakage48 before, 
during, or after the incident.  
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is an open-source database that includes information on terrorist 
events around the world from 1970 through 2012 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2012). 
48 Leakage in this context refers to any form of (un)intentional communication of intentions. 
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First, we addressed the sampling of the data to be used in the ESP and the 
limitations related to the use of open-source data. We discussed three limitations 
viz. (i) the reliability of data, (ii) the consistency of data, and (iii) the fuzziness of 
data. 
 
Second, we argued that the ESC12 represent categories that are too broad and 
general for use in a scenario model able to anticipate criminal behaviour. The 
process of crunching the data and subdividing the ESC12 into a range of variables 
is explained. Arguments and a line of reasoning for a proper subdivision of the 
variables will be given in chapter seven. 
 
Third, we considered an adequate answering procedure for RQ3 as well as for 
RQ4. We arrived at two different and possibly idiosyncratic models. Subsequently, 
we explained the development of the ESP PANDORA I containing detailed 
information of 157 terrorist incidents. Thereafter, we explained the process of 
merging PANDORA I with the Global Terrorist Database to create the ESP PANDORA II.  
 
Having assembled two ESPs we can now focus on the internal structure of the ESP 
and the process of data preparation. This will be the subject of the next chapter.  
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SEVEN | Developing the ESP 
PANDORA
7
This chapter focusses on the internal structure of the ESP 
PANDORA and on the process of data pre-processing.
The value of any piece of information is only known when you can 
connect it with something else that arrives at a future point in time.
It is all about being able to correlate data ahead of time, 
 to see how things are related.
Gus Hunt49
49 Ira  “Gus” Hunt is currently the Chief Technology Officer for the Chief Information Officer at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
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Law-enforcement reports on criminal incidents consist of intricate patterns of 
complex information that is incongruous in nature (cf. McCue, 2007). To be able to 
accumulate data from different criminal incidents in the ESC12 scenario model, 
data has to be “crunched” and pre-processed (see chapter five). This chapter 
focusses on the internal structure of the ESP PANDORA and on the process of data 
pre-processing. 
 
A total of three Master students contributed to this chapter: Van der Heide, 2011; 
Bressers, 2012; and Stege, 2012 (see also section 1.8 “Publications arising from 
this thesis”). This chapter advances on their studies.  
 
The chapter comprises thirteen sections. In section 7.1 we describe the 
development of the ESP PANDORA and the methodology for identifying the 
relevant variables. In the subsequent sections (7.2 to 7.12) we describe the internal 
structure of the ESP PANDORA. For convenient reading we have included a table in 
every section. Section 7.13 concludes this chapter with a chapter summary. 
7.1 Development of the ESP PANDORA 
In the research methodology described in chapter one, we introduced stage 3 
“Create an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP)” (see table 1.1). An important 
step in this process of creation is subdividing the twelve Elementary Scenario 
Components into variables. To guide us in this process, and to help us identify the 
relevant variables of the ESC12 scenario model, we used the technique of 
exploratory testing. In exploratory testing the focus lies on gaining insights into - 
and familiarity with- a domain where problems are in a preliminary stage of 
investigation (cf. Kaner, 2008). Exploratory testing is closely linked with the 
development of a scenario model (see section 3.4). It constitutes learning, 
awareness raising, stimulation of creative thinking, and investigating the 
relationship between societal processes (Van Notten, 2006).  
 
We approached the process of exploratory testing by adding data of actual 
terrorist incidents to the ESC12 scenario model. By doing so, we learned from the 
data, while we were creating (and continuously adapting) the internal structure of 
the ESP PANDORA, according to what was learned. Effectively, we optimised the ESP 
PANDORA, by treating (a) learning and (b) adapting as mutually supportive activities. 
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 ESC12 Variables 
1 Arena 10 
2 Time(frame) 6 
3 Context 2 
4 Protagonist 26 
5 Antagonist 17 
6 Motivation 2 
7 Primary objective 2 
8 Means 15 
9 Modus operandi 10 
10 Resistance 8 
   
 Total variables 98 
 
Table 7.1 The ESC12 and their 98 corresponding variables. 
 
The sections 7.2 to 7.12 include tables (table 7.2 to 7.12) in which we have defined 
5 columns of information. Below we describe the five columns. 
 
Column 1: Number of variable (indicated as “#”) 
For an efficient discussion, we have attributed a reference number to every 
variable. This number is presented in the first column of every table. 
 
Column 2: Variable 
The second column denotes the variable of the specific Elementary Scenario 
Component.  
 
Column 3: Explanatory note(s) 
The third column constitutes an additional, more elaborate explanation of the 
variable of column 2.  
 
Column 4: For example 
For an adequate understanding of the variables of the ESC12 scenario model 
and their internal structure, we have included the fourth column. This column is 
added for illustrational purposes, and contains an example of data related to 
the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh50. In the tables below 
this information is printed in italics.  
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1. When data was obviously related to one of the Elementary Scenario 
Components, we introduced it as a variable of that component (i.e., when 
we were investigating an incident and found that it occurred in Paris, we 
added the variable “City” to the Elementary Scenario Component Arena). 
2. When, from the professional experience perspective, we assessed a certain 
variable to be relevant, we added that variable to the corresponding 
Elementary Scenario Component (i.e., from our experience in the field of 
close protection we understand that it is relevant to know whether an attack 
took place while the target was “en route” or stationary. Consequently, we 
introduced the variable “En route” to the Elementary Scenario Component 
Arena). 
3. When we learned from the dataset that specific data appeared frequently, 
and seemed relevant, we introduced a new variable to one of the 
Elementary Scenario Components (i.e., from the dataset we learned that in 
several cases an (un)intentional communication of intentions occurred, -in 
the literature referred to as “leakage”-. Because we assumed that leakage 
plays an important role in the anticipation of criminal behaviour, we 
introduced the variable “Leakage” to the Elementary Scenario Component 
Protagonist). 
 
Consequently, the internal structure of the ESP PANDORA empirically advanced and 
improved throughout the process of adding data. Notably, the technique of 
exploratory testing implies that the quality of the outcome relies on the freedom 
and responsibility of the people that perform the actual tests. To provide insight 
into our considerations with respect to the creation process, minutes have been 
kept of the changes to the internal structure of the ESP PANDORA (cf. Bressers, 
2012).  
 
Below, we will advance with the internal structure of the ESC12 and the 98 
variables that were created in the process of exploratory testing. For convenient 
reading we include table 7.1 that lists the Elementary Scenario Components and 
the number of variables that are created for every component.  
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7.2 General information 
The table “General Information” summarises the general information about a 
terrorist event and constitutes five variables. 
 
  General information   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example  Type of 
Variable 
1 Case ID Label of incident Van Gogh Text 
2 Attack type Classification of incident Assassination Category 
3 Background Short summary of incident Assassination of 




Was the incident regarded successful? The incident was 
successful 
Dichotomous 
5 Sources Sources of information that were used to obtain 
information about the incident  
(Buruma, 2007) Text 
 
Table 7.2 PANDORA: General information. 
 
Variable 1: Case ID 
In the variable Case ID, every case is attributed a unique identification number. 
 
Variable 2: Attack type 
The categorical variable Attack type captures the general category of terrorist act 
and often reflects the broad category of tactics used. The variable consists of the 
following nine categories that are based on the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
V2 cat 1: Assassination 
An incident with the primary objective to eliminate opponents. This 
variable does not to include attacks on non‐specific members of a 
targeted group. The killing of a police officer would be labelled as 
“Armed assault” (unless there is reason to believe the attackers singled 
out a particularly prominent officer for assassination). 
V2 cat 2: Armed assault 
An incident directed at causing physical harm or death to human beings 
by any means other than an explosive. 
V2 cat 3: Bombing / explosion 
An incident in which effects are caused by an energetically unstable 
material undergoing rapid decomposition and releasing a pressure wave 
that causes physical damage to the surrounding environment.  
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Column 5: Type of variable 
The fifth column contains the type of the variable. We have distinguished four 
types of variable: (1) dichotomous variables (such as yes/no and male/female), 
(2) numerical variables, (3) categorical variables, and (4) text variables. For a 
listing of the ESC12 and their corresponding types of variables, we refer to 
table 6.1. 
 
The sections 7.3 to 7.12 correspond to the Elementary Scenario Components 
listed in table 7.1. In addition to these ten Elementary Scenario Components51, we 
have added an additional section (section 7.2) in which we summarise the general 
information related to an incident. This section does not relate to any of the ESC12 
and is purely added for convenient reading.   
 
When, in the forthcoming tables below, a categorical variable is included, we will 
list the values of that category. For a convenient discussion, we use a format in 
which “Antagonist V5 cat 1” would indicate that we are discussing the fifth 
variable of the table (“V5”) of the elementary scenario component Antagonist, and 
more precisely the first category (“cat 1”) of that variable. This format will be used 
frequently throughout the next chapters. 
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herring are only used in conjunction with other scenario components. They are therefore not listed as separate 
sections in this chapter.  
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V2 cat 9: Unspecified 
The attack type cannot be determined from the available information. 
 
Variable 3: Background 
The text variable Background allows a short textual description of the incident. 
 
Variable 4: Successful incident 
The dichotomous variable Successful incident allows the entry of an incident being 
valued as successful. The success of an incident may be hard to establish but is 
related closely to the Elementary Scenario Component Primary objective and 
Means. For instance, the Primary objective could be to generate media attention 
by means of creating an explosion that causes physical harm to people. When in 
this case, the device explodes but fails to harm people, yet generates media 
attention, we would assess the incident as successful.  
The two dichotomous values are: 
V4 cat 1: The incident was successful. 
V4 cat 2: The incident was not successful. 
 
Variable 5: Sources 
The text variable Sources leaves room to indicate the sources that were used to 
obtain information of the particular incident. 
 
Notably, the category General Information does not relate to any of the ESC12 
and is purely added to summarise the general information about an incident. 
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V2 cat 4: Hijacking 
An incident directed at taking control of a vehicle such as an aircraft, 
boat, or bus, with the purpose of diverting it to an un-programmed 
destination, obtain payment of a ransom, force the release of prisoners, 
or some other political objective. Hijackings are separated from hostage 
taking because in hijacking the primary target is a vehicle, regardless of 
whether there are people/passengers in the vehicle. 
V2 cat 5: Hostage taking (barricade incident) 
An incident directed at obtaining political or other concessions in return 
for the release of prisoners (hostages). Such incidents are separated from 
kidnapping since hostage taking (barricade incident) usually occurs, and 
plays out, at the target location with little or no intention to hold the 
hostages for an extended period in a separate clandestine location. 
V2 cat 6: Hostage taking (kidnapping) 
Hostage taking (kidnapping) can be distinguished from Hostage taking 
(barricade incident) by the intention to move and hold the hostages in a 
clandestine location. Usually in kidnappings the victims are selected 
beforehand. 
V2 cat 7: Facility / Infrastructure attack 
An incident, excluding the use of an explosive, executed to cause 
damage to a non‐human target, such as a building, monument, train, or 
pipeline. Facility / Infrastructure attacks consist of actions primarily aimed 
at damaging property, or at causing a diminution in the functioning of a 
useful system (mass disruption) yet not causing direct harm to people. 
Facility / infrastructure attacks include arson and various forms of 
sabotage and may include acts that intend to cause harm to people as a 
result of the harm done to objects (e.g., blowing up a dam so that the 
ensuing flood will kill residents downstream). This category includes acts 
which aim to harm an installation, yet also cause harm to people 
incidentally. 
V2 cat 8: Unarmed assault 
An incident aimed at causing physical harm or death directly to human 
beings by any means other than explosive, firearm, incendiary, or sharp 
instrument (knife, etc.). 
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V1 cat 6: South Asia  
V1 cat 7: Central Asia  
V1 cat 8: Western Europe  
V1 cat 9: Eastern Europe  
V1 cat 10: Middle East & North Africa  
V1 cat 11: Sub‐Saharan Africa  
V1 cat 12: Russia & the Newly Independent States (NIS)  
V1 cat 13: Australia & Oceania  
 
Variable 2: Country 
The categorical variable Country identifies the nation where the incident occurred. 
The categories are derived from the GTD and include non‐independent states, 
dependencies, and territories, such as Northern Ireland and Corsica. When an 
incident occurred in international waters or airspace, the country of departure is 
listed as the country of the incident. If the departure point is not identified, the 
incident is classified as International. In the case where the country in which an 
incident occurred cannot be identified, it is classified as Unspecified. 
 
Note that the political circumstances of many countries have changed over time. In 
a number of cases, countries that represented the location of terrorist attacks no 
longer exist; examples include West Germany, the USSR, and Yugoslavia. In these 
cases the country name for the year that the event occurred is recorded. As an 
example, a 1989 attack in Bonn would be recorded as taking place in West 
Germany (FRG). An identical attack in 1991 would be recorded as taking place in 
Germany. The list of country codes can be found in appendix B. 
 
Variable 3: City 
The text variable City identifies the name of the city in which the incident occurred. 
 
Variable 4: Kill zone 
The dichotomous variable Kill zone identifies the area where the actual incident 
took place. The variable consists of three categories. 
V4 cat 1: Urban 
V4 cat 2: Rural 





7.3 Elementary Scenario Component 1: Arena 
The Elementary Scenario Component Arena describes where the terrorist act took 
place, in what geographic location and what type of environment. The Elementary 
Scenario Component Arena and its ten corresponding variables are explained in 
table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 PANDORA: Arena. 
 
Variable 1: Region 
The categorical variable Region identifies the area in which the incident occurred. 
The regions are divided into the following thirteen categories that are taken from 
the GTD. An explication of the regions can be found in appendix A. 
The 13 regions are  
V1 cat 1: North America Canada, Mexico, United States 
V1 cat 2: Central America & Caribbean  
V1 cat 3: South America 
V1 cat 4: East Asia  
V1 cat 5: Southeast Asia 
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  Arena   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Region  In which region did the incident take 
place?   
Western Europe Category 
2 Country In which country did the incident take 
place? 
Netherlands Category 
3 City In what city did the incident take place? Amsterdam Text 
4 Kill zone Was the arena urban or rural? Urban Dichotomous 
5 Static 
location 
At which type of a static location did the 
incident take place?  
Other  Category 
6 En route On which type of route did the incident 
take place? 











Additional description related to the 
Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
Work address was 
public, home address 
was easy to find through 
OSINT/HUMINT52 
Text 
9 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated with the 




Is a Red herring associated with the 
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Variable 9: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Arena represents something else by means of association, 
resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 10: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the Elementary Scenario 
Component Arena was believed to have included a Red herring or false indicator.  
 
7.4 Elementary Scenario Component 2: Time(frame) 
The Elementary Scenario Component Time(frame) provides a detailed time line of 
the incident by listing six variables. Table 7.4 depicts the internal structure of the 
component Time(frame). 
 
  Time(frame)   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Day of the 
week 
Which day of the week did the event take 
place? 
Tuesday Category 
2 Date Day / month / year 2/11/2004 Numeric 




Additional description of the Elementary 
Scenario Component Time(frame) 
- Text 
5 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component 
Time(frame)? 
- Text 
6 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 




Table 7.4 PANDORA: Time. 
  
Variable 1: Day of the week 
The categorical variable Day of the week contains the weekday on which the 
incident occurred. It consists of seven values. 
V1 cat 1: Monday 
V1 cat 2: Tuesday 
V1 cat 3: Wednesday 
V1 cat 4: Thursday 
V1 cat 5: Friday 
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Variable 5: Static location 
The categorical variable Static location refers to the location where the incident 
took place (as opposed to “En route”). The location can be specified with values 
consisting of seven categories. 
V5 cat 1: Home address 
V5 cat 2: Workplace  
V5 cat 3: Social location  
V5 cat 4: Hotel / Motel  
V5 cat 5: Other 
V5 cat 6: N.A. (Not applicable) 
V5 cat 7: Unspecified 
 
Variable 6: En route 
The categorical variable En route refers to whether the terrorist act was committed 
while the antagonist was on his way from work, home or a social event or vice 
versa. The variable consists of seven categories. 
V6 cat 1: Home - Work (or vice versa) 
V6 cat 2: Home - Social (or vice versa) 
V6 cat 3: Work - Social (or vice versa) 
V6 cat 4: Work - Work 
V6 cat 5: Social - Social 
V6 cat 6: N.A. (Not applicable) 
V6 cat 7: Unspecified 
 
Variable 7: Public route / location 
The dichotomous variable Public route / location defines whether the route or 
location where the incident took place was publicly known (through media reports, 
social media postings etc., or by common knowledge) It relates to the level of 
intelligence that the Protagonist needed to have in order to prepare the incident. 
The variable “Public route / location” consists of three categories. 
V7 cat 1: Public route / location 
V7 cat 2: No public route / location 
V7 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 8: Description of arena 
The text variable Description allows additional information about the arena being 
introduced into the scenario model.  
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 Variable 9: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Arena represents something else by means of association, 
resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 10: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the Elementary Scenario 
Component Arena was believed to have included a Red herring or false indicator.  
 
7.4 Elementary Scenario Component 2: Time(frame) 
The Elementary Scenario Component Time(frame) provides a detailed time line of 
the incident by listing six variables. Table 7.4 depicts the internal structure of the 
component Time(frame). 
 
  Time(frame)   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Day of the 
week 
Which day of the week did the event take 
place? 
Tuesday Category 
2 Date Day / month / year 2/11/2004 Numeric 




Additional description of the Elementary 
Scenario Component Time(frame) 
- Text 
5 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component 
Time(frame)? 
- Text 
6 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 
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Variable 8: Description of arena 
The text variable Description allows additional information about the arena being 
introduced into the scenario model.  
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7.5 Elementary Scenario Component 3: Context 
The Elementary Scenario Component Context captures the relevant background 
against which the incidents took place. It contains the variables Type and 
Description of context. Table 7.5 depicts these two variables and the internal 
structure of the component Context. 
	  
  Context   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Type of 
context 
What was the type of context of the event? Religious Category 
2 Description 
of type of 
context 
Additional description of the Elementary 
Scenario Component Context 
The film “Submission” 
directed by Van 
Gogh, fuelled the 




Table 7.5 PANDORA: Context. 
 
Variable 1: Type of context 
The categorical variable Type of context allows input from a category that defines 
the type of the context. The six categories related to the variable are as follows.  
V1 cat 1: Political  
V1 cat 2: Economical 
V1 cat 3: Religious 
V1 cat 4: Personal  
V1 cat 5: Miscellaneous  
V1 cat 6: Unspecified 
 
Variable 2: Description of type of context  
The text variable Description of type of context allows additional information 
related to the type of the context of the incident to be recorded.  
 
The Elementary Scenario Components Symbolism and Red herring are not 
deemed relevant in relation to this particular Elementary Scenario Component. 
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V1 cat 6: Saturday 
V1 cat 7: Sunday 
 
Variable 2: Date 
The numeric variable Date contains the date on which the incident occurred 
presented in the format [dd/mm/yyyy]. In the case of incident(s) occurring over an 
extended period, the field will record the day when the incident was initiated. The 
variable “Description of Time(frame)” (see variable 4) allows for additional details. 
 
Variable 3: Time 
The numeric variable Time identifies the exact time on which the incident 
occurred, presented in local time in the 24 hrs. format [hh:mm]. In the case of 
incident(s) occurring over an extended period, the variable records the time when 
the incident was initiated. 
 
Variable 4: Description of time(frame) 
The text variable Description of time(frame) allows for additional information to be 
recorded related to the time(frame) such as information about the extended 
period that the incident took place, or specific details about the time(frame) such 
as a holiday or remembrance day. 
 
Variable 5: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Time(frame) represents something else by means of 
association, resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 6: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the Elementary Scenario 
Component Time(frame) was believed to have included a Red herring or false 
indicator.  
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V1 cat 6: Saturday 
V1 cat 7: Sunday 
 
Variable 2: Date 
The numeric variable Date contains the date on which the incident occurred 
presented in the format [dd/mm/yyyy]. In the case of incident(s) occurring over an 
extended period, the field will record the day when the incident was initiated. The 
variable “Description of Time(frame)” (see variable 4) allows for additional details. 
 
Variable 3: Time 
The numeric variable Time identifies the exact time on which the incident 
occurred, presented in local time in the 24 hrs. format [hh:mm]. In the case of 
incident(s) occurring over an extended period, the variable records the time when 
the incident was initiated. 
 
Variable 4: Description of time(frame) 
The text variable Description of time(frame) allows for additional information to be 
recorded related to the time(frame) such as information about the extended 
period that the incident took place, or specific details about the time(frame) such 
as a holiday or remembrance day. 
 
Variable 5: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Time(frame) represents something else by means of 
association, resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 6: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the Elementary Scenario 
Component Time(frame) was believed to have included a Red herring or false 
indicator.  
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Was the protagonist known member of 





Additional description of terrorist 
organisation. 
- Text 
17 Nature of 
incident  
What is the nature of the incident?  Lone Wolf Category 
18 Description 
of nature of 
incident 





Significant information about the 
background / history of the 
protagonist 
- Text 
20 Part of 
multiple-
incident 






Additional description of other 






Information about previous incidents 






Information about subsequent 
incidents related to the protagonist or 
terrorist organisation. 
- Text 
24 Ties with 
third parties 
Are there ties between the protagonist 
and third parties? 
Yes Dichotomous 
25 Description 
of ties with 
third parties 
Additional details of ties between the 
protagonist and third parties. 
Bouyeri is believed 
to have close 
connections with 
(members of) the 
“Hofstad group” 
Text 
26 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 




Table 7.6 PANDORA: Protagonist. 
  
Variable 1: Confirmed protagonist 
The dichotomous variable Confirmed protagonist captures whether the identity of 
the protagonist is known. It accepts two values based on the GTD. 
V1 cat 1: Confirmed 
Cases where credible, non‐government analysts identify probable 
perpetrators receive a “Confirmed” in this variable. Cases where a 
government official expresses a definite position on the perpetrator 
based on intelligence or other information are equally labelled as 
“Confirmed”. Cases where a terrorist organisation claims responsibility 
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7.6 Elementary Scenario Component 4: Protagonist 
According to the rules of creative scenarios, the plot revolves around the 
protagonist; the main character of the play (cf. Aristotle, trans. 1987). Congruently, 
the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist may be regarded as the central 
component of the ESC12 model.  
 
Table 7.6 lists the different variables that constitute the Elementary Scenario 
Component Protagonist, and its internal structure. It includes twenty-six variables 
that allow information concerning the protagonist to be recorded in the scenario 
model.  
 
  Protagonist   




Is the protagonist known? (see also 
Protagonist V5) 
Yes Dichotomous 
2 Number of 
protagonists 
involved 
Number of protagonists that were 
involved  
1 Numeric 
3 Number of 
protagonists 
captured 
Number of protagonists that were 
captured  
1 Numeric 
4 Number of 
protagonist 
fatalities 
Number of protagonists involved / 













Additional description of the 









of claim of 
incident 
Additional description of the claim of 
incident 
- Text 
9 Mode of 
claim of 
responsibility 




of claim of 
responsibility 
Additional description of the claim of 
responsibility? 
A letter was knifed 
to the chest of the 
antagonist 
Text 





Description of leakage - Text 
13 Protagonist’s 
gender 










Was the protagonist known member of 





Additional description of terrorist 
organisation. 
- Text 
17 Nature of 
incident  
What is the nature of the incident?  Lone Wolf Category 
18 Description 
of nature of 
incident 





Significant information about the 
background / history of the 
protagonist 
- Text 
20 Part of 
multiple-
incident 






Additional description of other 






Information about previous incidents 






Information about subsequent 
incidents related to the protagonist or 
terrorist organisation. 
- Text 
24 Ties with 
third parties 
Are there ties between the protagonist 
and third parties? 
Yes Dichotomous 
25 Description 
of ties with 
third parties 
Additional details of ties between the 
protagonist and third parties. 
Bouyeri is believed 
to have close 
connections with 
(members of) the 
“Hofstad group” 
Text 
26 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 
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the protagonist is known. It accepts two values based on the GTD. 
V1 cat 1: Confirmed 
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component of the ESC12 model.  
 
Table 7.6 lists the different variables that constitute the Elementary Scenario 
Component Protagonist, and its internal structure. It includes twenty-six variables 
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model.  
 
  Protagonist   




Is the protagonist known? (see also 
Protagonist V5) 
Yes Dichotomous 
2 Number of 
protagonists 
involved 
Number of protagonists that were 
involved  
1 Numeric 
3 Number of 
protagonists 
captured 
Number of protagonists that were 
captured  
1 Numeric 
4 Number of 
protagonist 
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Number of protagonists involved / 













Additional description of the 









of claim of 
incident 
Additional description of the claim of 
incident 
- Text 
9 Mode of 
claim of 
responsibility 




of claim of 
responsibility 
Additional description of the claim of 
responsibility? 
A letter was knifed 
to the chest of the 
antagonist 
Text 





Description of leakage - Text 
13 Protagonist’s 
gender 





Variable 8: Description of claim of incident  
The text variable Description of claim of incident allows for an additional 
description of the person or organisation that claimed responsibility for the 
incident.  
 
Variable 9: Mode of claim of responsibility 
The categorical variable Mode of claim of responsibility captures the manner by 
which the responsibility was claimed. These manners are divided into the following 
ten categories. If additional information exists (for instance, a particularly novel or 
strange mode is used), this information may be captured in the subsequent 
Description of claim of responsibility variables. 
V9 cat 1: Telephone call 
V9 cat 2: Letter  
V9 cat 3: Note left at scene 
V9 cat 4: Note left elsewhere  
V9 cat 5: E‐mail  
V9 cat 6: Video 
V9 cat 7: Posting at website  
V9 cat 8: Personal claim  
V9 cat 9: Other 
V9 cat 10: Unspecified 
 
Variable 10: Description of claim of responsibility 
The text variable Description of the claim of responsibility, allows for an additional 
description of the claim of responsibility.  
 
Variable 11: Leakage 
The dichotomous variable Leakage identifies whether leakage preceded the 
incident. Leakage in this context refers to any form of (un)intentional 
communication of intentions. The variable contains three values. 
V11 cat 1: Leakage 
V11 cat 2: No leakage  
V11 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 12: Description of leakage 
The text variable Description of leakage allows for recording additional information 
about the variable leakage. 
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for the attack are recorded as “Confirmed”, unless the source specifically 
notes that authorities doubt the veracity of the claim. 
V1 cat 2: Unconfirmed 
“Unconfirmed” is used in all other cases. 
 
Variable 2: Number of protagonists involved 
The numeric variable Number of protagonists involved, captures the number of 
known protagonists that were involved in the incident. In cases where there are 
more than one protagonists involved, the variables name, sex, and age group, are 
multiplied in the ESP PANDORA. 
 
Variable 3: Number of protagonists captured 
The numeric variable Number of protagonists records, captures the number of 
known protagonists that were taken into custody.  
 
Variable 4: Number of protagonist fatalities 
The numeric value Number of protagonist fatalities, captures the number of 
protagonists that died as a result of the incident. The value will be presented in 
the format [#protagonists involved / #protagonists died]. 
 
Variable 5: Incident attributed to 
The text variable Incident attributed to, allows additional information related to the 
attribution of the incident, to be introduced in the ESP PANDORA.  
 
Variable 6: Description of background of protagonist 
The text variable Description of background of protagonist, allows for an 
additional description of the protagonist. 
 
Variable 7: Incident claimed by 
The text variable Incident claimed by, captures the name of the person or 
organisation that claimed responsibility for the incident. To ensure consistency in 
the usage of group names, we use a standardised list of terrorist organisations that 
has been established by the GTD. Additional information on the claim of the 
incident may be recorded in the subsequent variable Description of claim of 
incident. 
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Variable 8: Description of claim of incident  
The text variable Description of claim of incident allows for an additional 
description of the person or organisation that claimed responsibility for the 
incident.  
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which the responsibility was claimed. These manners are divided into the following 
ten categories. If additional information exists (for instance, a particularly novel or 
strange mode is used), this information may be captured in the subsequent 
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Variable 17: Nature of incident 
The categorical variable Nature of incident allows capturing information about the 
nature of the incident. The variable includes six categories that are described 
below. Additional description may be recorded in the subsequent variable 
Description of nature of incident. 
V17 cat 1: Nationalistic 
V17 cat 2: Religious 
V17 cat 3: Ideological 
V17 cat 4: Lone operator 
V17 cat 5: Miscellaneous  
V17 cat 6: Unspecified 
 
Variable 18: Description of nature of incident 
The text variable Description of nature of incident allows for additional information 
on the nature of incident variable to be captured. 
 
Variable 19: Background / History 
The text variable Background / History allows for significant information about the 
background and / or history of the protagonist to be recorded. 
 
Variable 20: Part of multiple-incident 
The dichotomous variable Part of multiple-incident indicates whether the 
Protagonist was involved in previous or subsequent criminal or illegal activities. 
The variable Part of multiple-incident is loosely related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi. When the modus operandi of a protagonist includes 
a combination of multiple attacks that converge within a limited time frame, we 
classify an attack as Part of multiple-incident. Subsequent text values allow for 
more specific descriptions of these activities. The variables include two categories. 
V20 cat 1: Part of multiple-incident 
V20 cat 2: Not part of multiple-incident 
 
Variable 21: Description of multiple-incident 
The text variable Description of multiple-incident allows for capturing additional 
information concerning the multiple-incident related to the specific case. 
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Variable 13: Protagonist’s gender 
The categorical variable Protagonist’s gender allows capturing the gender of the 
Protagonist. The variable includes three categories. 
V13 cat 1: Male 
V13 cat 2: Female 
V13 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 14: Age(group) 
The categorical variable Age(group) allows capturing the age group of the 
Protagonist. It consists of twelve categories.  
V14 cat 1: 0-10 years 
V14 cat 2: 11-20 
V14 cat 3: 21-30 
V14 cat 4: 31-40 
V14 cat 5: 41-50 
V14 cat 6: 51-60 
V14 cat 7: 61-70 
V14 cat 8: 71-80 
V14 cat 9: 81-90 
V14 cat 10: 91-100 
V14 cat 11: Miscellaneous 
V14 cat 12: Unspecified 
 
Variable 15: Terrorist organisation 
The categorical variable Terrorist organisation allows recording the terrorist 
organisation the Protagonist was affiliated with. To ensure consistency in the usage 
of group names, we use a standardised list of group names that has been 
established by the GTD. Additional information on the terrorist organisation may 
be recorded in the subsequent variable Description of terrorist organisation. 
 
Variable 16: Description of terrorist organisation 
This text variable Description of terrorist organisation allows for additional 
information on the terrorist organisation to be introduced in the ESP PANDORA. 
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Variable 17: Nature of incident 
The categorical variable Nature of incident allows capturing information about the 
nature of the incident. The variable includes six categories that are described 
below. Additional description may be recorded in the subsequent variable 
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The dichotomous variable Part of multiple-incident indicates whether the 
Protagonist was involved in previous or subsequent criminal or illegal activities. 
The variable Part of multiple-incident is loosely related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi. When the modus operandi of a protagonist includes 
a combination of multiple attacks that converge within a limited time frame, we 
classify an attack as Part of multiple-incident. Subsequent text values allow for 
more specific descriptions of these activities. The variables include two categories. 
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information concerning the multiple-incident related to the specific case. 
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Variable 13: Protagonist’s gender 
The categorical variable Protagonist’s gender allows capturing the gender of the 
Protagonist. The variable includes three categories. 
V13 cat 1: Male 
V13 cat 2: Female 
V13 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 14: Age(group) 
The categorical variable Age(group) allows capturing the age group of the 
Protagonist. It consists of twelve categories.  
V14 cat 1: 0-10 years 
V14 cat 2: 11-20 
V14 cat 3: 21-30 
V14 cat 4: 31-40 
V14 cat 5: 41-50 
V14 cat 6: 51-60 
V14 cat 7: 61-70 
V14 cat 8: 71-80 
V14 cat 9: 81-90 
V14 cat 10: 91-100 
V14 cat 11: Miscellaneous 
V14 cat 12: Unspecified 
 
Variable 15: Terrorist organisation 
The categorical variable Terrorist organisation allows recording the terrorist 
organisation the Protagonist was affiliated with. To ensure consistency in the usage 
of group names, we use a standardised list of group names that has been 
established by the GTD. Additional information on the terrorist organisation may 
be recorded in the subsequent variable Description of terrorist organisation. 
 
Variable 16: Description of terrorist organisation 
This text variable Description of terrorist organisation allows for additional 
information on the terrorist organisation to be introduced in the ESP PANDORA. 
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7.7 Elementary Scenario Component 5: Antagonist 
The Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist captures the relevant information 
about the antagonist to whom the incident was directed. Table 7.7 lists the 
seventeen variables and internal structure of the Elementary Scenario Component 
Antagonist. 
	  
 Antagonist    
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Primary target Was the antagonist a person or an object? Person Dichotomous 
2 Number of 
antagonist(s) 
involved 
The number of known antagonists involved in 
incident 
1 Numeric 
3 Specific / 
generic 
antagonist(s) 
Was / were the antagonist(s) selected 
randomly or selectively from a target 
population. 
Specific Dichotomous 
4 Selection of 
antagonist(s) 
What was the possible rationale behind the 




5 Type of 
antagonist(s)  
What category can be assigned to the Type 
of antagonist(s)?   
Journalists/media Category 
6 Description of 
the type of 
antagonist(s)  
Additional information about the Type of 
antagonist(s) and possible relation to 
secondary antagonist(s) 
- Text 
7 Name of 
antagonist(s) 
Name of antagonist(s) Theo van Gogh Text 
8 Description of 
antagonist(s) 
Description of antagonist(s) Director of movie 
‘Submission’ 
Text 
9 Nationality of 
antagonist(s) 
Nationality of antagonist(s) Dutch Category 
10 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist? 
- Text 
11 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 





Number of antagonist(s) that died from in 
relation to the incident. Encoded in the 
format [#protagonists involved / 
#protagonists died] 
1/1 Category 
13 Other fatalities Were there other fatalities related to the 
incident?  
Yes Category 
14 Total fatalities How many fatalities were related to the 
incident?  
1 Category 
15 Other Injuries Were there other casualties related to the 
incident?  
1 Category 
16 Total injuries How many casualties were related to the 
incident?  
2 Category 
17 Description of 
fatalities / 
injuries 
Additional description of fatalities / injuries A police officer 
was injured after 




Table 7.7 PANDORA: Antagonist. 
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Variable 22: Known previous incidents 
The text variable Known previous incidents, allows for capturing additional 
information concerning earlier incidents to which the Protagonist was related. 
 
Variable 23: Known subsequent incidents 
The text variable Known subsequent incidents allows for capturing additional 
information concerning later incidents to which the Protagonist was related. 
 
Variable 24: Ties with third parties 
The dichotomous variable Ties with third parties refers to possible connections 
with any terrorist, criminal or clandestine groups that the protagonist was not 
officially affiliated with. A text value allows for additional details of these ties to be 
recorded. The variable includes three categories. 
V24 cat 1: Ties with third parties 
V24 cat 2: No ties with third parties 
V24 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 25: Description of ties with third parties 
The dichotomous variable Ties with third parties refers to possible connections 
with any terrorist, criminal or clandestine groups that the protagonist was not 
officially affiliated with. 
 
Variable 26: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the variables that compose 
the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist was believed to have included a 
Red herring or false indicator.  
 
The Elementary Scenario Component Symbolism is not deemed relevant in 
relation to the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist. 
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7.7 Elementary Scenario Component 5: Antagonist 
The Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist captures the relevant information 
about the antagonist to whom the incident was directed. Table 7.7 lists the 
seventeen variables and internal structure of the Elementary Scenario Component 
Antagonist. 
	  
 Antagonist    
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Primary target Was the antagonist a person or an object? Person Dichotomous 
2 Number of 
antagonist(s) 
involved 
The number of known antagonists involved in 
incident 
1 Numeric 
3 Specific / 
generic 
antagonist(s) 
Was / were the antagonist(s) selected 
randomly or selectively from a target 
population. 
Specific Dichotomous 
4 Selection of 
antagonist(s) 
What was the possible rationale behind the 




5 Type of 
antagonist(s)  
What category can be assigned to the Type 
of antagonist(s)?   
Journalists/media Category 
6 Description of 
the type of 
antagonist(s)  
Additional information about the Type of 
antagonist(s) and possible relation to 
secondary antagonist(s) 
- Text 
7 Name of 
antagonist(s) 
Name of antagonist(s) Theo van Gogh Text 
8 Description of 
antagonist(s) 
Description of antagonist(s) Director of movie 
‘Submission’ 
Text 
9 Nationality of 
antagonist(s) 
Nationality of antagonist(s) Dutch Category 
10 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist? 
- Text 
11 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 





Number of antagonist(s) that died from in 
relation to the incident. Encoded in the 
format [#protagonists involved / 
#protagonists died] 
1/1 Category 
13 Other fatalities Were there other fatalities related to the 
incident?  
Yes Category 
14 Total fatalities How many fatalities were related to the 
incident?  
1 Category 
15 Other Injuries Were there other casualties related to the 
incident?  
1 Category 
16 Total injuries How many casualties were related to the 
incident?  
2 Category 
17 Description of 
fatalities / 
injuries 
Additional description of fatalities / injuries A police officer 
was injured after 




Table 7.7 PANDORA: Antagonist. 
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Variable 22: Known previous incidents 
The text variable Known previous incidents, allows for capturing additional 
information concerning earlier incidents to which the Protagonist was related. 
 
Variable 23: Known subsequent incidents 
The text variable Known subsequent incidents allows for capturing additional 
information concerning later incidents to which the Protagonist was related. 
 
Variable 24: Ties with third parties 
The dichotomous variable Ties with third parties refers to possible connections 
with any terrorist, criminal or clandestine groups that the protagonist was not 
officially affiliated with. A text value allows for additional details of these ties to be 
recorded. The variable includes three categories. 
V24 cat 1: Ties with third parties 
V24 cat 2: No ties with third parties 
V24 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 25: Description of ties with third parties 
The dichotomous variable Ties with third parties refers to possible connections 
with any terrorist, criminal or clandestine groups that the protagonist was not 
officially affiliated with. 
 
Variable 26: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the variables that compose 
the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist was believed to have included a 
Red herring or false indicator.  
 
The Elementary Scenario Component Symbolism is not deemed relevant in 
relation to the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist. 
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V5 cat 1: Business 
Business is defined as a collection of individuals or organisations 
engaged in a commercial or mercantile activity as a means of livelihood. 
This category includes companies, institutions, or private citizens 
patronising a business, such as a restaurant, gas station, music store, 
bar, café, and movie theatres. It also includes hospitals, chambers of 
commerce, and cooperatives. When an attack is carried out in public or 
quasi‐public areas such as “business district or commercial area”, (the 
attacks are captured under “Private Citizens and Property”, (Antagonist 
V5 cat 14). 
V5 cat 2: Government (general) 
This category includes attacks on government buildings, government 
members, former government members (including members of political 
parties), their convoys, political movements; or government sponsored 
institutions provided the attack is carried out to harm the government. It 
includes attacks on judges, public attorneys (e.g., prosecutors), courts 
and court systems, politicians, royalty, head of state, government 
employees (unless police or military), election‐related attacks, 
intelligence agencies and spies. 
V5 cat 3: Police 
This category includes attacks on members of the police force or police 
installations. It includes police boxes, patrols headquarters, academies, 
cars, checkpoints, etc. It also includes attacks against jails or prison 
facilities, or jail or prison staff or jail or prison guards. Moreover, it 
includes attacks against private security guards and security. 
V5 cat 4: Military 
This category includes attacks against army units, army personnel and 
equipment. It also includes attacks on recruiting sites, and soldiers 
engaged in internal policing functions such as at checkpoints and in 
anti‐narcotics activities. Excluded are attacks against militia and 
guerrillas; these types of attacks are classified as “Terrorist” (Antagonist 
V5 cat 17). 
V5 cat 5: Abortion related 
Attacks on abortion clinics, employees, patrons, or security personnel 
stationed at clinics. 
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Variable 1: Primary target 
The dichotomous variable Primary target refers to the antagonist being a person 
or an object. The variable contains two categories. 
V1 cat 1: Person 
V1 cat 2: Object 
 
Variable 2: Number of antagonists involved 
The numeric variable Number of antagonists involved captures the number of 
known antagonists that were involved in the incident.  
 
Variable 3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
The dichotomous variable Specific / Generic antagonist(s) refers to whether the 
antagonist(s) were selected randomly or selectively from a target population. The 
variable contains three categories. 
V3 cat 1: Specific 
V3 cat 2: Generic 
V3 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 4: Selection of antagonist(s)  
The categorical variable Selection of antagonist(s) allows for capturing the 
rationale behind the selection of the antagonist(s). The variable contains eight 
categories. 
V4 cat 1: Significance of antagonist(s) 
V4 cat 2: Vulnerability of antagonist(s) 
V4 cat 3: Level of grievance 
V4 cat 4: Level of exposure 
V4 cat 5: Significant date event 
V4 cat 6: Iconic value of antagonist 
V4 cat 7: Miscellaneous 
V4 cat 8: Unspecified 
 
Variable 5: Type of antagonist(s) 
The categorical variable Type of antagonist(s) allows for a classification of the Type 
of antagonist(s) or target. The following twenty-two categories and the subsequent 
descriptions are taken from the GTD “Target Type” list. 
	    
 
 185 
V5 cat 1: Business 
Business is defined as a collection of individuals or organisations 
engaged in a commercial or mercantile activity as a means of livelihood. 
This category includes companies, institutions, or private citizens 
patronising a business, such as a restaurant, gas station, music store, 
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Variable 1: Primary target 
The dichotomous variable Primary target refers to the antagonist being a person 
or an object. The variable contains two categories. 
V1 cat 1: Person 
V1 cat 2: Object 
 
Variable 2: Number of antagonists involved 
The numeric variable Number of antagonists involved captures the number of 
known antagonists that were involved in the incident.  
 
Variable 3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
The dichotomous variable Specific / Generic antagonist(s) refers to whether the 
antagonist(s) were selected randomly or selectively from a target population. The 
variable contains three categories. 
V3 cat 1: Specific 
V3 cat 2: Generic 
V3 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 4: Selection of antagonist(s)  
The categorical variable Selection of antagonist(s) allows for capturing the 
rationale behind the selection of the antagonist(s). The variable contains eight 
categories. 
V4 cat 1: Significance of antagonist(s) 
V4 cat 2: Vulnerability of antagonist(s) 
V4 cat 3: Level of grievance 
V4 cat 4: Level of exposure 
V4 cat 5: Significant date event 
V4 cat 6: Iconic value of antagonist 
V4 cat 7: Miscellaneous 
V4 cat 8: Unspecified 
 
Variable 5: Type of antagonist(s) 
The categorical variable Type of antagonist(s) allows for a classification of the Type 
of antagonist(s) or target. The following twenty-two categories and the subsequent 
descriptions are taken from the GTD “Target Type” list. 
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V5 cat 12: Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
This category includes attacks on offices and employees of non‐
governmental organisations (NGOs). NGOs are defined as primarily 
large multinational non‐governmental organisations. (These include the 
Red Cross and Doctors without Borders). The category does not include 
labour unions, social clubs, student groups, and other non‐NGO (such 
cases are classified as “Other”, (Antagonist V5 cat 13). 
V5 cat 13: Other 
This category includes attacks directed against antagonists that do not 
fit into other categories. 
V5 cat 14: Private citizens & property 
This category includes attacks on individuals, the public in general or 
attacks in public areas including markets and pedestrian malls. The 
category also includes incidents involving political supporters as private 
citizens and property, provided that these supporters are not part of a 
government‐sponsored event. The category explicitly excludes attacks 
causing civilian casualties in businesses such as restaurants, cafes or 
movie theatres (these categories are classified as “Business”, 
(Antagonist V5 cat 1). 
V5 cat 15: Religious figures / institutions 
This category includes attacks on religious leaders (including 
missionaries), religious institutions, religious places or objects. The 
category also includes attacks on organisations that are affiliated with 
religious entities that are not NGOs, businesses or schools. 
Attacks on religious pilgrims are considered “Private citizens and 
Property” (Antagonist V5 cat 14). 
V5 cat 16: Telecommunication 
This category includes attacks on facilities and infrastructure for the 
transmission of information. More specifically the category includes 
equipment such as cell phone towers, telephone booths, television 
transmitters, radio, and microwave towers. 
V5 cat 17: Terrorists 
This category includes attacks directed towards terrorists or members of 
identified terrorist organisations (see “Terrorist organisations” in the 
Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist, V15). The latter are 
included in this category. “Membership” in this context, is broadly 
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V5 cat 6: Airports & airlines 
This category includes attacks carried out either against an airport or 
against an airplane. Attacks against airline employees while on board 
are also included in this value. Moreover, it includes attacks conducted 
against airport business offices and executives. Attacks where airplanes 
were used to carry out the attack (such as three of the four 9/11 attacks) 
are not included in this value. 
V5 cat 7: Government (diplomatic) 
This category includes attacks carried out against foreign missions, 
including embassies, consulates, etc. It also includes attacks on judges, 
public attorneys (e.g., prosecutors), courts and court systems, 
politicians, royalty, head of state, government. 
V5 cat 8: Educational institution 
This category includes attacks against (religious) schools, teachers, or 
guards protecting school sites. Includes attacks against university 
professors, teaching staff and school buses. If attacks involving students 
are not directed against a school, university or other educational 
institution, or are carried out in an educational setting, they are 
classified as private citizens and property. The category excludes attacks 
against military schools (attacks on military schools are classified as 
“Military,” (Antagonist V5 cat 4). 
V5 cat 9: Food or water supply 
Attacks on food or water supplies or reserves are included in 
this category. 
V5 cat 10: Journalists & media 
This category includes attacks on reporters, news assistants, 
photographers, publishers, as well as attacks on media headquarters 
and offices. Attacks on transmission facilties such as antennae or 
transmission towers are included in this value (while attacks on 
broadcast infrastructure are classified as “Telecommunications,” 
(Antagonist V5 cat 16). 
V5 cat 11: Maritime 
This category includes civilian ports and maritime facilities It includes 
attacks against fishing ships, oil tankers, ferries, yachts, etc. The 
categopry does not include attacks on fishermen as they are classified 
as “Private Citizens and Property,” (Antagonist V5 cat 14). 
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against airport business offices and executives. Attacks where airplanes 
were used to carry out the attack (such as three of the four 9/11 attacks) 
are not included in this value. 
V5 cat 7: Government (diplomatic) 
This category includes attacks carried out against foreign missions, 
including embassies, consulates, etc. It also includes attacks on judges, 
public attorneys (e.g., prosecutors), courts and court systems, 
politicians, royalty, head of state, government. 
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guards protecting school sites. Includes attacks against university 
professors, teaching staff and school buses. If attacks involving students 
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institution, or are carried out in an educational setting, they are 
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against military schools (attacks on military schools are classified as 
“Military,” (Antagonist V5 cat 4). 
V5 cat 9: Food or water supply 
Attacks on food or water supplies or reserves are included in 
this category. 
V5 cat 10: Journalists & media 
This category includes attacks on reporters, news assistants, 
photographers, publishers, as well as attacks on media headquarters 
and offices. Attacks on transmission facilties such as antennae or 
transmission towers are included in this value (while attacks on 
broadcast infrastructure are classified as “Telecommunications,” 
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attacks against fishing ships, oil tankers, ferries, yachts, etc. The 
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as “Private Citizens and Property,” (Antagonist V5 cat 14). 
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Variable 7: Type of antagonist(s) 
The text variable Type of antagonist(s) allows capturing the name of the person or 
the object that was / were targeted. 
 
Variable 8: Description of antagonist(s) 
The text variable Description of antagonist(s) allows the Type of antagonist(s) to be 
included in the dataset. 
 
Variable 9:  
The categorical variable Nationality of antagonist(s) allows the input of the 
nationality of the antagonist by country. For information about the country codes, 
we refer to the variable Country of the Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
(see Arena V2). The list of country codes can be found in appendix B.  
 
Variable 10: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Antagonist represents something else by means of 
association, resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 11: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the Elementary Scenario 
Component Antagonist was believed to have included a Red herring or false 
indicator.  
 
Variable 12: Antagonist(s) died from attack 
The numeric variable Antagonist(s) died from attack captures the number of 
antagonists that died as a result of the incident. The value is presented in the 
format [#antagonists involved / #antagonists died]. 
 
Variable 13: Other fatalities 
The dichotomous variable Other fatalities captures whether or not other people 
died as a result of the incident. 
 
Variable 14: Total fatalities 





defined and includes informants for terrorist organisations, but excludes 
former terrorists. The value also includes cases involving the targeting of 
militia and guerrillas. 
V5 cat 18: Tourists 
Tourists are defined as persons who travel primarily for the purposes of 
leisure or amusement. Attacks included in this category must specifically 
target tourists (or (government) tourist offices), not just assault 
a business or transportation system used by tourists. The category does 
include the targeting of tour buses or “tours.” 
V5 cat 19: Transportation (other than aviation) 
This category includes attacks on public transportation systems. The 
category also includes efforts to assault public buses, minibuses, trains, 
metro/subways, highways (if the highway itself is the target of the 
attack), bridges, roads, etc. 
V5 cat 20: Unspecified 
If the target type cannot be determined from the available information, 
the category Unspecified is selected. 
V5 cat 21: Utilities 
This category pertains to facilities for the transmission or generation of 
energy. For example, power lines, oil pipelines, electrical transformers, 
high tension lines, gas and electric substations, are all included in the 
category. The category also includes lampposts or streetlights. Attacks 
on officers, employees or facilities of utility companies excluding the 
type of faculties above are classified as “Business” (Antagonist V5 cat 
1). 
V5 cat 22: Violent political parties 
This category pertains to entities that are both political parties (and 
thus, classified as Government) and terrorists. It is operationally defined 
as groups that engage in electoral politics and appear as Protagonist in 
the ESP PANDORA. 
 
Variable 6: Description of Type of antagonist(s) 
The text variable Description of Type of antagonist(s) allows for an additional 
description of the Type of antagonist(s). 
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7.8 Elementary Scenario Component 6: Motivation 
The Elementary Scenario Component Motivation captures the relevant information 
related to the motivation of the protagonist. Table 7.8 lists the internal structure 
and the two different variables that constitute the Elementary Scenario 
Component Motivation.  
 
  Motivation   








Additional explanation of 
motivation of protagonist 
Protagonist was offended by Van 
Gogh’s film ‘Submission’ and wanted 
to kill the film director that insulted 
the prophet.  
Text 
 
Table 7.8 PANDORA: Motivation. 
 
Variable 1: Possible motivation 
The categorical variable Possible motivation allows for description of the 
psychological features that drive the protagonist by one of six motivations. For a 
clarification of these motivations, we refer to subsection 2.2.3. The possible 
motivation of a protagonist may be described by one of six categories below. 
V1 cat 1: Need  
V1 cat 2: Greed  
V1 cat 3: Power 
V1 cat 4: Moral outrage 
V1 cat 5: Glory 
V1 cat 6: Unknown 
 
Variable 2: Description of motivation 
The text variable Description of motivation allows for textual elaboration on the 
possible motive of the protagonist for choosing the specific antagonist, date, or 
arena.  
 
As the Elementary Scenario Component Motivation refers to the intrinsic 
disposition of the protagonist, the Elementary Scenario Components Symbolism 





Variable 15: Other injuries 
The dichotomous variable Other injuries captures whether other people were 
injured as a result of the incident. 
 
Variable 16: Total injuries 
The numeric variable Total injuries captures the total number of injuries that are 
related to the incident. This category will be presented in the format 
[#protagonists involved / #protagonists died]. 
 
Variable 17: Description of fatalities / injuries 
The text variable Description of fatalities / injuries allows additional information 
about the fatalities and / or injuries to be recorded.  
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Variable 15: Other injuries 
The dichotomous variable Other injuries captures whether other people were 
injured as a result of the incident. 
 
Variable 16: Total injuries 
The numeric variable Total injuries captures the total number of injuries that are 
related to the incident. This category will be presented in the format 
[#protagonists involved / #protagonists died]. 
 
Variable 17: Description of fatalities / injuries 
The text variable Description of fatalities / injuries allows additional information 
about the fatalities and / or injuries to be recorded.  
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7.10 Elementary Scenario Component 8: Means  
The Elementary Scenario Component Means captures the relevant resources that 
the protagonist had to prepare for the execution of the incident. Table 7.10 lists 
the fifteen variables and the internal structure of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Means. 
 
  Means   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Type of 
incident 
Classification of the type of incident. Assassination/liquida
tion 
Category 
2 Description of 
incident  





Classification of the weapon category. Firearms Category 
4 Weapon sub- 
category 
Classification of weapon sub-category. 
 
Handgun(s) Category 
5 Description of 
Weapon (sub-) 
category 




6 Type of primary 
explosive 
Classification of explosive. - Category 
7 Amount of 
primary 
explosive 
Amount of explosive used. - Numeric 
8 Detonation Classification of detonation of explosive. - Category 
9 Description of 
explosive 
Additional description of explosive / 
detonation. 
- Text 
10 Suicide mission Can the incident be classified as a suicide 
mission? 
Yes Dichotomous 
11 Description of 
suicide mission 
Additional description of suicide mission. Bouyeri planned to 
die in the attack to 




In what way was the weapon / explosive 
delivered? 
- Category 
13 Description of 
transportation 
Remarks on transportation of weapons, 
resources etc. / delivery method etc. 
Bicycle Text 
14 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component Means? 
- Text 
15 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component Means? 
- Text 
 
Table 7.10 PANDORA: Means. 
  
Variable 1: Type of incident 
The categorical variable Type of incident classifies the incident in one of eleven 
categories taken from the GTD. 
V1 cat 1: Assassination / Liquidation 
 
 192 
7.9 Elementary Scenario Component 7: Primary 
objective 
Table 7.9 lists the internal structure and the two different variables that constitute 
the Elementary Scenario Component Primary objective.  
	  
  Primary objective   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Initial aim of 
the 
protagonist 
What was the initial aim 
the protagonist had in 
relation to the incident? 
Applying pressure Category 
2 Description 
of initial aim  
Description of initial aim 
of the protagonist 
The primary objective of the protagonist, was 
to apply pressure to prevent further insults to 
the Prophet and Islam by spreading fear among 
the people of the Netherlands,  
Text 
 
Table 7.9 PANDORA: Primary objective. 
 
Variable 1: Initial aim 
The categorical variable Initial aim allows the Primary objective to be included in 
the scenario model. The variable constitutes nine categories. 
V1 cat 1: Applying pressure 
V1 cat 2: Media attention 
V1 cat 3: Oppression 
V1 cat 4: Emphasising cause 
V1 cat 5: Extending influence 
V1 cat 6: Eliminating opponent(s) 
V1 cat 7: Training 
V1 cat 8: Miscellaneous 
V1 cat 9: Unspecified 
 
Variable 2: Description of initial aim 
The text variable Description of initial aim allows importing additional information 
about the primary objective of the incident into the ESC12 scenario model. 
 
The Elementary Scenario Component Symbolism and Red herring are not deemed 
relevant in relation to the Elementary Scenario Component Primary objective. 
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7.10 Elementary Scenario Component 8: Means  
The Elementary Scenario Component Means captures the relevant resources that 
the protagonist had to prepare for the execution of the incident. Table 7.10 lists 
the fifteen variables and the internal structure of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Means. 
 
  Means   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Type of 
incident 
Classification of the type of incident. Assassination/liquida
tion 
Category 
2 Description of 
incident  





Classification of the weapon category. Firearms Category 
4 Weapon sub- 
category 
Classification of weapon sub-category. 
 
Handgun(s) Category 
5 Description of 
Weapon (sub-) 
category 




6 Type of primary 
explosive 
Classification of explosive. - Category 
7 Amount of 
primary 
explosive 
Amount of explosive used. - Numeric 
8 Detonation Classification of detonation of explosive. - Category 
9 Description of 
explosive 
Additional description of explosive / 
detonation. 
- Text 
10 Suicide mission Can the incident be classified as a suicide 
mission? 
Yes Dichotomous 
11 Description of 
suicide mission 
Additional description of suicide mission. Bouyeri planned to 
die in the attack to 




In what way was the weapon / explosive 
delivered? 
- Category 
13 Description of 
transportation 
Remarks on transportation of weapons, 
resources etc. / delivery method etc. 
Bicycle Text 
14 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component Means? 
- Text 
15 Red herring Is a Red herring associated with the 
Elementary Scenario Component Means? 
- Text 
 
Table 7.10 PANDORA: Means. 
  
Variable 1: Type of incident 
The categorical variable Type of incident classifies the incident in one of eleven 
categories taken from the GTD. 
V1 cat 1: Assassination / Liquidation 
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7.9 Elementary Scenario Component 7: Primary 
objective 
Table 7.9 lists the internal structure and the two different variables that constitute 
the Elementary Scenario Component Primary objective.  
	  
  Primary objective   
# Variable Explanatory note(s) For example Type of 
variable 
1 Initial aim of 
the 
protagonist 
What was the initial aim 
the protagonist had in 
relation to the incident? 
Applying pressure Category 
2 Description 
of initial aim  
Description of initial aim 
of the protagonist 
The primary objective of the protagonist, was 
to apply pressure to prevent further insults to 
the Prophet and Islam by spreading fear among 
the people of the Netherlands,  
Text 
 
Table 7.9 PANDORA: Primary objective. 
 
Variable 1: Initial aim 
The categorical variable Initial aim allows the Primary objective to be included in 
the scenario model. The variable constitutes nine categories. 
V1 cat 1: Applying pressure 
V1 cat 2: Media attention 
V1 cat 3: Oppression 
V1 cat 4: Emphasising cause 
V1 cat 5: Extending influence 
V1 cat 6: Eliminating opponent(s) 
V1 cat 7: Training 
V1 cat 8: Miscellaneous 
V1 cat 9: Unspecified 
 
Variable 2: Description of initial aim 
The text variable Description of initial aim allows importing additional information 
about the primary objective of the incident into the ESC12 scenario model. 
 
The Elementary Scenario Component Symbolism and Red herring are not deemed 
relevant in relation to the Elementary Scenario Component Primary objective. 
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categories below are taken from the GTD. Values for weapon category and 
corresponding sub‐type are as follows: 
V4 cat 1: Biological 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 2: Chemical 
Subcat a: Poisoning 
V4 cat 3: Radiological 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 4: Nuclear  
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories]  
V4 cat 5: Firearms 
Subcat b: Automatic weapon 
Subcat c: Handgun 
Subcat d: Rifle/Shotgun (non‐automatic) 
Subcat e: Unknown gun category 
Subcat f: Other gun category 
V4 cat 6: Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 
Subcat g: Grenade 
Subcat h: Land mine 
Subcat i: Letter bomb 
Subcat j: Pressure trigger 
Subcat k: Projectile (rockets, mortars, RPGs, etc.) 
Subcat l: Remote trigger 
Subcat m: Suicide (carried bodily by human being) 
Subcat n: Time fuse 
Subcat o: Vehicle 
Subcat p: Unknown explosive category 
Subcat q: Other explosive category 
V4 cat 7: Fake Weapons 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 8: Incendiary 
Subcat r: Arson/Fire 
Subcat s: Flame thrower 
Subcat t: Gasoline or Alcohol 
V4 cat 9: Melee 
Subcat u: Blunt object 
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V1 cat 2: Armed assault 
V1 cat 3: Bombing 
V1 cat 4: Hijacking 
V1 cat 5: Hostage taking / Kidnapping 
V1 cat 6: Vehicle attack 
V1 cat 7: Computer network attack / Electronic warfare 
V1 cat 8: CBRN 
V1 cat 9: Other 
V1 cat 10: Miscellaneous 
V1 cat 11: Unspecified 
 
Variable 2: Description of incident 
The text variable Description of incident allows importing additional information 
about the primary objective of the incident. 
 
Variable 3: Weapon category 
The categorical variable Weapon category records the general category of the 
weapon(s) used in the incident. It consists of the following thirteen categories that 
were taken from the GTD. 
V3 cat 1: Biological 
V3 cat 2: Chemical 
V3 cat 3: Radiological 
V3 cat 4: Nuclear 
V3 cat 5: Firearms 
V3 cat 6: Explosives / Bombs / Dynamite 
V3 cat 7: Fake Weapons 
V3 cat 8: Incendiary 
V3 cat 9: Melee 
V3 cat 10: Vehicle (not to include vehicle‐borne explosives, i.e., car / truck bombs) 
V3 cat 11: Sabotage equipment 
V3 cat 12: Other 
V3 cat 13: Unspecified 
 
Variable 4: Weapon sub-category 
The categorical variable Weapon sub-category records a more specific value for 
most of the weapon category identified immediately above. The thirteen 
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categories below are taken from the GTD. Values for weapon category and 
corresponding sub‐type are as follows: 
V4 cat 1: Biological 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 2: Chemical 
Subcat a: Poisoning 
V4 cat 3: Radiological 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 4: Nuclear  
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories]  
V4 cat 5: Firearms 
Subcat b: Automatic weapon 
Subcat c: Handgun 
Subcat d: Rifle/Shotgun (non‐automatic) 
Subcat e: Unknown gun category 
Subcat f: Other gun category 
V4 cat 6: Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite 
Subcat g: Grenade 
Subcat h: Land mine 
Subcat i: Letter bomb 
Subcat j: Pressure trigger 
Subcat k: Projectile (rockets, mortars, RPGs, etc.) 
Subcat l: Remote trigger 
Subcat m: Suicide (carried bodily by human being) 
Subcat n: Time fuse 
Subcat o: Vehicle 
Subcat p: Unknown explosive category 
Subcat q: Other explosive category 
V4 cat 7: Fake Weapons 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 8: Incendiary 
Subcat r: Arson/Fire 
Subcat s: Flame thrower 
Subcat t: Gasoline or Alcohol 
V4 cat 9: Melee 
Subcat u: Blunt object 
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V1 cat 2: Armed assault 
V1 cat 3: Bombing 
V1 cat 4: Hijacking 
V1 cat 5: Hostage taking / Kidnapping 
V1 cat 6: Vehicle attack 
V1 cat 7: Computer network attack / Electronic warfare 
V1 cat 8: CBRN 
V1 cat 9: Other 
V1 cat 10: Miscellaneous 
V1 cat 11: Unspecified 
 
Variable 2: Description of incident 
The text variable Description of incident allows importing additional information 
about the primary objective of the incident. 
 
Variable 3: Weapon category 
The categorical variable Weapon category records the general category of the 
weapon(s) used in the incident. It consists of the following thirteen categories that 
were taken from the GTD. 
V3 cat 1: Biological 
V3 cat 2: Chemical 
V3 cat 3: Radiological 
V3 cat 4: Nuclear 
V3 cat 5: Firearms 
V3 cat 6: Explosives / Bombs / Dynamite 
V3 cat 7: Fake Weapons 
V3 cat 8: Incendiary 
V3 cat 9: Melee 
V3 cat 10: Vehicle (not to include vehicle‐borne explosives, i.e., car / truck bombs) 
V3 cat 11: Sabotage equipment 
V3 cat 12: Other 
V3 cat 13: Unspecified 
 
Variable 4: Weapon sub-category 
The categorical variable Weapon sub-category records a more specific value for 
most of the weapon category identified immediately above. The thirteen 
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V8 cat 3: Pressure 
V8 cat 4: Manually 
V8 cat 5: Motion or trip-wire controlled 
V8 cat 6: Miscellaneous 
V8 cat 7: Other 
V8 cat 8: Unspecified 
 
Variable 9: Description of explosive 
The text variable Description of explosive allows importing additional information 
about the explosives and ways of detonation that were used in the incident.  
 
Variable 10: Suicide mission 
The dichotomous variable Suicide mission captures whether the incident implied 
the planned death of (one of the) the protagonist(s) people died as a result of the 
incident. The variable consists of three categories. 
V10 cat 1: Suicide mission 
V10 cat 2: No suicide mission 
V10 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 11: Description of suicide mission 
The text variable Description of suicide mission allows importing additional 
information about the incident.  
 
Variable 12: Delivery method 
The categorical variable Delivery method records the method of delivery of the 
weapon used in the incident. It consists of seventeen categories.  
V12 cat 1: Ground-based vehicle 
V12 cat 2: Water, vessel 
V12 cat 3: Sub aquatic / scuba 
V12 cat 4: Aircraft 
V12 cat 5: Missile, surface to surface 
V12 cat 6: Missile, surface to air 
V12 cat 7: Missile, air to surface 
V12 cat 8: Missile, air to air 
V12 cat 9: Missile, unknown type 
V12 cat 10: Suicide terrorist 
V12 cat 11: Human host 
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Subcat v: Hands, feet, fists 
Subcat w: Knife 
Subcat x: Rope or other strangling device 
Subcat y: Sharp object other than knife 
Subcat z: Suffocation  
V4 cat 10: Vehicle (not to include vehicle‐borne explosives, i.e., car / truck bombs)  
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 11: Sabotage equipment 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 12: Other 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 13: Unspecified 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories]  
 
Variable 5: Description of Weapon sub-category 
The text variable Description of Weapon sub-category allows importing additional 
information about the weapon(s) and its (sub-)category that were used in the 
incident. Information may include the novel use of a weapon or innovative means 
of concealing a weapon, specific weapon models, relevant details of the weapons’ 
origins, etc. 
 
Variable 6: Type of primary explosive 
The categorical variable Type of primary explosive records the general type of 
primary explosive used in the incident. It consists of two hundred and twenty-four 
categories that were taken from the GTD. For reasons of brevity we refer to 
Appendix C for the complete list of these values. 
 
Variable 7: Amount of primary explosive 
The numeric variable Amount of primary explosive captures the total amount of 
primary explosives that was used in the incident.  
 
Variable 8: Detonation 
The categorical variable Detonation allows capturing the method of detonation of 
the explosives used. It consists of eight categories. 
V8 cat 1: Timer 
V8 cat 2: Radio frequency 
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V8 cat 3: Pressure 
V8 cat 4: Manually 
V8 cat 5: Motion or trip-wire controlled 
V8 cat 6: Miscellaneous 
V8 cat 7: Other 
V8 cat 8: Unspecified 
 
Variable 9: Description of explosive 
The text variable Description of explosive allows importing additional information 
about the explosives and ways of detonation that were used in the incident.  
 
Variable 10: Suicide mission 
The dichotomous variable Suicide mission captures whether the incident implied 
the planned death of (one of the) the protagonist(s) people died as a result of the 
incident. The variable consists of three categories. 
V10 cat 1: Suicide mission 
V10 cat 2: No suicide mission 
V10 cat 3: Unspecified 
 
Variable 11: Description of suicide mission 
The text variable Description of suicide mission allows importing additional 
information about the incident.  
 
Variable 12: Delivery method 
The categorical variable Delivery method records the method of delivery of the 
weapon used in the incident. It consists of seventeen categories.  
V12 cat 1: Ground-based vehicle 
V12 cat 2: Water, vessel 
V12 cat 3: Sub aquatic / scuba 
V12 cat 4: Aircraft 
V12 cat 5: Missile, surface to surface 
V12 cat 6: Missile, surface to air 
V12 cat 7: Missile, air to surface 
V12 cat 8: Missile, air to air 
V12 cat 9: Missile, unknown type 
V12 cat 10: Suicide terrorist 
V12 cat 11: Human host 
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Subcat v: Hands, feet, fists 
Subcat w: Knife 
Subcat x: Rope or other strangling device 
Subcat y: Sharp object other than knife 
Subcat z: Suffocation  
V4 cat 10: Vehicle (not to include vehicle‐borne explosives, i.e., car / truck bombs)  
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 11: Sabotage equipment 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 12: Other 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories] 
V4 cat 13: Unspecified 
[no corresponding weapon sub‐categories]  
 
Variable 5: Description of Weapon sub-category 
The text variable Description of Weapon sub-category allows importing additional 
information about the weapon(s) and its (sub-)category that were used in the 
incident. Information may include the novel use of a weapon or innovative means 
of concealing a weapon, specific weapon models, relevant details of the weapons’ 
origins, etc. 
 
Variable 6: Type of primary explosive 
The categorical variable Type of primary explosive records the general type of 
primary explosive used in the incident. It consists of two hundred and twenty-four 
categories that were taken from the GTD. For reasons of brevity we refer to 
Appendix C for the complete list of these values. 
 
Variable 7: Amount of primary explosive 
The numeric variable Amount of primary explosive captures the total amount of 
primary explosives that was used in the incident.  
 
Variable 8: Detonation 
The categorical variable Detonation allows capturing the method of detonation of 
the explosives used. It consists of eight categories. 
V8 cat 1: Timer 
V8 cat 2: Radio frequency 
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7.11 Elementary Scenario Component 9: Modus 
operandi 
The Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi captures how the incident 
was prepared and in what order events took place. Modus operandi and its ten 
variables provide information about terrorist plans and how they are carried out. 
Table 7.11 shows the internal structure of this component.  
 
  Modus operandi   
# Variable Explanation For example  Type of 
variable 
1 Level of 
intelligence 
What level of intelligence did 
the protagonist(s) need to 
attain for their actions? 
Low Category 
2 Actual M.O.  Explanation of the M.O. What 
happened, in what order etc. 
Antagonist was shot eight 
times with a handgun. 
Subsequently, Protagonist cut 
Antagonist’s throat, nearly 
decapitating him, and 
stabbed him in the chest. Two 
knives were left implanted in 
his torso, one attaching a five-




Classification of Pre-incident 
action(s) 
Surveillance, terrorist training Category 
4 Description of 
Pre-incident 
action(s) 
Description of Pre-incident 
action(s) 
Route of antagonist was well 




Classification of Post-incident 
action(s) 
Subsequent action(s) Category 
6 Description of 
post-incident 
action(s) 
Description of Post-incident 
action(s) 
Protagonist tried to flee and 
shot at several policemen and 
civilians 
Text 
7 Communication Was there any form of 
communication during, before 
or after the attack? 
- Dichotomous 
8 Description of 
communication 
Description of communication  Text 
9 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated 
with the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi? 
 Text 
10 Red herring Is a Red herring associated 
with the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi? 
 Text 
 
Table 7.11 PANDORA: Modus operandi. 
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V12 cat 12: Mail / post 
V12 cat 13: Food / beverages 
V12 cat 14: Water supply 
V12 cat 15: Gaseous 
V12 cat 16: Miscellaneous 
V12 cat 17: Unspecified 
 
Variable 13: Description of transportation 
The text variable Description of transportation allows importing additional 
information about the explosives and ways of detonation that were used in the 
incident.  
 
Variable 14: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Means represents something else by means of association, 
resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 15: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the variables that constitute 
the Elementary Scenario Component Means were believed to have included a Red 
herring or false indicator.  
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7.11 Elementary Scenario Component 9: Modus 
operandi 
The Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi captures how the incident 
was prepared and in what order events took place. Modus operandi and its ten 
variables provide information about terrorist plans and how they are carried out. 
Table 7.11 shows the internal structure of this component.  
 
  Modus operandi   
# Variable Explanation For example  Type of 
variable 
1 Level of 
intelligence 
What level of intelligence did 
the protagonist(s) need to 
attain for their actions? 
Low Category 
2 Actual M.O.  Explanation of the M.O. What 
happened, in what order etc. 
Antagonist was shot eight 
times with a handgun. 
Subsequently, Protagonist cut 
Antagonist’s throat, nearly 
decapitating him, and 
stabbed him in the chest. Two 
knives were left implanted in 
his torso, one attaching a five-




Classification of Pre-incident 
action(s) 
Surveillance, terrorist training Category 
4 Description of 
Pre-incident 
action(s) 
Description of Pre-incident 
action(s) 
Route of antagonist was well 




Classification of Post-incident 
action(s) 
Subsequent action(s) Category 
6 Description of 
post-incident 
action(s) 
Description of Post-incident 
action(s) 
Protagonist tried to flee and 
shot at several policemen and 
civilians 
Text 
7 Communication Was there any form of 
communication during, before 
or after the attack? 
- Dichotomous 
8 Description of 
communication 
Description of communication  Text 
9 Symbolism Is a symbolic value associated 
with the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi? 
 Text 
10 Red herring Is a Red herring associated 
with the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi? 
 Text 
 
Table 7.11 PANDORA: Modus operandi. 
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V12 cat 12: Mail / post 
V12 cat 13: Food / beverages 
V12 cat 14: Water supply 
V12 cat 15: Gaseous 
V12 cat 16: Miscellaneous 
V12 cat 17: Unspecified 
 
Variable 13: Description of transportation 
The text variable Description of transportation allows importing additional 
information about the explosives and ways of detonation that were used in the 
incident.  
 
Variable 14: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Means represents something else by means of association, 
resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 15: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the variables that constitute 
the Elementary Scenario Component Means were believed to have included a Red 
herring or false indicator.  
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V5 cat 1: Subsequent attack(s) 
V5 cat 2: Subsequent action(s) 
V5 cat 3: Incident claimed 
V5 cat 4: Successful exfiltration 
V5 cat 7: Other 
V5 cat 8: Miscellaneous 
V5 cat 9: Unspecified  
 
Variable 6: Description of Post-incident action(s) 
The text variable Description of Post-incident action(s) allows for additional 
information related to Pre-incident action(s) to be included in the model.  
 
Variable 7: Communication 
The dichotomous variable Communication captures whether there was evidence of 
(any form of) communication during, before, or after the attack? The variable 
consists of two categories: 
V7 cat 1: yes 
V7 cat 2: no 
 
Variable 8: Description of communication 
The text variable Description of communication allows for additional information 
related to communication to be included in the model.  
 
Variable 9: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Modus operandi represents something else by means of 
association, resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 10: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the variables that constitute 
the Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi were believed to have 
included a Red herring or false indicator.  
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Variable 1: Level of intelligence 
The categorical variable Level of intelligence refers to how much knowledge the 
protagonist needed or attained prior to the execution of their actions. This can be 
one of four categories. 
V1 cat 1: Low 
V1 cat 2: Medium 
V1 cat 3: High 
V1 cat 4:Unspecified 
 
Variable 2: Actual M.O.  
The text variable Actual M.O. captures the storyline of the incident. In other words 
how the incident was prepared and in what order events took place. The different 
actions that occurred before and after the event can be described in Actual M.O.  
and stored in the subsequent variables Pre-incident action(s) and Post-incident 
action(s). 
  
Variable 3: Pre-incident action(s) 
The categorical variable Pre-incident action(s) records the actions that preceded 
the incident. It consists of ten categories.  
V3 cat 1: Weapons / Material movement 
V3 cat 2: Terrorist travel 
V3 cat 3: Terrorist training 
V3 cat 4: Surveillance 
V3 cat 5: Infiltration 
V3 cat 6: Test of security 
V3 cat 7: Elicitation 
V3 cat 8: Other 
V3 cat 9: Miscellaneous 
V3 cat 10: Unspecified 
 
Variable 4: Description of Pre-incident action(s) 
The text variable Description of Pre-incident action(s) allows for additional 
information related to Pre-incident action(s) to be included in the model.  
 
Variable 5: Post-incident action(s) 
The categorical variable Post-incident action(s) records the actions that followed 
the incident. It consists of nine categories.  
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V5 cat 1: Subsequent attack(s) 
V5 cat 2: Subsequent action(s) 
V5 cat 3: Incident claimed 
V5 cat 4: Successful exfiltration 
V5 cat 7: Other 
V5 cat 8: Miscellaneous 
V5 cat 9: Unspecified  
 
Variable 6: Description of Post-incident action(s) 
The text variable Description of Post-incident action(s) allows for additional 
information related to Pre-incident action(s) to be included in the model.  
 
Variable 7: Communication 
The dichotomous variable Communication captures whether there was evidence of 
(any form of) communication during, before, or after the attack? The variable 
consists of two categories: 
V7 cat 1: yes 
V7 cat 2: no 
 
Variable 8: Description of communication 
The text variable Description of communication allows for additional information 
related to communication to be included in the model.  
 
Variable 9: Symbolism 
The text variable Symbolism allows describing to what extent the Elementary 
Scenario Component Modus operandi represents something else by means of 
association, resemblance, or convention.  
 
Variable 10: Red herring 
The text variable Red herring allows capturing whether the variables that constitute 
the Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi were believed to have 
included a Red herring or false indicator.  
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Variable 1: Level of intelligence 
The categorical variable Level of intelligence refers to how much knowledge the 
protagonist needed or attained prior to the execution of their actions. This can be 
one of four categories. 
V1 cat 1: Low 
V1 cat 2: Medium 
V1 cat 3: High 
V1 cat 4:Unspecified 
 
Variable 2: Actual M.O.  
The text variable Actual M.O. captures the storyline of the incident. In other words 
how the incident was prepared and in what order events took place. The different 
actions that occurred before and after the event can be described in Actual M.O.  
and stored in the subsequent variables Pre-incident action(s) and Post-incident 
action(s). 
  
Variable 3: Pre-incident action(s) 
The categorical variable Pre-incident action(s) records the actions that preceded 
the incident. It consists of ten categories.  
V3 cat 1: Weapons / Material movement 
V3 cat 2: Terrorist travel 
V3 cat 3: Terrorist training 
V3 cat 4: Surveillance 
V3 cat 5: Infiltration 
V3 cat 6: Test of security 
V3 cat 7: Elicitation 
V3 cat 8: Other 
V3 cat 9: Miscellaneous 
V3 cat 10: Unspecified 
 
Variable 4: Description of Pre-incident action(s) 
The text variable Description of Pre-incident action(s) allows for additional 
information related to Pre-incident action(s) to be included in the model.  
 
Variable 5: Post-incident action(s) 
The categorical variable Post-incident action(s) records the actions that followed 
the incident. It consists of nine categories.  
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V2 cat 3: Not applicable (N.A.) 
 
Variable 3: Number of protectors 
The numeric variable Number of protectors captures the number of people 
protecting the Antagonist at the time of the incident. The variable accepts “0” as 
input when the Antagonist was not protected or guarded by people at the time of 
the incident. 
 
Variable 4: Number of armed protectors 
The numeric variable Number of armed protectors captures how many of the 
protectors people protecting the antagonist were armed at the time of the 
incident. The variable is presented in the format [#protectors / #armed protectors]  
 
Variable 5: Procedure 
The text variable Procedure allows for additional information to be recorded about 
the procedures which the protectors followed before, during, and in response to 
the incident. 
 
Variable 6: Category of protection 
The categorical variable Category of protection records the protection that the 
antagonist had at the time of the incident. It consists of thirteen categories.  
V6 cat 1: Armoured car class d 
V6 cat 2: Armoured car class c 
V6 cat 3: Armoured car class b 
V6 cat 4: Armoured car class a 
V6 cat 5: Armoured car class unknown 
V6 cat 6: Travelling in convoy 
V6 cat 7: Advanced protection team 
V6 cat 8: Counter surveillance team 
V6 cat 9: Body armour 
V6 cat 10: RF jammers 
V6 cat 11: Other 
V6 cat 12: Unspecified 
V6 cat 13: N.A. 
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7.12 Elementary Scenario Component 10: Resistance 
The Elementary Scenario Component Resistance refers to the obstacles that the  
Protagonist had to overcome to execute his plan. Table 7.12 lists the eight 
variables and internal structure of the Elementary Scenario Component Resistance. 
 
  Resistance   
# Variable Explanation For example Type of 
variable 
1 Protection Did the antagonist have any form of close protection? No Dichotomous 
2 Driver Was the antagonist accompanied by a driver? N.A. Dichotomous 
3 Number of 
protectors 
How many protectors were there? - Category 
4 Number of 
armed 
protectors  
How many of the protectors were armed? Coded in 
the format {#protectore / #protectors armed] 
 
- Numeric 
5 Procedure What procedure did the protectors follow?   Text 
6 Category of 
protection 






Has there been an earlier breach in security? - Text 
8 Security 
intervention 
Has there been a security intervention during / 
proceeding / preceding the attack? 
- Text 
 
Table 7.12 PANDORA: Resistance. 
 
Variable 1: Protection 
The dichotomous variable Protection captures whether the antagonist had any 
type of protection. An explanation of the different types of protection included in 
the scenario model, may be recorded in the variable “Category of protection” (see 
variable 6). The variable Protection consists of two categories. 
V1 cat 1: Protection 
V1 cat 2: No protection 
 
Variable 2: Driver 
The dichotomous variable Driver captures whether the antagonist was 
accompanied by a driver / chauffeur at the time of the incident. When an incident 
did not take place when the antagonist was En route, the category Not Applicable 
is selected.  
The variable consists of three categories. 
V2 cat 1: Driver 
V2 cat 2: No driver 
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V2 cat 3: Not applicable (N.A.) 
 
Variable 3: Number of protectors 
The numeric variable Number of protectors captures the number of people 
protecting the Antagonist at the time of the incident. The variable accepts “0” as 
input when the Antagonist was not protected or guarded by people at the time of 
the incident. 
 
Variable 4: Number of armed protectors 
The numeric variable Number of armed protectors captures how many of the 
protectors people protecting the antagonist were armed at the time of the 
incident. The variable is presented in the format [#protectors / #armed protectors]  
 
Variable 5: Procedure 
The text variable Procedure allows for additional information to be recorded about 
the procedures which the protectors followed before, during, and in response to 
the incident. 
 
Variable 6: Category of protection 
The categorical variable Category of protection records the protection that the 
antagonist had at the time of the incident. It consists of thirteen categories.  
V6 cat 1: Armoured car class d 
V6 cat 2: Armoured car class c 
V6 cat 3: Armoured car class b 
V6 cat 4: Armoured car class a 
V6 cat 5: Armoured car class unknown 
V6 cat 6: Travelling in convoy 
V6 cat 7: Advanced protection team 
V6 cat 8: Counter surveillance team 
V6 cat 9: Body armour 
V6 cat 10: RF jammers 
V6 cat 11: Other 
V6 cat 12: Unspecified 
V6 cat 13: N.A. 
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7.12 Elementary Scenario Component 10: Resistance 
The Elementary Scenario Component Resistance refers to the obstacles that the  
Protagonist had to overcome to execute his plan. Table 7.12 lists the eight 
variables and internal structure of the Elementary Scenario Component Resistance. 
 
  Resistance   
# Variable Explanation For example Type of 
variable 
1 Protection Did the antagonist have any form of close protection? No Dichotomous 
2 Driver Was the antagonist accompanied by a driver? N.A. Dichotomous 
3 Number of 
protectors 
How many protectors were there? - Category 
4 Number of 
armed 
protectors  
How many of the protectors were armed? Coded in 
the format {#protectore / #protectors armed] 
 
- Numeric 
5 Procedure What procedure did the protectors follow?   Text 
6 Category of 
protection 






Has there been an earlier breach in security? - Text 
8 Security 
intervention 
Has there been a security intervention during / 
proceeding / preceding the attack? 
- Text 
 
Table 7.12 PANDORA: Resistance. 
 
Variable 1: Protection 
The dichotomous variable Protection captures whether the antagonist had any 
type of protection. An explanation of the different types of protection included in 
the scenario model, may be recorded in the variable “Category of protection” (see 
variable 6). The variable Protection consists of two categories. 
V1 cat 1: Protection 
V1 cat 2: No protection 
 
Variable 2: Driver 
The dichotomous variable Driver captures whether the antagonist was 
accompanied by a driver / chauffeur at the time of the incident. When an incident 
did not take place when the antagonist was En route, the category Not Applicable 
is selected.  
The variable consists of three categories. 
V2 cat 1: Driver 
V2 cat 2: No driver 
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Variable 7: Previous security breach 
The text variable Previous security breach allows for the recording of information 
about earlier security breaches.  
 
Variable 8: Security intervention 
The text variable Security intervention allows for the recording of information 
about security interventions before, during, or in response to the incident.  
 
The Elementary Scenario Components Symbolism and Red herring are not 
deemed relevant in relation to the Elementary Scenario Component Resistance. 
 
7.13 Chapter summary 
The ESC12 represent the twelve elementary components from which every 
scenario can be built. However, these components are considered too general to 
accommodate the relevant details of criminal behaviour. The process of 
subdividing the ESC12 into variables is described in this chapter.  
 
First, we explained the process of exploratory testing by which we created an 
internal structure of the ESP PANDORA, and by which we arrived at a total of 98 
variables that are related to the ESC12 (section 7.1).  
 
In the subsequent eleven sections (section 7.2 to 7.12) we provided insight into 
the internal structure of the ESP PANDORA, and into the 98 variables it 
encompasses. Moreover, we illustrated how data is deconstructed and 
implemented in the ESP PANDORA The sections 7.2 to 7.12 include detailed tables 
that illustrate the Elementary Scenario Component, its corresponding variables, 
and its internal structure. For adequate understanding, we exemplified the internal 
structure of the ESP PANDORA by adding data from the assassination of the Dutch 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh. 
 
Having established 98 variables of the ESC12, and the internal structure of the ESP 
PANDORA, we may commence by opening Pandora’s box, and start analysing 
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Having established 98 variables of the ESC12, and the internal structure of the ESP 
PANDORA, we may commence by opening Pandora’s box, and start analysing 
criminal behaviour. This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
  
EIGHT | Opening PANDORA‘s box
8
In this chapter we study how the ESP PANDORA I may 
be used to analyse historic criminal behaviour and we will 
answer the third research question.
History serves as a monument to past achievements,
an inspiration to newly inducted members, 
a database for operational achievements. 
Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War53
53 Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (1985) is a study by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch. The authors examine three types of misfortune and show their implication in a 
variety of defeats in military campaigns of the twentieth century.
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On April 9th 2011, shortly after noon, a man entered a shopping mall in the 
Netherlands, wearing a bulletproof vest and carrying a semi-automatic Smith & 
Wesson .22 long rifle, a Colt .45 pistol, and a Taurus .44 Magnum revolver. Three 
minutes later 6 people were shot dead, 17 people were injured (one of which 
would succumb to injuries later the same day), and the shooter had committed 
suicide (Openbaar Ministerie, 2011). This attack was the deadliest lone-operator 
incident54 in the Netherlands since an individual drove his car into a crowd two 
years earlier, killing seven people and himself in an apparent attack on the Dutch 
Royal family. 
 
In the aftermath of both the shopping mall shooting and the apparent attack on 
the Dutch Royal family, the investigative teams raised two questions: (1) could the 
incident have been prevented? and (2) would it be possible anticipate future lone-
operator incidents? To approach both questions, the investigative teams needed a 
better insight into the predicaments of lone-operator behaviour.  
 
The words quoted at the beginning of this chapter suggest that history can 
provide information to create “a database for operational achievements”. The 
National Crime Squad of the Netherlands (one of the organisations investigating 
the aforementioned lone-operator incident) needed exactly that. In order to 
anticipate future behaviour, they required general characteristics of lone operators 
instead of specific characteristics of a single lone-operator incident. In other words, 
questions concerning the correlation between lone operators and mental health, 
or the relation between lone operators and their targets, were deemed essential 
but could not be answered from the data of the isolated incidents that were 
investigated. Therefore, the National Crime Squad expressed interest in using the 
ESC12 scenario model to detect general characteristics in the behaviour of lone 
operators55. 
 
The operational interest of the National Crime Squad coincided with the research 
stage in which we attempted to answer RQ3 [To what extent can a scenario model 
be used to analyse historic criminal behaviour?]. Therefore, we agreed to employ 
the ESC12 scenario model to analyse historic behaviour of lone operators. The 
analysis was conducted by Van der Heide and published in the Master thesis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For the use of the term lone operators we refer to definition 2.4 of this thesis. 
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Moreover, we identified seventeen variables (related to these six components) that 
encompass valuable information by which general characteristics in the behaviour 
of lone operators may be detected. The six Elementary Scenario Components and 
their respective variables are summarised in table 8.1. Please note that the 
numbering of the variables in table 8.1 coincides with the numbering of the same 
variables in chapter seven. For a more elaborate description of the ESC12 and the 
internal structure of the corresponding variables, we refer to chapter seven. 
 
ESC Variable  
Arena Region (V1) 
Kill zone (V4) 
Static location (V5) 
En route (V6) 
Public route / location (V7) 
In which region does the incident occur? 
Does the incident occur in an urban or rural zone? 
Does the incident occur at a static location? 
Does the incident occur while the antagonist was en route? 
Is the route / location publicly known? 
Protagonist Confirmed Protagonist (V1) 
Description of background (V6) 
Protagonist’s gender (V13) 
Protagonist’s Age(group) (V14) 
Is the protagonist known? 
Additional details of the background of protagonist 
What is the gender of the protagonist? 
Which age group does the protagonist fit into? 
Antagonist Specific / Generic antagonist(s) (V3) 
 
Type of antagonist(s) (V5) 
Symbolism (V10) 
Are the antagonist(s) selected randomly or selectively from 
a target population? 
What is the type of the antagonist? 
Does the antagonist represent a symbolic value 
Motivation Possible motivation of protagonist (V1) 
Description of motivation of 
protagonist (V2) 
What is the possible motive for the protagonist? 
Additional description of motivation for the protagonist 
Means Type of Incident (V1) 
Weapon sub-category (V4) 
What is the type of the incident? 
Which weapon sub-category is used? 
Modus 
Operandi 
Level of intelligence (V1) What is the level of intelligence that the protagonist needs 
to execute the incident 
 
Table 8.1 The ESC and the variables selected for the experiment. 
8.1.2 Case selection: Lone-operator incidents 
Ever since the start of modern terror, the world has witnessed four waves of 
terrorism, starting in the 1880s and lasting until now (see Rapoport, 2004). These 
four waves are defined, and distributed over time58, as follows. 
1. The Anarchist Wave started in the 1880s and continued until the 1920s.  
2. The Anti-Colonial Wave began in the 1920s, and lasted to the 1960s.  
3. The New-left Wave started in the late 1960s and dissipated in the 1990s.  
4. The Religious Wave began in 1979, and lasts until the present time. 
(Rapoport, 2004). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 We note that the four waves of terrorism theory by Rapoport (2004) uses broad and roughly delineated 
timeframes. In our research we have distributed the cases according to the predominant energy of the wave, 
sometimes disregarding the strict delineation of the timeframes. 
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Individual terrorism, indicators of lone operators (Van der Heide, 2011). With her 
main research question What is the time-independent profile for lone operator 
terrorists?, Van der Heide focussed on the operational interest of the investigative 
teams56. To answer RQ3, we will build on her findings. To put it differently, the 
extent to which the scenario model allows specific analysis of historic behaviour of 
lone operators, will be critical in our analysis.  
 
In section 8.1 we describe the research framework for the analysis performed in 
this chapter. In section 8.2 we present forty cases of lone-operator behaviour, and 
distribute them equally over the four waves of modern terrorism (i.e., we present 
ten lone-operator incidents per wave). In section 8.3 we present a cross-wave 
analysis of the results generated in the previous section, in an attempt to generate 
general characteristics of lone-operator behaviour57. Section 8.4 concludes this 
chapter by focussing on how the scenario model performs in analysing historic 
criminal behaviour. In effect, this section will be used to answer RQ3. 
 
8.1 Research framework  
Below, we present the research framework for our analysis of historic behaviour of 
lone-operator incidents. In subsection 8.1.1 we introduce six Elementary Scenario 
Components, the seventeen variables related to these components that we 
selected for our experiment. In subsection 8.1.2 we describe the process of case 
selection. We introduce the concept of four waves of modern terrorism by 
Rapoport (2004), and carefully select ten cases of lone-operator incidents for every 
wave. In subsection 8.1.4 we focus on the process of analysis of lone-operator 
behaviour.   
8.1.1 Analysis based on ESC6 and 17 variables 
To address both RQ3 and the operational need of the National Crime Squad, 
within a limited timeframe, we focus our analysis on six of the ESC12: Arena, 
Protagonist, Antagonist, Motivation, Means, and Modus Operandi. To distinguish 
this set of scenario components from the ESC12, we call them ESC6 (Something 
that exclusively happens in this chapter). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  Van der Heide used the ESC12 scenario model to answer the research question “What is the time-
independent profile for lone-operator terrorists?” 
57 Sections 8.2 and 8.3 reflect the result of the cooperation with Van der Heide (2011). 
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56  Van der Heide used the ESC12 scenario model to answer the research question “What is the time-
independent profile for lone-operator terrorists?” 
57 Sections 8.2 and 8.3 reflect the result of the cooperation with Van der Heide (2011). 
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8.1.3 The dataset 
Good practice of scientific inquiry requires that data and methodology are 
documented and made public. To ensure we are able to publish about our results, 
we took our data of lone-operator behaviour from Wikipedia. This open-source 
data repository is freely available and accessible without restrictions from copyright 
or classification of information. By its nature, we are sure that Wikipedia contains 
the successful lone-operator attacks that have had a significant effect or impact 
(criterion 4). For further considerations on using open-source data and our 
approach to the constraints associated with it, we refer to subsection 6.1.2 
Limitations of using open-source data.  
8.1.4 Analysis of lone-operator behaviour 
The analysis of our observations is based on ten selected cases of lone-operator 
behaviour per wave. We emphasise that these observations are to be considered 
as explanatory in nature. We do not claim to cover the full domain, but we use the 
forty cases to investigate general characteristics in the behaviour of lone operators 
in relation to the four waves of modern terrorism as defined by Rapoport (2004). 
 
For convenient reading we include four tables that summarise four times ten cases 
that are selected (table 8.2 to 8.5). Every table represents one of the four waves of 
modern terrorism, and consists of ten carefully selected lone-operator incidents 
which satisfy the four criteria; they are presented in chronological order. Every 
table constitutes four columns. In the first column (marked with #) an incident is 
attributed a number from 1 to 40. This number is used in the discussion of our 
findings. In the second column a CaseID identifies the protagonist or antagonist 
related to the specific case. In the third column a short description of the incident is 
provided. The fourth column indicates the date of the incident. 
 
In our discussion we will frequently refer to the internal structure of the ESC12 as 
introduced in chapter seven. For instance, the reference “Antagonist V5 cat 14” 
would refer to the 14th category of the 5th variable of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Antagonist (viz. the category “Private citizens & property”, see section 
7.6). The subsections (and tables) 7.1 to 7.11 may be consulted for additional 
explanation of the internal structure of the ESC12. 
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As Rapoport (2004) argues, the name given to each wave reflects its dominant -but 
not its only- feature or “predominant energy”, within a given time period. In the 
context of this thesis, we therefore take the four waves of modern terrorism as a 
delineator of predominant energy, and not as much as a delineator of time. So, in 
the process of selecting cases for the analysis of lone-operator behaviour, we 
distribute the cases according to the four-wave classification by Rapoport, with 
time as a subordinate variable. We will analyse forty cases of lone-operator 
incidents. The four waves of terrorism theory by Rapoport (2004) are used to relate 
the cases to different political contexts. The cases are selected based upon four 
criteria. 
1. The cases are executed by lone operators (see definition 2.4 for the 
definition of “lone operators”). 
2. The cases constitute an attack (as opposed to an attempt). 
3. The selection process should achieve an even distribution over the four 
waves of modern terrorism, i.e., we select ten cases per wave of modern 
terrorism59. 
4. The cases have a significant effect or impact, either domestically or 
internationally.  
 
To provide more insight for colleague expert researchers into our considerations 
with respect to the selection process, we refer to Appendix D. It lists 140 incidents 
that are considered for the research described in this chapter. All these incidents 
are related to lone operators (criterion 1). From the 140 incidents, 30 are to be 
characterised as attempts. This implies that the remaining list (after applying 
criterion 2) contains 110 incidents. Of this list, 40 cases are selected for close 
investigation, 10 cases per wave of modern terrorism (criterion 3). Next to the first 
three criteria, the decisive criterion is criterion 4. Here, effect and impact of the 
incident are weighed and compared with other cases that are selected for the 
same wave. With our case-selection process we aim to constitute a list that 
represents the Zeitgeist of the individual waves of the lone-operator behaviour. So, 
the cases can be used to explore the nature and development of lone-operator 
behaviour over time. Here, we remark that the 140 cases selected for the analysis 
of lone-operator behaviour by no means constitute an exhaustive or complete list 
of lone-operator terrorism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In the case-selection process, we disregarded the proportional part of the ten cases with respect to the total 
number of cases per wave. Appendix D lists the 140 cases that are included in the PANDORA I dataset. 
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As Rapoport (2004) argues, the name given to each wave reflects its dominant -but 
not its only- feature or “predominant energy”, within a given time period. In the 
context of this thesis, we therefore take the four waves of modern terrorism as a 
delineator of predominant energy, and not as much as a delineator of time. So, in 
the process of selecting cases for the analysis of lone-operator behaviour, we 
distribute the cases according to the four-wave classification by Rapoport, with 
time as a subordinate variable. We will analyse forty cases of lone-operator 
incidents. The four waves of terrorism theory by Rapoport (2004) are used to relate 
the cases to different political contexts. The cases are selected based upon four 
criteria. 
1. The cases are executed by lone operators (see definition 2.4 for the 
definition of “lone operators”). 
2. The cases constitute an attack (as opposed to an attempt). 
3. The selection process should achieve an even distribution over the four 
waves of modern terrorism, i.e., we select ten cases per wave of modern 
terrorism59. 
4. The cases have a significant effect or impact, either domestically or 
internationally.  
 
To provide more insight for colleague expert researchers into our considerations 
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that are considered for the research described in this chapter. All these incidents 
are related to lone operators (criterion 1). From the 140 incidents, 30 are to be 
characterised as attempts. This implies that the remaining list (after applying 
criterion 2) contains 110 incidents. Of this list, 40 cases are selected for close 
investigation, 10 cases per wave of modern terrorism (criterion 3). Next to the first 
three criteria, the decisive criterion is criterion 4. Here, effect and impact of the 
incident are weighed and compared with other cases that are selected for the 
same wave. With our case-selection process we aim to constitute a list that 
represents the Zeitgeist of the individual waves of the lone-operator behaviour. So, 
the cases can be used to explore the nature and development of lone-operator 
behaviour over time. Here, we remark that the 140 cases selected for the analysis 
of lone-operator behaviour by no means constitute an exhaustive or complete list 
of lone-operator terrorism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 In the case-selection process, we disregarded the proportional part of the ten cases with respect to the total 
number of cases per wave. Appendix D lists the 140 cases that are included in the PANDORA I dataset. 
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# Case ID Description Date 
1 Czar Alexander II Czar Alexander II is assassinated with home made explosives, 
by Ignacy Hryniewiecki, a member of the revolutionary Russian 
party Narodnaya Volya60. 
13-03-1881 
2 French president 
Marie Francois Sadi 
Carnot 
After delivering a speech in Lyon Sadi Carnot, the president of 
France is stabbed to death by Italian anarchist Sante Geronimo 




Canovas del Castillo 
Michele Angiolillo shoots Spanish prime-minister Antonio 
Cánovas del Castillo dead at a thermal bath resort, seeking 
vengeance for the imprisonment and torture of alleged 
revolutionaries at the Montjuïc fortress.  
08-08-1897 
4 Empress Elisabeth of 
Austria 
Luigi Lucheni stabs Empress Elisabeth, the consort of Emperor 
Franz Joseph I of Austria-Hungary, to death with a sharpened 
needle file in Geneva. Lucheni regarded the Empress to be a 
member of the oppressive upper class. 
10-09-1898 
5 King Umberto I of 
Italy 
On a visit to Monza, King Umberto I is shot to death by the 
Italian-American anarchist Gaetano Bresci who seeks revenge 
for the Bava-Beccaris massacre in Milan. 
29-07-1900 
6 US president William 
McKinley 
US born anarchist Leon Czolgosz shoots U.S. president William 
McKinley at point-blank range at the Pan-American Exposition 





Russian prime-minister Stolypin is shot to death in the Kiev 
Opera House by Dimitri Bogrov, an anarchist and ex-agent of 





Spanish prime-minister Canalejas is shot to death by Manuel 
Pardiñas, a Spanish anarchist who commits suicide right after his 
act.  
12-11-1912 
9 King George I of 
Greece 
While on an afternoon walk, King George I of Greece is shot 
dead at close range  by Alexandros Schinas, a member of a 
socialist organisation who claims that the King had refused to 
give him money. 
18-03-1913 
10 President Symon 
Petliura of Ukraine 
Head of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Petliuara is shot to 
death while walking in Paris by Sholom Schwartzbard a Russian 
Jewish anarchist and poet. Schwartzbard holds Petliuara 
responsible for the loss of his family in the pogroms. 
25-03-1926 
 
Table 8.2 Ten cases of lone-operator terrorism: 1880s to the 1920s. 
 
Based on the 10 cases depicted in table 8.2, we will present our observations of 
the ESC (A) Arena, (B) Protagonist, (C) Antagonist, (D) Motivation, (E) Means, and 
(F) Modus Operandi and the seventeen corresponding variables that were 
selected, in the first wave of modern terrorism. 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  We note that the assassination of Czar Alexander is -by some sources- attributed to two or three 
protagonists. We reiterate that, our definition of lone operators includes protagonists that work in small 
networks or autonomous cells, (see definition 2.4).  
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8.2 The ESC6 in modern terrorism  
In this section, we will assess the forty cases of lone-operator terrorism as they 
were selected according to criteria 1 to 4. Below we will focus on (i) the ESC6, and 
(ii) the seventeen corresponding variables, that were introduced in table 8.1.  
 
In the four subsections below, we will address one of the waves of modern 
terrorism per subsection. In subsection 8.2.1 we will focus our attention on the first 
wave of modern terrorism, and so on.  
8.2.1 The ESC6 in the first wave of modern terrorism 
According to Rapoport, modern terror begins in Russia in the 1880s where it is 
initiated by the Anarchist movements. Their terrorist strategy has been recorded as 
executing prominent officials. This strategy appeared so successful, that it rapidly 
was adopted by many revolutionary anti-state groups of the time frame. It created 
a wave of terror. With some exceptions, most terrorists of the first wave of modern 
terrorism tried to avoid indiscriminate attacks on civilians or non-combatants who 
were not related to the cause that the protagonists wished to advance (cf. 
Rapoport, 2004). 
 
Table 8.2 introduces ten lone-operator incidents that are selected for the first wave 
of modern terrorism. (For a complete overview of the lone operator incidents that 
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Arena V7: Public route / location  
With respect to the question whether the location or route was publicly known, we 
observe that nine (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) of the ten incidents occur in a public place 
(Arena V7 cat 1) and one incident (3) occurs in a private location (Arena V7 cat 2). 
 
B: Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist 
Based on the collection of the 10 cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.2, we observe the following with regards to the four variables related to 
the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist. 
 
Protagonist V1: Confirmed protagonist  
All of the protagonists of the ten incidents of the first wave were known 
(Protagonist V1 cat 1). 
 
Protagonist V6: Description of background of protagonist 
We did not find a description of the background of the protagonist of the ten 
incidents of the first wave of modern terrorism. 
 
Protagonist V13: Protagonist’s gender  
All protagonists of the ten incidents of the first wave were male (Protagonist V13 
cat 1). 
 
Protagonist V14: Protagonist’s Age(group)  
Seven out of the ten protagonists (1,2,3,4,5,6,7) were aged between twenty-one 
and thirty years old (Protagonist V14 cat 3), whereas two (8,10) protagonists were 
aged between thirty-one and forty (Protagonist V14 cat 4). One protagonist (9) was 
between forty-one and fifty years of age (Protagonist V14 cat 5).  
 
C: Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist 
Based on the collection of the 10 cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.2, we observe the following with regards to the three variables related to 
Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist.  
 
Antagonist V3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
All antagonists of the ten incidents of the first wave of modern terrorism were 




A: Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
Based on the collection of the ten cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.2, we observe the following with regards to the five variables related to the 
Elementary Scenario Component Arena.  
 
Arena V1: Region  
The first wave of modern terrorism seems to centre very much on the Western 
world. Out of the total of ten lone-operator incidents, six (2,3,4,5,8,9) 61 take place 
in Western Europe (Arena V1 cat 8), three (1,7,10) in Russia & the Newly 
Independent States (NIS) (Arena V1 cat 12), and one (6) in North America, Canada, 
Mexico & United States (Arena V1 cat 1). This may confirm the theory that modern 
terror started with the anarchist wave in France and Italy, and then spread to 
Eastern Europe and the new world (North America) at the turn of the nineteenth 
century (cf. Iviansky, 1977). However, it may also be related to an inappropriate 
sampling of the cases related to the first wave of modern terrorism.  
 
Arena V4: Kill zone  
Concerning the kill zone, we observe that nine (1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) of the ten 
incidents studied, were executed in an urban environment (Arena V4 cat 1). In one 
case (3) the Kill zone was classified as rural. 
 
Arena V5: Static location  
In five incidents (2,3,5,6,7) the antagonist was attacked in a static location. In two 
cases (3,7) the incident occurs at a social location (Arena V5 cat 3), one antagonist 
(2) was attacked at a hotel or motel (Arena V5 cat 4), one (6) at a location 
categorised as “other” (Arena V5 cat 5), and in one case (5) in a location that was 
Unspecified (Arena V5 cat 7). 
 
Arena V6: En route  
In five incidents (1,4,8,9,10) out of the ten, the antagonist was en route. In four of 
these cases (4,8,9,10) the route was from a social to a social location (Arena V6 cat 
2). In one case (1), the antagonist was on route from home to work or vice versa 
(Arena V6 cat 1). 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The numbers between brackets refer to the individual cases of lone-operator terrorism as presented in the 
first column of the tables 8.2 to 8.5. 
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61 The numbers between brackets refer to the individual cases of lone-operator terrorism as presented in the 
first column of the tables 8.2 to 8.5. 
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E: Elementary Scenario Component Means 
Based on the collection of the 10 cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.2, we observe the following with regards to the two variables of the 
Elementary Scenario Component Means.  
 
Means V1: Type of incident 
All of the incidents in the first wave of modern terrorism were classified as 
Assassination / Liquidation (Means V1cat1). 
 
Means V4: Weapon sub-category 
Concerning the use of weapons, we observe that seven lone-operator terrorists 
(3,5,6,7,8,9,10) used a handgun (Means V4 cat 5, Subcat c), One protagonist (1) 
used a self-made explosive classified as Unknown explosive category (Means V4 
cat 6 Subcat p), one protagonist (2) used a knife (Means V4 cat 9, Subcat w), and 
one (4) used a sharp object other than knife (Means V4 cat 9, Subcat y).  
 
F: Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi 
Based on the collection of the 10 cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.2, we observe the following with regards to the variable of the Elementary 
Scenario Component Modus operandi.  
 
Modus operandi V1: Level of intelligence 
Nine of the ten lone operators (1,2,3,4,5,6,8,9,10) only needed a low level of 
intelligence (Modus operandi V1 cat 1) to carry out their act. When this is put 
against the timeframe of the first wave, it may indicate that (a) targets were easy to 
track or follow, or (b) that information concerning the whereabouts of potential 
targets for assassinations was easily accessible for the protagonist. The exception 
is Dimitri Bogrov (7). We estimate that the ex-agent of the secret police force of 
the Russian Empire needed a medium level of intelligence (Modus operandi V1 cat 
2) in order to execute his attack. 
8.2.2 The ESC6 in the second wave of modern terrorism 
The second wave of terrorism, which began in the 1920s, was dominated by the 
cause of national liberation. In this second wave, terrorism was intertwined with 
guerrilla warfare, such as the Viet Minh resistance against the French colonizers 
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Antagonist V5: Type of antagonist(s) 
All antagonists of the ten incidents of the first wave of modern terrorism were 
persons (as opposed to objects). Moreover, all the antagonists belong to the 
category of Government (general) (Antagonist V5 cat 2). We distinguish: three 
prime-ministers (3,7,8), three presidents (2,6,10) (we included Symon Petliura, head 
of the Ukrainian government in exile (10) in this category), two kings (5,9), a czar 
(1), and an empress (4). 
 
Antagonist V10: Symbolism 
With regards to the symbolic value of the antagonists, we may conclude that two 
antagonists (3,6) were targeted because they represented “the elite of society” to 
which the anarchists fiercely opposed, while two of the antagonists (4,5) were 
assassinated because (from the perspective of the protagonist) they represented 
an oppressive regime. 
 
D: Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
Based on the collection of the ten cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.2, we observe the following with regards to the two variables related to 
Elementary Scenario Component Motivation.  
 
Motivation V1: Possible motivation of protagonist 
Of the ten protagonists of the first wave of modern terrorism, six protagonists were 
motivated by moral outrage (3,4,5,6,9,10) (Motivation V1 cat 4): three protagonists 
claim to avenge earlier repression, torture, or massacres (3,5,10) and three 
protagonists (4,6,9) were motivated by hate against governments, elite, and 
aristocracy in general. Although the four remaining protagonists (1,2,7,8) were 
active in a political movement (three (2,7,8) were related to the anarchist 
movement, and one (1) to the left wing political party Narodnaya Volya), their 
motivation was, and still is unknown (Motivation V1	  cat	  6).  
 
Motivation V2: Description of motivation of protagonist 
With respect the variable Description of motivation of protagonist, we may 
conclude that all of the protagonists of the ten cases of the first wave were 
involved or in touch with a political movement. So, even though the protagonists 
acted as lone operators (they planned their acts without direct command from the 
outside), they were surrounded by a movement that shared, supported, and 
disseminated their anarchist principles. 
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prime-ministers (3,7,8), three presidents (2,6,10) (we included Symon Petliura, head 
of the Ukrainian government in exile (10) in this category), two kings (5,9), a czar 
(1), and an empress (4). 
 
Antagonist V10: Symbolism 
With regards to the symbolic value of the antagonists, we may conclude that two 
antagonists (3,6) were targeted because they represented “the elite of society” to 
which the anarchists fiercely opposed, while two of the antagonists (4,5) were 
assassinated because (from the perspective of the protagonist) they represented 
an oppressive regime. 
 
D: Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
Based on the collection of the ten cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.2, we observe the following with regards to the two variables related to 
Elementary Scenario Component Motivation.  
 
Motivation V1: Possible motivation of protagonist 
Of the ten protagonists of the first wave of modern terrorism, six protagonists were 
motivated by moral outrage (3,4,5,6,9,10) (Motivation V1 cat 4): three protagonists 
claim to avenge earlier repression, torture, or massacres (3,5,10) and three 
protagonists (4,6,9) were motivated by hate against governments, elite, and 
aristocracy in general. Although the four remaining protagonists (1,2,7,8) were 
active in a political movement (three (2,7,8) were related to the anarchist 
movement, and one (1) to the left wing political party Narodnaya Volya), their 
motivation was, and still is unknown (Motivation V1	  cat	  6).  
 
Motivation V2: Description of motivation of protagonist 
With respect the variable Description of motivation of protagonist, we may 
conclude that all of the protagonists of the ten cases of the first wave were 
involved or in touch with a political movement. So, even though the protagonists 
acted as lone operators (they planned their acts without direct command from the 
outside), they were surrounded by a movement that shared, supported, and 
disseminated their anarchist principles. 
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A: Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.3, we observe 
the following with regards to the five variables related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Arena.  
 
Arena V1: Region  
Geographically, the second wave of lone-operator terrorism does not have its 
focus on one specific region. Four incidents (13,16,18,19) occurred in South 
America (Arena V1 cat 3), two incidents (11,14) took place in North America, 
Canada, Mexico & United States (Arena V1 cat 1), and two (15,17) in South Asia 
(Arena V1 cat 6). Furthermore, one incident occurred in Central Asia (Arena 
V1cat7), and one incident (20) took place in Sub-Saharan Africa (Arena V1cat11). 
This geographic distribution seems to support the idea of a colonialist wave of 
terror, which evidentially takes place in parts of the world that were colonised by 
Europe, such as South and Central America & Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and 
Africa. 
 
Arena V4: Kill zone  
Concerning the kill zone, we observe that nine of the ten incidents studied 
(11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,20) were executed in an urban environment (Arena V4 
cat 1). In one case (19) the environment was Unspecified (Arena V4 cat 3). 
 
Arena V5: Static location  
In nine of the ten incidents studied (11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,20) the antagonist 
was assaulted at a static location. In five of these cases (12,13,14,17,18) the 
location was classified as Other (Arena V5 cat 5); in three cases (11,15,16), the 
location was classified as Social location (Arena V5 cat 3); in one case (20), the 
location was classified as Workplace (Arena V5 cat 2).  
 
Arena V6: En route  
In one of the ten incidents recorded for the second wave of terrorism, the 
antagonist was en route when he was attacked. Guatemalan president Castillo 
Armas (19) was on his way from a social location to a social location (Arena V6 cat 
2). 
Arena V7: Public route / location  
With respect to the question whether the location or route was publicly known, we 
observe that in seven cases (11,12,13,15,16,17,18,19), the Arena was a public 
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and the struggle of Palestine to become independent from Great Britain (cf. 
Rapoport, 2004). 
 
# Case ID Description Date 
11 Mexican president 
Alvaro Obregón 
Mexican president Obregón is shot in a café where he is 
celebrating his electoral victory. His assassin is the anti-
governmental roman catholic José de León Toral.  Toral blames 
Obregón for the Mexican government's atrocities against the 
Catholic Church. 
17-07-1928 
12 Afghan King 
Mohammed Nadir 
Shah 
Afghan King Mohammed Shah is shot to death while attending 
a high school graduation ceremony, by a teenage boy named 
Abdul Khaliq,  
08-11-1932 
13 Peruvian president 
Luis Miguel 
Sanchez Cerro 
Peruvian president Sanchez is killed when viewing recruits at 
Santa Beatrice racetrack by a member of a supressed political 
party Abelardo de Mendoza. 
30-04-1933 
14 Governor Huey 
Pierce Long 
Governor Huey Long is shot to death by Dr. Carl Weiss, the 




Gandhi, the preeminent leader of Indian nationalism in British-
ruled India is shot on his way to a prayer meeting by Nathuram 
Godse, a Hindu nationalist who is strongly opposed to Ghandi’s 
doctrine of nonviolence. 
30-01-1948 
16 Politician Jorge 
Eliécer Gaitán 
Leader of the populist movement in Colombia, and former 
minister Gaitán is running for the presidential elections when he 
is assassinated after a lunch with friends. The alleged murderer 
Juan Roa Sierra is killed by an enraged mob and the motives 
behind the killing remain unclear. 
09-04-1948 
17 Pakistan prime-
minister Liaqat Ali 
Khan 
Ali Khan is shot while addressing a gathering of 100,000 in 
Municipal Gardens, Rawalpindi, Pakistan by Saad Akbar Babrak, 
an Afghan national and a professional assassin. The 






Somoza is shot to death at a campaign reception by Rigoberto 
López Pérez, a Nicaraguan poet and music composer. The 





Castillo Armas  
Castillo Armas is killed while taking a stroll with his wife by 
Romeo Vásquez, a palace guard who was found dead a short 




Verwoerd is stabbed in the neck and chest in the House of 
Assembly by an uniformed parliamentary messenger Dimitri 
Tsafendas who claims to have been motivated by outrage for 
Verwoerd’s racial policy. 
06-09-1966 
 
Table 8.3 Ten cases of lone-operator terrorism: 1920s to the 1960s. 
Based on the ten cases depicted in table 8.2, we present our observations of the 
ESC (A) Arena, (B) Protagonist, (C) Antagonist, (D) Motivation, (E) Means, and (F) 
Modus Operandi in the second wave of modern terrorism, below. 
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A: Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
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and the struggle of Palestine to become independent from Great Britain (cf. 
Rapoport, 2004). 
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Tsafendas who claims to have been motivated by outrage for 
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Table 8.3 Ten cases of lone-operator terrorism: 1920s to the 1960s. 
Based on the ten cases depicted in table 8.2, we present our observations of the 
ESC (A) Arena, (B) Protagonist, (C) Antagonist, (D) Motivation, (E) Means, and (F) 
Modus Operandi in the second wave of modern terrorism, below. 
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protagonist was a teenage boy, even though we do not know his exact age. In two 
cases (13,17) the age of the prospective protagonist could not be determined 
exactly, but is believed to be less than fifty. 
 
C: Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.3, we observe 
the following with regards to the three variables related to the Elementary 
Scenario Component Antagonist.  
 
Antagonist V3:  
Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
All antagonists of the ten incidents of the second wave of modern terrorism were 
selected specifically (Antagonist V3 cat 1). 
 
Antagonist V5: Type of antagonist(s) 
All antagonists of the ten incidents of the second wave of modern terrorism were 
persons (as opposed to objects). In nine of the ten cases 
(11,12,13,14,16,17,18,19,20) the antagonists belonged to the category of 
Government (general) (Antagonist V5 cat 2). Congruent with the first wave of 
modern terrorism, these nine antagonists were all high-profile members of the 
government. We distinguish four presidents (11,13,18,19), two prime-ministers 
(17,20), one governor/senator (14), a king (12), and a prominent politician (16). 
Only in the case of Mohandas Gandhi (16), the target was not part of the 
government (Gandhi was a prominent leader of the Indian independence 
movement) and was categorised as Religious figures / institutions (Antagonist V5 
cat 15). 
 
Antagonist V10: Symbolism 
In two cases, a symbolic value was attributed to the antagonist. In the case of the 
assassination of Nicaraguan president Garcia (18), the poet Perez shot Garcia 
because he regarded him “an icon of the oppressive regime”. Additionally, in the 
case of South Africa’s prime-minister Verwoerd (20), Verwoerd was stabbed to 
death because the protagonist, regarded Verwoerd as “the architect of the 
Apartheid-regime” and held him responsible for the racist policies of the regime.	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accessible location (Arena V7 cat 1) such as a street (15,16,19), a public event 
(12,13,17), or a restaurant (11). Out of the three cases in which the assassination 
did not happen in a public place (Arena V7 cat 2), two antagonists were executed 
in a parliament building (16,20), and one assassination took place in a private club 
(18). 
 
B: Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist 
Based on the collection of the 10 cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.3, we observe the following with regards to the four variables related to 
the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist. 
 
Protagonist V1: Confirmed protagonist  
All of the protagonists of the ten incidents of the second wave were known 
(Protagonist V1 cat 1). 
 
Protagonist V6: Description of background of protagonist 
Concerning the backgrounds of the protagonists of the ten incidents of the second 
wave, we may conclude that two protagonists (16,20) had a history of mental 
problems. Juan Roa Sierra (16), the protagonist who assassinated Colombian 
liberal leader and presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and had illusions of “being mighty”. Dmitri Tsafendas (20), who 
stabbed South African prime-minister Hendrik Verwoerd to death, had been 
hospitalised several times before the assassination due to ‘irrational behaviour’.  
 
Protagonist V13: Protagonist’s gender  
All protagonists of the ten incidents of the second wave were male (Protagonist  
V13 cat 1). 
 
Protagonist V14: Protagonist’s Age(group)  
Congruent with the ten incidents of the first wave, all protagonists of the second 
wave were under fifty years of age. (In three cases  (12,13,17) the variable 
age(group) could not be determined, but reports indicate that the protagonists 
were young males less than fifty-one years of age). Five of the perpetrators 
(11,14,16,18,19) were aged between twenty-one and thirty years old (Protagonist 
V14 cat 3). One protagonist (15) was between thirty-one and forty years old 
(Protagonist V14 cat 4), and one protagonist (20) was between forty-one and fifty 
years of age (Protagonist V14 cat 5). In the case of Shah (12), we know that the 
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Means V4: Weapon sub-category 
With regards to the means by which the incidents were executed, we note that in 
nine incidents a handgun (Means V4 cat 5, Subcat c) was used to execute the 
attack (11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19). In the one remaining case (20), a knife (Means 
V4 cat 9, Subcat w) was used. 
 
F: Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.3, we observe 
the following with regards to the variable of the Elementary Scenario Component 
Modus operandi.  
 
Modus operandi V1: Level of intelligence 
In seven cases (11,12,13,14,15,16,17) the level of intelligence tat was required for 
the protagonists, was labelled as low (Modus operandi V1 cat 1). In the remaining 
three cases (18,19,20), the level of intelligence was labelled medium (Modus 
operandi V1 cat 2). To be able to approach the antagonist unobtrusively, Perez 
(18) needed to infiltrate the club where Somoza held a campaign reception, 
Tsafendas (20) needed to infiltrate prime-minister Verwoerd’s environment by 
being hired as a parliamentary messenger, and Vasquez Sanchez (19) needed to 
infiltrate president Castillo’s palace guard.  
 
8.2.3 The ESC6 in the third wave of modern terrorism  
The third wave of modern terrorism, according to Rapoport (2004), was driven by 
the goal of social revolution and national self-assertion. The trigger event for this 
wave was the Viet Cong's successful resistance against the French and later the US 
Military in Vietnam. The third wave of modern terrorism, also referred to as the 
new-left wave, is characterised by a modus operandi in which terrorist groups, 
operating in small independent cells (such as urban guerrillas) seek to overturn the 
capitalist system. Examples of such groups are: the Red Brigade in Italy, the Red 
Army Fraction in Germany, and the Weather Underground in the US. The third 
wave of modern terrorism started in the late 1960s and continued until 1990. In 
this wave, the quest for national self-assertion was often mixed with the fight 
against capitalism and Western democracies (cf. Rapoport, 2004). 
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D: Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.3, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Motivation.  
 
Motivation V1: Possible motivation of protagonist 
The motivation of seven (12,13,14,16,17,18,19) protagonists of the ten incidents of 
the second wave is unknown (Motivation V1 cat 6). The three remaining 
protagonists (11,15,20) were motivated by Moral outrage (Motivation V1 cat 4). 
 
Motivation V2: Description of motivation of protagonist 
With regards to the description of the motivation of the protagonist, we found 
indications that Sierra (16) the assassin of Colombian Politician Gaitán was 
suspected to have been suffering from deteriorating mental health. Additionally, 
we found that Vásquez (19) was believed to have been paid to kill Guatemalan 
president Armas. (Because these conditions were not mentioned as primary 
motivations, we decided to classify the motivation of both these protagonists as 
“unknown”.) Additionally, Toral (11), who shot Mexican president Obregón, was 
revenging the execution of two of his friends who were accused of plotting to 
assassinate Obregón. Godse (15) a Hindu nationalist activist was outraged by what 
he considered Gandhi's partiality to India's Muslims. Finally, Tsafendas (20) told 
the police that he killed Verwoerd because he was "disgusted with the racial 
policy". 
 
E: Elementary Scenario Component Means 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.3, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Means.  
 
Means V1: Type of incident 
All ten incidents of the second wave of modern terrorism were classified as 
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capitalist system. Examples of such groups are: the Red Brigade in Italy, the Red 
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wave of modern terrorism started in the late 1960s and continued until 1990. In 
this wave, the quest for national self-assertion was often mixed with the fight 
against capitalism and Western democracies (cf. Rapoport, 2004). 
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D: Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.3, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Motivation.  
 
Motivation V1: Possible motivation of protagonist 
The motivation of seven (12,13,14,16,17,18,19) protagonists of the ten incidents of 
the second wave is unknown (Motivation V1 cat 6). The three remaining 
protagonists (11,15,20) were motivated by Moral outrage (Motivation V1 cat 4). 
 
Motivation V2: Description of motivation of protagonist 
With regards to the description of the motivation of the protagonist, we found 
indications that Sierra (16) the assassin of Colombian Politician Gaitán was 
suspected to have been suffering from deteriorating mental health. Additionally, 
we found that Vásquez (19) was believed to have been paid to kill Guatemalan 
president Armas. (Because these conditions were not mentioned as primary 
motivations, we decided to classify the motivation of both these protagonists as 
“unknown”.) Additionally, Toral (11), who shot Mexican president Obregón, was 
revenging the execution of two of his friends who were accused of plotting to 
assassinate Obregón. Godse (15) a Hindu nationalist activist was outraged by what 
he considered Gandhi's partiality to India's Muslims. Finally, Tsafendas (20) told 
the police that he killed Verwoerd because he was "disgusted with the racial 
policy". 
 
E: Elementary Scenario Component Means 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.3, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Means.  
 
Means V1: Type of incident 
All ten incidents of the second wave of modern terrorism were classified as 





Based on these ten cases, we will present our observations of the six Elementary 
Scenario Components (A) Arena, (B) Protagonist, (C) Antagonist, (D) Motivation, (E) 
Means, and (F) Modus Operandi in the third wave of modern terrorism.  
In the third wave of modern terrorism, we find three lone-operators that operate 
over a period of time, killing and injuring more than one person in the process 
(27,28,29). Below we will briefly summarise these three cases. 
 
1. The first lone-operator terrorist operating over a period of time is Joseph 
Paul Franklin (27). Franklin confessed to ten murders, two bombings, and an 
attempt to kill Larry Flynt, between 1977 and 1980. Franklin stated to be 
motivated by the ambition to "clean the world" of people he considered 
inferior, especially Afro-American and Jewish people.  
 
2. The second protagonist (and probably most well known ‘lone wolf’) who 
operated over a prolonged timeframe, is Theodore (Ted) Kaczynski also 
known as the “Unabomber” (28). Kaczynski engaged in a mail-bombing 
spree that started in 1978 and continued until 1995, when he was arrested.  
 
3. The third lone-operator terrorist operating over a period of time is Joseph 
Christopher, also known as the “.22-Caliber Killer” (29). Christopher killed at 
least twelve individuals and injured five, from September 1980 until his 
arrest in May 1981.  
 
A: Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
Based on the collection of the ten cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.4, we observe the following with regards to the five variables related to the 
Elementary Scenario Component Arena.  
 
Arena V1: Region  
With respect to the geographic spread of the ten lone-operator incidents from the 
third wave, we observe that seven of the lone-operator attacks 
(21,23,25,27,28,29,30) occurred in North America, Canada, Mexico & United 
States (Arena V1 cat 1). The remaining three attacks took place in South America 
(22) (Arena V1 cat 3), Western Europe (24) (Arena V1 cat 8), and Middle East & 




# Case ID Description Date 
21 US president John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy 
John F. Kennedy, is travelling in a presidential motorcade 
in Dallas, Texas, when he is shot to death with a long 
range firearm. Lee Harvey Oswald was charged with the 
assassination of Kennedy. He denied but was killed 
by Jack Ruby on November 24, before he could be 
indicted or tried. 
22-11-1963 
22 President of El Salvador 
of Maximilliano 
Hernández Martinez 
Hernández, is stabbed to death at age 84, by his driver 
Cipriano Morales whose father was one of the many 
executed by Hernández's dictatorship. 
15-05-1966 
23 Civil rights leader 
Martin Luther King,  
Martin Luther King is shot to death with a long range 
firearm by James Earl Ray, while standing on the balcony 
of his hotel room. 
04-04-1968 
24 German student 
movement leader Rudi  
Dutschke 
 
Rudi Dutschke is shot in the head, while getting on his 
bike by a young anti-communist Josef Bachmann. 
Dutschke survives the attack and dies 11 years later, 
reportedly because of the brain damage sustained in the 
assassination attempt. 
11-04-1968 
25 Presidential candidate 
Robert Francis Kennedy 
Robert F. Kennedy is shot while walking through a hotel 
kitchen by a 24-year-old Palestinian-Jordanian Shirhan 
Shirhan because of the senator's advocacy of U.S. support 
for Israel. 
05-06-1968 
26 King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia 
King Faisal is assassinated by his cousin Prince Faisal bin 
Musaid while he is welcoming him in his palace in Riyadh. 
Prince Faysal reportedly wants to avenge the death of his 
brother Prince Khalid who was shot by a policeman. 
25-03-1975 
27 Producer Larry Flynt Larry Flynt, American publisher of porn magazines, is shot 
by white-supremacist  serial killer Joseph Franklin with a 
long range firearm, when he is leaving the court building 
with his lawyer, after a legal battle related to obscenity. 
06-03-1978 
28 Theodore Kaczynski 
(a.k.a. ‘The 
Unabomber’) 
Theodore "Ted" Kaczynski (also known as the Unabomber 
(university and airline bomber) is an American mathemati-
cian, social critic and primitivist, who engages in a mail 
bombing spree that spans nearly 20 years, killing three 
people and injuring 23 others. 
1978-1995 
29 Joseph Christopher 
(a.k.a. ‘The .22-Caliber 
Killer’) 
Joseph Christopher is an American serial killer known as 
the ".22-Caliber Killer". He kills twelve individuals and 
wounds numerous others in a period of eight months. 
1980-1981 
30 Musician John Lennon John Lennon is shot to death by Mark Chapman, a “fan” 
who becomes obsessed with the musician. Upon arrest 
the killer states "I’m sure the big part of me is Holden 
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Table 8.4 Ten cases of lone-operator terrorism: 1960s to the 1990s. 
 
In this subsection, we will assess ten cases of lone-operator terrorism of the third 
wave of terrorism. A brief summary of the cases that are selected from the third 




Protagonist V6: Description of background of protagonist 
There is a great variety in the backgrounds of the protagonists of the third wave. 
Four protagonists (21,23,27,30) were (high) school drop-outs, two protagonists 
(25,30) had physically abusive fathers (25,30) and/or visited a psychologist (21,30). 
Two protagonists were treated or tested by psychologists: Oswald (21) was 
diagnosed as having a “vivid fantasy life, focused on omnipotence and power to 
compensate for personal shortcomings and frustrations” as well as suffering from 
“a personality pattern disturbed with schizoid features and passive-aggressive 
tendencies”; Chapman (30), the lone operator that shot Lennon, combined several 
background characteristics: he was physically abused by his father; he skipped 
classes, was a drug abuser, became a born-again Christian, attempted to commit 
suicide, and was treated for clinical depression. Later in life, he developed several 
manic obsessions; one of those led him to believe he was Holden Caulfield. 
 
Protagonist V13: Protagonist’s gender 
All the ten protagonists of the ten incidents of the third wave were male 
(Protagonist V13 cat 1). 
 
Protagonist V14: Protagonist’s Age(group)  
Congruent with the ten incidents of the first wave, all protagonists were under fifty 
years of age. Six protagonists were between twenty-one and thirty years of age 
(21,24,25,26,29,30), and one was between thirty-one and forty years old (23). In 
one case (22) the age of the protagonist was classified as Unspecified. Because 
three protagonists operated over a longer period of time (27,28,29), two of them 
(27,28) do not fit the aforementioned age categories: Franklin (27) who attempted 
to assassinate Flynt at the age of twenty-seven, continued to (attempt to) kill 
people until the age of thirty-one. Kaczynski (28) started a mail bombing spree 
when he was thirty-six and continued sending mail bombs until he was fifty-two 
years of age.   
 
C: Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.4, we observe 
the following with regards to the three variables related to the Elementary 





Arena V4: Kill zone  
All ten incidents of the third wave of modern terrorism were executed in an urban 
environment.  
 
Arena V5: Static location 
Three incidents (22,23,26) took place at a static location. One of these locations 
(22) was classified as Home address (Arena V5 cat 7), one (23) as Hotel / Motel 
(Static location V5 cat 4), and one (26) as Workplace (Arena V5 cat 2). 
 
In two cases the location of the incidents was not applicable as both the cases of 
Theodore Kaczynski (28) and Joseph Christopher (29) encompass a series of 
attacks that took place at a variety of locations, over a time span of several years.  
 
Arena V6: En route 
In five cases (21,24,25,27,30) the antagonist was assaulted when he was en route. 
In two of those cases (21,25), the antagonist was travelling from a work related 
location to another work related location (Arena V6 cat 5), and in two instances 
(24,30) from a social location to a social location (Arena V6 cat 5). In one case (27) 
the antagonist was en route from home to work (or v.v.) (Arena V6 cat 1). 
 
Arena V7: Public route / location 
In the cases of Kaczynski (28) and Christopher (29), the incident encompasses 
various locations and were therefore classified as Not Applicable. In five cases 
(21,24,26,27,30) the incident occurred in a publicly accessible location (Arena V7 
cat 1). In the remaining three cases, the location was not publicly known (Arena V7 
cat 2). We distinguish (i) the private residence where president Hernández (22) was 
stabbed, (ii) the kitchen of the hotel where Robert Kennedy was shot, and (iii) the 
palace where King Faisal was killed. 
 
B: Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.4, we observe 
the following with regards to the four variables related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Protagonist. 
 
Protagonist V1: Confirmed protagonist  
All of the protagonists of ten incidents of the third wave were known (Protagonist 
V1 cat 1). 
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Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.4, we observe 
the following with regards to the three variables related to the Elementary 
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In two of those cases (21,25), the antagonist was travelling from a work related 
location to another work related location (Arena V6 cat 5), and in two instances 
(24,30) from a social location to a social location (Arena V6 cat 5). In one case (27) 
the antagonist was en route from home to work (or v.v.) (Arena V6 cat 1). 
 
Arena V7: Public route / location 
In the cases of Kaczynski (28) and Christopher (29), the incident encompasses 
various locations and were therefore classified as Not Applicable. In five cases 
(21,24,26,27,30) the incident occurred in a publicly accessible location (Arena V7 
cat 1). In the remaining three cases, the location was not publicly known (Arena V7 
cat 2). We distinguish (i) the private residence where president Hernández (22) was 
stabbed, (ii) the kitchen of the hotel where Robert Kennedy was shot, and (iii) the 
palace where King Faisal was killed. 
 
B: Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.4, we observe 
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Component Protagonist. 
 
Protagonist V1: Confirmed protagonist  
All of the protagonists of ten incidents of the third wave were known (Protagonist 
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(Motivation V1 cat 3). In one incident (30) we classified the motivation of the 
protagonist as a craving for Glory (Motivation V1 cat 5). Additionally, we may 
conclude that in three cases (21,23,26) the motivation remains unknown 
(Motivation V1 cat 6). 
 
Motivation V2: Description of motivation of protagonist 
With regards to the description of motivation of the protagonists of the third wave, 
we note the following with regards to the five protagonists who were motivated by 
Moral outrage. Morales (22) aimed to revenge his father who was one of the many 
people murdered by Hernández’s dictatorship. Bachmann (24) was fuelled by an 
intense hate of communism. Shirhan (25) assassinated Kennedy because he was 
outraged by the senator's advocacy of U.S. support for Israel. Franklin (27) claimed 
to be outraged by the racially mixed couples portrayed in the publications of his 
antagonist, and Christopher (29) suffered an out of control rage towards African 
American people. For the two protagonists that were not motivated by Moral 
outrage we note the following. Kaczynski (28), who we classified as being 
motivated by Power, tried to influence the process of scientific progress, and 
Chapman (30) who we classified as being motivated by Glory, stated he 
assassinated Lennon to obtain some of his fame and glory  
 
E: Elementary Scenario Component Means 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.4, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables related to Elementary Scenario 
Component Means.  
 
Means V1: Type of incident 
Nine (21,22,23,24,25,26,27,29,30) of the ten incidents in the third wave of modern 
terrorism were classified as Assassination / Liquidation (Means V1 cat 1). The 
incident related to Kaczynski (28) was classified as Bombing (Means V1 cat 3). 
 
Means V4: Weapon sub-category 
Concerning the weapon sub-category used in the incidents, we observe that in 
four cases (24,25,26,30) a handgun (Means V4 cat 5 subcat c) was the weapon of 
choice. In four cases, a Rifle / Shotgun was used (21,22,27, 29). In one case (22) a 
knife (Means V4 cat 9 Subcat w) was used, and in one case (28) the protagonist 
used a self-made explosive classified as Unknown explosive category (Means V4 
cat 6 Subcat p) to carry out his act.  
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Antagonist V3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
Eight of the ten antagonists (21,22,23,24,25,26,27,30) of the third wave of modern 
terrorism were specifically selected (Antagonist V3 cat 1). Consequently, the two 
remaining protagonists, Kaczynski (28), and Christopher (29), selected their 
antagonists randomly from a target population, that was defined by (supposed) 
involvement with modern technology (28), or ethnic descent (29).  
 
Antagonist V5: Type of antagonist(s) 
All ten antagonists of the third wave of modern terrorism were persons (as 
opposed to objects). Moreover, the majority of the targets (23,24,27,28,29,30) was 
classified as Private citizens & property (Antagonist V5 14). Four of the antagonists 
(21,22,25,26) belonged to the category Government (general) (Antagonist V5 14) 
from which we distinguish: two presidents (21,22), one presidential candidate (25), 
and a king (26). 
 
Antagonist V10: Symbolism 
In five cases, a symbolic value was attributed to the antagonist: First, King (23) was 
assassinated because the protagonist thought King to be “a symbol of the Afro-
American community”. Second, Dutschke (24) was targeted because the 
protagonist believed that Dutschke represented communism and the red danger 
in Germany. Third, the American publisher Flynt (27) was selected because the 
protagonist regarded him as a symbol of the new inter-racial tolerance. Fourth, 
Kaczynski (28) aimed to “attract attention to the erosion of human freedom 
necessitated by modern technologies” and aimed his attempts at people that 
symbolised the abuse of modern technology. Fifth, Christopher (29) was motivated 
by deep pathological racism, and aimed to send a message to the African 
American community by targeting members of that community.  
 
D: Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.4, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Motivation.  
 
Motivation V1: Possible motivation of protagonist 
In seven cases, the motivation of the protagonist was known 
(22,24,25,27,28,29,30). In five of these cases  (22,24,25,27,29), the protagonist was 
motivated by Moral outrage (Motivation V1 cat 4), in one case (28) by Power 
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used a self-made explosive classified as Unknown explosive category (Means V4 
cat 6 Subcat p) to carry out his act.  
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Antagonist V3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
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involvement with modern technology (28), or ethnic descent (29).  
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All ten antagonists of the third wave of modern terrorism were persons (as 
opposed to objects). Moreover, the majority of the targets (23,24,27,28,29,30) was 
classified as Private citizens & property (Antagonist V5 14). Four of the antagonists 
(21,22,25,26) belonged to the category Government (general) (Antagonist V5 14) 
from which we distinguish: two presidents (21,22), one presidential candidate (25), 
and a king (26). 
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In five cases, a symbolic value was attributed to the antagonist: First, King (23) was 
assassinated because the protagonist thought King to be “a symbol of the Afro-
American community”. Second, Dutschke (24) was targeted because the 
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protagonist regarded him as a symbol of the new inter-racial tolerance. Fourth, 
Kaczynski (28) aimed to “attract attention to the erosion of human freedom 
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In seven cases, the motivation of the protagonist was known 
(22,24,25,27,28,29,30). In five of these cases  (22,24,25,27,29), the protagonist was 
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In this subsection, we will assess ten cases of lone-operator terrorism of the fourth 
wave of terrorism. A brief summary of the cases that are selected from the fourth 
wave of modern terrorism is presented in table 8.5. 
 
# Case ID Description Date 
31 Franz Fuchs Between 1993 en 1997 Franz Fuchs kills four people and injures 15 
against foreigners and people who were friendly to foreigners with 
three improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and 25 mail bombs. 
1993 - 1997 
32 Prime-minister 
of Israel Yitzhak 
Rabin 
Rabin was assassinated when he attended a mass rally in Tel Aviv, 
that is held in support of the Oslo Accords, by a radical right-wing 
Orthodox Jew Yigal Amir, who opposed the signing of the these 
accords. 
04-11-1995 




David Copeland, an English Neo-Nazi militant executes a 13-day 
bombing campaign in April 1999 aimed at London’s black, 
Bangladeshi and gay communities that results in three deaths and 
more than a hundred injuries. 
April 1999 
34 LA Jewish 
Community 
Center Shooting 
White-supremacist  Buford Furrow, Jr. walks into the lobby of the 
North Valley Jewish Community Center and opens fire with a 
semiautomatic weapon. The gunfire wounds three children, a 
teenage counselor, and an office worker. 
10-08-1999 
35 Dutch politician 
Pim Fortuyn 
Nine days before the general election in the Netherlands, Fortuyn 
is shot to death in a parking lot outside a radio studio. The 
environmental activist Volkert van der Graaf who shot him, claims 
that Fortuyn was using Muslims and immigrants as scapegoats in a 





Anna Lindh is attacked while shopping in a department store in central 
Stockholm. She is stabbed in the chest, abdomen and arms. The 
attacker Mijailo Mijailović reportedly has serious mental problems, and 





An Arab resident of east Jerusalem Hussam Taysir Duwait attacks 
several cars on Jaffa Road in Jerusalem using a front-end loader 
killing three people and wounding at least thirty pedestrians, before 
being shot to death. A motive for the attack cannot be determined, 
but police at the scene refers to the incident as a terrorist attack. 
02-07-2008 
38 Attack on the 
Dutch Royal 
Family 
During the celebration of Queen's Day in the Netherlands, Karst 
Tates drives his car at high speed into a parade that includes mem-
bers of the Royal Family of the Netherlands, killing eight bystanders 
and injuring ten people. Tates’ exact motive remains unclear. 
30-04-2009 
39 Fort Hood 
shooting 
On November 5th 2009, a U.S. Army major and psychiatrist Nidal 
Malik Hasan, fatally shot 13 people and injures more than 30 others 
at Fort Hood, Texas. Although Hasan does not motivate his actions, 





Taseer is shot to death by one of his bodyguards that shot him 27 
times with a sub-machine gun as he is returning to his car after 
meeting a friend for lunch in Islamabad. His assassin Malik Qadri	  
claims he killed Taseer because of the latter's vocal opposition to the 
blasphemy law in Pakistan. 
04-01-2011 
 




F: Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.4, we observe 
the following with regards to the variable related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi.  
 
Modus operandi V1: Level of intelligence 
With regards to the level of intelligence the protagonists of the ten incidents of the 
third wave required, we find that seven (23,24,26,27,28,29,30) of only needed a 
low level of intelligence (Modus operandi V1 cat 1). A medium level of intelligence 
(Modus operandi V1 cat 2) was required in the following two cases. First, Oswald 
(21) managed to get a job at the Texas School Book Depository, the location from 
where the shots were reportedly fired that killed John Kennedy. Second, Morales 
(22) had to infiltrate Martinez’ inner circle and become his driver before he could 
execute his plan. “Unspecified” (Modus operandi V1 cat 4) was listed in the 
remaining case of the assassination of Robert Kennedy (25). From the data 
collected, it did not become apparent whether the protagonist Shirhan was at the 
scene because he infiltrated the location in advance (which would lead to a listing 
of “medium level of intelligence”) or merely by chance. 
 
8.2.4 The ESC6 in the fourth wave of modern terrorism  
The roots of the fourth wave of modern terrorism can be traced back to the year 
1979 in which the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. This invasion inspired the call 
to jihad, which led to the recruitment of mujahedeen from all over the Muslim 
world; which eventually resulted in the emergence of Al Qaeda. Also, the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 had as outcome the establishment of a Caliphate, an Islamic 
theocracy, under the reign of Ayatollah Khomeini. This, in turn, caused the 
radicalisation of certain Shi’ite organisations in Iraq, such as al-Dawa, and 
particularly in Lebanon (the formation of Hizballah). The Iranian revolution and the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets invoked religious radicalism that justified 
the resort to violence. After those major events, the fourth wave of terrorism, the 
religious wave started and lasts until today (cf. Rapoport, 2004)62.  
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Arena V7: Public route / location 
In one case (33) the incident encompasses various locations. Therefore, we have 
classified the variable Public route / location as Not Applicable. In seven of the 
cases (31,32,34,35,37,38,40), the arena was a location that was public. In other 
words, the protagonists knew that the antagonist was going to be at a specific 
location at a specific time. The exceptions are (i) the Fort Hood shooting (39), and 
(ii) the attack on Anna Lindh (36) in which the protagonist ran into the antagonist 
unpremeditated. 
 
B: Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.5, we observe 
the following with regards to the four variables related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Protagonist. 
 
Protagonist V1: Confirmed protagonist  
As in the first three waves, all of the protagonists of the ten incidents of the fourth 
wave were known (Protagonist V1 cat 1). 
 
Protagonist V6: Description of background of protagonist  
Concerning the background of the lone-operator terrorists of the fourth wave, we 
note that six of the protagonists were believed to be either suffering from mental 
illness (33,34,35,36), or socially inept behaviour (31,34). The mental illnesses vary 
from obsessive-compulsive disorder (35) to passive-aggressiveness tendencies 
(33,36) and paranoid schizophrenia (34). Moreover, one of the protagonists of the 
fourth wave (31) was described as highly intelligent, two of the protagonists were 
classified as school drop-outs (32,33), and two as having served some time in jail 
(34,37).  
 
Protagonist V13: Protagonist’s gender 
As in the first three waves, all of the protagonists of the ten incidents of the fourth 
wave were male (Protagonist V13 cat 1). 
 
Protagonist V14: Protagonist’s Age(group) 
Three of the protagonists were aged between twenty-one and thirty years old 
(32,33,36), six of them were between thirty-one and forty years of age 




Based on the ten cases depicted in table 8.5, we will present our observations of 
the six Elementary Scenario Components (A) Arena, (B) Protagonist, (C) Antagonist, 
(D) Motivation, (E) Means, and (F) Modus Operandi in the fourth wave of modern 
terrorism, below. 
 
A: Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
Based on the collection of the ten cases of lone-operator incidents from the fourth 
wave, we observed the following with regards to the five variables related to the 
Elementary Scenario Component Arena.  
 
Arena V1: Region  
With respect to the variable Region, we note that five incidents (31,33,35,36,38) 
occurred in Western Europe (Arena V1 cat 8), two incidents (32,37) in Central Asia 
(Arena V1 cat 7), and two incidents occurred in the North America, Canada, 
Mexico & United states (Arena V1 cat 1). One incident (40) was executed in South 
Asia (Arena V1 cat 6).    
 
Arena V4: Kill zone 
Nine out of the ten cases (31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,40) took place in an urban 
environment. The exception is the Fort Hood shooting (39), which was executed 
on a military base (Fort Hood) in a rural area in Texas.  
  
Arena V5: Static location  
Seven of the incidents occurred at a static location (32,34,35,36,37,38,39). Five of 
these incidents (32,34,36,37,38) took place on a location classified as Social (Arena 
V5 cat 3). One incident (35) was executed at a location classified as Other (Arena 
V5 cat 5), and one (39) incident at a location classified as Work (Arena V5 cat 2).  
 
Notably, two cases (31,33) are related to a series of (mail) bombing incidents. As 
these incidents took place at several different locations, the variables Static 
location and En route were classified as N.A. (Not Applicable) (Arena V5 cat 7). 
 
Arena V6: En route 
Only one incident of the ten selected lone-operator incidents of the fourth wave 
was executed while the antagonist was en route. Pakistani governor Taseer (40) 
was shot when he was returning home from a meeting with a friend. We classify 
the En route variable in this case as Home - Social (or vice versa) . 
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Nine out of the ten cases (31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,40) took place in an urban 
environment. The exception is the Fort Hood shooting (39), which was executed 
on a military base (Fort Hood) in a rural area in Texas.  
  
Arena V5: Static location  
Seven of the incidents occurred at a static location (32,34,35,36,37,38,39). Five of 
these incidents (32,34,36,37,38) took place on a location classified as Social (Arena 
V5 cat 3). One incident (35) was executed at a location classified as Other (Arena 
V5 cat 5), and one (39) incident at a location classified as Work (Arena V5 cat 2).  
 
Notably, two cases (31,33) are related to a series of (mail) bombing incidents. As 
these incidents took place at several different locations, the variables Static 
location and En route were classified as N.A. (Not Applicable) (Arena V5 cat 7). 
 
Arena V6: En route 
Only one incident of the ten selected lone-operator incidents of the fourth wave 
was executed while the antagonist was en route. Pakistani governor Taseer (40) 
was shot when he was returning home from a meeting with a friend. We classify 
the En route variable in this case as Home - Social (or vice versa) . 
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D: Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.5, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Motivation.  
 
Motivation V1: Possible motivation of protagonist 
In six cases (31,34,36,37,38,39) the motivation of the protagonist remains unknown 
(Motivation V1 cat 6). In three cases  (33,35,40), the protagonist was motivated by 
Moral outrage (Motivation V1 cat 4), and in one case (32) the protagonist was 
motivated by Power (Motivation V1 cat 3).  
 
Motivation V2: Description of motivation of protagonist 
There appears to be a great variety in backgrounds for the protagonists of the ten 
incidents of the fourth wave. We have found indications that psychologists 
associated three of the protagonists (33,34,36) with a mental disorder. First, 
Copeland (33) was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Second, Furrow (34) 
had been treated for mental illness before he started his bombing campaign. 
Third, post incident tests indicated that Mijailović (36) suffered from a mental 
illness at the time of the killing of Lindh.  
 
Additionally, Fuchs (31) was characterised by psychologists as “highly intelligent, 
but a socially inept loner”. Moreover, he developed a highly paranoid thought 
process during the years of his bombing campaign. Amir (32) was believed to have 
been stimulated by political motives, as he was heavily opposed to the Oslo 
Accords. Duwait (37) was known to be a drug abuser and Hasan (39) was believed 
to have been motivated by anti-American sentiments. Of the remaining three 
protagonists (35,38,40) nothing has been noted in relation to this variable. 
 
E: Elementary Scenario Component Means 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.5, we observe 
the following with regards to the two variables of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Means. 
 
Means V1: Type of incident  
Of the ten of lone-operator incidents of the fourth wave, four (32,35,36,40) were 
classified as Assassination / Liquidation (Means V1 cat 1). Of the remaining six 
incidents, two incidents (31,33) were classified as Bombing (Means V1 cat 3), two 
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C: Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist 
Based on the collection of the ten cases of lone-operator incidents summarised in 
table 8.5, we observe the following with regards to the three variables of the 
Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist.  
 
Antagonist V3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
With respect to the Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist, we observe that 
six of the antagonists of the fourth wave (31,33,34,37,38,39) were chosen 
randomly from a target population (Antagonist V3 cat 2). They were selected 
because of features such as ethnic descent (31,33,34,37), and / or  sexual 
orientation (33), or profession (39). In the case of the Attack on the Dutch Royal 
family, it is unknown whether the attack was directed at the royal family or at the 
bystanders. However, as we assessed, in both these situations the antagonists 
were selected randomly from a target population. 
 
Antagonist V5: Type of antagonist(s) 
Concurrent with the previous waves of modern terrorism, all the antagonists were 
persons (as opposed to objects). However, the target categories differ 
substantially. Four antagonists (31,33,34,37) were classified as Private citizens and 
property (Antagonist V5 cat 14), three (32,38,40) as Government (diplomatic) 
(Antagonist V5 cat 14), two (35,36) as Government (general) (Antagonist V5 cat 2), 
and one (39) as Military (Antagonist V5 cat 4).  
 
Antagonist V10: Symbolism 
In five cases (31,33,34,37,39) a symbolic value was attributed to the Elementary 
Scenario Component antagonist First, the white-supremacist Franz Fuchs (31)  was 
engaged in a mail bomb spree, targeting foreigners and people who were kind to 
foreigners. Second, Copeland, the London Nail Bomber (33), targeted the black, 
Asian, and gay community in London, viewing specific people as symbolic for the 
whole community. Third, Burrow, the LA Jewish Community Center (34) 
symbolised the Jewish community in general. Fourth, the actions by Duwait (37) 
were directed at the Israeli community. Fifth, Hasan (39) aimed to send a message 
against the American interference in Afghanistan. 
 
	    
 
 235 
D: Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
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C: Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist 
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incidents of the first wave). The column “W 1 – 4” refers to the sum total of the 
results of the forty incidents that were studied.	  
 
A: Cross-wave analysis of the Elementary Scenario Component Arena 
Arena V1: Region  
With regards to the variable Region, we introduce figure 8.6 that presents the 
geographical distribution of the forty cases of lone-operator terrorism that are 
included in the experiment. 
Figure 8.6 Cross-wave analysis of the ESC Arena. 
 
We refrain from drawing any conclusion from the geographical distribution 
depicted in figure 8.6, as the sample size of the cases does not provide us with an 
adequate indication of the statistical significance. 
 
Arena V4: Kill zone 
With regards to the variable Kill zone we note that 92.5% of the forty incidents that 
are studied, occur in an urban environment (see table 8.7).  
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(34,39) as Armed assaults (Means V1 cat 2), and two (37,38) as Vehicle attacks 
(Means V1 cat 6).   
 
Means V4: Weapon sub-category 
Concerning the Weapon sub-category used in the incidents, we observe that in 
three cases (32,35,39) a handgun was used (Means V4 cat 5 subcat c), and in two 
cases (34,40) an automatic weapon (Means V4 cat 5 subcat b). Explosives classified 
as Unknown explosive category (Means V4 cat 6 subcat p) were used in two cases 
(31,33). Additionally, a Vehicle (Means V3 cat 10) was used as a weapon in two 
cases (37,38), and a knife (Means V4 cat 9 Subcat w) was used in one incident (36). 
 
F: Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi 
Based on the data of lone-operator incidents summarised in table 8.5, we observe 
the following with regards to the variable related to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Modus operandi.  
 
Modus operandi V1: Level of intelligence 
In eight (31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38) of the ten cases the level of intelligence was 
classified as low. In the case of the Ford Hood shooter (39), the level of 
intelligence was determined to be medium as the protagonist worked for the US 
military for quite some time and radicalised while working there. In the case of the 
assassination of Taseer (40) the level of intelligence was determined to be high as 
the protagonist deliberately infiltrated into Taseer’s security outfit, by signing up 
for Pakistan’s elite police and subsequently requesting to be on Taseer’s security 
service. 
 
8.3 Cross-wave analysis of lone-operator behaviour  
In this section, the results of the four individual waves of lone-operator incidents 
will be accumulated in an attempt to produce general characteristics of lone-
operator behaviour. We provide a cross-wave analysis of the seventeen variables 
that are related to the ESC6 (A)	   Arena, (B) Protagonist, (C) Antagonist, (D) 
Motivation, (E) Means, and (F) Modus Operandi.  
 
To illustrate our cross-wave analysis of lone-operator behaviour, we include a pie 
chart (figure 8.6), and 11 tables (viz. table 8.7 to table 8.17). In the tables, we have 
included columns “W 1” to “W 4” that list the results of the individual waves of 
modern terrorism in percentages (in which “W 1” refers to the results of the ten 
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these cases the variables Static location and En route were classified as Not 
Applicable.) 
 
Arena V7: Public route / location 
With regards to the variable Public route / location, we observe that 70% of the 
forty incidents studied, occurred in a location -or on a route- that was disclosed 
prior to the arrival of the antagonist (this value includes known residencies or work 
addresses). Table 8.9 lists the results of the individual waves of modern terrorism 
and the average of the four waves, in percentages. 
 
Public Route / Location W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 – 4 (%) 
Public route / location 90 70 50 70 70 
No public route / location 10 30 30 20 22.5 
N.A. - - 20 10 7.5 
 
Table 8.9 Cross-wave analysis of the variables Public Route / Location. 
 
The fact that the majority of the incidents took place in a location that was easily to 
ascertain, provide the protagonist with the advantage of preparation. This 
conclusion corresponds with the findings that 70% of the protagonists only require 
a low level of intelligence and 30% use surveillance to anticipate their act. (See 
cross-wave analysis of the outlier Modus operandi below.) 
 
B: Cross-wave analysis of the protagonist 
Protagonist V1: Confirmed protagonist  
Analysis of the data of the protagonist accumulated in the four waves of lone-
operator incidents indicates that all protagonists are known. 
 
Protagonist V6: Description of background of protagonist  
We note that information on the background of a protagonist is (i) not consistently 
noted, and (ii) seems to be highly fuzzy in the data repository of Wikipedia. The 
percentages mentioned in this paragraph, include this inconsistency and fuzziness 
and are therefore to be read as indicative. For this reason we have (a) italicised the 
percentages, and (b) decided not include a separate table for the variable 
Description of background of protagonist. For our considerations on approaching 




Kill zone W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 – 4 % 
Urban 90 90 100 90 92.5 
Rural 10 - - 10 5 
Unknown - 10 - -   2.5 
 
Table 8.7 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Kill zone. 
 
Arena V5: Static location, Arena V6: En route 
The variables Static location and En route are closely related. An incident either 
occurs at a Static location, or when the antagonist was En route. (Obviously, there 
are cases in which these variables are categorised as Not Applicable or 
Unspecified). Because of the relation between these variables, we have combined 
them in our cross-wave analysis and in table 8.8. 	  
 
Static location: W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 – 4 (%) 
Home address - - - - - 
Work address - 10 10 10 7.5 
Social location 20 30 - 50 25 
Hotel / Motel 10 - 10 - 5 
Other 10 50 - 10 17.5 
Unknown 10 - 10 - 5 
Total Static location 50 90 30 70 60 
      
Not Applicable - - 20 20 10 
      
En route: W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 – 4 (%) 
Home - work ( vv.) 10 - 10 - 5 
Home - social ( vv.) - - - 10 2.5 
Work - social ( vv.) - - - - - 
Work - work - - 20 - 5 
Social - social 40 10 20 - 17.5 
Unknown - - - - - 
Total En route 50 10 50 10 30 
      
Total incidents 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 8.8 Cross-wave analyses of the variables Static location, and En route. 
 
With regards to the variables Static location and En route, we note that 60% of the 
attacks occurred while the antagonist was at a static location, while 30% of the 
attacks occurred while the antagonist was en route. (In four cases (10%) the 
protagonists were responsible for different incidents over a certain time span. In 
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Age(group)  W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 – 4 (%) 
<20 - - - - - 
21 -30 70 50 60 30 52.5 
31 -40 20 10 10 60 25 
41 -50 10 10 - 10 7.5 
>50 - - - -  
Unknown - 30 30 - 15 
 
Table 8.10 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Age(group). 
 
C: Cross-wave analysis of the antagonist 
Antagonist V3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s) 
The variable Specific / Generic antagonist(s) indicates an interesting development. 
In the first two waves of modern terrorism, we find that none of the antagonists 
were chosen randomly from a target population (i.e., all the antagonists are 
selected specifically). In the third wave of modern terrorism, we find that 20% of 
the antagonists were chosen randomly from a target population. In the fourth 
wave this percentage increased to 60%. This development seems to confirm the 
theory by Schmid and Jongman (1988) that the antagonist for a modern terrorist 
attack is selected generically from a target population because for the symbolic 
relation the antagonist holds with the main target and / or with the goal of the 
terrorist (organisation). Table 8.11 depicts the values for the variable Specific / 
Generic antagonist(s).	  
 
Specific / Generic antagonist(s) W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 – 4 (%) 
Specific 100 100 20 40 65 
Generic - - 80 60 35 
 
Table 8.11 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Specific / Generic antagonist(s). 
 
Antagonist V5: Type of antagonist(s) 
A cross-wave analysis of the Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist of 
modern terrorism indicates that in 100% of the cases the selected targets are 
persons – as opposed to objects (Antagonist V5).  
 
We do not wish to imply that lone-operator terrorists, by definition, limit their 
target selection to human targets; but the percentage indicates that no other 
cases were included in the dataset that was used for this experiment. (For instance, 
the ESP PANDORA I includes an incident in which a lone operator flew a small 
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In the ESC12 scenario model, the variable Description of background of 
protagonist constitutes a text value, instead of a numeric value that may be 
expressed as a percentage 63 . A text value does not allow for adequate 
quantification. However, when we return to the texts of the data repository of 
Wikipedia, we note that in sixteen of the forty incidents (40%) a reference is made 
to the mental condition of the protagonist. Close examination reveals that in eight 
cases (20%) the lone operators appear to have been diagnosed with (or said to be 
suffering from) mental illnesses. In three of these cases (37.5% of the subset of 
protagonists with mental illnesses) schizophrenia is mentioned. Additionally, in 
seven of the forty incidents (17.5%) a reference is made to the fact that the 
protagonist is believed to be an (second generation) immigrant in the country 
where they perform their terrorist act. In six cases (15%), it is mentioned that the 
protagonist joined the army, and in another six cases (15%) that the protagonist is 
a (high) school drop out (cf. Van der Heide, 2011).  
 
Protagonist V13: Protagonist’s gender 
Analysis of the data of the protagonist accumulated in the four waves of lone-
operator incidents indicates that all protagonists were male (Protagonist V13 cat 
1). 
 
Protagonist V14: Protagonist’s Age(group) 
All the protagonists related to the forty incidents accumulated for the experiment 
were younger than fifty-one years old. We note that in the first wave of modern 
terrorism, 70% of the protagonists were aged between twenty-one and thirty years 
old (Protagonist V14 cat 3), while in the fourth wave of modern terrorism this 
percentage decreased to 30%.  
 
We thus arrive at the following result: in 52.5% of the forty incidents, the 
protagonists are aged between twenty-one and thirty years old.  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  In most data repositories that we studied, information on the background of a protagonist is (i) not 
consistently noted, and (ii) seems to be highly fuzzy. To be able to include this information in the ESC12 
scenario model, we decided to create a text value for this variable (see chapter seven). 
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D: Cross-wave analysis of the Elementary Scenario Component Motivation 
Motivation V1: Possible motivation of protagonist 
The motivation of the protagonists throughout the twentieth century appears to 
have changed over time, though no clear pattern can be derived from the data (cf. 
Van der Heide, 2011).  First of all, in 50% of all cases of lone-operator acts, the 
motivation could not be determined. Nonetheless, moral outrage seems to be the 
most prevalent motivation of the protagonists throughout the four waves of 
modern terrorism. Table 8.14 depicts the values for the variable Possible 
motivation of protagonist. 
	  
Motivation W1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W4 (%) W 1 - 4 (%) 
Moral outrage 60 30 50 30 42.5 
Power - - 10 10 5 
Glory - - 10 - 2.5 
Unknown 40 70 30 60 50 
 
Table 8.14 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Motivation. 
 
Motivation V2: Description of motivation of protagonist 
As with the variable Description of background of protagonist (Protagonist V6), 
descriptions about the motivations of the protagonist (i) were not consistently 
noted, and (ii) seem to be highly fuzzy. The percentages mentioned in this 
paragraph, include this inconsistency and fuzziness, and are therefore to be read 
as indicative. For this reason we have (a) italicised the percentages, and (b) 
decided not include a separate table for the variable Description of motivation of 
protagonist. For our considerations on approaching the restrictions of open source 
data, we refer to subsection 6.1.2. 
 
According to the data published on Wikipedia we note that all of the protagonists 
of the first wave (25% of all the incidents studied) are involved or in touch with 
anarchist movements (this evidently might be intrinsic to the definition of “the 
anarchist wave”). In the second wave, in three incidents (7.5% of all the incidents 
studied) it is noted that the perpetrators might have been motivated by 
“communism”. In another two incidents (5% of all the incidents studied) a 
reference is made to a mix of political and personal reasons. In the third wave, the 
motivation of three protagonists (7.5% of all the incidents studied) is linked to a 
“racial” or “white-supremacist ” perspective. In the fourth wave, political reasons 
appear to be the main motivational factor, as in six incidents (15% of all the 
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airplane into an office of the International Revenue Service64.) Still, it seems safe to 
conclude, that the vast majority of cases of lone-operator terrorism are directed 
against human targets.  
 
While in the first wave, all of the targets were selected from the target population 
of the Government (general), this percentage dropped in the second wave to 90%, 
in the third wave to 40%. In the fourth wave only 20% of the selected targets 
belonged to the category Government (general). This development can be 
explained by the increase of antagonists that were selected generically, as we have 
described above (see Antagonist V3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s)). Table 8.12 
depicts the values for the variable Type of antagonist(s). 
 
Type of antagonist(s) W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 - 4 (%) 
Government (general) 100 90 40 20 62.5 
Private citizens & property -­‐	   -­‐	   60 40 25 
Government (diplomatic) - - - 30 7.5 
Religious figures / institutions -	   10	   -   2.5 
Military -­‐	   -­‐	   - 10 2.5 
 
Table 8.12 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Type of antagonist(s). 
 
Antagonist V10: Symbolism 
With regards to the Elementary Scenario Component Symbolism, we note that 
that the symbolic value attached to the antagonist appears to be of significant 
value in the process of target selection. In the analysis of the four waves of 
terrorism 40% of the antagonists were considered to carry a symbolic value. Table 
8.13 depicts the values for the variable symbolism related to the Elementary 
Scenario Component Antagonist. 
	  
Symbolism W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 - 4 (%) 
Symbolism 40 20 50 50 40 
 
Table 8.13 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Symbolism. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 On February 18, 2010, US citizen Joseph Andrew Stack crashed a Piper PA-28 Dakota airplane into the 
Echelon Building in Austin, Texas. Stack wanted to attack the office of the International Revenue Service (IRS) 
that was housed -together with other governmental organisations- in the Echelon Building. Stack set fire to his 
private house before leaving for the attack, and left a note on his website stating he blamed capitalism and the 
IRS for his financial downfall and initiated his acts as a symbolic sacrifice for change (Extracted from the 
PANDORA I dataset).  
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Weapon sub-category W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 - 4 (%) 
Handgun 70 90 40 30 57.5 
Rifle / Shotgun - - 40 - 10 
Automatic weapon - - - 20 5 
Unknown explosive category 10 - 10 20 10 
Knife 10 10 10 10 10 
Sharp object other than knife 10 - - - 2.5 
Vehicle - - - 20 5 
 
Table 8.16 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Weapon sub-category. 
 
F: Cross-wave analysis of the Elementary Scenario Component Modus 
operandi 
Modus operandi V1: Level of intelligence 
In the Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi, the level of intelligence 
of the lone-operator terrorists needed for their acts appears to be significant. We 
observe that in 80% of the incidents studied the protagonists only required a low 
level of intelligence to execute their plans. In 15% of the cases a medium level of 
intelligence was required and 2.5% of the attacks (only in the one case of the 
assassination of Taseer in which the protagonist infiltrated Taseers security outfit to 
be able come close to the antagonist) was executed after requiring a high level of 
intelligence. (In the remaining 2.5% of the cases the level of intelligence needed to 
carry out the attack could not be specified.) 
 
While a cross-wave analysis seems to indicate a slight development towards a 
higher level of intelligence that is required by the lone operator, we do not wish to 
draw conclusions based on the percentages generated. Table 8.17 indicates the 
level of intelligence the protagonists needed for every individual wave. 
	  
Level of intelligence W1 % W 2 % W 3 % W 4 % W 1 - 4 (%) 
High 




30 20 10 15 







Table 8.17 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Level of intelligence. 
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incidents studied) a reference is made to political reasons in general, and in three 
incidents (7.5% of all the incidents studied) to “racism” and / or “white-
supremacist ” tendencies.  
 
E: Cross-wave analysis of the Elementary Scenario Component Means 
Means V1: Type of incident  
With regards to the variable Type of incident, we see a shift of type. In the first two 
waves all the incidents are classified as Assassination / Liquidation. In the third 
wave one incident is classified as a bombing. In the fourth wave of modern 
terrorism vehicle attacks and armed assaults are introduced. As Assassination / 
Liquidation implies the murder of a specially selected target, this development 
coincides with the shift from specifically selected antagonists, to antagonists that 
are selected from a general target population as explained above (see Antagonist 
V3: Specific / Generic antagonist(s)). 
 
Overall we may conclude that a cross-wave analysis of lone operator incidents 
indicates that 82.5 % of the studied cases are classified as Assassination / 
Liquidation. Table 8.15 lists the results of the individual waves of modern terrorism 
and the average of the four waves, in percentages. 
	  
Type of Incident W1 % W 2 % W 3 % W 4 % W 1 - 4 (%) 
Assassination / Liquidation 100 100 90 40 82.5 
Bombing - - 10 20 7.5 
Vehicle attack - - - 20 5 
Armed assault - - - 20 5 
 
Table 8.15 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Type of incident. 
 
Means V4: Weapon sub-category  
With regards to the variable Weapon sub-category, we establish that there seems 
to be quite a variety of weapons of choice. While we may establish that our cross-
wave analysis of lone-operator incidents indicates that the weapon used most 
often by lone operators is a handgun (in 57.5% of the cases studied), we do not 
discover a clear pattern in the remaining weapon sub-categories. 
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Weapon sub-category W 1 (%) W 2 (%) W 3 (%) W 4 (%) W 1 - 4 (%) 
Handgun 70 90 40 30 57.5 
Rifle / Shotgun - - 40 - 10 
Automatic weapon - - - 20 5 
Unknown explosive category 10 - 10 20 10 
Knife 10 10 10 10 10 
Sharp object other than knife 10 - - - 2.5 
Vehicle - - - 20 5 
 
Table 8.16 Cross-wave analysis of the variable Weapon sub-category. 
 
F: Cross-wave analysis of the Elementary Scenario Component Modus 
operandi 
Modus operandi V1: Level of intelligence 
In the Elementary Scenario Component Modus operandi, the level of intelligence 
of the lone-operator terrorists needed for their acts appears to be significant. We 
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intelligence. (In the remaining 2.5% of the cases the level of intelligence needed to 
carry out the attack could not be specified.) 
 
While a cross-wave analysis seems to indicate a slight development towards a 
higher level of intelligence that is required by the lone operator, we do not wish to 
draw conclusions based on the percentages generated. Table 8.17 indicates the 
level of intelligence the protagonists needed for every individual wave. 
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8.4 Answer to research question 3  
In this chapter we addressed RQ3: To what extent can a scenario model be used 
to analyse historic criminal behaviour? 
 
To answer the research question we started with a description of the research 
framework. We introduced (i) the six Elementary Scenario Components (ESC6), and 
(ii) the seventeen variables related to these components. Additionally, we 
explained the concept of four waves of modern terrorism (cf. Rapoport, 2004), 
which we used to define the timeframe of modern terrorism, and to divide this 
timeframe in four historic waves. Subsequently, we selected ten incidents of lone-
operator terrorism per wave.  
 
Next, we presented forty cases of lone-operator behaviour. They were equally 
distributed over the four waves of modern terrorism (i.e., we presented ten lone-
operator incidents per wave). Subsequently, we identified and valued (i) the six 
Elementary Scenario Components, and (ii) the seventeen variables of the incidents 
per wave. Then we compared and contrasted the ten individual incidents per wave 
by analysing the communalities and differences between them.  
 
Third, in a cross-wave analysis we accumulated the results of every wave of 
modern terrorism and brought together the forty cases of lone-operator terrorism 
in a search for specific characteristics of lone-operator behaviour. Based on our 
cross-wave analysis, we were able to set out an exploratory path into the world of 
lone-operator behaviour and make some first observations with respect to the 
detection of a time-independent profile of the lone-operator terrorist 
 
From the results obtained, we may conclude (1) that the scenario model based on 
the Elementary Scenario Components is able to accumulate different historic 
criminal incidents in a systemised way, and (2) that it provides an opportunity to 
analyse historic criminal behaviour in general, by transcending the level of 
individual incidents. Moreover, we may conclude (3) that a scenario model can be 
used to analyse criminal behaviour to the extent that it provides contrasts and 
comparisons of idiosyncratic and seemingly unrelated incidents, and thus (4) it 
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NINE | Discovering 
PANDORA‘s box
9
In this chapter we will study the results of applying data-mining tools to 
the ESP PANDORA II and we will answer the fourth research question.
Through analysis of thousands of recorded gunfights, 
the Cleric has determined 
that the geometric distribution of antagonists in any gun battle, 
is a statistically predictable element.
Equilibrium65
65 Equilibrium (2002) is an American dystopian science fiction action film written and directed by Kurt Wimmer. 
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Modern law-enforcement agencies are faced with enormous quantities of 
heterogeneous data that is incongruous in nature and includes unsystematic and 
incomplete data. Hidden inside this data is implicit, previously unknown, and 
potentially useful information that can be processed and turned into actionable 
intelligence products (cf. Witten, Frank, & Hall, 2011). This process of extracting 
information from databases is called knowledge discovery in databases (KDD) or 
data mining. 
 
In this chapter we will address the fourth research question of this thesis: To what 
extent are data-mining techniques applied to a scenario model able to enhance 
the ability of law-enforcement agencies to anticipate criminal behaviour? We will 
answer this question by using the ESC12 scenario model, and try to discover “the 
implicit, previously unknown, and potentially useful information” that is hidden in 
the ESP PANDORA II. To answer the fourth research question, we evaluate and 
compare the results of two data-mining classifiers to the PANDORA II dataset. 
 
In section 9.1 we elaborate on the experimental setup of the experiments. This 
section encompasses the process of data preparation, the data-mining classifiers 
that we use, and the way we interpret the results of the experiments. In Section 9.2 
we describe the three experiments that we conduct. In section 9.3 we provide an 
overview of the results of the experiments, and in section 9.4 these results are 
discussed. In section 9.5 we accumulate the results of the experiments, and 
formulate an answer to RQ4. 
 
9.1 Experimental setup  
This section presents the setup of our experiments. It describes the process of data 
preparation (in subsection 9.1.1), the data-mining classifiers that we use for the 
experiments (in subsection 9.1.2) and the way we interpret the final results (in 
subsection 9.1.3). 
 
9.1.1 Data preparation 
For the experimental setup, we used the dataset of PANDORA II introduced in 
subsection 6.3.2. This ESP includes 98 variables and 53,289 records. In the process 
of data preparation, we made two assumptions. 
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ability of the ESC12 scenario model, we confidently build our discussion on the 
experiments conducted with the subset of 16 variables. 
 
Table 9.1 lists the variables that are selected for our data-mining experiments. In 
the first column the variables are issued by a reference number. The second 
column indicates the Elementary Scenario Component to which the variable is 
related. The third column refers to the internal structure of the ESC12 that was 
introduced in chapter seven (in which the reference “Protagonist V2” would refer 
to the second variable of the Elementary Scenario Component Protagonist). The 
fourth column lists the name of the variable, while the fifth column refers to the 




ESC  Variable Variable name Table # 
Records 
1 General info  General info V4 Successful incident  7.1 52,646 
2 Arena  Arena V2 Country 7.2 52,634 
3 Time(frame)  Time(frame) V2 Day 7.3 52,633 
4 Time(frame)  Time(frame) V2 Month 7.3 52,633 
5 Time(frame)  Time(frame) V2 Year 7.3 52,633 
6 Protagonist  Protagonist V2 Number of Protagonists involved 7.5 19,922 
7 Protagonist  Protagonist V15 Terrorist organisation  7.5 52,610 
8 Protagonist:  Protagonist V20 Part of multiple-incident 7.5 51,985 
9 Protagonist:  Protagonist V24 Ties with third parties 7.5 52,549 
10 Antagonist  Antagonist V5 Type of antagonist(s) 7.6 52,621 
11 Antagonist  Antagonist V12 Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack 7.6 52,432 
12 Antagonist  Antagonist V14 Total fatalities 7.6 52,440 
13 Antagonist  Antagonist V15 Total injuries 7.6 52,437 
14 Means  Means V1 Type of Incident 7.9 52,449 
15 Means  Means V4 Weapon sub-category 7.9 45,384 
16 Means  Means V10 Suicide mission 7.9 52,440 
 
Table 9.1 ESC12 variables included in the data-mining experiments. 
 
9.1.2 The data-mining classifiers 
In order to assess to what extent data-mining techniques (applied to the PANDORA II 
dataset) are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the anticipation of criminal 
behaviour, data-mining classifiers are required.  
 
In Anticipating terrorism with Pandora II, Stege (2012) investigated which classifier 
would be most suitable for our data-mining experiments. Stege performed tests 
with four well-known data-mining classifiers viz. ZeroR, J48 decision tree, Naïve 
Bayes, and K-Nearest Neighbor. For extensive reporting of these tests we refer to 
Anticipating terrorism with Pandora II (Stege, 2012). Based on her research, Stege 
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• Assumption 1: Variables that have a value based on fewer than 10,000 
records are assumed to possess insufficient power to provide us with 
reliable results, and are therefore excluded from the data-mining 
experiments. 
• Assumption 2: Variables that refer to the same phenomenon are assumed 
to be strongly correlated by default, and therefore are excluded form the 
data-mining experiments.  
 
Ad assumption 1 
Of the 98 variables of the ESP PANDORA II, 76 variables had a value based on fewer 
than 10,000 records. According to assumption 1 the number of variables was 
decreased to 22. 
 
Ad assumption 2  
Typically, we assume that variables referring to the same phenomenon are strongly 
correlated. For instance, the variable City is obviously strongly correlated to the 
variable Country. To discover variables that refer to the same phenomenon (in 
other words variables that carry obvious correlations with other variables), a pre-
test was performed by Stege (2012). For an elaborate description of this test, as 
well as for a discussion of its results, we refer to Anticipating terrorism with 
Pandora (Stege, 2012). The pre-test indicated an obvious correlation between six 
of the 22 remaining variables66. Therefore, applying assumption 2 on the dataset 
excludes another six variables from the data-mining experiments. 
 
The application of the assumptions 1 and 2 on the PANDORA II dataset leads to a 
total of 16 variables that (i) have a value based on more than 10,000 records, and 
(ii) are not correlated by default.  
 
As only 16 of the 98 ESC12 variables are included in the experiments that are 
described in this chapter, the extent of the experiments is rather limited. However, 
as we aim to assess whether data-mining techniques are able to enhance the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 We note that in the original pre-test that was performed by Stege, 7 variables were discovered that are 
strongly correlated by default. However, in the development of the internal structure of the ESP PANDORA II (as 
explained in chapter seven) several variables were combined. With respect to the subject of this chapter, 6 
variables remained that are strongly correlated by default. These variables are: Region and Country, Weapon 
category and Weapon sub-category, Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack and Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack exact, 
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between 1 and 12. Consequently, the accuracy results of the variable Day will most 
probably be less accurate than the results of the variable Month.  
 
To provide a categorical and range-independent interpretation of the results of 
the three experiments, we will juxtapose the outcome of the J48 algorithm to that 
of the ZeroR baseline classifier.  
 
Significance 
To be able to assess the significance of the outcomes of the first two experiments, 
Stege (2012) performed a 5-fold cross-validation for each classifier to determine to 
what extent the unknown variables can be traced from the known variables. 
Moreover, in order to determine whether the differences in accuracies are 
significant, she performed a one-way ANOVA with a Tukey HSD post-hoc test in 
SPSS (significance level >.05). For an extensive report on these tests and their 
results, we refer to Anticipating terrorism with Pandora II (Stege 2012). We will use 
the outcome of the tests in subsections 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 when we refer to the 
significance of the results of the classifiers. 
 
To assess the significance of the third experiment, we will compare the results of 
each classifier to a test set and analyse the results based on the proportion of 
successful hits (see 9.2.3).  
 
9.2 Three experiments  
To approach RQ4, we conduct three different data-mining experiments that 
represent situations in which law-enforcement agencies are required to (1) learn 
from, (2) adapt to, and (3) anticipate criminal behaviour. (For an explanation of the 
ability to learn, to adapt, and to anticipate, we refer to subsection 2.5.1, 5.2.1, 
5.2.2, and 5.2.3 respectively.) Below we will describe the three data-mining 
experiments in detail.  
9.2.1 The first experiment: Learning 
In the first experiment, we test to what extent data-mining techniques applied to 
the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the process of 
learning from criminal behaviour. The experiment is based on a situation in which 
law-enforcement agencies are investigating a terrorist attack that recently 
occurred. In the process of investigation, law-enforcement agencies have to 
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concluded that the most suitable classifier for our experiments would be the J48 
decision tree. We gratefully follow her recommendation. To be able to assess the 
usefulness and value of this classifier, we will compare the results of the J48 
classifier with the baseline classifier ZeroR. Below we will briefly describe both the 
ZeroR and the J48 classifier. 
 
ZeroR 
The ZeroR classifier identifies the most common class value in a training set and 
returns that value when evaluating an instance (Stege, 2012). For instance, if data 
encompasses 55% class A, 40% class B, and 5% class C, then the ZeroR classifier 
would identify 55% of the instances correctly. Though there is no predictive power 
in ZeroR, it is useful for determining a baseline performance as a benchmark for 
other classification methods. For an extensive description of ZeroR we refer to 
Anticipating terrorism with Pandora II, (Stege, 2012). 
 
J48 decision tree (J48) 
The J48 classifier builds decision trees from a set of labelled training data, using 
the concept of information entropy (cf. Vanderlooy, 2009). It uses the fact that 
each feature of data can be used to make a decision by splitting the data into 
smaller subsets, one subset for every value (or range of values) of the feature. The 
splitting procedure stops if all variables in a subset belong to the same class. The 
complexity (depth) of a decision tree may be reduced by removing sub-trees and 
replacing them by leaves. Subsequently, the decision tree removes sections of the 
tree that provide little power to classify instances (Vanderlooy, 2009). For an 
extensive description of J48 decision tree we refer to Anticipating terrorism with 
Pandora II, (Stege, 2012). 
9.1.3 Interpretation of the results 
Below, we interpret the success of the classifiers by generating and comparing the 
accuracy and significance of the generated results. 
 
Accuracy 
The level of success of the classifiers will be determined by the proportion of 
successful hits, i.e., the accuracy of the outcome. We note that there is a 
correlation between the accuracy of the classifier and the categorical range of the 
variable. For instance, the categorical range of the variable Day consists of a 
number between 1 and 31, while the variable Month consists of a number 
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between 1 and 12. Consequently, the accuracy results of the variable Day will most 
probably be less accurate than the results of the variable Month.  
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concluded that the most suitable classifier for our experiments would be the J48 
decision tree. We gratefully follow her recommendation. To be able to assess the 
usefulness and value of this classifier, we will compare the results of the J48 
classifier with the baseline classifier ZeroR. Below we will briefly describe both the 
ZeroR and the J48 classifier. 
 
ZeroR 
The ZeroR classifier identifies the most common class value in a training set and 
returns that value when evaluating an instance (Stege, 2012). For instance, if data 
encompasses 55% class A, 40% class B, and 5% class C, then the ZeroR classifier 
would identify 55% of the instances correctly. Though there is no predictive power 
in ZeroR, it is useful for determining a baseline performance as a benchmark for 
other classification methods. For an extensive description of ZeroR we refer to 
Anticipating terrorism with Pandora II, (Stege, 2012). 
 
J48 decision tree (J48) 
The J48 classifier builds decision trees from a set of labelled training data, using 
the concept of information entropy (cf. Vanderlooy, 2009). It uses the fact that 
each feature of data can be used to make a decision by splitting the data into 
smaller subsets, one subset for every value (or range of values) of the feature. The 
splitting procedure stops if all variables in a subset belong to the same class. The 
complexity (depth) of a decision tree may be reduced by removing sub-trees and 
replacing them by leaves. Subsequently, the decision tree removes sections of the 
tree that provide little power to classify instances (Vanderlooy, 2009). For an 
extensive description of J48 decision tree we refer to Anticipating terrorism with 
Pandora II, (Stege, 2012). 
9.1.3 Interpretation of the results 
Below, we interpret the success of the classifiers by generating and comparing the 
accuracy and significance of the generated results. 
 
Accuracy 
The level of success of the classifiers will be determined by the proportion of 
successful hits, i.e., the accuracy of the outcome. We note that there is a 
correlation between the accuracy of the classifier and the categorical range of the 
variable. For instance, the categorical range of the variable Day consists of a 
number between 1 and 31, while the variable Month consists of a number 
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Ref # Variable Known (√)  Unknown (X) 
1 Successful incident  √  
2 Country √  
3 Day √  
4 Month √  
5 Year √  
6 Number of protagonists  X 
7 Terrorist organisation  X 
8  Part of multiple-incident √  
9 Ties with third parties  X 
10 Type of antagonist(s) √  
11 Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack √  
12 Total fatalities √  
13 Total injuries √  
14 Type of incident √  
15 Weapon sub-category √  
16 Suicide Mission √  
 
Table 9.2 Variables included in the first experiment. 
9.2.2 The second experiment: Adapting 
In the second experiment, we test to what extent data-mining techniques, applied 
to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the process 
of adapting to a developing criminal behaviour. The experiment is based on the 
situation in which law-enforcement agencies are facing an active threatening 
situation in which a strategic location (e.g., parliament or court building), 
scheduled event (e.g., the Olympic games), or important person (e.g., political 
leader) needs to be protected from a possible (terrorist) attack. In the process of 
adaptation, developing criminal behaviour needs to be managed in order to 
obstruct or evade the progress of that behaviour (see definition 2.6: adapting). For 
an explanation of the value of the ability to adapt, we refer to section 2.5 and 
subsection 5.2.2. 
 
For this experiment, we assume that of the sixteen variables, six are known in 
advance while ten variables remain unknown. First, we assume that the attack is 
going to be a (1) Successful incident. Second, we assume that the variables 
Country (2), Day (3), Month  (4), and Year (5) of the event are known. Finally, we 
assume that the Type of antagonist(s) (10) is known in advance (e.g., the court 
building, the Olympic games, or the political leader that needs to be protected). 
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combine their knowledge of the case that is currently under investigation, with 
“readily accessible lessons from history” (see definition 2.5: learning). For an 
explanation of the value of the ability to learn, we refer to section 2.5 and 
subsection 5.2.1.  
 
In the design of the first experiment we assume that in the hours after a terrorist 
attack, thirteen of the sixteen ESC12 variables are (or become) known. Here we 
mention that a known variable is equivalent to a variable with a value of which the 
accuracy is 100%.  
 
The known variables are: Successful incident (1), Country (2) of the attack, Day (3), 
Month (4), and Year (5) of the attack. Furthermore, we assume that (shortly after 
the incident) it is known if the attack was Part of a multiple-incident (8), what the 
Type of antagonist(s) (10) was, and whether Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack (11). 
With respect to the victims, we assume that shortly after the incident the Total 
fatalities (12) are known, as well as the Total injuries (13). Finally, we assume that 
the Type of incident (14) is known, as well as the Weapon sub-category (15) that 
was used and whether the attack could be classified as a Suicide mission (16).  
 
Consequently, we assume that the remaining three unknown variables (viz. 
Number of protagonists (6), Terrorist organisation (7), and Ties with third parties 
(9)) would provide valuable information for law-enforcement agencies in the 
investigation of a terrorist attack that recently occurred.  
 
In the first experiment, we aim to generate and compare the accuracy percentages 
of both the ZeroR and the J48 classifier in predicting the outcome of the three 
unknown variables. 
 
Table 9.3 provides an overview of the variables that are included in the first 
experiment. It indicates the 13 variables that are assumed to be known (√), and the 
3 variables that are assumed unknown (X). 
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the incident) it is known if the attack was Part of a multiple-incident (8), what the 
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fatalities (12) are known, as well as the Total injuries (13). Finally, we assume that 
the Type of incident (14) is known, as well as the Weapon sub-category (15) that 
was used and whether the attack could be classified as a Suicide mission (16).  
 
Consequently, we assume that the remaining three unknown variables (viz. 
Number of protagonists (6), Terrorist organisation (7), and Ties with third parties 
(9)) would provide valuable information for law-enforcement agencies in the 
investigation of a terrorist attack that recently occurred.  
 
In the first experiment, we aim to generate and compare the accuracy percentages 
of both the ZeroR and the J48 classifier in predicting the outcome of the three 
unknown variables. 
 
Table 9.3 provides an overview of the variables that are included in the first 
experiment. It indicates the 13 variables that are assumed to be known (√), and the 
3 variables that are assumed unknown (X). 
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and effective fashion, based on the interpretation of past events” (see definition 
2.7: anticipating). For an explanation of the value of the ability to anticipate, we 
refer to section 2.5. and subsection 5.2.3. 
 
To be able to assess the ability of the ESC12 scenario model to anticipate terrorist 
incidents that may happen in the future, we divided the data of the ESP PANDORA II 
into a training set and a test set. First, we trained the classifiers on the basis of a 
training set, which included all incidents from PANDORA II that occurred before 
2007. Subsequently, we used the classifiers to generate accuracy percentages of 
the test set that included the remaining incidents that are dated from 2007 until 
2010. To value the results from the third experiment, we compare the accuracy of 
J48 algorithm with that of the ZeroR baseline.  
 
Ref # Variable Known (√)  Unknown (X) 
1 Successful incident   X 
2 Country  X 
3 Day  X 
4 Month  X 
5 Year  X 
6 Number of protagonists  X 
7 Terrorist organisation  X 
8  Part of multiple-incident  X 
9 Ties with third parties  X  
10 Type of antagonist(s)  X 
11 Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack  X 
12 Total fatalities  X 
13 Total injuries  X 
14 Type of incident  X 
15 Weapon sub-category  X 
16 Suicide Mission  X 
 
Table 9.4 Variables included in the third experiment. 
 
In the third experiment, we aim to generate and compare the accuracy 
percentages of both classifiers to predict the outcome of the ten unknown 
variables. 
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Consequently, we try to determine to what extent the ten unknown variables can 
be derived from the six known variables mentioned above. The unknown variables 
are: Number of protagonists (6), Terrorist organisation (7), Part of multiple-incident 
(8), Ties with third parties (9), Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack (11), Total fatalities 
(12), Total injuries (13), Type of incident (14), Weapon sub-category (15), and 
Suicide mission (16).  
 
Table 9.3 provides an overview of the variables included in the second 
experiment. It indicates the six variables that are assumed to be known (√), and the 
ten variables that are assumed to be unknown (X). 
	  
Ref # Variable Know (√)  Unknown (X) 
1 Successful incident  √  
2 Country √  
3 Day √  
4 Month √  
5 Year √  
6 Number of protagonists  X 
7 Terrorist organisation  X 
8  Part of multiple-incident  X 
9 Ties with third parties  X 
10 Type of antagonist(s) √  
11 Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack  X 
12 Total fatalities  X 
13 Total injuries  X 
14 Type of incident  X 
15 Weapon sub-category  X 
16 Suicide Mission  X 
 
Table 9.3 Variables included in the second experiment. 
 
In the second experiment, we aim to generate and compare the accuracy 
percentages of both classifiers to predict the outcome of the ten unknown 
variables. 
9.2.3 The third experiment: Anticipating 
In the third experiment, we test to what extent data-mining techniques, applied to 
the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in anticipating 
future terrorist attacks. Hence, we assume that of the sixteen variables, all sixteen 
are unknown (see table 9.4). The experiment represents a situation in which law-
enforcement agencies can proactively engage a possible terrorist attack that might 
take place in the future, and “make decisions concerning future events in a timely 
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and effective fashion, based on the interpretation of past events” (see definition 
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enforcement agencies can proactively engage a possible terrorist attack that might 
take place in the future, and “make decisions concerning future events in a timely 
 
 259 
9.3.1 Results of the first experiment 
As was explained in 9.2.1, the first experiment is based on a situation in which a 
law-enforcement agency is investigating a terrorist attack that recently occurred. 
As we assumed, in such a situation thirteen of the sixteen ESC12 variables are to 
be known. Moreover, we assumed that the three unknown variables (viz. Number 
of protagonists, Terrorist organisation, and Ties with third parties) would provide 
valuable information for law-enforcement agencies in the process of learning from 
criminal behaviour (see subsection 9.2.1).  
 
Table 9.5 displays the accuracy percentages that were generated by each data-
mining classifier (viz. ZeroR and J48) for the three variables that were assumed to 
be unknown in the first experiment68. 
 
Ref # Unknown variable ZeroR % J48 % 
6 Number of protagonists 30.98 40.50 
7 Terrorist organisation 6.80 68.52 
9 Ties with third parties 6.81 68.40 
 
Table 9.5 Accuracy results (in percentages) of the first experiment. 
 
With respect to the accuracy percentages of both classifiers, we make two 
observations. 
1. For all three unknown variables, the J48 generates a result that is 
significantly69 higher than the baseline classifier ZeroR.  
2. The results that are generated by the J48 classifier for the variables Terrorist 
organisation and Ties with third parties, have improved substantially in 
comparison to the results of the baseline classifier.  
 
The results of this experiment, and the extent to which data-mining techniques 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the 
process of learning from criminal behaviour, will be discussed in subsection 9.4.1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  Because there were many missing values in the dataset for the three unknown attributes Number of 
protagonists, Terrorist group and Ties with third parties (see subsection 6.3.2), we performed the experiment 
for these variables without the missing values. 
69 To assess whether the differences in the accuracies of both classifiers are significant, we performed a one-
way ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) with a Tukey HSD post-hoc test in SPSS (significance level >.05). For a 




9.3 Results  
The results described below are generated by the data-mining tool Weka67 , 
version 3-6-6 for Mac. For a detailed explanation of Weka we refer to Witten, 
Frank & Hall (2011). To conduct the experiment, we converted the PANDORA II 
dataset to a CSV (comma separated value) file. Because the original file was too 
large to open in OpenOffice, we limited the number of records by using the cases 
from the year 1991 until the year 2010. This reduced the total number of records 
of PANDORA II to 53,288. Next, we implemented the dataset into Weka, and 
selected the two classifiers described before (viz. ZeroR and the J48 decision tree).  
 
To assess the accuracy for the results of the first two experiments, we performed a 
five-fold cross-validation. In a five-fold cross-validation the dataset is randomly 
partitioned into five equal size subsamples (five partitions of 20% of the dataset). A 
single partition of the subsample is retained as the validation data, and the 
remaining four subsamples (80% of the dataset) are used as training data. The 
cross-validation process is then repeated five times (five folds), with each of the 
five subsamples used exactly once as the validation data. Subsequently, the five 
results from the folds are averaged to produce a single accuracy value.  
 
For the third experiment, we split the data into a training set and a test set (see 
subsection 9.2.3). Consequently, we could not perform a five-fold cross-validation. 
Therefore, to assess the accuracy for the results of the third experiment we 
analysed the results based on the proportion of successful hits.  
 
For a detailed explanation of the parameters of the three tests, we refer to 
Anticipating terrorism with Pandora (Stege, 2012). 
 
In this section we will provide the results that were collected in the three data-
mining experiments announced in section 9.2. The results of the first experiment 
are presented in subsection 9.3.1, the results of the second experiment in 
subsection 9.3.2, and the results of the third experiment are presented in 
subsection 9.3.3. The discussion of the results will be the subject of section 9.4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  Weka is a popular suite of machine learning software written in Java, developed at the University of 
Waikato, New Zealand. 
 
 259 
9.3.1 Results of the first experiment 
As was explained in 9.2.1, the first experiment is based on a situation in which a 
law-enforcement agency is investigating a terrorist attack that recently occurred. 
As we assumed, in such a situation thirteen of the sixteen ESC12 variables are to 
be known. Moreover, we assumed that the three unknown variables (viz. Number 
of protagonists, Terrorist organisation, and Ties with third parties) would provide 
valuable information for law-enforcement agencies in the process of learning from 
criminal behaviour (see subsection 9.2.1).  
 
Table 9.5 displays the accuracy percentages that were generated by each data-
mining classifier (viz. ZeroR and J48) for the three variables that were assumed to 
be unknown in the first experiment68. 
 
Ref # Unknown variable ZeroR % J48 % 
6 Number of protagonists 30.98 40.50 
7 Terrorist organisation 6.80 68.52 
9 Ties with third parties 6.81 68.40 
 
Table 9.5 Accuracy results (in percentages) of the first experiment. 
 
With respect to the accuracy percentages of both classifiers, we make two 
observations. 
1. For all three unknown variables, the J48 generates a result that is 
significantly69 higher than the baseline classifier ZeroR.  
2. The results that are generated by the J48 classifier for the variables Terrorist 
organisation and Ties with third parties, have improved substantially in 
comparison to the results of the baseline classifier.  
 
The results of this experiment, and the extent to which data-mining techniques 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the 
process of learning from criminal behaviour, will be discussed in subsection 9.4.1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  Because there were many missing values in the dataset for the three unknown attributes Number of 
protagonists, Terrorist group and Ties with third parties (see subsection 6.3.2), we performed the experiment 
for these variables without the missing values. 
69 To assess whether the differences in the accuracies of both classifiers are significant, we performed a one-
way ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) with a Tukey HSD post-hoc test in SPSS (significance level >.05). For a 




9.3 Results  
The results described below are generated by the data-mining tool Weka67 , 
version 3-6-6 for Mac. For a detailed explanation of Weka we refer to Witten, 
Frank & Hall (2011). To conduct the experiment, we converted the PANDORA II 
dataset to a CSV (comma separated value) file. Because the original file was too 
large to open in OpenOffice, we limited the number of records by using the cases 
from the year 1991 until the year 2010. This reduced the total number of records 
of PANDORA II to 53,288. Next, we implemented the dataset into Weka, and 
selected the two classifiers described before (viz. ZeroR and the J48 decision tree).  
 
To assess the accuracy for the results of the first two experiments, we performed a 
five-fold cross-validation. In a five-fold cross-validation the dataset is randomly 
partitioned into five equal size subsamples (five partitions of 20% of the dataset). A 
single partition of the subsample is retained as the validation data, and the 
remaining four subsamples (80% of the dataset) are used as training data. The 
cross-validation process is then repeated five times (five folds), with each of the 
five subsamples used exactly once as the validation data. Subsequently, the five 
results from the folds are averaged to produce a single accuracy value.  
 
For the third experiment, we split the data into a training set and a test set (see 
subsection 9.2.3). Consequently, we could not perform a five-fold cross-validation. 
Therefore, to assess the accuracy for the results of the third experiment we 
analysed the results based on the proportion of successful hits.  
 
For a detailed explanation of the parameters of the three tests, we refer to 
Anticipating terrorism with Pandora (Stege, 2012). 
 
In this section we will provide the results that were collected in the three data-
mining experiments announced in section 9.2. The results of the first experiment 
are presented in subsection 9.3.1, the results of the second experiment in 
subsection 9.3.2, and the results of the third experiment are presented in 
subsection 9.3.3. The discussion of the results will be the subject of section 9.4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  Weka is a popular suite of machine learning software written in Java, developed at the University of 
Waikato, New Zealand. 
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2. The results that are generated by the J48 classifier for the variable Number 
of protagonists and Suicide mission have improved slightly in comparison to 
the results of the baseline classifier.  
3. The results that are generated by the J48 classifier for the variables Terrorist 
organisation and Ties with third parties, have improved significantly in 
comparison to the results of the baseline classifier72.  
 
For convenient reading, we have marked the two variables that generate an 
accuracy percentage that is substantially better than the baseline classifier in table 
9.6, in bold. 
 
Notably, in the second experiment the J48 classifier generates accuracy 
percentages that are lower than the ZeroR classifier for five of the ten unknown 
variables (viz. Part of multiple-incident, Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack, Total 
fatalities, Type of incident, and Weapon sub-category). Additionally, the accuracy 
results generated for three of the ten unknown variables are only slightly higher 
than the ZeroR classifier (viz. Number of protagonists, Total Injuries, and Suicide 
mission). This outcome may be explained by the setup of the second experiment, 
in which six known variables are used to identify correlations relevant to the ten 
unknown variables. In other words, the J48 builds its decision tree on fewer data 
than it did in the first experiment, and it is feasible that the known variables do not 
contain enough predictive value to draw conclusions from. The fact that the ZeroR 
outperforms the J48 classifier for five of the ten unknown variables, might be 
explained by the fact that J48 is trying to generate a reasoning (by drawing on 
only six variables) while the ZeroR classifier simply identifies the most common 
class value.  
 
The results of the second experiment, and the extent to which data-mining 
techniques, applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement 
agencies in the process of adapting to a developing criminal behaviour, will be 
discussed in subsection 9.4.2. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 To assess whether the differences in the accuracies of both classifiers are significant, we performed a one-
way ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) with a Tukey HSD post-hoc test in SPSS (significance level >.05). For a 




9.3.2 Results of the second experiment 
As was explained in 9.2.2, the second experiment is based on a situation in which 
a law-enforcement agency is facing the threat of an actual terrorist attack against a 
person or object. As we assumed, in such a situation six of the sixteen ESC12 
variables are known. Moreover, we assumed that the ten unknown variables (viz. 
Number of protagonists, Terrorist organisation, Part of multiple incident, Ties with 
third parties, Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack, Total fatalities, Total injuries, Type of 
incident, Weapon sub-category, and Suicide mission) provide valuable information 
for law-enforcement agencies in the process of adapting to a developing criminal 
behaviour (see subsection 9.2.2). 
  
Table 9.6 displays the accuracy results that were generated by each data-mining 
classifier (viz. ZeroR and J48) for the ten variables that were assumed to be 
unknown in the second experiment70,71. 
	  
Ref # Unknown variable ZeroR % J48 % 
6 Number of protagonists 30.98 35.96 
7 Terrorist organisation 6.80 67.53 
8 Part of multiple-incident 93.59 86.10 
9 Ties with third parties 6.81 67.62 
11 Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack 88.12 50.09 
12 Total fatalities 51.10 51.00 
13 Total injuries 55.94 59.44 
14 Type of incident 59.19 44.31 
15 Weapon sub-category 48.32 25.05 
16 Suicide Mission 95.88 96.57 
 
Table 9.6 Accuracy results (in percentages) of the second experiment. 
 
With respect to the accuracy percentages of both classifiers, we make three 
observations. 
1. The results that are generated by the J48 classifier for the variables Part of 
multiple incident, Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack, Total fatalities, Total 
injuries, Type of incident, and Weapon sub-category, are lower than the 
baseline classifier. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  Because there were many missing values in the dataset for the three unknown attributes, Number of 
protagonists, Terrorist group, and Ties with third parties (see subsection 6.3.2), we performed the experiment 
for these variables without the missing values. 
71 We note that the results published in the thesis Anticipating terrorism with Pandora II (Stege, 2012) contain 
slight inaccuracies. In our discussion (and in table 9.6) we corrected these errors, and present the current 
results from the original experiments executed by Stege (2012).  
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2. The results that are generated by the J48 classifier for the variable Number 
of protagonists and Suicide mission have improved slightly in comparison to 
the results of the baseline classifier.  
3. The results that are generated by the J48 classifier for the variables Terrorist 
organisation and Ties with third parties, have improved significantly in 
comparison to the results of the baseline classifier72.  
 
For convenient reading, we have marked the two variables that generate an 
accuracy percentage that is substantially better than the baseline classifier in table 
9.6, in bold. 
 
Notably, in the second experiment the J48 classifier generates accuracy 
percentages that are lower than the ZeroR classifier for five of the ten unknown 
variables (viz. Part of multiple-incident, Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack, Total 
fatalities, Type of incident, and Weapon sub-category). Additionally, the accuracy 
results generated for three of the ten unknown variables are only slightly higher 
than the ZeroR classifier (viz. Number of protagonists, Total Injuries, and Suicide 
mission). This outcome may be explained by the setup of the second experiment, 
in which six known variables are used to identify correlations relevant to the ten 
unknown variables. In other words, the J48 builds its decision tree on fewer data 
than it did in the first experiment, and it is feasible that the known variables do not 
contain enough predictive value to draw conclusions from. The fact that the ZeroR 
outperforms the J48 classifier for five of the ten unknown variables, might be 
explained by the fact that J48 is trying to generate a reasoning (by drawing on 
only six variables) while the ZeroR classifier simply identifies the most common 
class value.  
 
The results of the second experiment, and the extent to which data-mining 
techniques, applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement 
agencies in the process of adapting to a developing criminal behaviour, will be 
discussed in subsection 9.4.2. 
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The results of the third experiment, and the extent to which data-mining 
techniques, applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement 




In this section we will discuss the results of the three experiments. In subsection 
9.4.1 we discuss the results of the first experiment in which we tested to what 
extent data-mining techniques applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist 
law-enforcement agencies in the process of learning from criminal behaviour. In 
subsection 9.4.2 we discuss the results of the second experiment in which we 
tested to what extent data-mining techniques applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are 
able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the process of adapting to criminal 
behaviour. In subsection 9.4.3 we discuss the results of the third experiment in 
which we tested to what extent data-mining techniques applied to the ESP 
PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in in the process of 
anticipating to developing criminal behaviour. We will complete every subsection 
by a summary of the results of the experiment, and by providing a conclusion. 
 
In our discussion we will first deal with the difference in results between the 
classifiers ZeroR (that we use as baseline) and J48. Subsequently, we will reflect on 
the decisions that are considered by the J48 decision tree.  
 
Anticipating these reflections, we would like to emphasise that from the data in 
our experiments, the J48 classifier generated rather complex decision trees that 
sometimes did not generalise well when related to the results of the training data. 
Since we aim to assess the value of data-mining techniques in general, rather than 
the process of classification by the J48 classifier, we will mainly reflect on 
interpreting the decisions by the J48 decision tree. To that avail, we will simplify 
the outcome of the J48 decision tree by listing the respective variables that were 
considered. Next, we will try to interpret these variables from a law-enforcement 
perspective in an attempt to weigh and assess the accuracy percentages that 
result from the J48 decision process. We emphasise that these interpretations are 




9.3.3 Results of the third experiment 
As was explained in 9.2.3, the third experiment is based on a situation in which a 
law-enforcement agency can pro-actively engage a possible terrorist attack that 
might take place in the future. In such a situation, we assumed that none of the 
sixteen ESC12 variables are known, and that all variables would provide valuable 
information for law-enforcement agencies in the process of anticipating criminal 
behaviour (see subsection 9.2.3). 
 
Because the third experiment is performed with a training set and a test set (see 
subsection 9.2.3), we could not determine significance levels. Therefore, to avoid 
any discussion on differences in accuracy percentages that are insignificant, we 
have decided to discard differences in accuracy results that are less than 10 
percentage points. Obviously, this percentage is chosen arbitrarily. Table 9.7 
displays the accuracy results that were generated by each classifier (viz. ZeroR and 
J48) for the five variables of which the in accuracy values differ more than 10 
percentage points 73. 
 
Ref # Unknown variable ZeroR % J48 % 
2 Country 2.59 46.26 
7 Terrorist organisation 2.50 83.92 
9 Ties with third parties 2.50 68.40 
14 Type of incident 53.51 77.90 
15 Weapon sub-category 15.23 45.20 
 
Table 9.7 Accuracy results (in percentages) of the third experiment. 
 
With respect to the accuracy percentages of both classifiers, we make the 
following observation. 
1. For all five unknown variables (in which the difference in accuracy 
percentages between both classifiers is more than 10 percentage points), 
the J48 generates a result that is significantly74 higher than the baseline 
classifier ZeroR.  
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73  Because there were many missing values in the dataset for the three unknown attributes, Number of 
protagonists, Terrorist group and Ties with third parties (see subsection 6.3.2), we performed the experiment 
for these variables without the missing values. 
74 To assess whether the differences in the accuracies of both classifiers are significant, we performed a one-
way ANOVA (ANalysis Of VAriance) with a Tukey HSD post-hoc test in SPSS (significance level >.05). For a 
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Below, in our discussion of the unknown variables (viz. UV1, UV2, and UV3), 
• we display only the variables that contributed to the J48 decision tree (i.e., 
the possible correlations between the variables that were not considered by 
the J48 decision tree, are neither noted nor discussed), 
• we display these variables in the order in which they were considered by the 
J48 decision tree (for convenient reading -and to avoid confusion with the 
reference numbers issued to the unknown variables (viz. UV1, UV2, and 
UV3)-, we assign these variables a character (A) to (F)).  
 
UV1: Number of protagonists 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Number of protagonists 30.98 40.50 
   
The J48 decision tree produces a higher accuracy percentage (40.50%) for the 
variable Number of protagonist than the baseline classifier (30.98%); the difference 
being 9.52 percentage points. This result is attained by a decision tree that 
considers the following six variables respectively.  
(A) Suicide Mission  
(B) Country 
(C) Type of antagonist(s) 
(D) Weapon sub-category  
(E) Part of multiple-incident 
(F) Total injuries.  
Below we will briefly discuss the correlation between Number of protagonists and 
these six variables. 
 
A: Suicide mission 
On the basis of the data accumulated in the ESP PANDORA II the J48 decision tree 
suggest a correlation between the variables Number of protagonists and Suicide 
Mission. This correlation seems plausible given the fact that most suicide attacks 
are carefully planned and orchestrated by a larger number of protagonists (larger 
than one), in order to achieve the most effect. 
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In our discussion we will frequently refer to the internal structure of the ESC12 that 
was introduced in chapter seven. For instance, the reference “Antagonist V5 cat 
14” would refer to the 14th category of the 5th variable of the Elementary Scenario 
Component Antagonist (viz. the category “Private citizens & property”, see section 
7.6). The subsections (and tables) 7.1 to 7.11 may be consulted for additional 
explanation of the internal structure of the ESC12. 
 
9.4.1 Discussion of the first experiment 
With the first experiment, we tested to what extent data-mining techniques 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the 
process of learning from criminal behaviour. The experiment is based on a 
situation in which law-enforcement agencies are investigating a terrorist attack that 
recently occurred. In the process of investigation, law-enforcement agencies have 
to combine their knowledge of the case that is currently under investigation, with 
“readily accessible lessons from history” (see definition 2.5: learning).  
 
In the design of the first experiment we assume that in the hours after a terrorist 
attack, thirteen variables are, or become, known. (For a list of these variables we 
refer to table 9.2.) Consequently, we assume that the remaining three unknown 
variables may offer valuable information for the law-enforcement agencies that are 
investigating the terrorist attack. Moreover, we assume that enhancing the 
accuracy values for the unknown variables would assist law-enforcement agencies 
in learning from criminal behaviour. 
 
The unknown variables (UV) in the first experiment are:  
UV1: Number of protagonists 
UV2: Terrorist organisation 
UV3: Ties with third parties 
 
Below we discuss these three unknown variables. For convenient reading we will 
reproduce the appropriate row of table 9.2 (viz. reference number 6, 7, and 9), 
before discussing the results of the experiment.  
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UV2: Terrorist organisation 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Terrorist organisation 6.80 68.52 	  
   	  
For the variable Terrorist organisation the J48 algorithm seems to produce a 
considerably higher accuracy percentage (68.52%) than the baseline (6.80%); the 
difference being 61.72 percentage points. This result is attained by a decision tree 
that considers the following four variables respectively. 
(A) Country 
(B) Type of antagonist(s)  
(C) Year 
(D) Part of multiple-incident.  
Below we will briefly discuss the correlation between Number of protagonists and 
these four variables. 
 
A: Country,  
The correlation between the variables Terrorist organisation and Country confirms 
the notion of counter-terrorism organisations that terrorist organisations operate in 
a geographically confined area (which do not necessarily have to be their “home-
countries”).  
 
B: Type of antagonist(s) 
The J48 decision tree indicates a correlation between the variables Terrorist 
organisation and Type of antagonist(s). This correlation may be best explained by 
an example: The three most classified types of antagonist concerning terrorist 
organisations are (1) Corsican National Liberation Front which exclusively aims at 
types of antagonist classified as “Government (general)” (Antagonist V5 cat 2), (2) 
Hizbul Mujahideen which primarily aims at types of antagonist classified as 
“Military” (Antagonist V5 cat 4), and (3) the Muttahida Qami Movement which aims 
at types of antagonist classified as “Private citizens & property” (Antagonist V5 cat 
14). 
 
C: Year  
The J48 decision tree of the variable Type of antagonist(s) indicates that terrorist 




A possible explanation for the influence of the variable Country is that the data 
accumulated in the ESP PANDORA II indicate a relation between certain countries 
and the number of protagonists. This might be due to the fact that lone-operator 
attacks relatively frequently take place in certain western countries. In contrast, 
data in the ESP PANDORA II suggests that in countries with, for instance a (civil) war, 
attacks are generally executed by a larger number of protagonists than average.  
 
C: Type of antagonist(s)  
The relation between Number of protagonists and Type of antagonist(s) may be 
explained by the fact that certain target types require a specific amount of 
protagonists. For instance, “Military” type targets (Antagonist V5 cat 4) usually 
require a large(r) number of protagonists in order to be successful (see section 
7.6).  
 
D: Weapon sub-category  
The correlation between the variables Number of protagonists and Weapon sub-
category, may be best explained by an example: If the Weapon sub-category is 
“Hands, feet, fists” (Means V4 cat 9, Subcat v), then the number of protagonists is 
usually relatively small. Consequently, if the Weapon sub-category is 
“Radiological” (Means V4 cat 3), or “Nuclear” (Means V4 cat 4), this is a strong 
indicator that more than one protagonist is involved (see section 7.9). 
 
E: Part of multiple-incident 
The variable Part of multiple-incident holds a rather obvious relation to Number of 
protagonists. It indicates that the majority of the cases in the ESP PANDORA II that 
constitute multiple-incidents, are related to more (than one) protagonist(s). It 
seems obvious that for multiple-incidents to happen at the same time, more 
protagonists are required. 
 
F: Total injuries 
The fact that the J48 decision tree of the variable Number of protagonists 
considers the variable Total injuries, indicates that the number of protagonists and 
the number of injuries are related.  This may be explained by the probable 
assumption that two protagonists (with weapons from a certain Weapon sub-
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C: Type of antagonist(s)  
The relation between Number of protagonists and Type of antagonist(s) may be 
explained by the fact that certain target types require a specific amount of 
protagonists. For instance, “Military” type targets (Antagonist V5 cat 4) usually 
require a large(r) number of protagonists in order to be successful (see section 
7.6).  
 
D: Weapon sub-category  
The correlation between the variables Number of protagonists and Weapon sub-
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“Hands, feet, fists” (Means V4 cat 9, Subcat v), then the number of protagonists is 
usually relatively small. Consequently, if the Weapon sub-category is 
“Radiological” (Means V4 cat 3), or “Nuclear” (Means V4 cat 4), this is a strong 
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constitute multiple-incidents, are related to more (than one) protagonist(s). It 
seems obvious that for multiple-incidents to happen at the same time, more 
protagonists are required. 
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The fact that the J48 decision tree of the variable Number of protagonists 
considers the variable Total injuries, indicates that the number of protagonists and 
the number of injuries are related.  This may be explained by the probable 
assumption that two protagonists (with weapons from a certain Weapon sub-




D: Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack,  
The correlation between the variable Ties with third parties and the variable 
Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack may be explained by the fact that the Modus 
operandi of the terrorist organisation and the parties they are related with, are 
closely correlated. In other words, terrorist organisations which are associated with 
one another, frequently use a similar Modus operandi in which the antagonist 
often dies from an attack. 
 
E: Part of multiple-incident. 
In congruence with the variable Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack discussed above, 
the correlation between the variable Ties with third parties and Part of multiple-
incident may be explained by the fact that the Modus operandi of the terrorist 
organisation and the parties they are related with, are correlated.  
 
Concluding the first experiment 
With the first experiment, we tested to what extent data-mining techniques 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in in the 
process of learning from criminal behaviour. In the setup of the experiment, we 
assumed that right after a terrorist attack, the three unknown values Number of 
protagonists, Terrorist organisation, and Ties with third parties offer added value in 
the process of learning from criminal behaviour (see table 9.2). Moreover, we 
assumed that enhancing the accuracy values for the unknown variables would 
assist law-enforcement agencies in learning from criminal behaviour. 
 
The accuracy value that were generated by the first data-mining experiment show 
that for all the three unknown variables, the J48 classifier produced accuracy 
percentages that are significantly higher than those generated by the ZeroR 
baseline classifier (see table 9.4). Therefore, we tentatively conclude that data-
mining techniques may give preference in the ordering of the unknown variables 
to a high degree of accuracy. This ordering may subsequently help criminal 
investigators and analysts, to learn from historic criminal behaviour. 
 
Therefore, based on the results of the first data-mining experiment, we may 
conclude that data-mining techniques applied to the ESP PANDORA II, (a) enhance 
the accuracy of the ESC12 scenario model, and (b) are therefore able to assist law-




data in the ESP PANDORA II that exemplifies this correlation may be found in the 
Communist Party of India Maoist (CPI-M). CPI-M was active in the years 2009 and 
2010, but since 2011 no more incidents were recorded for this terrorist 
organisation. In passing, we remark that this interpretation is supported by the four 
waves of modern terrorism theory by Rapoport (2004). 
 
D: Part of multiple-incident 
On the basis of the data accumulated in the ESP PANDORA II, the J48 decision tree 
correlates the variables Terrorist organisation and Part of multiple-incident. This 
concurs with the prominent notion of counter terrorism organisations. In this 
notion, a specific tactic (such as organising a terrorist attack around multiple 
incidents) is closely related to certain terrorist organisations.  
 
UV3: Ties with third parties 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Ties with third parties 6.81 68.40 	  
   	  
The J48 algorithm produces a notably higher accuracy percentage (68.40%) for the 
variable Ties with third parties than the ZeroR classifier (6.81%); the difference 
being 61.59 percentage points. This result is generated by a decision tree that 
considers five variables. 
(A) Country,  
(B) Type of antagonist(s)  
(C) Year 
(D) Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack 
(E) Part of multiple-incident  
Below we will briefly discuss on the correlation between Ties with third parties and 
these five variables. 
 
A: Country, B: Type of antagonist(s), C: Year  
The first three “leaf nodes” of the decision tree generated for UV3 (Ties with third 
parties) are the same as in the decision tree we have discussed under UV 2 
(Terrorist organisation). Therefore, we refer to UV2 for the discussion of the 
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UV1: Terrorist organisation 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Terrorist organisation 6.80 67.53 	  
   	  
For the variable Terrorist organisation the J48 algorithm produces a considerably 
higher result (67.53%) than the ZeroR baseline classifier (6.80%); the difference 
being 60.73 percentage points. This result is attained by a decision tree that 
considers three variables respectively.  
(A) Country 
(B) Year  
(C) Type of antagonist(s)  
 
For an interpretation of the relation between the variables Terrorist organisation 
and Country, Year, and Type of antagonist(s) we refer to our discussion “UV2 
Terrorist organisation“ of the first experiment. 
 
UV2: Ties with third parties 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Ties with third parties 6.81 67.62 	  
   	  
The J48 decision tree produces a higher result (67.62%) for the variable Ties with 
third parties than the baseline classifier (6.81%); the difference being 60.81 
percentage points. This result is attained by a decision tree that considers three 
variables respectively.  
(A) Year 
(B) Country 
(C) Type of antagonist(s) 
Below we will briefly reflect on the correlation between the variable Ties with third 
parties and these three variables. 
 
For an interpretation of the relation between the variables Ties with third Parties 
and Year, Country, and Type of antagonist(s) we refer to our discussion “UV3 Ties 
with third Parties“ of the first experiment. 
 
 270 
9.4.2 Discussion of the second experiment 
With the second experiment, we tested to what extent data-mining techniques 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the 
process of adapting to criminal behaviour. This experiment is based on a situation 
in which law-enforcement agencies are facing the threat of an actual terrorist 
attack against a person or object. In the process of adaptation, law-enforcement 
agencies have to take appropriate action to deal with developing criminal 
behaviour (see definition 2.6: adapting).  
 
In the design of the second experiment we assume that in such a situation, six 
variables are (or become) known (for a list of these variables we refer to table 9.3.).  
 
Consequently, we assume that the remaining ten variables might provide valuable 
information for law-enforcement to take appropriate action to deal with 
developing criminal behaviour. Moreover, we assume that enhancing the accuracy 
values for the unknown variables would assist law-enforcement agencies in 
adapting to developing criminal behaviour. 
 
In subsection 9.3.2 we have indicated that for two of the ten unknown variables 
the results of the J48 are the substantially higher as the ZeroR classifier. These 
variables are: 
UV1: Terrorist organisation 
UV2: Ties with third parties  
 
Below we discuss only these two unknown variables. For convenient reading we 
will reproduce the appropriate row of table 9.3 (viz. row 7 and 9), before 
discussing the results of the experiment.  
 
Below, in our discussion of the unknown variables (viz. UV1 and UV2), 
• we display only the variables that were considered by the J48 decision tree 
(i.e., the possible correlations between the variables that were not 
considered by the J48 decision tree, are neither noted, nor discussed), 
• we display these variables in the order in which they were considered by the 
J48 decision tree (for convenient reading -and to avoid confusion with the 
reference numbers issued to the unknown variables (viz. UV1 and UV2)-, we 
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9.4.3 Discussion of the third experiment  
With the third experiment we tried to assess to what extent data-mining 
techniques, applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement 
agencies to anticipate future criminal behaviour. This experiment is based on a 
situation in which law-enforcement agencies can pro-actively engage a possible 
terrorist attack that might take place in the future. In the process of adaptation, 
law-enforcement agencies have to be able to make decisions concerning future 
events in a timely and effective fashion, based on the interpretation of past events 
(see definition 2.6: anticipating).  
 
In the design of the third experiment we assume that in anticipating future attacks, 
none of the sixteen variables are known. Moreover, we assume that enhancing the 
accuracy values for the unknown variables would assist law-enforcement agencies 
in anticipating future criminal behaviour. 
 
Below, we will discuss the five variables of which the J48 classifier delivered an 
accuracy percentage that is more than 10 percentage points higher than the 
baseline classifier (see subsections 9.2.3 and 9.3.3). These variables are:  
UV1: Country 
UV2: Terrorist organisation 
UV3: Ties with third parties 
UV4: Type of incident 
UV5: Weapon sub-category. 
 
Below, we will discuss these five unknown variables. For convenient reading we will 
reproduce the appropriate row of table 9.7 (viz. row 2, 7, 9, 12, 14, and 15), before 
discussing the results of the experiment.  
 
Below, in our discussion of the unknown variables (viz. UV1 to UV5), 
• we display only the variables that were considered by the J48 decision tree 
(i.e., the possible correlations between the variables that were not 
considered by the J48 decision tree, are not noted, nor discussed), 
• we display these variables in the order in which they were considered by the 
J48 decision tree (for convenient reading -and to avoid confusion with the 
reference numbers issued to the unknown variables (viz. UV1, to UV5)-, we 




Additionally, we note that the fact that in both the decision trees of UV1:Terrorist 
organisation and UV2:Ties with third parties, the same variables are considered. 
This confirms the -rather obvious- relation between a terrorist organisation and the 
third party it is affiliated with. We therefore tentatively conclude that the variable 
Terrorist organisation holds a strong predictive value for the variable Ties with 
third party, and vice versa. For example, based on the data accumulated in the 
ESP PANDORA, we may expect that the terrorist organisation “Jemaah Islamiya” 
always correlates with the third party “Moro National Liberation Front Splinter 
group”. 
 
Concluding the second experiment 
With the second experiment, we tested to what extent data-mining techniques 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in in the 
process of adapting to developing criminal behaviour.  
 
In the setup of the experiment, we assumed that when a law-enforcement agency 
faces an actual terrorist attack against a person or object, the ten unknown 
variables provide valuable information in the process of taking appropriate action 
to deal with adapting to developing criminal behaviour (see definition 2.6: 
adapting). Moreover, we assumed that enhancing the accuracy values for the 
unknown variables would assist law-enforcement agencies in adapting to 
developing criminal behaviour. 
 
The accuracy percentages generated by the second data-mining experiment, show 
that for two of the ten unknown variables (viz. Terrorist organisation and Ties with 
third parties), the J48 classifier produced accuracy percentages that are 
substantially higher than those generated by the ZeroR baseline classifier (see 
figure 9.6). Therefore, we tentatively conclude that data-mining techniques may 
give preference in the ordering of the unknown variables to a high degree of 
accuracy. This ordering may subsequently help criminal investigators, to 
adequately adapt to developing criminal behaviour. 
 
Therefore, based on the results of the second data-mining experiment, we may 
conclude that in the case of a threatening situation, data-mining techniques, 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, (a) enhance the accuracy of the ESC12 scenario 
model, and (b) are therefore able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the 
process of adapting to developing criminal behaviour.  
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attack is executed on one individual antagonist, these attacks generally occur in 
the same country.  
 
UV2: Terrorist organisation 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Terrorist organisation 2.50 83.92 
 
The result indicate that the J48 classifier was able to predict the Terrorist 
organisation of a prospective attack with an accuracy (of 83.92%) that is 
considerably higher than the baseline classifier ZeroR (2.5%); the difference being 
80.79 percentage points. Remarkably, this result is achieved by a decision tree that 
only considers one variable. 
(A) Ties with third parties.  
 
A: Ties with third parties 
The data accumulated in ESP PANDORA II suggests (i) that specific third parties75 are 
strongly correlated with certain terrorist organisations, and (ii) that this correlation 
that was identified by the J48 classifier based on the training set (the incidents that 
occurred before 2007), apparently persists after 2007. For example, from the data 
we conclude that the terrorist organisation “Jemaah Islamiya” strongly correlates 
with the third party “Moro National Liberation Front Splinter group”. 
Consequently, if an incident arises in which it becomes apparent that a certain 
third party maintains connections with an unknown Terrorist organisation, the latter 
may successfully be anticipated.  
 
UV3: Ties with third parties 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Ties with third parties 2.50 68.40 
 
	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 A “third party” refers to any terrorist, criminal or clandestine group(s) that the protagonist (or terrorist 





Variable ZeroR J48 
Country 2.59 46.26 
 
The result shows that (based on incidents that took place before 2007) the J48 
classifier was able to predict the Country of a terrorist attack (that took place 
between 2007 and 2010) with an accuracy percentage (46.26%) that is 
considerably higher than the baseline classifier ZeroR (2.59%); the difference being 
43.67 percentage points. To attain this accuracy, the decision tree considers the 
correlations between Country, and the following variables:  
(A) Terrorist organisation 
(B) Part of multiple-incident  
(C) Successful incident  
Below we will briefly reflect on these correlations. 
 
A: Terrorist organisation  
In the discussion of the first two experiments we have indicated that, based on the 
data accumulated in PANDORA II, we observed that terrorist organisations primarily 
operated in specific countries (which do not necessarily have to be their “home-
countries”). Therefore, the fact that the J48 decision tree considers the variable 
Terrorist organisation to have a predictive value in the anticipation of the variable 
Country, is rather obvious. 
 
B: Part of multiple-incident  
According to the data in PANDORA II, the separate incidents that comprised a 
“multiple incident” always occurred in the same country. Therefore, the fact that 
the J48 decision tree considers Part of multiple-incident in the decision tree for the 
variable Country is rather obvious. 
 
C: Successful incident  
The J48 decision tree considers the successfulness of previous incidents (on the 
same antagonist) to indicate the value for the variable Country. According to the 
tree, these attempts hold valuable information with respect to the anticipation of 
the variable country. This may be explained by the fact that, when more than one 
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same antagonist) to indicate the value for the variable Country. According to the 
tree, these attempts hold valuable information with respect to the anticipation of 
the variable country. This may be explained by the fact that, when more than one 
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(E) Type of antagonist(s) 
(F) Successful incident   
Below we will briefly reflect on the correlation between Type of incident and these 
six variables. 
 
A: Weapon sub-category  
The decision tree indicates a correlation between the Type of incident and the 
Weapon sub-category. This seems obvious as, to a certain extent, the Type of 
incident dictates the Weapon sub-category. For example, if the type of incident is 
a Bombing (Means V1 cat 3), the Weapon sub-category will be “Explosives / 
Bombs  / Dynamite” (Means V4 cat 6).  
 
B: Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack  
Additionally, the J48 decision tree indicates a correlation between the Type of 
incident and whether or not the Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack. While the decision 
tree does not provide us with an adequate explanation for the role of this variable, 
we have noted negative correlations between Type of incident and Antagonist(s) 
die(s) from attack. For example, in PANDORA II no “Computer network attack / 
Electronic warfare” (Means V1 cat 7) incidents are recorded in which the 
Antagonist (which usually comprises of a set of computers) died from the attack. 
Moreover, in the successful incidents recorded in the dataset in which the 
Antagonist is a building or object, the Antagonist obviously does never die from 
the attack. This negative correlation may explain why the J48 decision tree 
considers the variable Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack when trying to anticipate the 
variable Type of incident. 
 
C: Total fatalities  
The correlation between the variables Type of Incident and Total fatalities, seems 
a logical one. For instance, if the Type of incident is a “Bombing” (Means V1 cat 
3), there are usually more fatalities than when the incident is an “Assassination / 
Liquidation” (Means V1 cat 1). It is therefore quite understandable that the J48 
decision tree considers the variable Total fatalities when trying to anticipate Type 
of incident. 
 
D: Terrorist organisation,  
The data accumulated in the ESP PANDORA II shows several examples of the 
correlation between the variables Terrorist organisation and Type of incident. For 
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In addition to the previous variable, the J48 classifier seems to be quite successful 
in the prediction of Ties with third parties (68.40%). The result shows that the 
classifier was able to predict the variable Ties with third parties with an accuracy 
that is 65,90 percentage points higher than the accuracy percentage of the 
baseline classifier ZeroR (2.50%). To attain this result, the J48 decision tree relates 
Ties with third parties only to one other variable. 
(A) Terrorist organisation  
 
A: Terrorist organisation  
For an interpretation of the relation between the variables Ties with third Parties 
and Terrorist organisation, we refer to our discussion “UV2 Ties with third Parties“ 
of the third experiment. 
 
Conclusively we note that the results indicate that, if an incident arises in which the 
Terrorist organisation is known, it may be possible (based on historic cases) to 
anticipate the third party it is affiliated with (the variable Ties with third parties) to a 
rather high degree of accuracy. Additionally, if in an incident the variable Ties with 
third parties is known, the variable Terrorist organisation may be anticipated to a 
rather high degree of accuracy. We therefore reiterate our conclusion that the 
variable Terrorist organisation holds a strong predictive value for the variable Ties 
with third party, and vice versa. 
 
UV4: Type of Incident 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Type of incident 53.51 77.90 
 
The J48 classifier seems to be quite successful in the prediction of Type of 
incident. The result shows that the classifier was able to predict this variable with 
an accuracy (of 77.90%) that is higher than the baseline classifier (53.51%); the 
difference being 24,39 percentage points. The J48 decision tree for the variable 
Type of incident considers six variables.  
(A) Weapon sub-category 
(B) Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack 
(C) Total fatalities 
(D) Terrorist organisation 
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being 29.97 percentage points. The result is achieved by a J48 decision tree that 
considers ten variables.  
(A) Type of incident 
(B) Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack 
(C) Year 
(D) Country 
(E) Terrorist organisation 
(F) Suicide mission 
(G) Type of antagonist(s) 
(H) Part of multiple-incident 
(I) Total injuries 
(J) Successful incident  
Below we will briefly reflect on the correlation between Type of incident and these 
ten variables. 
 
A: Type of incident 
For a discussion of the correlation between the variables Weapon sub-category 
and Type of incident, we refer to the discussion of the results of “UV5:Type of 
incident” of the third experiment. 
 
B: Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack 
For a discussion of the correlation between the variables Weapon sub-category 
and Antagonist(s) die(s) from attack, we refer to the discussion of the results of 
“UV6: Weapon sub-category” of the second experiment. 
 
C: Year 
For a discussion of the correlation between the variables Weapon sub-category 
and Year, we refer to the discussion of the results of “UV6: Weapon sub-category” 
of the second experiment. 
 
D: Country  
For a discussion of the correlation between the variables Weapon sub-category 
and Country, we refer to the discussion of the results of “UV6: Weapon sub-
category” of the second experiment. 
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example, the Terrorist organisation Al Qaeda that correlates with the Type of 
incident “Hostage taking / kidnapping” (Means V1 cat 7), or the Terrorist 
organisation Hizballah that strongly correlates with the Type of incident 
“Bombings” (Means V1 cat 3). These correlations may indicate why the J48 
decision tree considers the variable Terrorist organisation when trying to anticipate 
Type of incident. 
 
E: Type of antagonist(s)  
The correlation between Type of incident and Type of antagonist(s) was discussed 
in “UV5: Type of incident” in the second experiment, where we referred to the 
terrorist planning cycle (TPC). Terrorists generally aim to minimize the risk of their 
operation while aiming to achieve the highest probability of success (see 
subsection 3.6.2). The Type of antagonist(s) to a certain extent dictates the Type of 
incident with the highest probability of success. For instance, when terrorists plan 
an attack on the telecommunication infrastructure (Antagonist v5 cat 16), the Type 
of incident might well be a ”Computer network attack / Electronic warfare” (Means 
V1 cat 7), while “Assassination / Liquidation” (Means V1 cat 1) seems less 
plausible. In contrast, when the Type of antagonist(s) is a religious figure 
(Antagonist v5 cat 15), the Type of incident ”Computer network attack / Electronic 
warfare”, does not seem probable. These correlations may indicate why the J48 
decision tree considers the variable Type of antagonist(s) when trying to anticipate 
Type of incident. 
 
F: Successful incident  
We observed that the J48 decision tree of Type of incident considers the variable 
Successful incident. However, we are not able to explain this decision, nor any 
correlation between these variables.  
 
UV5: Weapon sub-category 
 
Variable ZeroR J48 
Weapon sub-category 15.23 45.20 
 
The result depicted above shows that the J48 classifier was able to predict the 
Weapon sub-category of a prospective attack with an accuracy (45.20%) that is 
considerably higher than the ZeroR baseline classifier (15.23%); the difference 
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Concluding the third experiment 
With the third experiment, we tested to what extent data-mining techniques 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II, are able to assist law-enforcement agencies in the 
process of anticipating criminal behaviour.  
 
In the setup of the experiment, we assumed that when a law-enforcement agency 
needs to engage pro-actively a possible terrorist attack that might take place in 
the future (see definition 2.7: anticipating), all the sixteen unknown variables may 
provide valuable information in the process of anticipating to developing criminal 
behaviour. Moreover, we assumed that enhancing the accuracy values for the 
unknown variables would assist law-enforcement agencies in anticipating future 
criminal behaviour. 
 
The results generated by the third data-mining experiment, show that the J48 
classifier produced accurate percentages that are more than 10 percentage points 
higher than the ZeroR classifier for the five variables Country, Terrorist 
organization, Ties with third parties, Type of incident, Weapon sub-category (see 
figure 9.7). 
 
Therefore, based on the aforementioned results, we may conclude that data-
mining techniques applied to the ESP PANDORA (a) enhance the accuracy of the 
ESC12 scenario model, and (b), support law-enforcement agencies in anticipating 
future criminal behaviour.  
 
9.5 Answer to research question 4 
In this chapter we addressed RQ4 [To what extent are data-mining techniques 
applied to a scenario model able to enhance the ability of law-enforcements 
agencies to anticipate criminal behaviour?].  
 
To approach this research question, we conducted three separate tests in which 
we applied the J48 data-mining algorithm to sixteen variables of the ESP PANDORA 
II. The experiments were designed to represent situations in which law-
enforcement agencies are required to (1) learn from, (2) adapt to, and (3) anticipate 




E: Terrorist organisation 
For a discussion of the correlation between the variables Weapon sub-category 
and Terrorist organisation, we refer to the discussion of the results of “UV6: 
Weapon sub-category” of the second experiment. 
 
F: Suicide mission 
Based on the J48 decision tree, we observe that there is a correlation between the 
variables Weapon sub-category and Suicide mission. This correlation seems 
plausible since the majority of suicide missions involve explosives. Consequently, 
in the anticipation of the Weapon sub-category the J48 decision tree considers the 
variable Suicide mission. 
 
G: Type of antagonist(s) 
For a discussion of the correlation between the variables Weapon sub-category 
and Type of antagonist(s), we refer to the discussion of the results of “UV6: 
Weapon sub-category” of the second experiment. 
 
H: Part of multiple-incident 
In the anticipation of the Weapon sub-category the J48 decision tree considers the 
variable Part of multiple-incident. This correlation seems plausible as a study of the 
data in the ESP PANDORA II indicates that Weapon sub-categories such as 
“Explosives / Bombs / Dynamite” (Means V4 cat 6), are frequently used in attacks 
that comprise multiple-incidents. 
 
I: Total injuries 
The relation between the variables Weapon sub-category and Total injuries seems 
a logical one. For instance, if the number of people injured is large, a Weapon 
sub-category such as “Explosives / Bombs / Dynamite” (Means V4 cat 6) or 
“Nuclear” (Means V4 cat 4) seems more plausible that a Weapon sub-category 
such as “Hands, feet, fists” (Means V4 cat 9, Subcat v). 
 
J: Successful incident  
We observed that the J48 decision tree of the variable Weapon sub-category 
considers the variable Successful incident. However, we are not able to explain this 
decision, nor the correlation between these variables.  
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The accuracy percentages of the J48 decision tree that were generated by the 
three experiments, indicate that applying the J48 classifier to the ESP PANDORA II 
enhances the ability of the ESC12 scenario model considerably. Moreover, the 
results of the experiments indicate (i) that the variables of the ESP PANDORA II do 
correlate with each other, and (ii) the classifier J48 decision tree is able to predict 
the value of variables on the basis of other variables.  
 
With respect to the fourth research question of this thesis, we may conclude the 
following.  
1. Data-mining techniques are valuable in the anticipation of criminal 
behaviour. This finding coincides with previous research in this field (cf., 
Brown, 1998; Chen et al., 2004; Corcoran et al., 2003; McCue, 2005).  
2. Data-mining techniques, applied to the ESP PANDORA II, can adequately 
assist law-enforcement agencies in anticipating criminal behaviour. 
 
Based on these conclusions, we answer the fourth research by concluding that 
data-mining techniques applied to a scenario model actually enhance the ability of 
law-enforcement agencies to anticipate criminal behaviour. 
 
Additionally, we remark that we would encourage the experiments conducted in 
this chapter to be repeated with other, more elaborate, data-mining algorithms to 
see if the anticipative value of the ESP PANDORA can be enhanced even further.  
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TEN | Conclusions
10
This chapter provides a summary of answers to the four research 
questions. Subsequently, it presents an answer to the problem 
statement, followed by a conclusion. Finally, five directions for 
future research are proposed.
Problems cannot be solved by the same level of 
thinking that created them.
Albert Einstein76
76 Albert Einstein (1879 – 1955), German-born physicist who developed the special and general theories of relativity. Einstein is generally considered the most influential physicist 
of the twentieth century.
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In this chapter we will summarise the answers to the four research questions, the 
problem statement, and formulate the conclusion of our research. Referring to the 
words by Einstein quoted at the beginning of this chapter, we aim to solve our 
“problem” by bringing together three “levels of thinking”: Law enforcement, 
Science, and Art. The extent to which the problem is solved by amalgamating 
these levels of thinking, is the subject of this chapter.  
 
In section 10.1 we provide the announced summary of the answers to the four 
research questions. In section 10.2, we answer the problem statement and 
formulate a research conclusion. Finally, in section 10.3 we recommend five 
directions for future research. 
 
10.1 Answers to the research questions 
In this section we reiterate and summarise the answers to the four research 
questions that were formulated in chapter one. As the flow of the argument in this 
thesis is not completely linear, we have included paragraphs in the discussion that 
indicate on which chapters the answer to the research question is built. 
 
Research question 1 
What does literature on scenario-based anticipation methods offer that is relevant 
for the development of a scenario model by which criminal behaviour can be 
anticipated? 
 
The answer to the first research question is derived from the chapters two and 
three. In fact we synthesised information from two sources:  
1. the theoretical basis for our thesis, as formulated in chapter two; 
2. a literature review conducted in chapter three. 
 
This approach results in a general and a specific conclusion that are relevant with 
respect to research question 1.  
 
General Conclusion 
Based on the literature studied, we conclude that an effective scenario model is 
able to accumulate different historic criminal incidents in a systemised way.  
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Combining the conceptual design with the architectural design, we created a 
blueprint for the activities to be generated by an ESC12 scenario model that allow 
human operators to anticipate future criminal behaviour. 
 
So, we answer RQ2 by specifically concluding that our experimental approach 
indicates that (a) to design an ESC12 scenario model able to anticipate criminal 
behaviour is attainable, and (b) an ESC12 scenario model may be created 
according to an outlined design or blueprint. 
 
Research Question 3  
To what extent can a scenario model be used to analyse historic criminal 
behaviour? 
 
The answer to the third research question is derived from chapter five, six, seven, 
and eight. Here we synthesised information from four sources: 
1. the answer to RQ2 described in chapter five (see also above); 
2. the creation of an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) in chapter six; 
3. a study of the internal structure of the ESC12 in chapter seven; 
4. an analysis of historic criminal behaviour from the ESP PANDORA I in chapter 
eight. 
 
To approach the third research question we created an Experimental Scenario 
Platform (ESP) named ESP PANDORA I. PANDORA I combines the scenario model 
proposed in our answer to RQ3, with a dataset of terrorist incidents. We included 
in the ESP PANDORA I an informative and detailed list of information items about 
incidents of lone-operator terrorism.  
 
For our analysis of historic criminal behaviour, we selected 40 cases of lone-
operator incidents from the PANDORA I dataset that were distributed according to 
the four waves of modern terrorism (cf. Rapoport, 2004). Every wave of modern 
terrorism in our analysis comprised 10 incidents of lone-operator terrorism. 
 
Next, we compared and contrasted the 10 incidents per wave, by analysing the 
communalities and differences between them. In a cross-wave analysis we 
accumulated the results per wave, and effectively brought together the 40 




Based on the literature studied, we further conclude that an effective scenario 
model will (i) store knowledge and experience gained from previous situations, 
that in turn can be used for (ii) detecting and analysing trends and unexpected 
relations. Subsequently, these trends and relations can be extrapolated towards 
the future to (iii) assist in anticipating future incidents. 
  
Research question 2 
To what extent can a scenario model be designed by which criminal behaviour can 
be anticipated? 
 
The answer to the second research question is derived from chapter three, four, 
and five. Here we synthesised information from three sources: 
1. the answer to RQ1 described in chapter three (see also above); 
2. the study of the ESC12 in chapter four; 
3. the design of an ESC12 scenario model proposed in chapter five. 
 
In chapter four we explored the role of the ESC12 and arrived at the general 
conclusion that the ESC12 offer a durable set of components to contribute to (a) 
learning from, (b) adapting to, and (c) the anticipation of criminal behaviour. 
 
In chapter five we advanced on this conclusion and documented the design of a 
novel scenario model that allows human operators to anticipate future criminal 
behaviour. To the best of our knowledge we are the first in attempting to design a 
anticipative scenario model for use in law enforcement.  
 
We continued our research by separating (1) the conceptual design of the scenario 
model from (2) the architectural design. We characterise both parts below. 
1. In the conceptual design of the scenario model we explore the role of the 
ESC12 in a scenario model. 
2. In the architectural design of the scenario model we propose the integration 
of four modules (viz. Data cruncher, Scenario matrix, Controller, and 
Scenario generator) that facilitate six processes (viz. Data pre-processing, 
Data warehousing, Facilitating differentiated output, Generating 
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We note that our research is restricted to the application of rather straightforward 
data-mining algorithms. We assume that the use of more sophisticated data-
mining techniques may further improve the results. In section 10.3 we provide 
recommendations for further research in this direction.  
 
10.2 Answer to the problem statement 
In this section we provide an answer to the problem statement. Our answer is 
based on the flow of the arguments throughout the thesis, and on the responses 
to the four research questions as presented in the previous section. 
 
Problem Statement 
To what extent can a scenario model support law-enforcement agencies in the 
anticipation of criminal behaviour? 
 
In section 3.3 we have stated that an effective scenario model should satisfy three 
conditions: 
1. Offer the possibility to learn from historic criminal behaviour. 
2. Offer the possibility to adapt the chosen strategy on the basis of indicators 
that are found. 
3. Offer the possibility to anticipate (unexpected) future real-world behaviour. 
 
In this thesis we proposed the design for a new and state-of-the-art scenario 
model, built on the ESC12. Subsequently, we related this ESC12 scenario model 
to a law-enforcement context by adding data from historic criminal behaviour and 
measured its effectiveness by assessing the three conditions mentioned above. It 
resulted in a tri-partite answer to the problem statement. 
 
First, we described and showed that the ESC12 scenario model can successfully, 
i.e., to a large extent, be used to analyse and learn from historic criminal 
behaviour, by detecting general characteristics in the behaviour of lone operators.  
 
Second, we described and showed that the ESC12 scenario model can be used 
rather successfully to adapt to developing criminal behaviour, and change the 
strategy on the basis of the indicators that are found, by testing its ability to 




trend of lone-operator behaviour over the years. In particular, we were interested 
in the predictive power of the trend analysis. 
 
From the results obtained, we may conclude that a scenario model based on the 
ESC12, that accumulates different historic criminal incidents in a systemised way, 
allows (a) contrasting and comparison of idiosyncratic and seemingly unrelated 
incidents, and (2) provides an opportunity to analyse historic criminal behaviour in 
general by transcending the level of individual incidents.  
 
Research Question 4  
To what extent are data-mining techniques applied to a scenario model able to 
enhance the ability of law enforcements agencies to anticipate criminal behaviour? 
 
The answer to the fourth research question is derived from chapter five, six, seven, 
and nine. Here we synthesised information from four sources: 
1. the answer to RQ2 described in chapter five (see also above); 
2. the creation of an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) in chapter six; 
3. a study of the internal structure of the ESC12 in chapter seven; 
4. an study of the application of data-mining tools to the ESP PANDORA II in 
chapter nine. 
 
To address the fourth research question we created a new ESP, named PANDORA II. 
PANDORA II combines the scenario model proposed in our answer to RQ3, with a 
dataset that includes general data of 53,289 terrorist incidents.  
 
To approach the fourth research question we conducted three experiments in 
which we applied data-mining techniques to the ESP PANDORA II. The experiments 
were designed to represent three different situations in which law-enforcement 
agencies are required to act.  
The results of our experiments indicate that data-mining techniques enhance the 
ability of the ESC12 scenario model to anticipate criminal behaviour considerably.  
 
From the results, we may conclude that (a) data-mining techniques are valuable in 
the anticipation of criminal behaviour, and (b) data-mining techniques applied to 
the ESP PANDORA II adequately assist law-enforcement agencies in anticipating 
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2: Investigate more elaborate data-mining techniques 
Our research demonstrated that the application of data-mining algorithms to the 
ESC12 scenario model enhances the anticipative quality of the model. In our 
experiments we used the J48 decision tree, which is a fairly straightforward 
algorithm. We expect that the application of more elaborate data-mining 
algorithms such as Support Vector Machines (SVM’s) might render surpassing 
results. So an obvious suggestion for further research is to investigate to what 
extend other data-mining tools would enhance the anticipative value of the 
scenario model. 
 
3: Apply Case-based Reasoning on the ESC12 scenario model 
Advancing on the second suggestion for further research is the application of 
Case-based Reasoning (CBR). In chapter one we referred to research that 
indicated that CBR might be able to enhance the anticipative powers of the ESC12 
scenario model (see Spronck, 2010). In CBR information from historical situations is 
stored as “cases” in a database. When a new situation arises, CBR can search for 
historical cases with similar characteristics and suggest the best possible approach 
associated with a particular set of conditions. While there might be an obvious 
relation between the design of the ESC12 scenario model and the process of CBR, 
we did not include CBR in our research. Therefore, an interesting direction for 
future research would be to apply CBR on the ESC12 scenario model and to assess 
the effect on he anticipative capabilities of the model. 
 
4: Investigate relation between actual incidents and works of fiction 
In the previous chapters we argued that there is a strong analogy between a 
theatrical performance and a terrorist act. Moreover, we argued that the ESC12 
effectively represent the elements that make up works of fiction, as well as the 
elements that make up a terrorist act. However, in testing the ESC12 scenario 
model, we exclusively directed our attention at terrorist incidents that actually did 
take place. Because the ESC12 scenario model provides the opportunity to add 
creative narratives to the scenario model, it would be interesting to investigate the 
relation between works of fiction and actual terrorist incidents. To elaborate on this 
direction for research, and to suggest a foundation for future studies, we added an 




Third, we described and showed that the ESC12 scenario model can successfully, 
i.e., to a large extent, be used to anticipate future criminal behaviour, by testing its 
anticipative potential.  
 
From the results described above, we may conclude that the ESC12 scenario 
model successfully can support law-enforcement agencies in the anticipation of 
criminal behaviour. 
 
10.3 Future research  
The research presented in this thesis is complex, and simultaneously promising. By 
attempting to design a scenario model able to anticipate criminal behaviour, we 
entered “uncharted territory”. The exploration of this territory presented us with 
many challenging views and appealing new avenues of investigation. 
Notwithstanding the fact that our exploration was fascinating, it required us to stay 
close to the scope of our research, and to navigate carefully. In this process we 
inevitably had to discard tempting avenues and promising areas of investigation 
Apparently, we left them for future research. Below we propose five 
recommendations for future research.  
 
1: Enhance the infrastructure 
In our research we determined that the ESC12 offer an effective and durable set of 
components to describe, characterise and model criminal behaviour. However, we 
also argued that the ESC12 represent categories that are too broad to capture all 
relevant details of criminal behaviour. So, we studied the internal structure of the 
ESC12 and proposed to subdivide the scenario components in 98 variables. While 
we did not find information related to criminal behaviour that could not be 
attached to one of the 98 variables, we expect that the internal structure of the 
ESC12 as proposed, might require modification when more data is attached to the 
ESC12 scenario model. So, possible future research in this direction is to 
investigate whether the internal structure of the ESC12 can be enhanced in such a 
way that it can accommodate all the relevant data related to criminal behaviour. 
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5: Investigate the use of the ESC12 scenario model in other contexts 
As a final recommendation for further research, we would like to encourage the 
investigation of the use of an ESC12 scenario model in other than law enforcement 
contexts. Obviously, as the title of this thesis indicates, we focused our attention on 
a scenario model by which criminal behaviour may be anticipated. Yet, based on 
the experience gained during our research, we expect that an ESC12 scenario 




5: Investigate the use of the ESC12 scenario model in other contexts 
As a final recommendation for further research, we would like to encourage the 
investigation of the use of an ESC12 scenario model in other than law enforcement 
contexts. Obviously, as the title of this thesis indicates, we focused our attention on 
a scenario model by which criminal behaviour may be anticipated. Yet, based on 
the experience gained during our research, we expect that an ESC12 scenario 
model might be applicable in other fields such as fraud detection. 
  
ELEVEN | Deleted scenes
11
In “Deleted scenes” we take a sneak preview of the future of the ESC12 
scenario model by investigating to what extent text-mining techniques 
are able to extract automatically values for the ESC12 variables from 
creative narratives. 
I knew a girl at school called Pandora… 
…never got to see her box, though.
Notting Hill, (1999)77
77 Notting Hill (1999) is a romantic comedy directed by Roger Michell. Notting Hill; The ultimate edition was released in 2001 and included six deleted scenes that were omitted 
from the feature film.
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It is a common tradition in film production to eliminate scenes that are 
perceived to have an adverse effect on the flow of the narrative. “Deleted 
scenes” refers to the footage that was recorded during a film production, but was 
omitted from the final version of the film in the process of editing. Occasionally, 
deleted scenes are made available as a bonus feature during the commercial 
release of a motion picture. While these scenes did not fit the flow of the narrative, 
they are believed to offer a valuable addition to the subject of the film.  
 
In accordance with the tradition of appending deleted scenes to a film release, we 
have added an extra chapter to this book. In Deleted scenes we conduct a 
preliminary investigation into two claims that did not seem to fit the flow of the 
narrative, yet are believed to offer a valuable addition to the subject of our 
research.  
 
As we argued in the previous chapters, there seems to be a strong analogy 
between a theatrical performance and a terrorist act (see section 4.1). The fact that 
(a) the ESC12 scenario model is rooted in the creative industry, and (b) there is an 
apparent relation between terroristic and creative narratives, provides us with the 
opportunity to add creative narratives to the ESC12 scenario model. During our 
research, this notion led to the following two claims. 
Claim 1: Combining data from terrorist incidents with data from works of 
fiction would enhance the potential of the ESC12 scenario model. 
Claim 2: Text-mining techniques would enable the automatic extraction of 
potential values for the ESC12 variables from works of fiction78. 
 
While the abovementioned claims appeared thought provoking and appealing, we 
decided to exclude them from the Ph.D. research. As we assumed, they would 
open avenues of investigation that would exceed the scientific objective of our 
study (see section 1.2). However, as a suggestion for future research and a 
foundation for further study, we decided to add a chapter to the thesis. “Deleted 
scenes” in our opinion, presents a valuable perspective on the future of the ESC12 
scenario model.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 We regard as work of fiction any work that deals, in part or in fulll, with information or events that are 
not real but rather imaginary and theoretical; that is, invented by an author. 
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Kaczynski read The Secret Agent in his hideout in Montana, and copied the mind-
set and lifestyle of the professor. He created home-made explosives and directed 
his bombing campaign against people involved with scientific progress. 
Additionally, Kaczynski used the name “Conrad” as an alias on various occasions 
(cf. Houen, 2002; De Graaff, 2007). 
 
2: Black Abductor  
In 1972 the novel Black Abductor was published, in which a left wing revolutionary 
group kidnaps a student named Patricia Prescott, daughter of an influential 
politician (Ellenberg, 1974). The group decides to “brainwash” Patricia until she 
becomes one of their own.  
 
Two years after publication of the novel, the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), a 
left wing revolutionary group, kidnaps a student named Patricia Hearst, daughter of 
an influential media magnate. Hearst was held captive for eighteen months and 
later claimed to have been “brainwashed” up until the point that she adopted the 
views of her captors. Hearst even collaborated with the SLA in a bank robbery. 
While the FBI mentioned the numerous similarities between the book and the 
kidnapping, they did not deliver definitive evidence for a link between the novel 
and the modus operandi of the SLA (cf. De Graaff, 2007). 
 
3: The Turner Diaries  
When Timothy McVeigh (also known as “the Oklahoma city bomber”) was arrested, 
police found a page of The Turner Diaries in the trunk of his car, a novel written by 
William Pierce; leader of the neo-nazist National Alliance. McVeigh read the book 
numerous times and sold it at gun shows throughout the US (Reilly 1998). McVeigh 
copied the concept of “leaderless resistance” from the writings of Pierce, and 
embraced the ambition to create a revolt against “the tyrannical federal 
government” that was described in the novel. In concurrence with the Turner 
Diaries, McVeigh directed his attack at a federal building. Moreover, copying the 
modus operandi described by Pierce, he used an explosive mix of 5,000 pounds of 





To investigate to what extent combining data from terrorist incidents with data 
from works of fiction would enhance the potential of the ESC12 scenario model, 
we will elaborate on the nexus between terroristic and creative narratives that we 
discovered during our research in section 11.1. In section 11.2 we will investigate 
to what extent text-mining techniques enable the automatic extraction of values 
for the ESC12 variables from works of fiction. Section 11.3 summarises the results 
of our text-mining experiment, and section 11.4 concludes this chapter with a 
chapter summary. 
 
11.1 The nexus between terrorist and creative 
narratives 
To stimulate further investigation of claim 1 [Combining data from terrorist 
incidents with data from works of fiction would enhance the potential of the ESC12 
scenario model], we will elaborate on the nexus between terroristic and creative 
narratives, that was discovered during our research. 
 
In our study of the potential of an anticipative scenario model, we found several 
examples of terrorist incidents that carried a strong resemblance with works of 
fiction. To emphasise the nexus between terroristic and creative narratives, and to 
illustrate the potential of augmenting the ESC12 scenario model with data from 
creative narratives we will (a) draw on other relevant scientific studies, and (b) 
demonstrate the nexus by three examples below. 
 
In Something in the air; terrorism as art, De Graaff (2007) states that both terrorists 
and artists use a narrative; a central storyline that defines the behaviour of the 
individuals involved. Moreover, De Graaff presents a number of examples in which 
terrorists followed the creative narrative quite literally. We will briefly summarise 
three of these examples below.  
 
1: The Secret Agent  
Theodore Kaczynski also known as the Unabomber, strongly identified himself with 
“the professor” a fictional character from the novel The Secret Agent, written by 
Joseph Conrad (Jackson, 1996). The professor rejects the academic world and 
decides to live in reclusion. From his hideout he aims to target the scientific 
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To investigate to what extent combining data from terrorist incidents with data 
from works of fiction would enhance the potential of the ESC12 scenario model, 
we will elaborate on the nexus between terroristic and creative narratives that we 
discovered during our research in section 11.1. In section 11.2 we will investigate 
to what extent text-mining techniques enable the automatic extraction of values 
for the ESC12 variables from works of fiction. Section 11.3 summarises the results 
of our text-mining experiment, and section 11.4 concludes this chapter with a 
chapter summary. 
 
11.1 The nexus between terrorist and creative 
narratives 
To stimulate further investigation of claim 1 [Combining data from terrorist 
incidents with data from works of fiction would enhance the potential of the ESC12 
scenario model], we will elaborate on the nexus between terroristic and creative 
narratives, that was discovered during our research. 
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examples of terrorist incidents that carried a strong resemblance with works of 
fiction. To emphasise the nexus between terroristic and creative narratives, and to 
illustrate the potential of augmenting the ESC12 scenario model with data from 
creative narratives we will (a) draw on other relevant scientific studies, and (b) 
demonstrate the nexus by three examples below. 
 
In Something in the air; terrorism as art, De Graaff (2007) states that both terrorists 
and artists use a narrative; a central storyline that defines the behaviour of the 
individuals involved. Moreover, De Graaff presents a number of examples in which 
terrorists followed the creative narrative quite literally. We will briefly summarise 
three of these examples below.  
 
1: The Secret Agent  
Theodore Kaczynski also known as the Unabomber, strongly identified himself with 
“the professor” a fictional character from the novel The Secret Agent, written by 
Joseph Conrad (Jackson, 1996). The professor rejects the academic world and 
decides to live in reclusion. From his hideout he aims to target the scientific 




and compared with actual terrorist incidents present in the PANDORA II database. 
This comparison yielded evidence that writers have been inspired by terrorist 
attacks, but also that a terrorist was inspired by one of the novels in the test set. 
Von Bannisseht noted that for the novel 3rd degree the program retrieved three 
results: (1) the Hariri case (2005), (2) the Hamadeh case (2004), and (3) the US 
embassy case (1983). Because of the strong correlation between the ESC12 (and its 
variables) in the novel, and the Hamadeh case, Von Bannisseht concludes that it is 
definitely possible that the protagonist of the Hamadeh case was inspired by the 
book 3rd degree (The novel was published in March 2004; Hamadeh was 
assassinated in October of that same year.)83. Von Bannisseht completes her thesis 
by noting that the ESP PANDORA II will be enhanced by implementing fictional 
literature to the dataset, especially when the structure of fictional art is analysed 
and when this knowledge is used by a text-mining professional (Von Bannisseht, 
2014). 
 
As the abovementioned studies and examples suggest, the comparison of creative 
narratives with terroristic narratives provide for a better and more efficient 
understanding of criminal behaviour. Therefore, we postulate that combining data 
from terrorist incidents with data from works of fiction would enhance the potential 
of the ESC12 scenario model.  
 
11.2 Experimental setup  
The notion that data from works of fiction would enhance the potential of the 
ESC12 scenario model, led us to investigate claim 2 of this chapter [Text-mining 
techniques would enable the automatic extraction of the ESC12 variables from 
works of fiction] by conducting a text-mining experiment. First, we will provide a 
brief introduction into text mining. Second, we will elaborate on the dataset that 
was used for the experiment. Third, we will focus on the rules that were created to 
extract the ESC12 from the dataset by means of text mining. 
 
Text mining 
Text mining refers to the process of extracting meaning from texts and 
transforming the content of unstructured text into structured data that can be 
standardised, matched upon, and integrated into a database (Scholtes, 2012). 
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Based on the aforementioned examples, De Graaff (2007) contemplates that, 
“fortunately or unfortunately, art has often led the way to reality”79. Moreover, he 
states that every terrorist organisation creates its own narrative: “One of the 
greatest achievements of Al Qaeda is the creation of the narrative of oppression of 
the Islamic community, which will eventually lead to a resurrection of the Khalifat” 
Moreover, De Graaff concludes that the “the narrative of art” may be well used to 
anticipate “the narrative of terrorism”. 
 
In a TED80 talk, McCue (2012) advances on the notion of “terrorism narrative” in 
which he compares Al Qaeda to a commercial brand: “Al Qaeda was essentially a 
product on a shelf in a souk somewhere, which not many people had heard 
of. Nine-eleven launched it -that was its’ big marketing day- and it was packaged 
for the 21st century. […] They [Al Qaeda] were effectively creating a brand which 
can be franchised around the world.” McCue advances to suggest a counter 
terrorism strategy based on weakening the credibility of the brand, and eradicating 
the narrative of terrorism with a counter narrative81.  
 
In Naratives and home-grown Jihadist terrorism, Overheul (2014) investigated (a) 
the value of narratives in countering home-grown Jihadist terrorism, and (b) the 
potential of the ESC12 scenario model in anticipating the narrative of potential 
terrorists. Overheul completes his study by stating that (a) terrorism can be 
countered more effectively and efficiently by focussing on the narrative of 
terrorists, and (b) utilising the narratives (from sources such as works of fiction) that 
are used by terrorists, would enhance the potential of the ESC12 scenario model 
(Overheul, 2014).  
 
In Integrating fictional art into Pandora II, Von Bannisseht (2014) investigated to 
what extent the ESP PANDORA II may be expanded with fictional art. To this avail she 
conducted an experiment in which 10 disparate works of fiction82 were analysed 
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81 McCue does not use the word “narrative” in his talk, but suggests to use the “stories” of the victims of a 
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82The books that were included in the experiments are: (1) The Janson directive, (2) Gone tomorrow, (3) Teeth 
of the tiger, (4) Transfer of power, (5) Executive power, (6) Sum of all fears, (7) The afghan, (8) 3rd degree, (9) 
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For the text-mining experiment, we created a dataset in which we used thirteen 
works of fiction that were written by Frederick Forsyth. The novels included in the 
experiment are shown in alphabetical order in Table 11.1.  
	  
 Title Year of Publishing 
   
1 Avenger 2003 
2 Day of the Jackal 1971 
3 Icon 1996 
4 The Afghan 2006 
5 The Cobra 2010 
6 The Deceiver 1991 
7 The Devil's Alternative 1979 
8 The Dogs of War 1974 
9 The Fist of God 1994 
10 The Fourth Protocol  1984 
11 The Negotiator 1989 
12 The Odessa File 1972 
13 The Shepherd 1975 
 
Table 11.1 Thirteen novels that were used for the text-mining experiment. 
 
Rules 
In order to extract the values of the ESC12 variables from the novels by means of 
text mining, we applied text-mining rules to the thirteen novels listed in table 11.1. 
First, we retrieved the values of the ESC12 variables from the novels using rule-
based extraction. Next, we saved the results to a CSV-file (comma separated 
value), which was exported into Microsoft Excel. Finally, fairly straightforward 
statistical analysis tools were used to classify and rank the results.  
 
For reasons of brevity we will limit our discussion to the rules that were created for 
the Elementary Scenario Components Arena, Timeframe, Context, Antagonist, 
Means, and Resistance. Moreover, because the mere emphasis of this chapter lies 
on assessing the potential of text mining, we will only briefly discuss the rules we 
created. For a more elaborate discussion of these rules, we refer to Integrating 





Instead of recognising individual words, text mining deals with detecting linguistic 
or statistical word patterns. Information can be retrieved from text files such as 
books, e-mails, or writings, but also by using additional tools that assign text to 
multimedia formats such as audio, video files, and photos. One of the approaches 
to retrieve information from texts is rule-based extraction. A rule instructs a text-
mining program what results to deliver. For our experiment we used the text-
mining tool ZyLAB Professional Text Mining84 that allowed us to create rules, and 
to test those rules on text files.  
 
In text mining, recall and precision are two important measures by which search 
strategies may be evaluated (Scholtes, 2014).  
• Recall refers to the ratio of the number of relevant records retrieved, to the 
total number of relevant records in the database.  
• Precision refers to the ratio of the number of relevant records retrieved, to 
the total number of irrelevant and relevant records retrieved.  
 
Both recall and precision are usually expressed as a percentage85. 
 
With our experimental setup we conducted a preliminary test of claim 1 that text-
mining techniques may enable the automatic extraction of the ESC12 variables 
from works of fiction. In our investigation we expect that, while the computer may 
automatically retrieve the value of a number of candidate values for ESC12 
variables (recall), the end user may need to assess the values of the presented 
variables (and, in doing so, enhance the precision).  
 
Dataset  
In the setup of our experiment we took into consideration that, because of their 
unstructured nature, fictional texts are much harder to mine than (less-unstructured) 
police reports (Scholtes, 2014). Moreover, we accepted the fact that the ESC12 
include components such as Context and Motivation that may be hard to detect 
because of the nature of fictional texts. 
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contains ten protagonists and some antagonists. If six of the identifications are correct, but two are actually 
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Figure 11.3 Text-mining rules created for the ESC Timeframe. 
 
Context  
For the Elementary Scenario Component Context, we created rules based on four 
repositories of words (viz. Economic, Personal, Political, and Religious). By creating 
word repositories, we intended to detect information about the context of a story. 
For example, words that are assigned to the repository “Political” are parliament, 
party, freedom, politics etc. In contrast, words assigned to the repository 
“Personal”, are family, brother, fiancé etc. The rules we designed, establish that 
the repository that is most dominant in the novel, determines the context of a 
terrorist incident. Figure 11.4 is a visualisation of the rules that were created for the 









For the Elementary Scenario Component Arena, we created two separate rules. 
The first rule was created for a basic extraction of all locations from a text. The 
second rule aims to extract only locations when they are linguistically positioned in 
the vicinity of words indicating an incident. This rule extracts the entire sentence in 
which such occurrences take place. Figure 11.2 is a visualisation of the rules that 






Figure 11.2 Text-mining rules created for the ESC Arena. 
 
Timeframe  
To retrieve variables related to the Elementary Scenario Component Timeframe, 
we created rules related that aim to extract: (1) Date, (2) Day of the week, (3) 
Month, (4) Holiday, (5) Year, (6) Time period, and (7) Time. Figure 11.3 is a 
visualisation of the rule that was created for the Elementary Scenario Component 
Timeframe. The rule aims at a basic entity extraction of all temporal and time 
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Related to the Elementary Scenario Component Means we created one individual 
rule per weapon type value. We aim to extract incidents from a text where a 
specific weapon type  (see figures below) is linguistically connected to a verb. 
Figure 11.6 is a visualisation of the rules that were created for the Elementary 





















Figure 11.4 Text-mining rules created for the ESC Context. 
 
Antagonist 
To extract information of the Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist, we 
created rather complex text-mining rules.  The rules aim to detect a linguistic 
combination of active verb forms of incident related words, with a person or 
organisation within the same sentence. Figure 11.5 is a visualisation of the rules 
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Figure 11.4 Text-mining rules created for the ESC Context. 
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The text-mining rules that were generated with respect to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Arena produced a sum total of 18,991 results out of the thirteen 
novels represented in the dataset. With respect to the story of Day of the Jackal, 
the rules presented 972 results. These results contained continents (i.e., “Africa”), 
countries (i.e., “Algiers”), addresses (i.e., “11 Rue des Saussaies”), and other 
location indicators (i.e., “Route Nationale Seven”). In figure 11.8 we have plotted 
the countries (viz. France, Algeria, Brittain, and Scotland86) and cities (Viz. Paris, 
London, Rome, Brussels, Marseille, Rennes, Copenhagen, and Milan) that play a 
prominent role in Day of the Jackal, on a map of Europe. (The size of the circles 
reflects the number of times a location is mentioned in the novel.) 
 
 
Figure 11.8 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Arena. 
 
Analysis of the results for the Elementary scenario component Arena leads us to 
conclude that text mining indicates the main arena of Day of the Jackal to be 
France, and Paris in particular. Additionally, a significant link is suggested to 
Algeria, the United Kingdom (particularly to London) and Italy (particularly to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




With respect to the Elementary Scenario Component Resistance, we created a 
broad rule to look for sentences with any of the words specified, in any form.	  
Figure 11.7 is a visualisation of the rules that were created for the Elementary 




Figure 11.7 Text-mining rules created for the ESC Resistance. 
 
11.3 Results of the experiment 
Below we will present the results of the text-mining rules that were applied on the 
thirteen novels written by Frederick Forsyth. As this chapter aims to give an insight 
into the possibilities of text-mining techniques in the automatic extraction of the 
ESC12 variables, we will discuss different aspects of the obtained results. We will 
focus on qualitative as well as on quantitative results. Moreover, we will discuss 
general results that were obtained by applying the rules on all the thirteen novels, 
as well as concentrate on the results obtained from one specific novel.  
 
As we assumed, Day of the Jackal is the most well known novel by Forsyth. So, 
when we specify our discussion to the results related to one individual novel, we 
refer to Day of the Jackal. For the reader’s convenience, we added a summary of 
this novel as appendix E. 
 
Below we will discuss results that were retrieved for the Elementary Scenario 
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novels represented in the dataset. With respect to the story of Day of the Jackal, 
the rules presented 972 results. These results contained continents (i.e., “Africa”), 
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Figure 11.8 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Arena. 
 
Analysis of the results for the Elementary scenario component Arena leads us to 
conclude that text mining indicates the main arena of Day of the Jackal to be 
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With respect to the Elementary Scenario Component Resistance, we created a 
broad rule to look for sentences with any of the words specified, in any form.	  
Figure 11.7 is a visualisation of the rules that were created for the Elementary 




Figure 11.7 Text-mining rules created for the ESC Resistance. 
 
11.3 Results of the experiment 
Below we will present the results of the text-mining rules that were applied on the 
thirteen novels written by Frederick Forsyth. As this chapter aims to give an insight 
into the possibilities of text-mining techniques in the automatic extraction of the 
ESC12 variables, we will discuss different aspects of the obtained results. We will 
focus on qualitative as well as on quantitative results. Moreover, we will discuss 
general results that were obtained by applying the rules on all the thirteen novels, 
as well as concentrate on the results obtained from one specific novel.  
 
As we assumed, Day of the Jackal is the most well known novel by Forsyth. So, 
when we specify our discussion to the results related to one individual novel, we 
refer to Day of the Jackal. For the reader’s convenience, we added a summary of 
this novel as appendix E. 
 
Below we will discuss results that were retrieved for the Elementary Scenario 






The text-mining rules that were generated with respect to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Context returned a sum total of 6,728 results related to four types of 
contexts (viz. Economic, Personal, Political, and Religious). Because different 
contexts may play a role in a specific novel, we have marked the type of context 
with the highest appearance per title. Table 11.11 lists the results for the 
Elementary Scenario Component Context. 
 
 Economic	   Personal	   Political	   Religious	   Grand	  Total	  
Avenger 73	   116	   162	   45	   396	  
Day of the Jackal 93	   48	   306	   17	   464	  
Icon 121	   196	   409	   55	   781	  
The Afghan 79	   101	   145	   159	   484	  
The Cobra 101	   72	   149	   27	   349	  
The Deceiver 69	   110	   251	   44	   474	  
The Devil's Alternative 71	   66	   559	   33	   729	  
The Dogs of War 376	   49	   220	   21	   666	  
The Fist of God 119	   184	   435	   91	   829	  
The Fourth Protocol 59	   100	   375	   27	   561	  
The Negotiator 129	   67	   347	   102	   645	  
The Odessa File 71	   74	   159	   26	   330	  
The Shepherd	   3	   4	   9	   4	   20	  
Total	   1,364	   1,187	   3,526	   651	   6,728	  
 
Table 11.11 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Context. 
 
Analysis of the text-mining results depicted in table 11.11, leads us to conclude 
that the context of Day of the Jackal seems to be political. 
 
Antagonist 
For the Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist, the text-mining rules 
generated a total number of 2,226 qualitative results. To illustrate the nature of 
these results, we illustrate three pieces of texts that were retrieved from the novel 
Day of the Jackal. 
 
• “... he (Rodin) will not even enter into operation until he (Rodin) has devised a plan that will enable 
him (Rodin) not only to complete the mission, but to escape unharmed. 'Do you estimate that such a 
plan could be worked out to permit a professional to kill …” 
 
• “... assassinate him (Charles de Gaulle) …” 
 
• “… he (Lebel) must have one qualification that marks him (Lebel) out... he (Lebel) would have to be 




Rome). To a lesser extent Brussels and Copenhagen seem to play a role in the 
novel Day of the Jackal. 
 
Timeframe 
For the Elementary Scenario Component Timeframe the text-mining rules retrieved 
total of 8,157 results out of the thirteen novels represented in the dataset. These 
results contained dates, days of the week, months, holidays, years, time periods, 
and times. For the novel Day of the Jackal 1,175 results were presented. Figure 
11.9 lists the individual years that were mentioned in the novel, while figure 11.10 
lists the different dates within a year. (The # symbol signifies the number of times 
the year / date was mentioned in the novel.) 
	  
Year #  Year #  Year #  Year # 
1961 16  1944 3  1931 1  1953 1 
1963 12  1929 2  1937 1  1955 1 
1960 10  1956 2  1942 1  1957 1 
1962 4  1958 2  1945 1  1964 1 
1940 3  1959 2  1946 1  1968 1 
 
Table 11.9 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Arena 
 
 
Date #  Date #  Date #  Date # 
August 23  July 18th 2  March 8th 1  August 5th 1 
July 16  July 29th 2  March 11th 1  August 14th 1 
January 12  August 12th 2  March 11th, 1963 1  August 16th 1 
Monday 10  August 22nd 2  April 21st 1  August 20th 1 
June 9  August 15th 2  June 12th 1  August 21st 1 
April 6  August 22nd, 1962 2  June 18th 1  August 23rd 1 
December 5  August 11th 2  June 18th, 1940 1  August 24th 1 
February 5  August 25th, 1963 2  July first 1  September 3rd 1 
August 1st 4  August 13th 2  July 1st 1  November 8th 1 
June 15th 3  January 14th 1  July 17th 1  November 8th, 1931 1 
July 14th 3  January 14th, 1963 1  July 28th 1  November 1 
July 22nd 3  February 14th 1  July 30th 1  09-12-63 1 
April 3rd, 1929 2  February 22nd 1  July 31 1  10-12-60 1 
June 30th 2  February 25th 1  July 31st 1  August 5th 1 
July 7th 2  March 4th 1  August 4th 1  August 14th 1 
 
Table 11.10 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Timeframe. 
 
Analysis of the aforementioned text-mining results, leads us to conclude that the 
timeframe of Day of the Jackal seems to be 1960 – 1963, whereas August 
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The text-mining rules that were generated with respect to the Elementary Scenario 
Component Means returned a sum total of 2,700 results related to four types of 
contexts (viz. Explosive, Firearms, Incendiary Melee and Nuclear). Table 11.13 
illustrates these results. 
	  
 Explosive	   Firearms	   Incendiary	   Melee	   Nuclear	   Grand	  Total	  
Avenger 22	   45	   	   8	   12	   132	  
Day of the Jackal 11	   192	   2	   1	   	   398	  
Icon 17	   64	   3	   1	   9	   158	  
The Afghan 38	   55	   2	   2	   4	   156	  
The Cobra 13	   28	   4	   	   	   73	  
The Deceiver 34	   107	   	   3	   2	   253	  
The Devil's Alternative 20	   134	   	   1	   26	   315	  
The Dogs of War 74	   115	   	   	   1	   305	  
The Fist of God 135	   108	   4	   3	   82	   440	  
The Fourth Protocol 30	   25	   	   	   57	   137	  
The Negotiator 26	   89	   	   1	   11	   216	  
The Odessa File 31	   41	   1	   	   2	   116	  
The Shepherd	   1	   	   	   	   	   1	  
Total	   452	   1,003	   16	   20	   206	   2,700	  
 
Table 11.13 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Means. 
 
With respect to the novel Day of the Jackal we may conclude that analysis of the 
text-mining results indicate that the weapons used most frequently, are related to 
the category “firearms”.   
 
Resistance 
For the Elementary Scenario Component Resistance we generated qualitative 
results. From the thirteen novels written by Frederick Forsyth, 898 instances were 
retrieved that are related to security measures. For the novel Day of the Jackal, the 
text-mining rules returned 99 instances. To illustrate these results, we will list the 
first 15 instances (related to security measures) that were retrieved for the novel 
Day of the Jackal in table 11.14. 
	   	  
 
 310 
The text-mining rules that we created, occasionally returned results that, by no 
means, relate to the Elementary Scenario Component Antagonist. Below we will 
reproduce one of such results, retrieved from the novel Day of the Jackal. 
 
• “… she (MADAME LA BARONNE DE LA CHALONNIERE) could pass for five years younger, and 
sometimes felt ten years less than her age, the knowledge that her son was twenty and probably 
screwing his own women by now, no more to come home for the school holidays and go shooting …” 
 
Quantifying the results that were retrieved from the novel Day of the Jackal leads 
to a list of 27 antagonists87,88 that the protagonist of the story must confront.  
 
Antagonist Number of appearances  Antagonist Number of appearances 
Lebel 37 	   Argoud 3 
Marc Rodin 19 	   Bastien -Thiry 3 
Charles de Gaulle 18 	   John F. Kennedy 3 
Viktor Kowalski 10 	   Kovacs 3 
Duggan 7 	   “the bugger” 3 
Trujillo 7 	   the General 2 
Calthrop 6 	   Jean Paul Sartre 2 
Monson 6 	   Grand Zohra 2 
Francois 5 	   the Belgian 2 
Marroux 5 	   M. Roger Frey 2 
Rolland 5 	   Raoul Saint-Clair 2 
Brittany 4 	   Dr Mathieu 2 
Bouvier 4 	     
Jean-Claude Dumas 4 	   OTHER 21 
Ministre 4 	   GRAND TOTAL 191 
 
Table 11.12 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Antagonist. 
 
With respect to the novel Day of the Jackal we may conclude that analysis of the 
text-mining results suggests that the three main antagonists of Day of the Jackal 
are respectively: “Lebel”, “Marc Rodin” and “Charles de Gaulle”.   
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Because of the literary style of the novel Day of the Jackal, it is quite possible that an antagonist appears 
twice in table 11.12. For instance, “the bugger” may refer to one of the other antagonist mentioned in the 
table. Additionally, “the general” may refer to Charles de Gaulle. 
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11.4 Chapter summary  
In this chapter Deletes scenes, we provided a sneak preview of the possible future 
of the ESC12 scenario model, by addressing two claims that originated in our 
research, but did not directly relate to our scientific objective.  
 
First, we addressed claim 1 [A combination of data from terrorist incidents and 
works of fiction would enhance the potential of the ESC12 scenario model]. To 
assess the value of this claim, we investigated the nexus between terroristic and 
creative narratives. We provided three examples of terrorist incidents that carried a 
strong resemblance with works of fiction. Moreover, we accumulated information 
from our research, with that of related scientific studies. Based on this preliminary 
assessment, we observe that claim 1 has a high degree of validity, and 
recommend it for further investigation. 
 
Second, we addressed the claim 2 [Text-mining techniques would enable the 
automatic extraction of the ESC12 variables from works of fiction]. To assess the 
value of this claim, we set up a fairly straightforward experiment in which we 
applied text-mining techniques onto thirteen novels that were written by Frederick 
Forsyth. Based on the rules designed, we may conclude that text-mining 
techniques seem to allow for automatic extraction of the values of the ESC12 
variables. Given the fact that (a) the recall of our text-mining algorithms may be 
improved by more elaborate rules, and (b) the precision of the results may be 
enhanced by experts in the field of law enforcement and information extraction, 
we believe that claim 2 has a high degree of validity, and recommend it for further 
examination. 
 
Building on our preliminary assessment of both claims, we tentatively conclude 
that if (a) data from terrorist incidents and works of fiction enhances the potential 
of the ESC12 scenario model, and (b) text-mining enables the automatic extraction 
of the ESC12 variables from works of fiction, we would be able to increase the 
database of criminal behaviour exponentially.  
 
If we allow ourselves to take a sneak preview of the future of the ESC12 scenario 
model, we imagine that before long: 
• it will be possible to retrieve the values of the ESC12 variables automatically 
from written stories, audio, and video files. This would increase the number 
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1. The security men and guards stiffened in their boxes beside the front gate and the massive iron grilles 
were swung open. 
2. Their son-in-law, Colonel Alain de Boissieu, then Chief of Staff of the armoured and cavalry units of the 
French Army, checked that both rear doors were safely shut, then took his place in the front beside 
Marroux. 
3. Henri d'Jouder, the hulking bodyguard of the day, a Kabyle from Algeria, took the front seat beside the 
driver, eased the heavy revolver under his left armpit, and slumped back. 
4. After a last word to one of the duty security men to be left behind, the second man got into the back 
alone. 
5. He (Henri) was Commissaire Jean Ducret, chief of the presidential Security Corps. 
6. Again the iron grille swung open and the small cortege swept past the ramrod guards into the Faubourg 
St Honor Arriving at the end of the Faubourg St Honore the convoy swept into the Avenue de Marigny. 
7. Only the white of the motor-cycle sirens told traffic cops on duty of the approach of the convoy, and they 
had to wave and whistle frantically to get the traffic stopped in time. 
8. The convoy picked up speed in the tree-darkened avenue and, erupted into the sunlit Place Clemenceau, 
heading straight across towards the Pont Alexandre III. 
9. With the presidential car brought to a stop, the second OAS group would sweep out of a side road to 
blast the security police vehicle at close range. 
10. Bougrenet de la Tocnaye would drive the car to intercept the security police, with Watin the Limp beside 
him (Bougrenet de la) clutching a submachine gun. 
11. As the safety catches flicked off beside the road at Petit-Clamart, General de Gaulle's convoy cleared the 
heavier traffic of central Paris and reached the more open avenues of the suburbs. 
12. The two motor-cycle outriders dropped back to take up station at the rear of the convoy. 
13. In this manner the convoy entered the Avenue de la Division Leclerc at Petit Clamart. 
14. At 8.18 Bastien-Thiry discerned the convoy hurtling down the Avenue de la Liberation towards him (8.18 
Bastien-Thiry) at seventy miles per hour. 
15. They opened up as the convoy came abreast of them, firing with a ninety-degree layoff at a moving target 
passing them at seventy miles per hour. 
 
Table 11.14 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Resistance 
 
If we combine the results of the text-mining rules that were applied to Day of the 
Jackal, we arrive at the conclusion that: 
• The main arena is Paris, France, with a significant link to Algeria and London. 
• The timeframe is 1960 – 1963, in which the month of August (particularly 
between August  20th and 24th) is particularly relevant.  
• The context is political. 
• The three main antagonists of Day of the Jackal are respectively: “Lebel”, 
“Marc Rodin” and “Charles de Gaulle”.   
• The means the protagonist has to execute his plan is primarily a firearm. 
• The protagonist has to overcome 99 defined security measures.  
 
Referring to the summary of the Day of the Jackal provided in appendix E, we note 
that all of the aforementioned conclusions coincide with the text. 
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that if (a) data from terrorist incidents and works of fiction enhances the potential 
of the ESC12 scenario model, and (b) text-mining enables the automatic extraction 
of the ESC12 variables from works of fiction, we would be able to increase the 
database of criminal behaviour exponentially.  
 
If we allow ourselves to take a sneak preview of the future of the ESC12 scenario 
model, we imagine that before long: 
• it will be possible to retrieve the values of the ESC12 variables automatically 
from written stories, audio, and video files. This would increase the number 
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1. The security men and guards stiffened in their boxes beside the front gate and the massive iron grilles 
were swung open. 
2. Their son-in-law, Colonel Alain de Boissieu, then Chief of Staff of the armoured and cavalry units of the 
French Army, checked that both rear doors were safely shut, then took his place in the front beside 
Marroux. 
3. Henri d'Jouder, the hulking bodyguard of the day, a Kabyle from Algeria, took the front seat beside the 
driver, eased the heavy revolver under his left armpit, and slumped back. 
4. After a last word to one of the duty security men to be left behind, the second man got into the back 
alone. 
5. He (Henri) was Commissaire Jean Ducret, chief of the presidential Security Corps. 
6. Again the iron grille swung open and the small cortege swept past the ramrod guards into the Faubourg 
St Honor Arriving at the end of the Faubourg St Honore the convoy swept into the Avenue de Marigny. 
7. Only the white of the motor-cycle sirens told traffic cops on duty of the approach of the convoy, and they 
had to wave and whistle frantically to get the traffic stopped in time. 
8. The convoy picked up speed in the tree-darkened avenue and, erupted into the sunlit Place Clemenceau, 
heading straight across towards the Pont Alexandre III. 
9. With the presidential car brought to a stop, the second OAS group would sweep out of a side road to 
blast the security police vehicle at close range. 
10. Bougrenet de la Tocnaye would drive the car to intercept the security police, with Watin the Limp beside 
him (Bougrenet de la) clutching a submachine gun. 
11. As the safety catches flicked off beside the road at Petit-Clamart, General de Gaulle's convoy cleared the 
heavier traffic of central Paris and reached the more open avenues of the suburbs. 
12. The two motor-cycle outriders dropped back to take up station at the rear of the convoy. 
13. In this manner the convoy entered the Avenue de la Division Leclerc at Petit Clamart. 
14. At 8.18 Bastien-Thiry discerned the convoy hurtling down the Avenue de la Liberation towards him (8.18 
Bastien-Thiry) at seventy miles per hour. 
15. They opened up as the convoy came abreast of them, firing with a ninety-degree layoff at a moving target 
passing them at seventy miles per hour. 
 
Table 11.14 Text-mining results generated for the ESC Resistance 
 
If we combine the results of the text-mining rules that were applied to Day of the 
Jackal, we arrive at the conclusion that: 
• The main arena is Paris, France, with a significant link to Algeria and London. 
• The timeframe is 1960 – 1963, in which the month of August (particularly 
between August  20th and 24th) is particularly relevant.  
• The context is political. 
• The three main antagonists of Day of the Jackal are respectively: “Lebel”, 
“Marc Rodin” and “Charles de Gaulle”.   
• The means the protagonist has to execute his plan is primarily a firearm. 
• The protagonist has to overcome 99 defined security measures.  
 
Referring to the summary of the Day of the Jackal provided in appendix E, we note 
that all of the aforementioned conclusions coincide with the text. 
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of incidents in the database from tens of thousands of terrorist incidents 
that actually did take place, to hundreds of thousands of incidents that have 
ever been recorded.  
• if we are able to retrieve the values of the ESC12 variables from sources 
other that works of literature (sources such as the semantic web or online 
gaming), we will be able to feed the database with millions of incidents that 
have (and will be) created worldwide.  
• if we create new scenarios by combining the individual values of the ESC12 
variables from the incidents accumulated in the database, we will increase 
the incidents significantly.  
 
Based on the information accumulated in this chapter, we provisionally conclude 
that when we start to retrieve values of the ESC12 variables form other sources 
than police databases, we move towards the point at which it would become 
rather hard to think of a criminal act that has neither been executed before, never 
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Canada, Mexico, United States 
2. Central America & Caribbean  
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
3.  South America  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
4.  East Asia  
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan 
5.  Southeast Asia  
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, 
Timor‐Leste, Vietnam 
6.  South Asia  
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka 
7. Central Asia  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
8. Western Europe  
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Corsica, Denmark, East Germany (GDR), Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Great 
Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Man, Isle of, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany (FRG) 
9. Eastern Europe  
Albania, Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia‐Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Yugoslavia 
10. Middle East & North Africa  
Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
Western Sahara, Yemen 
11.  Sub‐Saharan Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea‐Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
12.  Russia & the Newly Independent States (NIS)  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Soviet Union, Ukraine 
13.  Australasia & Oceania  
Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa 




Van den Herik, J. (2007). College dictaat: Ontwikkeling van Kennissytemen. 
Universiteit van Maastricht. 
	  
Van der Heide, L. (2011). Individual Terrorism: Indicators of lone operators. 
Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht. 
	  
Van der Heijden, K. (1996). Scenarios: The art of strategic planning. New York, NY: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Van Koppen, P., Heesing, D., & Crombag, H. (2002). Het recht van binnen: 
Psychologie van het recht. Deventer: Kluwer. Deventer: Kluwer. 
 
Van Lankveld, C. (2013). Quantifying individual player differences. Tilburg: Tilburg 
University. 
 
Van Notten, P. (2006). Scenario development: A typology of approaches. Think 
Scenarios, Rethink education. Retrieved 18-02-2014 from OECD.org 
 
Vanderlooy, S. (2009). Ranking and reliable classification. Tilburg: Tilburg 
University. 
 
Von Bannisseht, M. (2014). Integrating fictional art into Pandora II. Tilburg: Tilburg 
University. 
 
Von Lampe, K. (n.d.). organized-crime. Retrieved 24-06-2012 from Definitions of 
Organized Crime: www.organized-crime.de/yhome03.htm 
 
Weiman, G., & Winn, C. (1994). The theatre of terror: Mass media and 
internetional terrorism. White Plains, NY: Longman. 
 
Weimann, G. (2008). The psychology of mass-mediated terrorism. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 52 (1), 69 - 86. 
 
Witten, I., Frank, E., & Hall, M. (2011). Data mining: Practical machine learning 
tools and techniques. Burlington, MA, USA: Elsevier. 
 
Zollo, M., & Winter, S. (2002). Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic 





Appendix A – List of regions used in PANDORA  
 
1. North America  
Canada, Mexico, United States 
2. Central America & Caribbean  
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Virgin Islands (U.S.) 
3.  South America  
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, 
Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela 
4.  East Asia  
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan 
5.  Southeast Asia  
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, 
Timor‐Leste, Vietnam 
6.  South Asia  
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka 
7. Central Asia  
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
8. Western Europe  
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Corsica, Denmark, East Germany (GDR), Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Great 
Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Man, Isle of, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany (FRG) 
9. Eastern Europe  
Albania, Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia‐Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Yugoslavia 
10. Middle East & North Africa  
Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
Western Sahara, Yemen 
11.  Sub‐Saharan Africa 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea‐Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
12.  Russia & the Newly Independent States (NIS)  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Soviet Union, Ukraine 
13.  Australasia & Oceania  
Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa 




Van den Herik, J. (2007). College dictaat: Ontwikkeling van Kennissytemen. 
Universiteit van Maastricht. 
	  
Van der Heide, L. (2011). Individual Terrorism: Indicators of lone operators. 
Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht. 
	  
Van der Heijden, K. (1996). Scenarios: The art of strategic planning. New York, NY: 
John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Van Koppen, P., Heesing, D., & Crombag, H. (2002). Het recht van binnen: 
Psychologie van het recht. Deventer: Kluwer. Deventer: Kluwer. 
 
Van Lankveld, C. (2013). Quantifying individual player differences. Tilburg: Tilburg 
University. 
 
Van Notten, P. (2006). Scenario development: A typology of approaches. Think 
Scenarios, Rethink education. Retrieved 18-02-2014 from OECD.org 
 
Vanderlooy, S. (2009). Ranking and reliable classification. Tilburg: Tilburg 
University. 
 
Von Bannisseht, M. (2014). Integrating fictional art into Pandora II. Tilburg: Tilburg 
University. 
 
Von Lampe, K. (n.d.). organized-crime. Retrieved 24-06-2012 from Definitions of 
Organized Crime: www.organized-crime.de/yhome03.htm 
 
Weiman, G., & Winn, C. (1994). The theatre of terror: Mass media and 
internetional terrorism. White Plains, NY: Longman. 
 
Weimann, G. (2008). The psychology of mass-mediated terrorism. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 52 (1), 69 - 86. 
 
Witten, I., Frank, E., & Hall, M. (2011). Data mining: Practical machine learning 
tools and techniques. Burlington, MA, USA: Elsevier. 
 
Zollo, M., & Winter, S. (2002). Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic 





Appendix C – List of primary explosives used in 
PANDORA 
 
For reasons of brevity, the list of primary explosives used in the PANDORA I and II databases are depicted 
below as values separated by a comma. 
 
Acetylides of heavy metals, Aluminum containing polymeric propellant, Aluminum ophorite explosive, 
Amatex, Amatol, Ammonal, Ammonium nitrate explosive mixtures (cap sensitive), Ammonium nitrate explosive 
mixtures (non-cap sensitive), Ammonium perchlorate composite propellant, Ammonium perchlorate explosive 
mixtures, Ammonium picrate [picrate of ammonia, Explosive D], Ammonium salt lattice with isomorphously 
substituted inorganic salts, ANFO [ammonium nitrate-fuel oil], Aromatic nitro-compound explosive mixtures, 
Azide explosives, Baranol, Baratol, BEAF [1, 2-bis (2, 2-difluoro-2-nitroacetoxyethane)], Black powder, Black 
powder based explosive mixtures, *Blasting agents, nitro-carbo-nitrates, including non-cap sensitive slurry and 
water gel explosives, Blasting caps, Blasting gelatin, Blasting powder, BTNEC [bis (trinitroethyl) carbonate], 
BTNEN [bis (trinitroethyl) nitramine], BTTN [1, 2, 4 butanetriol trinitrate], Bulk salutes, Butyl tetryl, Calcium 
nitrate explosive mixture, Cellulose hexanitrate explosive mixture, Chlorate explosive mixtures, Composition A 
and variations, Composition B and variations, Composition C and variations, Copper acetylide, Cyanuric 
triazide, Cyclonite [RDX], Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine [HMX], Cyclotol, Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine 
[RDX], DATB [diaminotrinitrobenzene], DDNP [diazodinitrophenol], DEGDN [diethyleneglycol dinitrate], 
Detonating cord, Detonators, Dimethylol dimethyl methane dinitrate composition, Dinitroethyleneurea, 
Dinitroglycerine [glycerol dinitrate], Dinitrophenol, Dinitrophenolates, Dinitrophenyl hydrazine, 
Dinitroresorcinol, Dinitrotoluene-sodium nitrate explosive mixtures, "DIPAM [dipicramide; 
diaminohexanitrobiphenyl]", Dipicryl sulfone, Dipicrylamine, Display fireworks, DNPA [2, 2-dinitropropyl 
acrylate], DNPD [dinitropentano nitrile], Dynamite, EDDN [ethylene diamine dinitrate], EDNA 
[ethylenedinitramine], Ednatol, EDNP [ethyl 4, 4-dinitropentanoate], EGDN [ethylene glycol dinitrate], 
Erythritol tetranitrate explosives, Esters of nitro-substituted alcohols, Ethyl-tetryl, Explosive conitrates, 
Explosive gelatins, Explosive liquids, Explosive mixtures containing oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and 
hydrocarbons, Explosive mixtures containing oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and nitro bodies, Explosive 
mixtures containing oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and water insoluble fuels, Explosive mixtures containing 
oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and water soluble fuels, Explosive mixtures containing sensitised 
nitromethane, Explosive mixtures containing tetranitromethane (nitroform), Explosive nitro compounds of 
aromatic hydrocarbons, Explosive organic nitrate mixtures, Explosive powders, Flash powder, Fulminate of 
mercury, Fulminate of silver, Fulminating gold, Fulminating mercury, Fulminating platinum, Fulminating silver, 
Gelatinised nitrocellulose, Gem-dinitro aliphatic explosive mixtures, Guanyl nitrosamino guanyl tetrazene, 
Guanyl nitrosamino guanylidene hydrazine, Guncotton, Heavy metal azides, Hexanite, 
Hexanitrodiphenylamine, Hexanitrostilbene, Hexogen [RDX], Hexogene or octogene and a nitrated N-
methylaniline, Hexolites, HMTD [hexamethylenetriperoxidediamine], "HMX [cyclo-1, 3, 5, 7-tetramethylene 2, 
4, 6, 8-tetranitramine; Octogen]", Hydrazinium nitrate/hydrazine/aluminum explosive system, Hydrazoic acid, 
Igniter cord, Igniters, Initiating tube systems, KDNBF [potassium dinitrobenzo-furoxane], Lead azide, Lead 
mannite, Lead mononitroresorcinate, Lead picrate, Lead salts, explosive, Lead styphnate [styphnate of lead, 
lead trinitroresorcinate], Liquid nitrated polyol and trimethylolethane, Liquid oxygen explosives, Magnesium 
ophorite explosives, Mannitol hexanitrate, MDNP [methyl 4, 4-dinitropentanoate], MEAN [monoethanolamine 
nitrate], Mercuric fulminate, Mercury oxalate, Mercury tartrate, Metriol trinitrate, Minol-2 [40% TNT, 40% 
ammonium nitrate, 20% aluminum], "MMAN [monomethylamine nitrate]; methylamine nitrate", 
Mononitrotoluene-nitroglycerin mixture, Monopropellants, NIBTN [nitroisobutametriol trinitrate], Nitrate 
explosive mixtures, Nitrate sensitised with gelled nitroparaffin, Nitrated carbohydrate explosive, Nitrated 
glucoside explosive, Nitrated polyhydric alcohol explosives, Nitric acid and a nitro aromatic compound 
explosive, Nitric acid and carboxylic fuel explosive, Nitric acid explosive mixtures, Nitro aromatic explosive 
mixtures, Nitro compounds of furane explosive mixtures, Nitrocellulose explosive, Nitroderivative of urea 
explosive mixture, Nitrogelatin explosive, Nitrogen trichloride, Nitrogen tri-iodide, Nitroglycerine, 
trinitroglycerine], Nitroglycide, Nitroglycol [ethylene glycol dinitrate, EGDN], Nitroguanidine explosives, 
Nitronium perchlorate propellant mixtures, Nitroparaffins Explosive Grade and ammonium nitrate mixtures, 
Nitrostarch, Nitro-substituted carboxylic acids, Nitrourea, Octogen [HMX], Octol [75 percent HMX, 25 percent 
TNT], Organic amine nitrates, Organic nitramines, PBX [plastic bonded explosives], Pellet powder, Penthrinite 
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Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua & Deps, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Central African, Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Congo {Democratic Rep}, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland {Republic}, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea North, Korea South, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, {Burma}, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, St Kitts & 
Nevis, St Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican City, 




Appendix C – List of primary explosives used in 
PANDORA 
 
For reasons of brevity, the list of primary explosives used in the PANDORA I and II databases are depicted 
below as values separated by a comma. 
 
Acetylides of heavy metals, Aluminum containing polymeric propellant, Aluminum ophorite explosive, 
Amatex, Amatol, Ammonal, Ammonium nitrate explosive mixtures (cap sensitive), Ammonium nitrate explosive 
mixtures (non-cap sensitive), Ammonium perchlorate composite propellant, Ammonium perchlorate explosive 
mixtures, Ammonium picrate [picrate of ammonia, Explosive D], Ammonium salt lattice with isomorphously 
substituted inorganic salts, ANFO [ammonium nitrate-fuel oil], Aromatic nitro-compound explosive mixtures, 
Azide explosives, Baranol, Baratol, BEAF [1, 2-bis (2, 2-difluoro-2-nitroacetoxyethane)], Black powder, Black 
powder based explosive mixtures, *Blasting agents, nitro-carbo-nitrates, including non-cap sensitive slurry and 
water gel explosives, Blasting caps, Blasting gelatin, Blasting powder, BTNEC [bis (trinitroethyl) carbonate], 
BTNEN [bis (trinitroethyl) nitramine], BTTN [1, 2, 4 butanetriol trinitrate], Bulk salutes, Butyl tetryl, Calcium 
nitrate explosive mixture, Cellulose hexanitrate explosive mixture, Chlorate explosive mixtures, Composition A 
and variations, Composition B and variations, Composition C and variations, Copper acetylide, Cyanuric 
triazide, Cyclonite [RDX], Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine [HMX], Cyclotol, Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine 
[RDX], DATB [diaminotrinitrobenzene], DDNP [diazodinitrophenol], DEGDN [diethyleneglycol dinitrate], 
Detonating cord, Detonators, Dimethylol dimethyl methane dinitrate composition, Dinitroethyleneurea, 
Dinitroglycerine [glycerol dinitrate], Dinitrophenol, Dinitrophenolates, Dinitrophenyl hydrazine, 
Dinitroresorcinol, Dinitrotoluene-sodium nitrate explosive mixtures, "DIPAM [dipicramide; 
diaminohexanitrobiphenyl]", Dipicryl sulfone, Dipicrylamine, Display fireworks, DNPA [2, 2-dinitropropyl 
acrylate], DNPD [dinitropentano nitrile], Dynamite, EDDN [ethylene diamine dinitrate], EDNA 
[ethylenedinitramine], Ednatol, EDNP [ethyl 4, 4-dinitropentanoate], EGDN [ethylene glycol dinitrate], 
Erythritol tetranitrate explosives, Esters of nitro-substituted alcohols, Ethyl-tetryl, Explosive conitrates, 
Explosive gelatins, Explosive liquids, Explosive mixtures containing oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and 
hydrocarbons, Explosive mixtures containing oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and nitro bodies, Explosive 
mixtures containing oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and water insoluble fuels, Explosive mixtures containing 
oxygen-releasing inorganic salts and water soluble fuels, Explosive mixtures containing sensitised 
nitromethane, Explosive mixtures containing tetranitromethane (nitroform), Explosive nitro compounds of 
aromatic hydrocarbons, Explosive organic nitrate mixtures, Explosive powders, Flash powder, Fulminate of 
mercury, Fulminate of silver, Fulminating gold, Fulminating mercury, Fulminating platinum, Fulminating silver, 
Gelatinised nitrocellulose, Gem-dinitro aliphatic explosive mixtures, Guanyl nitrosamino guanyl tetrazene, 
Guanyl nitrosamino guanylidene hydrazine, Guncotton, Heavy metal azides, Hexanite, 
Hexanitrodiphenylamine, Hexanitrostilbene, Hexogen [RDX], Hexogene or octogene and a nitrated N-
methylaniline, Hexolites, HMTD [hexamethylenetriperoxidediamine], "HMX [cyclo-1, 3, 5, 7-tetramethylene 2, 
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Igniter cord, Igniters, Initiating tube systems, KDNBF [potassium dinitrobenzo-furoxane], Lead azide, Lead 
mannite, Lead mononitroresorcinate, Lead picrate, Lead salts, explosive, Lead styphnate [styphnate of lead, 
lead trinitroresorcinate], Liquid nitrated polyol and trimethylolethane, Liquid oxygen explosives, Magnesium 
ophorite explosives, Mannitol hexanitrate, MDNP [methyl 4, 4-dinitropentanoate], MEAN [monoethanolamine 
nitrate], Mercuric fulminate, Mercury oxalate, Mercury tartrate, Metriol trinitrate, Minol-2 [40% TNT, 40% 
ammonium nitrate, 20% aluminum], "MMAN [monomethylamine nitrate]; methylamine nitrate", 
Mononitrotoluene-nitroglycerin mixture, Monopropellants, NIBTN [nitroisobutametriol trinitrate], Nitrate 
explosive mixtures, Nitrate sensitised with gelled nitroparaffin, Nitrated carbohydrate explosive, Nitrated 
glucoside explosive, Nitrated polyhydric alcohol explosives, Nitric acid and a nitro aromatic compound 
explosive, Nitric acid and carboxylic fuel explosive, Nitric acid explosive mixtures, Nitro aromatic explosive 
mixtures, Nitro compounds of furane explosive mixtures, Nitrocellulose explosive, Nitroderivative of urea 
explosive mixture, Nitrogelatin explosive, Nitrogen trichloride, Nitrogen tri-iodide, Nitroglycerine, 
trinitroglycerine], Nitroglycide, Nitroglycol [ethylene glycol dinitrate, EGDN], Nitroguanidine explosives, 
Nitronium perchlorate propellant mixtures, Nitroparaffins Explosive Grade and ammonium nitrate mixtures, 
Nitrostarch, Nitro-substituted carboxylic acids, Nitrourea, Octogen [HMX], Octol [75 percent HMX, 25 percent 
TNT], Organic amine nitrates, Organic nitramines, PBX [plastic bonded explosives], Pellet powder, Penthrinite 
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Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua & Deps, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, 
Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape 
Verde, Central African, Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Congo {Democratic Rep}, Costa 
Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, East Timor, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, 
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland {Republic}, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea North, Korea South, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, 
Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, 
Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, {Burma}, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New 
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, St Kitts & 
Nevis, St Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican City, 




Appendix D – Data collection of lone-operator 







    
   FIRST WAVE OF MODERN TERRORISM 
1 11-05-1878 Attempt Max Hodel attempts to assassinate Kaiser Wilhelm I of Germany by shooting 
him. He fails twice, is apprehended and executed 
2 04-08-1878 Attack Sergey Stepnyak-Kravchinsky stabs General Nikolai Mezentsov, head of the 
Tsar's secret police, to death in response to the execution of Ivan Kovalsky 
3 feb. 1879 Attack Grigori Goldenberg shoots Prince Dmitri Kropotkin, the Governor of Kharkov 
in the Russian Empire, to death 
4 20-04-1879 Attempt Alexander Soloviev attempts to assassinate Tsar Alexander II of Russia. The 
monarch spots the weapon in his hands and flees, but Soloviev still fires five 
shots, all of which miss. He is captured and hanged on May 28 
5 17-02-1880 Attempt Stepan Khalturin successfully blows up part of the Winter Palace in an attempt 
to assassinate Tsar Alexander II of Russia. Although the Tsar escaped 
unharmed, eight soldiers were killed and 45 wounded 
6 01-03-1881 Attack Czar Alexander II is assassinated with home made explosives, by Ignacy 
Hryniewiecki, a member of the revolutionary Russian party Narodnaya Volya89. 
7 23-07-1892 Attempt Alexander Berkman tries to kill American industrialist Henry Clay Frick in 
retaliation for Frick's hiring of Pinkerton detectives to break up the 
Homestead Strike, resulting in the deaths of seven steelworkers. Although 
badly wounded, Frick survives, and Berkman is arrested and eventually 
sentenced to 22 years in prison 
8 09-12-1893 Attack Auguste Vaillant throws a nail bomb in the French National Assembly, killing 
nobody and injuring one. He is then sentenced to death and executed by the 
guillotine on February 4, 1894, shouting "Death to bourgeois society and 
long live anarchy!" (A mort la société bourgeoise et vive l'anarchie!). During 
his trial, Vaillant declared that he had not intended to kill anybody, but only 
to injure several deputies in retaliation against the execution of Ravachol, who 
had engaged himself in four bombings" 
9 12-02-1894 Attack Émile Henry, intending to avenge Auguste Vaillant, sets off a bomb in Café 
Terminus (a café near the Gare Saint-Lazare train station in Paris), killing one 
and injuring twenty 
10 24-06-1894 Attack After delivering a speech in Lyon Sadi Carnot, the president of France is 
stabbed to death by Italian anarchist Sante Geronimo. Caserio described the 
assassination as a political act. 
11 03-11-1896 Attack "In the Greek city of Patras, Dimitris Matsalis, an anarchist shoemaker, attacks 
banker Dionysios Fragkopoulos and merchant Andreas Kollas with a knife. 
Fragkopoulos is killed on the spot. Kollas is seriously wounded" 
12 08-08-1897 Attack Michele Angiolillo shoots Spanish prime-minister Antonio Cánovas del 
Castillo dead at a thermal bath resort, seeking vengeance for the 
imprisonment and torture of alleged revolutionaries at the Montjuïc fortress.  
13 10-09-1898 Attack Luigi Lucheni stabs Empress Elisabeth, the consort of Emperor Franz Joseph I 
of Austria-Hungary, to death with a needle file in Geneva, Switzerland. 
Lucheni is sentenced to life in prison and eventually commits suicide in his cell 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89  We note that the assassination of Czar Alexander is -by some sources- attributed to two or three 
protagonists. We reiterate that, our definition of lone operators includes protagonists that work in small 
networks or autonomous cells, (see definition 2.4).  
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composition, Pentolite, Perchlorate explosive mixtures, Peroxide based explosive mixtures, PETN 
[nitropentaerythrite, pentaerythrite tetranitrate, pentaerythritol, tetranitrate], Picramic acid and its salts, 
Picramide, Picrate explosives, Picrate of potassium explosive mixtures, Picratol, Picric acid (manufactured as an 
explosive), Picryl chloride, Picryl fluoride, PLX [95% nitromethane, 5% ethylenediamine], Polynitro aliphatic 
compounds, Polyolpolynitrate-nitrocellulose explosive gels, Potassium chlorate and lead sulfocyanate 
explosive, Potassium nitrate explosive mixtures, Potassium nitroaminotetrazole, Pyrotechnic compositions, PYX 
[2, 6-bis(picrylamino)]-3, 5-dinitropyridine, "RDX [cyclonite, hexogen, T4, cyclo-1, 3, 5, -trimethylene-2, 4, 6, -
trinitramine; hexahydro-1, 3, 5-trinitro-S-triazine]", Safety fuse, Salts of organic amino sulfonic acid explosive 
mixture, Salutes (bulk), Silver acetylide, Silver azide, Silver fulminate, Silver oxalate explosive mixtures, Silver 
styphnate, Silver tartrate explosive mixtures, Silver tetrazene, Slurried explosive mixtures of water, inorganic 
oxidizing salt, gelling, agent, fuel, and sensitizer (cap sensitive), Smokeless powder, Sodatol, Sodium amatol, 
Sodium azide explosive mixture, Sodium dinitro-ortho-cresolate, Sodium nitrate explosive mixtures, Sodium 
nitrate-potassium nitrate explosive mixture, Sodium picramate, Special fireworks, Squibs, Styphnic acid 
explosives, Tacot [tetranitro-2, 3, 5, 6-dibenzo- 1, 3a, 4, 6a tetrazapentalene], TATB [triaminotrinitrobenzene], 
TATP [triacetonetriperoxide], TEGDN [triethylene glycol dinitrate], Tetranitrocarbazole, Tetrazene [tetracene, 
tetrazine, 1(5-tetrazolyl)-4-guanyl tetrazene, hydrate], Tetryl [2, 4, 6 tetranitro-N-methylaniline], Tetrytol, 
Thickened inorganic oxidizer salt slurried explosive mixture, TMETN [trimethylolethane trinitrate], TNEF 
[trinitroethyl formal], TNEOC [trinitroethylorthocarbonate], TNEOF [trinitroethylorthoformate], TNT 
[trinitrotoluene, trotyl, trilite, triton], Torpex, Tridite, Trimethylol ethyl methane trinitrate composition, 
Trimethylolthane trinitrate-nitrocellulose, Trimonite, Trinitroanisole, Trinitrobenzene, Trinitrobenzoic acid, 
Trinitrocresol, Trinitro-meta-cresol, Trinitronaphthalene, Trinitrophenetol, Trinitrophloroglucinol, 
Trinitroresorcinol, Tritonal, Urea nitrate, Water-bearing explosives having salts of oxidizing acids and nitrogen 
bases, sulfates, or sulfamates Water-in-oil emulsion explosive compositions, Xanthamonas hydrophilic colloid 
explosive mixture, Combination of, Unknown,  
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Tsar's secret police, to death in response to the execution of Ivan Kovalsky 
3 feb. 1879 Attack Grigori Goldenberg shoots Prince Dmitri Kropotkin, the Governor of Kharkov 
in the Russian Empire, to death 
4 20-04-1879 Attempt Alexander Soloviev attempts to assassinate Tsar Alexander II of Russia. The 
monarch spots the weapon in his hands and flees, but Soloviev still fires five 
shots, all of which miss. He is captured and hanged on May 28 
5 17-02-1880 Attempt Stepan Khalturin successfully blows up part of the Winter Palace in an attempt 
to assassinate Tsar Alexander II of Russia. Although the Tsar escaped 
unharmed, eight soldiers were killed and 45 wounded 
6 01-03-1881 Attack Czar Alexander II is assassinated with home made explosives, by Ignacy 
Hryniewiecki, a member of the revolutionary Russian party Narodnaya Volya89. 
7 23-07-1892 Attempt Alexander Berkman tries to kill American industrialist Henry Clay Frick in 
retaliation for Frick's hiring of Pinkerton detectives to break up the 
Homestead Strike, resulting in the deaths of seven steelworkers. Although 
badly wounded, Frick survives, and Berkman is arrested and eventually 
sentenced to 22 years in prison 
8 09-12-1893 Attack Auguste Vaillant throws a nail bomb in the French National Assembly, killing 
nobody and injuring one. He is then sentenced to death and executed by the 
guillotine on February 4, 1894, shouting "Death to bourgeois society and 
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to injure several deputies in retaliation against the execution of Ravachol, who 
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9 12-02-1894 Attack Émile Henry, intending to avenge Auguste Vaillant, sets off a bomb in Café 
Terminus (a café near the Gare Saint-Lazare train station in Paris), killing one 
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13 10-09-1898 Attack Luigi Lucheni stabs Empress Elisabeth, the consort of Emperor Franz Joseph I 
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89  We note that the assassination of Czar Alexander is -by some sources- attributed to two or three 
protagonists. We reiterate that, our definition of lone operators includes protagonists that work in small 
networks or autonomous cells, (see definition 2.4).  
 
 328 
composition, Pentolite, Perchlorate explosive mixtures, Peroxide based explosive mixtures, PETN 
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31 09-10-1934 Attack First king of Yugoslavia, Alexander I of Yugoslavia, killed in Marseille during a 
state visit by a member of the International Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (IMRO 
32 10-09-1935 Attack Governor Huey Long was shot to death by Dr. Carl Weiss, the son-in-law of 
one of his most prominent political opponents. 
33 21-08-1940 Attack Ramon Mercader, sent by the Russian secret police, killed Lev Bronstein 
Trotsky, by a pick-hit on his head 
34 17-05-1941 Attempt Attempt by Vasil Laci to kill Victor Emmanuel III, King of Italy and member of 
the House of Savoy 
35 01-06-1942 Attack SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich, shot by Jan Kubi_ and Jozef 
Gab_ík 
36 20-07-1944 Attempt Chancellor and Führer of Germany Adolf Hitler Narrowly escapes in the July 
20 plot, initiated by Claus von Stauffenberg 
37 09-04-1947 Attack Leader of the populist movement in Colombia, and former minister Gaitán 
was running for the preseidential elections when he was assassinated after a 
lunch with friends. The murderer was killed by an enraged mob and the 
motives behind the killing remained unclear. 
38 30-01-1948 Attack Gandhi, the preeminent leader of Indian nationalism in British-ruled India. was 
shot on his way to a prayer meeting by Nathuram Godse, a Hindu nationalist 
who held Gandhi guilty of favouring Pakistan and strongly opposed his 
doctrine of nonviolence. 
39 09-04-1948 Attack Leader of the populist movement in Colombia, and former minister Gaitán 
was running for the presidential elections when he was assassinated after a 
lunch with friends. The alleged murderer Juan Roa Sierra, was killed by an 
enraged mob and the motives behind the killing remained unclear. 
40 01-11-1950 Attempt Attempt to kill US president Harry S. Truman in order to draw attention to the 
Puerto Rico independence movement, in which both attempted killers were 
active.  
41 16-10-1951 Attack Ali Khan was shot while addressing a gathering of 100,000 in Municipal 
Gardens, Rawalpindi, Pakistan by Saad Akbar Babrak, an Afghan national and 
a professional assassin. The assassination has never been investigated 
properly. 
42 26-07-1957 Attack Castillo Armas was killed while taking a stroll with his wife by Romeo Vásquez, 
a palace guard who was found dead a short while later. The motivations 
behind the killing remain unclear. 
43 29-09-1956 Attack Nicaraguan president Somoza was shot to death at a campaign reception by 
Rigoberto López Pérez, a Nicaraguan poet and music composer. The assassin 
died in a hail of bullets and little is known about his motivation. 
44 26-09-1959 Attack Prime-minister of Sri Lanka Solomon Bandaranaike, Assassinated by a 
Buddhist monk as part of a conspiracy 
45 13-05-1960 Attempt "Fidel Castro, Cuban leader. Attempts to introduce poison supplied by the 
CIA into Castro’s food. Castro supposedly survived 638 assassination 
attempts in all 
46 12-10-1960 Attack Inejiro Asanuma, member of Japanese Socialist Party. Asanuma was pierced 
to assassin's bayonet while making a speech 
47 11-12-1960 Attempt Attempt to assassinate US president-elect John F. Kennedy by lone wolf 
Richard Paul Pavlick 
48 27-02-1962 Attempt An attempt to kill President of the Republic of Vietnam Ngo Dinh Diem in the 
1962 South Vietnamese presidential palace bombing fails 
49 22-08-1962 Attempt Attempt to kill French president Charles de Gaulle by Jean Bastien-Thiry and 
the OAS 
50 06-09-1966 Attack Prime-minister Hendrik Verwoerd was stabbed in the neck and chest in the 
House of Assembly by an uniformed parliamentary messenger Dimitri 
Tsafendas who claimed to have been motivated by outrage for Verwoerds 
racial policy. 
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14 29-07-1900 Attack Gaetano Bresci shoots King Umberto I of Italy dead, seeking revenge for the 
Bava-Beccaris massacre in Milan. Due to the lack of capital punishment in 
Italy, Bresci is sentenced to penal servitude for life on Santo Stefano Island, 
where is found dead less than a year later 
15 06-09-1901 Attack Leon Czolgosz shoots U.S. president William McKinley at point-blank range at 
the Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo, New York. McKinley dies on 
September 14, and Czolgosz is executed by electric chair on October 29 
16 15-11-1902 Attempt Gennaro Rubino attempts to murder King Leopold II of Belgium as he returns 
in a procession from a memorial service for his recently-deceased wife, Marie 
Henriette. All three of Rubino's shots miss the monarch's carriage, and he is 
quickly subdued by the crowd and taken into police custody. He is sentenced 
to life imprisonment and dies in prison in 1918 
17 31-05-1906 Attempt Catalan anarchist Mateu Morral tries to kill King Alfonso XIII of Spain and 
Princess Victoria Eugenie of Battenberg after their wedding by throwing a 
bomb into the wedding procession following the ceremony. The monarchs 
are unhurt, but some bystanders and horses are killed. Morral is apprehended 
two days later and commits suicide while being transferred to prison 
18 01-02-1908 Attack Manuel Buíça and Alfredo Costa shoot to death King Carlos I of Portugal and 
his son, Crown Prince Luis Filipe, respectively, in the Lisbon Regicide. Both 
Buiça and Costa, who were both eventually shot dead by police officers, were 
sympathetic to a republican movement in Portugal that included anarchist 
elements 
19 28-03-1908 Attempt Anarchist Selig Cohen aka Selig Silverstein tries to throw a bomb in New York 
City's Union Square. A premature explosion kills a bystander named Ignatz 
Hildebrand and mortally wounds Cohen, who dies a month later 
20 01-09-1911 Attack Dmitri Bogrov shoots Russian prime-minister Pyotr Stolypin at the Kiev Opera 
House in the presence of Tsar Nicholas II and two of his daughters, Grand 
Duchesses Olga and Tatiana. Stolypin dies four days later, and Bogrov is 
hanged on September 28 
21 12-11-1912 Attack Spanish prime-minister Canalejas was shot to death by a Spanish anarchist 
who committed suicide right after his act. 
22 18-03-1913 Attack While on an afternoon walk, King George I of Greece was shot dead at close 
range in the back by Alexandros Schinas, a member of a socialist organisation 
who claimed that the King had refused to give him money. 
23 22-08-1922 Attack Michael Collins, IRA leader, killed in an ambush firefight near the end of Irish 
Civil War 
24 16-12-1922 Attack First Polish president Gabriel Narutowicz. Killed five days after his 
inauguration, while attending the opening of an art exhibit at the Zach_ta 
Gallery in Warsaw 
25 25-03-1926 Attack Head of the Ukrainian People's Republic, Petliuara was shot to death while 
walking in Paris by a  Sholom Schwartzbard a Russian Jewish anarchist and 
poet. 
26 01-04-1926 Attempt Attempt to assassinate Italian president Benito Mussolini by Violet Gibson 
    
   SECOND WAVE OF MODERN TERRORISM 
27 17-07-1928 Attack Mexican president Obregón was shot in a café where he was celebrating his 
electoral victory by anti-governmental roman catholic José de León Toral who 
blamed Obregón for the Mexican government's atrocities against the 
Catholic Church. 
28 06-03-1933 Attack Anton Cermak, Mayor of Chicago, killed in Miami, Florida during a visit of 
president-elect of Franklin Roosevelt 
29 08-11-1932 Attack Afghan King Mohammed Shah was shot to death by ethnic Hazara, Abdul 
Khaliq, a teenage boy while attending a high school graduation ceremony. 
30 30-04-1933 Attack Peruvian president Sanchez was killed when reviewing recruits at Santa 




31 09-10-1934 Attack First king of Yugoslavia, Alexander I of Yugoslavia, killed in Marseille during a 
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14 29-07-1900 Attack Gaetano Bresci shoots King Umberto I of Italy dead, seeking revenge for the 
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Henriette. All three of Rubino's shots miss the monarch's carriage, and he is 
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bomb into the wedding procession following the ceremony. The monarchs 
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two days later and commits suicide while being transferred to prison 
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kitchen of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles to celebrate his electoral 
victory 
75 03-04-1968 Attack Martin Luther King, American civil rights activist, was killed while standing on 
the balcony of his hotel room in Memphis. Shot by James Earl Ray, who was 
captured two months after the shooting 
76 08-12-1980 Attack Mark Chapman shot John Lennon, British musician and front man of popular 
band The Beatles, on the entrance of the building where he lived on 
December 8, 1980 
77 18-01-1961 Attack Patrice Hemery Lumumba, Congolese politician, killed by the army 
78 21-02-1965 Attack Malcolm (X) Little, American civil rights activist, allegedly killed by 
organization Black Muslim 
79 27-11-1975 Attack Ross McWrither, producer of Guinness Book of Records, kidnapped and killed 
by the IRA 
80 16-03-1978 Attack Aldo Moro, Italian politician, assassinated by the Brigate Rosse 
81 27-08-1979 Attack Louis Mountbatten, First Earl of Burma, kidnapped and assassinated by the 
IRA 
82 28-08-1968 Attack Sven Olof Palme, Swedish president, unknown perpetrator 
83 06-03-1978 Attack Larry Flynt, American publisher of porn magazines, was shot by white-
supremacist serial killer Joseph Paul Franklin with a long range firearm, while 
he was leaving the court building with his lawyer, after a legal battle related 
to obscenity. 
84 16-10-1979 Attack Park Tsjoeng Hee, South-Korean General and politician, killed by the KCIA 
85 30-07-1977 Attack Jorgen Ponto, German banker, kidnapped and assassinated by the RAF 
86 1978 - 1995 Attack "Theodore ""Ted"" Kaczynski (also known as the Unabomber (university and 
airline bomber), is an American mathematician, social critic and primitivist, 
who engaged in a mail bombing spree that spanned nearly 20 years, killing 
three people and injuring 23 others." 
87 1980 - 1981 Attack "Joseph Christopher was an American serial killer who was active from 
September 22, 1980 until his arrest on May 10, 1981. He was known as the 
"".22-Caliber Killer"" and the ""Midtown Slasher."" It is believed that he 
killed twelve individuals and wounded numerous others, almost all of them 
African American with one Hispanic male." 
88 08-12-1980 Attack "Singer / songwriter John Lennon was shot to death by Mark Chapman, a 
“fan” who became obsessed with the musician. Upon arrest the killer stated 
""I’m sure the big part of me is Holden Caulfield, who is the main person in 
the book [The catcher un the Rye].""" 
    
   FOURTH WAVE OF MODERN TERRORISM 
89 19-10-1984 Attack Jerzy Popieluszko, Polish catholic theologian, killed by the regime 
90 29-03-1981 Attempt Ronald Wilson Reagan, president of the US, was struck by gunfire from would-
be assassin John Hinckley, outside the Washington Hilton hotel. Although 
close to death during surgery, Reagan survived the assassination attempt 
91 06-10-1981 Attack Mohammed Anwar al-Sadat, president of Egypt, killed by the Muslim 
Brotherhood 
92 05-09-1977 Attack Hanns-Martin Schleyer, German businessman, assassinated by the RAF 
93 17-09-1980 Attack Anastasio Somoza Debayle, president of Nicaragua, unknown perpetrator 
94 30-05-1961 Attack Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Y Molina, Dominican Republic politician, assassinated 
by the CIA 
95 15-05-1972 Attempt George Corley Wallace, US governor and presidential candidate, lone wolf, 
survived attack 
96 12-10-1990 Attempt German Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble was shot in back 
and face after an election campaign event in Oppenau by Dieter Kaufmann. 
Has been paralysed and using a wheelchair ever since 
97 17-02-1991 Attempt British prime-minister John Major, attacked by IRA. Mortar attack during a 
meeting at 10 Downing Street 
 
 332 
   THIRD WAVE OF MODERN TERRORISM 
51 22-11-1963 Attack US president John F. Kennedy, was travelling in a presidential motorcade in 
Dallas, Texas, when he was shot to death with a long range firearm. Lee 
Harvey Oswald was charged with the assassination of Kennedy. He denied 
but was killed by Jack Ruby on November 24, before he could be indicted or 
tried. 
52 15-05-1966 Attack President of El Salvador Hernández, was stabbed to death at age 84, by his 
driver Cipriano Morales whose father had been one of the many murdered by 
Hernández's dictatorship. 
53 04-04-1968 Attack Martin Luther King, leader of the Afro-American Civil Rights movement was 
shot to death with a long range firearm by James Earl Ray, while standing on 
the balcony of his hotel room. 
54 11-04-1968 Attempt German student movement leader Rudi  Dutschke was shot in the head, while 
getting on his bike by a young anti-communist Josef Bachmann. Dutschke 
survived the attack and died 11 years later, reportedly because of the brain 
damage sustained in the assassination attempt. 
55 05-06-1968 Attack Presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy, was shot while walking through a 
hotel kitchen by Shirhan Shirhan, a 24-year-old Palestinian Jordanian 
citizenship, ostensibly because of the senator's advocacy of U.S. support for 
Israel. 
56 11-09-1973 Attack Salvador Allende Gossens, president of Chile, killed by the Chilean Army 
57 21-03-1983 Attack Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino Jr., Politician, Fillippines, killed by the Army 
58 10-10-1986 Attack Gerald (Gero) Hermann Johannes Von Braunmuhl, German diplomate, killed 
by the Rote Armee Fraktion 
59 25-03-1975 Attack King Faisal was assassinated by his cousin Prince Faisal, while he was greeting 
him in his palace in Riyadh. Prince Faysal reportedly wanted to avenge the 
death of his brother Prince Khalid who was shot by a policeman. 
60 07-04-1979 Attack Siegfried Buback, German General prosecutor, assassinated by the RAF 
61 10-05-1979 Attack Roque Dalton, Writer, El Salvador, Regime executed 
62 01-11-1963 Attack Ngo Dinh Diem, Politican, South Vietnam, assassinated by the Vietnamese 
army  
63 10-11-1979 Attack Gunter Von Drenkmann, president of the Berlin Court, killed by the RAF 
64 11-04-1968 Attack Alfred Will Rudolf Dutschke, German student leader, shot in his head on the 
street while leaving his house. Survived the attempt but died ten years after 
the incident due to brain damage caused by the attack 
65 11-06-1963 Attack Medgar W. Evers, American civil rights fighter, killed by the Ku Klux Klan 
66 25-03-1975 Attack King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, was assassinated by his cousin Prince Faisal bin 
Musaid while he was greeting him in his palace in Riyadh. Prince Faysal 
reportedly wanted to avenge the death of his brother Prince Khalid who was 
shot by a policeman. 
67 06-05-1978 Attack Larry Flint, American director of porn, shot when he was leaving the court 
building by sniper Joseph Paul Franklin 
68 22-09-1975 Attempt Gerald Rudolph Ford, president of the USA, two attempts on his life by 
different women 
69 31-10-1984 Attack Indira Shrimati Gandhi, Indian politician, stabbed in the chest by own guards, 
attributed to the Sikhs 
70 1958 - 1966 Numerou
s 
Attempts 
Charles Andre Joseph Marie de Gaulle, president of France 
71 30-11-1989 Attack Alfed Herrhausen, German banker, kidnapped and killed by the RAF 
72 11-05-1981 Attack Heinz-Herbert Karry, German politician killed by RZ  
73 22-11-1963 Attack John Fitzgerald Kennedy, president of the US, assassinated by Harvey Lee 
Oswald while he was traveling in a presidential motorcade in Dallas, Texas 
74 15-06-1968 Attack Robert Francis Kennedy, American politician and US presidential candidate, 
was shot by Sirhan, a Jordanian immigrant, while he was walking through the 
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others in a football stadium during a Soviet Victory Day parade, by a bomb 
that had been built into the concrete of one of the stadium's supporting 
columns. Presumably by Chechen Islamists 
118 14-02-2005 Attack Former Lebanese prime-minister and billionaire Rafik Hariri, assassination via 
car bomb in Beirut. Allegedly by Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence services 
119 10-05-2005 Attempt U.S. president George W. Bush and Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili. 
Attempt by Arutyunian, who threw a hand grenade at Bush, which failed to 
detonate 
120 04-08-2005 Attack Eden Natan-Zada, an alleged Kahanist, killed four Israeli Arabs on a bus and 
wounded 12 before being killed by other passengers.[11] Natan-Zada was a 
19-year-old soldier who had deserted his unit after he refused to remove 
settlers from the Gaza Strip. Less than two weeks later, on August 17, 2005, 
Asher Weisgan, a 40-year old Israeli bus-driver, shot and killed four 
Palestinians and injured two others in the West Bank settlement of Shiloh. 
121 07-10-2006 Attack "Journalist Anna Politkovskaya, shot in the elevator block of her apartment in 
Moscow. Unknown perpetrator 
122 04-09-2006 Attack Nabil Ahmad Jaoura, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, opened fire on tourists 
at the Roman Amphitheatre in Amman, Jordan. One British tourist died and 
six others, including five tourists, were injured. Police said he was not 
connected with any organized group but was angered by Western and Israeli 
actions in the Middle East.[12] 
123 23-11-2006 Attack Former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was killed by Acute radiation 
syndrome via ingestion of polonium-210. Perpetrators unknown, though 
believed to be figures within the government of Russia 
124 27-12-2007 Attack Former prime-minister of Pakistan and Pakistan Peoples Party Chair and 
Opposition Leader Benazir Bhutto. Killed while entering a vehicle upon 
leaving a political rally for the Pakistan People's Party in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. 
Perpetrators unknown, widely believed to be Islamic militants 
125 02-07-2008 Attack An Arab resident of east Jerusalem Hussam Taysir Duwait attacked several 
cars on Jaffa Road in Jerusalem using a front-end loader (erroneously referred 
to as a bulldozer in the media), killing three people and wounding at least 
thirty pedestrians, before being shot to death. A motive for the attack could 
not immediately be determined, but police at the scene referred to the 
incident as a terrorist attack. 
126 02-03-2009 Attack President of Guinea-Bissau João Bernardo Vieira was hacked to death during 
armed attack on his residence in Bissau by the army 
127 30-04-2009 Attempt During the celebration of Queen's Day in the Netherlands, Karst Tates drove 
his car at high speed into a parade that included members of the Royal 
Family of the Netherlands. The vehicle drove through a line of people 
watching the parade, resulting in eight deaths and ten injuries. It missed the 
Royal Family and crashed into a monument at the side of the road. No 
members of the Royal Family were harmed. 
128 01-06-2001 Attack In the Little Rock recruiting office shooting American born Carlos Leon 
Bledsoe, (who converted to Islam and was named Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad), opened fire with a rifle in a drive-by shooting on soldiers in front 
of a United States military recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas. He killed 
Private William Long, and wounded Private Quinton Ezeagwula. 
129 05-11-2009 Attack The Fort Hood shooting is considered a jihadist mass murder that took place 
on November 5, 2009, at Fort Hood, Texas when a U.S. Army major and 
psychiatrist Nidal Malik Hasan, fatally shot 13 people and injured more than 
30 others. 
130 19-01-2010 Attack "Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, senior Hamas military commander. Exact cause 
unknown 
131 18-02-2010 Attack "Andrew Joseph Stack III, crashed his Piper Dakota into Building I of the 
Echelon office complex in Austin, Texas, United States, killing himself and 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) manager Vernon Hunter. Thirteen others were 
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98 21-05-1991 Attack Former Indian prime-minister Rajiv Gandhi. Killed in an explosion triggered by 
a LTTE suicide bomber. First head of state to be killed by a suicide bomber 
99 10-04-1993 Attack South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani, killed by Janusz Walus in an 
anti-communist killing 
100 01-05-1993 Attack Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa.  
101 1993 -1997 Attack Between 1993 en 1997 Franz Fuchs killed four people and injured 15 against 
foreigners and people who were friendly to foreigners with three improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) and five waves of 25 mail bombs in total. 
102 23-03-1994 Attack Mexican Candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio was killed by Alberto Martinez in 
what is widely believed to be a conspiracy by the Mexican president at the 
time 
103 24-02-1994 Attack Baruch Goldstein, a former member of the Jewish Defence League and 
follower of the Kahanist movement,[7] opened fire inside the Cave of the 
Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 29 people and injuring at least 100.[8] 
104 06-04-1994 Attack Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian president Cyprien 
NtaryamiraPlane carrying the two leaders shot down by unknown attackers 
with a surface-to-air missile. The attack was the catalyst for the Rwandan 
Genocide.  
105 06-01-1995 Attempt Attempt to kill Pope John Paul II by Ramzi Yousef, part of Operation Bojinka. 
A large-scale planned Islamist terrorist attack to blow up 12 airliners and 
4,000 passengers 
106 04-11-1995 Attack Rabin was assassinated attending a mass rally in Tel Aviv, held in support of 
the Oslo Accords, by a radical right-wing Orthodox Jew Yigal Amir, who 
opposed the signing of the these accords. 
107 30-11-1999 Attempt Attempt to kill George Harrison, lead guitarist of popular band The Beatles, 
by Michael Abram. Abram broke into Harrison's house and repeatedly 
stabbed him 
108 April 1999 Attack David Copeland, an English Neo-Nazi militant executed a 13-day bombing 
campaign in April 1999 aimed at London’s black, Bangladeshi and gay 
communities that resulted in three deaths and more than a hundred injured. 
109 10-08-1999 Attack White-supremacist  Buford Furrow, Jr. walked into the lobby of the North 
Valley Jewish Community Center and opened fire with a semiautomatic 
weapon. The gunfire wounded three children, a teenage counselor, and an 
office worker. 
110 22-02-2000 Attack Member of the Basque Parliament Fernando Buesa, killed by ETA 
111 01-06-2001 Attack King Birendra of Nepal and other royal family members of same country were 
killed by his son, Prince Dipendra in what is known as the Nepalese royal 
massacre 
112 06-05-2002 Attack Nine days before the general election in the Netherlands, Fortuyn was shot to 
death in a parking lot outside a radio studio where he had just given an 
interview. The environmental activist Volkert van der Graaf that shot him, 
claimed that he had become alarmed that Fortuyn was using Muslims and 
immigrants as scapegoats in a campaign to seek political power. 
113 14-07-2002 Attempt French president Jacques Chirac was almost killed by Macime Brunerie. 
Brunerie attempted to shoot the president during the Bastille Day Military 
Parade 
114 11-09-2003 Attack Swedish Foreign Minister Anna LindhLindh was attacked while shopping in a 
department store in central Stockholm. She was stabbed in the chest, 
abdomen and arms. The attacker Mijailo Mijailovi_ reportedly had serious 
mental problems, and had previously been convicted of violent crimes. His 
motive was not considered political. 
115 12-03-2003 Attack "Serbian prime-minister Zoran _in_i_ was killed by Zvezdan Jovanovi_. 
Jovanovi_ killed his victim with a sniper rifle 
116 19-03-2004 Attempt President of Republic of China Chen Shui-bian was shot by Chen Yi-hsiung in 
what is known as the  
117 09-05-2004 Attack President of Chechnya Akhmad Kadyrov was killed along with about 30 
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others in a football stadium during a Soviet Victory Day parade, by a bomb 
that had been built into the concrete of one of the stadium's supporting 
columns. Presumably by Chechen Islamists 
118 14-02-2005 Attack Former Lebanese prime-minister and billionaire Rafik Hariri, assassination via 
car bomb in Beirut. Allegedly by Hezbollah and Syrian intelligence services 
119 10-05-2005 Attempt U.S. president George W. Bush and Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili. 
Attempt by Arutyunian, who threw a hand grenade at Bush, which failed to 
detonate 
120 04-08-2005 Attack Eden Natan-Zada, an alleged Kahanist, killed four Israeli Arabs on a bus and 
wounded 12 before being killed by other passengers.[11] Natan-Zada was a 
19-year-old soldier who had deserted his unit after he refused to remove 
settlers from the Gaza Strip. Less than two weeks later, on August 17, 2005, 
Asher Weisgan, a 40-year old Israeli bus-driver, shot and killed four 
Palestinians and injured two others in the West Bank settlement of Shiloh. 
121 07-10-2006 Attack "Journalist Anna Politkovskaya, shot in the elevator block of her apartment in 
Moscow. Unknown perpetrator 
122 04-09-2006 Attack Nabil Ahmad Jaoura, a Jordanian of Palestinian origin, opened fire on tourists 
at the Roman Amphitheatre in Amman, Jordan. One British tourist died and 
six others, including five tourists, were injured. Police said he was not 
connected with any organized group but was angered by Western and Israeli 
actions in the Middle East.[12] 
123 23-11-2006 Attack Former FSB officer Alexander Litvinenko was killed by Acute radiation 
syndrome via ingestion of polonium-210. Perpetrators unknown, though 
believed to be figures within the government of Russia 
124 27-12-2007 Attack Former prime-minister of Pakistan and Pakistan Peoples Party Chair and 
Opposition Leader Benazir Bhutto. Killed while entering a vehicle upon 
leaving a political rally for the Pakistan People's Party in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. 
Perpetrators unknown, widely believed to be Islamic militants 
125 02-07-2008 Attack An Arab resident of east Jerusalem Hussam Taysir Duwait attacked several 
cars on Jaffa Road in Jerusalem using a front-end loader (erroneously referred 
to as a bulldozer in the media), killing three people and wounding at least 
thirty pedestrians, before being shot to death. A motive for the attack could 
not immediately be determined, but police at the scene referred to the 
incident as a terrorist attack. 
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127 30-04-2009 Attempt During the celebration of Queen's Day in the Netherlands, Karst Tates drove 
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Family of the Netherlands. The vehicle drove through a line of people 
watching the parade, resulting in eight deaths and ten injuries. It missed the 
Royal Family and crashed into a monument at the side of the road. No 
members of the Royal Family were harmed. 
128 01-06-2001 Attack In the Little Rock recruiting office shooting American born Carlos Leon 
Bledsoe, (who converted to Islam and was named Abdulhakim Mujahid 
Muhammad), opened fire with a rifle in a drive-by shooting on soldiers in front 
of a United States military recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas. He killed 
Private William Long, and wounded Private Quinton Ezeagwula. 
129 05-11-2009 Attack The Fort Hood shooting is considered a jihadist mass murder that took place 
on November 5, 2009, at Fort Hood, Texas when a U.S. Army major and 
psychiatrist Nidal Malik Hasan, fatally shot 13 people and injured more than 
30 others. 
130 19-01-2010 Attack "Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, senior Hamas military commander. Exact cause 
unknown 
131 18-02-2010 Attack "Andrew Joseph Stack III, crashed his Piper Dakota into Building I of the 
Echelon office complex in Austin, Texas, United States, killing himself and 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) manager Vernon Hunter. Thirteen others were 
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98 21-05-1991 Attack Former Indian prime-minister Rajiv Gandhi. Killed in an explosion triggered by 
a LTTE suicide bomber. First head of state to be killed by a suicide bomber 
99 10-04-1993 Attack South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani, killed by Janusz Walus in an 
anti-communist killing 
100 01-05-1993 Attack Sri Lankan president Ranasinghe Premadasa.  
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Appendix E – Summary of The day of the Jackal 
  
The book The day of the Jackal, opens with the historical, failed attempt on the life of Charles de Gaulle, 
planned by Col. Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry in the Paris suburb of Petit-Clamart. Following Bastien-Thiry's arrest, 
the French security forces wage a short but extremely vicious "underground" war with the terrorists of the OAS, 
a militant right-wing group who have labelled de Gaulle a traitor to France after his grant of independence to 
Algeria. The French secret service, particularly its covert operations directorate (the "Action Service"), is 
remarkably effective in infiltrating the terrorist organisation with their own informants, allowing them to kidnap 
and neutralise the terrorists' chief of operations, Antoine Argoud. The failure of the Petit-Clamart assassination, 
and a subsequent failed assassination attempt at the École Militaire, combined with Bastien-Thiry's execution 
by firing squad, cripple the morale of the OAS. 
 
Argoud's deputy, lieutenant-colonel Marc Rodin, carefully examines their few remaining options and 
determines that the only way to succeed in killing de Gaulle is to hire a professional assassin from outside the 
organisation, someone completely unknown to both the French authorities and the OAS itself. After inquiries, 
he contacts an Englishman (whose name is never mentioned) who agrees to meet Rodin and his two principal 
deputies in Vienna. The Englishman is willing to assassinate de Gaulle for the sum total of $500,000 and the 
four men agree on his code name "The Jackal." The three OAS leaders then take up residency on the top floor 
of a Rome hotel guarded by a group of ex-legionnaires to avoid the risk of being captured like Argoud. 
 
The remainder of Part One describes the Jackal's exhaustive preparations for the assassination. He first 
acquires a legitimate British passport under a false name, under which he plans to operate for the majority of 
his mission. He eventually steals the passports of two foreign tourists visiting London who superficially 
resemble the Jackal, for use in an emergency. 
 
Using his primary false passport, the Jackal travels to Belgium, where he commissions a specialised sniper rifle 
of great slimness and an appropriate silencer from a master gunsmith, as well as a set of forged French identity 
papers from a master forger. When collecting his fake identity papers, the master forger attempts to blackmail 
the Jackal who kills him and hides the body in a trunk inside the forger's house. After exhaustively researching 
a series of books and articles by, and about, de Gaulle, the Jackal travels to Paris to determine the most 
favourable location and time to execute the assassination. 
 
After orchestrating a series of armed robberies in France, the OAS are able to deposit the first half of the 
Jackal's fee in his bank in Switzerland. At the same time, the French secret service, curious about Rodin and his 
subordinates being holed up in the hotel, fake a letter that lures one of Rodin's bodyguards to France, where 
he is captured and interrogated. After Rodin succumbs to his wounds, the secret service interprets his 
incoherent ramblings and is able to piece together Rodin's plot. While Rodin gave away the codename, the 
secret service did not obtain enough information to identity “the Jackal”. 
 
When told about the plot, de Gaulle (who was notoriously careless of his personal safety) refuses, to cancel his 
public appearances, to modify his normal routines, or even to allow any kind of public inquiry into the 
assassin's whereabouts to be made. Any inquiry, he orders, must be done in absolute secrecy. 
 
Roger Frey, the French Minister of the Interior, organises a meeting of the heads of the French security forces 
in which a Police Commissioner reasons that their first and most essential step is to establish the Jackal's 
identity, which is a job for a detective. When asked to name the best detective in France, he volunteers his own 
deputy commissioner, Claude Lebel. 
 
Granted special emergency powers to conduct his investigation, Lebel does everything he can to discover the 
Jackal's identity. First, he calls upon his "old boys network" of foreign intelligence and police contacts to 
inquire if they have any records of a top-class political assassin. Most of the inquiries are fruitless, but in the 
United Kingdom, the inquiry is passed on to the Special Branch of Scotland Yard, and another veteran 




injured, two seriously. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) field office was 
located in a four-story office building, along with other state and federal 
government agencies and some private businesses on the first floor. Prior to 
the crash, Stack had posted a suicide note referring to ""greed"" with the 
IRS, dated February 18, 2010, to his business website." 
132 14-09-2010 Attempt Missouri Governor Jay Nixon was stabbed by Casey Brezik. He mistakenly 
stabbed a college dean in a hallway by a lecture where Nixon was to speak. 
Brezik told police that he thought he had stabbed Nixon 
133 04-01-2011 Attack Salmaan Taseer, 26th Governor of Punjab was shot to death by one of his 
bodyguards that shot him 27 times with a sub-machine gun as he was 
returning to his car after meeting a friend for lunch in Islamabad. His assassin 
Malik Mumtaz Hussain Qadri reportedly said he killed Taseer because of the 
latter's vocal opposition to the blasphemy law in Pakistan. 
134 08-01-2011 Attempt Gabrielle Giffords, U.S. Representative from Arizona. Shot, along with several 
staffers and U.S. District Judge John Roll (killed), at a constituent event in her 
district by Jared Lee Loughner. There were a total of at least 6 deaths and 12 
injured 
135 02-03-2011 Attack Shahbaz Bhatti, Federal Minister for Minorities of Pakistan. Killed due to his 
opposition to Pakistan's blasphemy laws by the Taliban 
136 02-03-2011 Attack "Arid Uka is a Muslim Kosovo Albanian from Frankfurt am Main, On 2 March 
2011 he murdered two U.S. Airmen and severely wounded two others at 
Frankfurt Airport. This incident is considered to be the first successful 
assassination in Germany with an Islamist background. Shouting Allahu akbar 
(""God is great"") Uka fired with a pistol on unarmed US Airmen and the 
driver of a bus of the military services who waited at a terminal of Frankfurt 
Airport. The terminal German Bundespolizei was able to catch the assassin." 
137 02-05-2011 Attack Osama bin Laden, leader of terrorist organization Al Qaeda, killed in a raid by 
U.S. Navy SEAL Team 6 
138 12-07-2011 Attack Ahmed Wali Karzai, half-brother of Afghan president Hamid Karzai. Shot twice 
in the head and chest by his security guard as he was coming out of his 
bathroom 
139 22-07-2011 Attack Anders Behring Breivik, a right-wing Norwegian, killed 77 people in a car-
bomb attack in Oslo and a simultaneous attack with an automatic weapon on 
the island Utoya, where the youth-party of the Norwegian Socialist Party was 
gathered 
140 March 2012 Attack The Toulouse and Montauban shootings were a series of three gun attacks 
targeting Muslim French soldiers and Jewish civilians in the cities of 
Montauban and Toulouse in the Midi-Pyrénées region of France. In total, 
seven people were killed, and five others were injured, of which four 
seriously. The perpetrator Mohammed Merah, a 23-year-old French-Algerian 
Islamist, was shot and killed after a 30-hour siege with police.Merah attacked 
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On the day before August 25th 1963, the Minister summons Lebel again, and informes him the Jackal still at 
large. Lebel listens to the details of the President's schedule and security arrangements, and can suggest 
nothing more helpful than that everyone "should keep their eyes open." 
 
On the day of the assassination, the Jackal, disguised as a one-legged French war veteran, passes through the 
police checkpoints, carrying his custom rifle concealed in the sections of a crutch. He makes his way to an 
apartment building overlooking the Place du 18 Juin 1940, where de Gaulle is presenting medals to a small 
group of Resistance veterans. 
 
As the ceremony begins, Lebel is walking around the street on foot, questioning every police checkpoint. 
When he hears from a Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS) officer about a one-legged veteran with a 
crutch, he realises what the Jackal's plan is, and rushes into the apartment building, calling for the CRS man to 
follow him. 
 
In his sniper's nest, the Jackal readies his rifle and takes aim at de Gaulle's head. When de Gaulle unexpectedly 
leans forward to kiss the cheeks of the veteran he is honouring, the Jackal’s first shot misses by a fraction of an 
inch. The Jackal reloads his rifle for a second shot. 
 
Outside the apartment, Lebel and the CRS officer arrive on the top floor just in time to hear the sound of the 
first, silenced shot. The CRS man shoots off the lock of the door of the apartment and bursts in. The Jackal 
turns and fires, killing the young policeman with a shot to the chest. 
 
At last, confronting each other, the assassin and the police detective – who had both developed grudging, 
mutual respect for each other in the long chase – briefly look into each other's eyes, each recognising the other 
for who he is. The Jackal scrambles to load his third and last rifle bullet, while Lebel, unarmed, snatches up the 
dead policeman's MAT-49 submachine-gun. Lebel is faster, and shoots the Jackal with half a magazine-load of 



























This summary of the Day of the Jackal is based upon the summary published in the thesis Integrating fictional 




Although Special Branch's records turn up nothing, one of Thomas's subordinates suggests that if the assassin 
were an Englishman, but primarily operated abroad, he would most probably come to the attention of the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Thomas makes an informal inquiry with a friend on the SIS's staff, who 
mentions hearing a rumour from an officer stationed in the Dominican Republic at the time of president 
Trujillo's assassination. The rumour states that a hired assassin stopped Trujillo's car with a rifle shot, allowing a 
gang of partisans to finish him off. Moreover, the rumour is that the assassin was an Englishman, named 
Charles Calthrop. 
 
To his surprise, Thomas is summoned in person by the prime-minister (unnamed), who informs him that word 
of his inquiries has reached higher circles in the British government. Despite the enmity felt by much of the 
government against France in general and Charles de Gaulle in particular, the prime-minister informs Thomas 
that de Gaulle is his friend, and that the assassin must be identified and stopped at all costs. Thomas is handed 
a mandate much similar to Lebel's, with temporary powers allowing him to override almost any other authority 
in the land. 
 
Checking out the name of Charles Calthrop, Thomas finds a match to a man living in London, said to be on 
holiday in Scotland. While Thomas confirms that this Calthrop has been in the Dominican Republic at the time 
of Trujillo's death, he does not feel confident enough to inform Lebel. However, when one of his junior 
detectives realises that the first three letters of Calthrops’ Christian name and surname form the word “Chacal” 
(French for Jackal), Thomas calls Lebel immediately. 
 
Unknown to any member of the council in France, the mistress of one of them (an arrogant Air Force colonel 
attached to de Gaulle's staff) is actually an OAS agent. Through pillow talk, the colonel unwittingly feeds the 
Jackal a constant stream of information as to Lebel's progress. 
 
The Jackal enters France by way of Italy, driving a rented Alfa Romeo sports car with his special gun hidden in 
the chassis. On receiving word from the OAS agent that the French are on the lookout for him, he decides his 
plan will succeed anyway, and forges ahead. 
 
In London, the Special Branch raids Calthrop's flat, finding his passport, and deduce that he must be travelling 
on a false one. When they work out the name of the Jackal's primary false identity, Lebel and the police come 
close to apprehending the Jackal in the south of France. But thanks to his OAS contact, the Jackal checks out 
of his hotel early and evades them by only an hour. 
 
With the police on the lookout for him, the Jackal takes refuge in the château of a woman whom he seduced 
while she was staying at the hotel the night before. When she goes through his things and finds the gun, he 
kills her and escapes again. The murder is not reported until later that evening, allowing the Jackal to assume 
one of his two emergency identities and board the train for Paris. 
 
Lebel becomes suspicious of what the rest of the council labels the Jackal's "good luck", and has the 
telephones of all the members tapped, which leads him to discover the OAS agent. The Air Force colonel 
withdraws from the meeting in disgrace and later resigns from his post. When Thomas checks out and 
identifies reports of stolen or missing passports in London in the preceding months, he closes in on the Jackal's 
remaining false identities. 
 
On the evening of 22 August 1963, Lebel deduces that the Jackal has decided to target de Gaulle on 
Liberation Day, on 25 August, the day commemorating the liberation of Paris during World War II. As he 
realises, this is the day of the year when de Gaulle can be counted on to be in Paris, and to appear in public. 
Assuming the inquiry is over, the Minister orchestrates a massive, citywide manhunt for the Jackal (under his 
false name(s)) on the charge of killing the noblewoman, and dismisses Lebel with hearty congratulations. 
 
Despite their efforts, the Jackal eludes them yet again. By pretending to be homosexual, he allows himself to 
be "picked up" by another man and is taken to his apartment. The Jackal kills the man at his apartment, and 
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inch. The Jackal reloads his rifle for a second shot. 
 
Outside the apartment, Lebel and the CRS officer arrive on the top floor just in time to hear the sound of the 
first, silenced shot. The CRS man shoots off the lock of the door of the apartment and bursts in. The Jackal 
turns and fires, killing the young policeman with a shot to the chest. 
 
At last, confronting each other, the assassin and the police detective – who had both developed grudging, 
mutual respect for each other in the long chase – briefly look into each other's eyes, each recognising the other 
for who he is. The Jackal scrambles to load his third and last rifle bullet, while Lebel, unarmed, snatches up the 
dead policeman's MAT-49 submachine-gun. Lebel is faster, and shoots the Jackal with half a magazine-load of 



























This summary of the Day of the Jackal is based upon the summary published in the thesis Integrating fictional 




Although Special Branch's records turn up nothing, one of Thomas's subordinates suggests that if the assassin 
were an Englishman, but primarily operated abroad, he would most probably come to the attention of the 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). Thomas makes an informal inquiry with a friend on the SIS's staff, who 
mentions hearing a rumour from an officer stationed in the Dominican Republic at the time of president 
Trujillo's assassination. The rumour states that a hired assassin stopped Trujillo's car with a rifle shot, allowing a 
gang of partisans to finish him off. Moreover, the rumour is that the assassin was an Englishman, named 
Charles Calthrop. 
 
To his surprise, Thomas is summoned in person by the prime-minister (unnamed), who informs him that word 
of his inquiries has reached higher circles in the British government. Despite the enmity felt by much of the 
government against France in general and Charles de Gaulle in particular, the prime-minister informs Thomas 
that de Gaulle is his friend, and that the assassin must be identified and stopped at all costs. Thomas is handed 
a mandate much similar to Lebel's, with temporary powers allowing him to override almost any other authority 
in the land. 
 
Checking out the name of Charles Calthrop, Thomas finds a match to a man living in London, said to be on 
holiday in Scotland. While Thomas confirms that this Calthrop has been in the Dominican Republic at the time 
of Trujillo's death, he does not feel confident enough to inform Lebel. However, when one of his junior 
detectives realises that the first three letters of Calthrops’ Christian name and surname form the word “Chacal” 
(French for Jackal), Thomas calls Lebel immediately. 
 
Unknown to any member of the council in France, the mistress of one of them (an arrogant Air Force colonel 
attached to de Gaulle's staff) is actually an OAS agent. Through pillow talk, the colonel unwittingly feeds the 
Jackal a constant stream of information as to Lebel's progress. 
 
The Jackal enters France by way of Italy, driving a rented Alfa Romeo sports car with his special gun hidden in 
the chassis. On receiving word from the OAS agent that the French are on the lookout for him, he decides his 
plan will succeed anyway, and forges ahead. 
 
In London, the Special Branch raids Calthrop's flat, finding his passport, and deduce that he must be travelling 
on a false one. When they work out the name of the Jackal's primary false identity, Lebel and the police come 
close to apprehending the Jackal in the south of France. But thanks to his OAS contact, the Jackal checks out 
of his hotel early and evades them by only an hour. 
 
With the police on the lookout for him, the Jackal takes refuge in the château of a woman whom he seduced 
while she was staying at the hotel the night before. When she goes through his things and finds the gun, he 
kills her and escapes again. The murder is not reported until later that evening, allowing the Jackal to assume 
one of his two emergency identities and board the train for Paris. 
 
Lebel becomes suspicious of what the rest of the council labels the Jackal's "good luck", and has the 
telephones of all the members tapped, which leads him to discover the OAS agent. The Air Force colonel 
withdraws from the meeting in disgrace and later resigns from his post. When Thomas checks out and 
identifies reports of stolen or missing passports in London in the preceding months, he closes in on the Jackal's 
remaining false identities. 
 
On the evening of 22 August 1963, Lebel deduces that the Jackal has decided to target de Gaulle on 
Liberation Day, on 25 August, the day commemorating the liberation of Paris during World War II. As he 
realises, this is the day of the year when de Gaulle can be counted on to be in Paris, and to appear in public. 
Assuming the inquiry is over, the Minister orchestrates a massive, citywide manhunt for the Jackal (under his 
false name(s)) on the charge of killing the noblewoman, and dismisses Lebel with hearty congratulations. 
 
Despite their efforts, the Jackal eludes them yet again. By pretending to be homosexual, he allows himself to 
be "picked up" by another man and is taken to his apartment. The Jackal kills the man at his apartment, and 






Narratives play an important role in human life. In fact, they are rooted so deep in 
human existence that narratives are at the mainstay of entertainment, law, and 
politics. In recent years, a growing interest has emerged to investigate the use of 
narratives in anticipating criminal behaviour.  
 
In the creative sector, a narrative is generated by a scenario that describes the 
foreseeable interactions between characters and the system. It includes 
information about behaviour, goals, motivations, expectations, actions and 
reactions, successes and problems. While creative scenarios are widely used to 
help commercial organisations anticipate the behaviour of their competitor, little 
scholarly research is devoted to the use of scenario in the anticipation of criminal 
behaviour. Therefore, we have defined the research objective of this thesis is in the 
following problem statement: To what extent can a scenario model support law-
enforcement agencies in the anticipation of criminal behaviour?  
 
We intend to contribute to the discussion on anticipating criminal behaviour by 
two specific research activities: (1) studying the design, development, and use of 
an anticipative scenario model, and (2) assessing its potential to analyse and 
anticipate criminal behaviour. To guide our research, we have formulated four 
research questions:  
(RQ1) What does literature on scenario-based anticipation methods offer that is 
relevant for the development of a scenario model by which criminal behaviour can 
be anticipated? 
(RQ2) To what extent can a scenario model be designed by which criminal 
behaviour can be anticipated? 
(RQ3) To what extent can a scenario model be used to analyse historic criminal 
behaviour? 
(RQ4) To what extent are data-mining techniques applied to a scenario model able 
to enhance the ability of law enforcements agencies to anticipate criminal 
behaviour? 
 
The answers to these four research questions will allow us to formulate an answer 









Narratives play an important role in human life. In fact, they are rooted so deep in 
human existence that narratives are at the mainstay of entertainment, law, and 
politics. In recent years, a growing interest has emerged to investigate the use of 
narratives in anticipating criminal behaviour.  
 
In the creative sector, a narrative is generated by a scenario that describes the 
foreseeable interactions between characters and the system. It includes 
information about behaviour, goals, motivations, expectations, actions and 
reactions, successes and problems. While creative scenarios are widely used to 
help commercial organisations anticipate the behaviour of their competitor, little 
scholarly research is devoted to the use of scenario in the anticipation of criminal 
behaviour. Therefore, we have defined the research objective of this thesis is in the 
following problem statement: To what extent can a scenario model support law-
enforcement agencies in the anticipation of criminal behaviour?  
 
We intend to contribute to the discussion on anticipating criminal behaviour by 
two specific research activities: (1) studying the design, development, and use of 
an anticipative scenario model, and (2) assessing its potential to analyse and 
anticipate criminal behaviour. To guide our research, we have formulated four 
research questions:  
(RQ1) What does literature on scenario-based anticipation methods offer that is 
relevant for the development of a scenario model by which criminal behaviour can 
be anticipated? 
(RQ2) To what extent can a scenario model be designed by which criminal 
behaviour can be anticipated? 
(RQ3) To what extent can a scenario model be used to analyse historic criminal 
behaviour? 
(RQ4) To what extent are data-mining techniques applied to a scenario model able 
to enhance the ability of law enforcements agencies to anticipate criminal 
behaviour? 
 
The answers to these four research questions will allow us to formulate an answer 







frequently used in the process of information gathering as well as in law-
enforcement investigations. We study the communalities and differences between 
the ESC12 and “the Golden W’s” and arrive at the conclusion that the ESC12 offer 
a effective and durable set of components to describe, characterise and model a 
criminal incident.  
 
In chapter five we answer RQ2 and present the design for an innovative scenario 
model, based on the ESC12. The chapter starts by proposing a definition of the 
ESC12 scenario model. Next, we distinguish the conceptual design of the model, 
from the architectural design. We illustrate the conceptual design of the ESC12 
scenario model by focussing on the use of the ESC12 in (a) the ability to learn, 
(b) the ability to adapt, and (c) the ability to anticipate. Furthermore, we propose 
an architectural design of the ESC12 scenario model constituting four modules 
that facilitate six. Subsequently, we explain how these modules and processes 
interact with one another and how they can be combined in a scenario model with 
which criminal behaviour may be anticipated. Finally, we conclude that to 
adequately assess the proposed design of the scenario model, an experimental 
scenario platform needs to be constructed.  
 
Chapter six constitutes the creation of an Experimental Scenario Platform (ESP) in 
which data of criminal behaviour is added to the architectural design of the 
scenario model. In the creation of the ESP, we observe that the ESC12 represent 
categories to broad and general to encompass the relevant details of a criminal 
incident. Therefore, we subdivide the ESC12 into 98 variables and introduce four 
variables for each category (viz. dichotomous value, numerical value, categorical 
value, and text value). To be able to adequately address RQ3 and RQ4 we 
decided to create two separate ESPs.  
With RQ3 we aim to understand to what extent a scenario model may be used to 
detect a time-independent profile for lone-operators. For this experiment, we 
create ESP PANDORA I that contains detailed information on a 158 lone-operator 
incidents. RQ3 is answered in chapter 8.  
With RQ4, we aim to understand to what extent data-mining techniques applied to 
the scenario model may be able to enhance the ability to anticipate criminal 
behaviour. For this experiment, we create ESP PANDORA II that contains information 




Chapter two forms the theoretical basis for our study. It focusses on the 
overarching theme and provides a deeper understanding of crime in general and 
criminal behaviour in particular. Drawing on literature from (a) criminology, (b) 
terrorism research, and (c) organisational learning, the predicaments of criminal 
behaviour are studied. We start with defining the concept of crime and highlight 
three criminal theories that offer insight into the predicaments of crime relevant to 
the design of an anticipative scenario model. Next, we describe the relation 
between organised crime and terrorism, and provide definitions of both these 
terms. Subsequently, we focus on “lone-operators”; criminals that operate without 
an organisational structure.  
 
Because criminology indicates that a common denominator of both criminal and 
Terrorist organisations is their ability to learn, we conclude chapter two with a 
description of the concept of organisational learning and the opportunities it offers 
to anticipate criminal behaviour.  
 
In chapter three RQ1 is answered by conducting a literature review of scenario 
based anticipatory techniques. The chapter starts with defining the terms relevant 
to the use of scenarios in anticipating future behaviour. Next, we review the history 
of scenario planning and the development of scenarios. We focus on the use of 
creative scenarios and the concept of the twelve components by which any 
scenario can be constructed. Next, three proactive models that are in use in law 
enforcement are highlighted to illustrate the difference with anticipative scenario 
models. Subsequently, the limits of anticipating future events are addressed, and 
the most valuable methods in relation to this thesis are highlighted. We conclude 
the chapter with an answer to RQ1 by highlighting the relevant findings that 
emerged in our literature review.  
 
The research required to formulate an answer to RQ2, is split over the chapters 
four and five. Chapter four builds on the input of chapter three. First, we propose 
a novel manner of modelling criminal behaviour based on the creative scenarios 
components. We focus on the relation between a criminal offence and a theatrical 
performance and present a definition of the twelve Elementary Scenario 
Components (ESC12). Next, we list the ESC12 and illustrate them by using two 
narratives: (1) the early oral history of The epic of Gilgamesh and (2) the 
blockbuster motion picture Jaws. Subsequently, we introduce the ESC12 to the 
area of law enforcement by relating them to “the Golden W’s”, a concept that is 
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effectively support law-enforcement agencies in the anticipation of criminal 
behaviour to some extent. Finally, we suggest five directions for future research. 
 
In chapter eleven (Entitled “Deleted scenes”) we conduct a preliminary 
investigation into the possibilities of text mining; a subject that did not seem to fit 
the Ph.D. research, yet is believed to offer a valuable addition to this thesis (hence 
the title of the chapter).  
 
As we argued in the previous chapters, there seems to be a strong analogy 
between a theatrical performance and a terrorist act. This analogy provides us with 
the opportunity to add creative narratives to the ESC12 scenario model. Therefore, 
we designed an experiment in which we study two claims: (1) Combining data 
from terrorist incidents with data from works of fiction would enhance the potential 
of the ESC12 scenario model. (2) Text-mining techniques would enable the 
automatic extraction of the ESC12 variables from works of fiction. To address the 
first claim, we investigate the nexus between terroristic and creative narratives by 
drawing on related scientific studies. To investigate the second claim, we conduct 
a text mining experiment in which we apply text-mining rules on thirteen novels 
that were written by Frederick Forsyth. Based on the results of our investigations, 
we arrive at the conclusion that adding the ESC12 (variables) by means of text 
mining from works of fiction, would enhance the capabilities of the ESC12 scenario 
model. Based on this conclusion we build a sneak preview of the future of the 




In chapter seven we explain the internal structure of the ESP and the process of 
data preparation. Eleven sections provide insight into the way data is 
deconstructed and implemented by four different types of variables. Every section 
includes a detailed table that illustrates the Elementary Scenario Component, its 
corresponding variables and its internal structure. 
 
In chapter eight we answer RQ3. We study how the ESP PANDORA I may be used to 
analyse historic criminal behaviour. The chapter starts with an outline of the 
experiment and the process of case-selection. To define the timeframe of modern 
terrorism we introduce the four waves of modern terrorism concept of Rapoport 
(2004). Subsequently, we select 10 incidents of lone-operator terrorism per wave, 
and extract the ESC12 and the corresponding variables from every incident. Next, 
we analyse the communalities and differences between the different waves of 
terrorism. Subsequently, in a cross-wave analysis we accumulate the results of 
every wave of modern terrorism in a search for time-independent characteristics of 
lone-operator behaviour. From the results of this experiment, we arrive at the 
conclusion that a scenario model based on the ESC12 provides an opportunity to 
analyse historic criminal behaviour by transcending the level of individual 
incidents.  
 
In chapter nine we answer RQ4. We study to what extent data-mining tools, 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II enhance the ability of the model to anticipate 
criminal behaviour. To this end, we set up three experiments in which we apply 
two classifiers to the ESP PANDORA II. These experiments represent three 
operational law enforcement situations: (1) the process of investigation of a 
(terrorist) incident that recently occurred (2) an active threatening situation in which 
a strategic location, event, or important person needs to be protected from a 
possible (terrorist) attack, and (3) the anticipation of future incidents. From the 
results of these tests we conclude that data-mining tools, applied to the ESP 
PANDORA II do effectively enhance the ability of the model to anticipate criminal 
behaviour. 
 
In chapter ten the findings of our study are discussed and generalised to 
conclusions of the potential of a scenario model to anticipate criminal behaviour. 
By reviewing the answers to the four research questions, we arrive at our 
conclusion to the problem statement which reads that a scenario model can 
 
 345 
effectively support law-enforcement agencies in the anticipation of criminal 
behaviour to some extent. Finally, we suggest five directions for future research. 
 
In chapter eleven (Entitled “Deleted scenes”) we conduct a preliminary 
investigation into the possibilities of text mining; a subject that did not seem to fit 
the Ph.D. research, yet is believed to offer a valuable addition to this thesis (hence 
the title of the chapter).  
 
As we argued in the previous chapters, there seems to be a strong analogy 
between a theatrical performance and a terrorist act. This analogy provides us with 
the opportunity to add creative narratives to the ESC12 scenario model. Therefore, 
we designed an experiment in which we study two claims: (1) Combining data 
from terrorist incidents with data from works of fiction would enhance the potential 
of the ESC12 scenario model. (2) Text-mining techniques would enable the 
automatic extraction of the ESC12 variables from works of fiction. To address the 
first claim, we investigate the nexus between terroristic and creative narratives by 
drawing on related scientific studies. To investigate the second claim, we conduct 
a text mining experiment in which we apply text-mining rules on thirteen novels 
that were written by Frederick Forsyth. Based on the results of our investigations, 
we arrive at the conclusion that adding the ESC12 (variables) by means of text 
mining from works of fiction, would enhance the capabilities of the ESC12 scenario 
model. Based on this conclusion we build a sneak preview of the future of the 




In chapter seven we explain the internal structure of the ESP and the process of 
data preparation. Eleven sections provide insight into the way data is 
deconstructed and implemented by four different types of variables. Every section 
includes a detailed table that illustrates the Elementary Scenario Component, its 
corresponding variables and its internal structure. 
 
In chapter eight we answer RQ3. We study how the ESP PANDORA I may be used to 
analyse historic criminal behaviour. The chapter starts with an outline of the 
experiment and the process of case-selection. To define the timeframe of modern 
terrorism we introduce the four waves of modern terrorism concept of Rapoport 
(2004). Subsequently, we select 10 incidents of lone-operator terrorism per wave, 
and extract the ESC12 and the corresponding variables from every incident. Next, 
we analyse the communalities and differences between the different waves of 
terrorism. Subsequently, in a cross-wave analysis we accumulate the results of 
every wave of modern terrorism in a search for time-independent characteristics of 
lone-operator behaviour. From the results of this experiment, we arrive at the 
conclusion that a scenario model based on the ESC12 provides an opportunity to 
analyse historic criminal behaviour by transcending the level of individual 
incidents.  
 
In chapter nine we answer RQ4. We study to what extent data-mining tools, 
applied to the ESP PANDORA II enhance the ability of the model to anticipate 
criminal behaviour. To this end, we set up three experiments in which we apply 
two classifiers to the ESP PANDORA II. These experiments represent three 
operational law enforcement situations: (1) the process of investigation of a 
(terrorist) incident that recently occurred (2) an active threatening situation in which 
a strategic location, event, or important person needs to be protected from a 
possible (terrorist) attack, and (3) the anticipation of future incidents. From the 
results of these tests we conclude that data-mining tools, applied to the ESP 
PANDORA II do effectively enhance the ability of the model to anticipate criminal 
behaviour. 
 
In chapter ten the findings of our study are discussed and generalised to 
conclusions of the potential of a scenario model to anticipate criminal behaviour. 
By reviewing the answers to the four research questions, we arrive at our 





Verhalen spelen een belangrijke rol in intermenselijke relaties. In feite zijn verhalen 
zó diep geworteld in het menselijk bestaan, dat entertainment, recht, en politiek in 
belangrijke mate worden bepaald door verhalen. De laatste jaren is er een 
groeiende interesse ontstaan in de rol van het verhaal in het voorkomen van 
crimineel gedrag. 
 
Binnen de creatieve sector wordt een verhaal beschreven aan de hand van een 
scenario. Een scenario beschrijft interacties tussen de personages en het systeem, 
en bevat informatie over gedrag, doelen, motivaties, verwachtingen, acties en 
reacties, successen en problemen.  
 
Sinds het begin van de twintigste eeuw worden creatieve scenario’s door 
commerciële organisaties ingezet om gedrag van concurrenten te voorspellen. 
Hoewel reeds vele (wetenschappelijke) publicaties over dit onderwerp zijn 
verschenen, is het gebruik van scenario’s in het voorzien van crimineel gedrag een 
relatief nieuw onderwerp van onderzoek. Vandaar dat we voor deze thesis voor de 
volgende probleemstelling hebben gekozen: In hoeverre kan een scenario model 
opsporings-organisaties ondersteunen in het anticiperen van crimineel gedrag? 
 
Middels dit onderzoek dragen we bij aan de discussie over het anticiperen op 
crimineel gedrag door middel van twee specifieke onderzoeksactiviteiten: (1) het 
bestuderen en ontwikkelen van een proactief scenario model, en (2) het evalueren 
van het vermogen van dit model om op crimineel gedrag te anticiperen. Om dit 
onderzoek richting te geven, hebben we vier onderzoeksvragen (RQs) 
geformuleerd:  
(RQ1) Wat is er in de literatuur bekend over anticiperende scenario modellen, dat 
relevant is in de ontwikkeling van een proactief scenario model? 
(RQ2) In welke mate kan een scenario model ontworpen worden waarmee kan 
worden geanticipeerd op crimineel gedrag? 
(RQ3) In hoeverre kan een scenario model worden aangewend om historisch 
crimineel gedrag te analyseren? 
(RQ4) In hoeverre kunnen datamining technieken, toegepast op een scenario 
model, het vermogen van opsporingsinstanties verbeteren om te anticiperen op 
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(ESC12). Daarna illustreren we de rol van de ESC12 aan de hand van twee 
verhalen: (1) het klassieke epos van Gilgamesj en (2) de bioscoopfilm Jaws. 
Vervolgens vergelijken we de ESC12 met "de Gouden W's", een begrip dat vaak 
wordt gebruikt in het proces van informatieverzameling. Op basis van deze 
vergelijking concluderen we dat de ESC12 een duurzame set van componenten 
biedt waarmee crimineel gedrag effectief kan worden gemodelleerd en 
beschreven. Op basis van deze conclusie, besluiten we de ESC12 te 
implementeren in het ontwerp van een scenario model waarmee op crimineel 
gedrag kan worden geanticipeerd.  
 
In hoofdstuk vijf beantwoorden we RQ2 en presenteren we het ontwerp voor een 
innovatief scenario model, gebaseerd op de ESC12. Het hoofdstuk begint met de 
definitie van een ESC12 scenario model. Voorts onderscheiden we het 
conceptuele ontwerp van het scenario model, van het architectonische ontwerp. 
Voor het conceptuele ontwerp richten we ons op het gebruik van de ESC12 in 
relatie tot (a) het vermogen om te leren, (b) het vermogen tot aanpassing aan 
veranderende situaties, en (c) het vermogen om te anticiperen. Voor het 
architectonisch ontwerp van het ESC12 scenario model bestuderen we de 
integratie van vier modules en zes processen. We leggen uit hoe deze modules en 
processen met elkaar samen gebracht kunnen worden in één model, en 
presenteren een blueprint voor het ontwerp van een ESC12 scenario model. Tot 
slot concluderen we dat voor het testen van het voorgesteld ontwerp, een 
Experimenteel Scenario Platform moet worden gecreëerd.  
 
Hoofdstuk zes beschrijft de totstandkoming van het Experimenteel Scenario 
Platform (ESP) waarin gegevens van crimineel gedrag worden toegevoegd aan de 
architectonische vormgeving van het scenario model. Omdat we hebben 
geconcludeerd dat de ESC12 componenten te breed zijn om alle relevante details 
van een crimineel incident te omvatten, verdelen we de ESC12 in 98 variabelen. 
Vervolgens creëren we twee verschillende ESP’s voor de beantwoording van de 
resterende onderzoeksvragen RQ3 en RQ4.  
RQ3 richt zich op de vraag in hoeverre een scenario model kan worden gebruikt 
om een tijds- onafhankelijk profiel voor lone-operators te detecteren. Voor dit 
experiment creëren we ESP PANDORA I dat gedetailleerde informatie bevat over 
een 157 lone-operator incidenten. RQ3 wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk acht. 
RQ4, richt zich op de vraag in welke mate datamining technieken in staat zijn om 
het anticiperend vermogen van het scenario model te versterken. Voor dit 
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De antwoorden op deze vier onderzoeksvragen helpen ons een antwoord te 
formuleren op de probleemstelling. 
 
Hoofdstuk twee vormt de theoretische basis voor ons onderzoek. Het richt zich op 
het overkoepelende thema en biedt inzicht in criminaliteit in het algemeen, en 
crimineel gedrag in het bijzonder. Op basis van literatuur op het gebied van (a) 
criminologie, (b) terrorismeonderzoek, en (c) lerende organisaties, worden de 
kenmerken van crimineel gedrag bestudeerd. We definiëren het begrip 
criminaliteit en bestuderen drie relevante criminologische theorieën. We richten 
ons op de relatie tussen georganiseerde criminaliteit en terrorisme, en presenteren 
definities voor beide termen. Vervolgens onderzoeken we "lone-operators"; 
criminelen die opereren buiten een organisatiestructuur.  
 
Omdat het “lerend vermogen“ een bepalende factor blijkt te zijn voor zowel 
criminele als terroristische organisaties, sluiten we dit hoofdstuk af met een 
beschrijving van “organisational learning” en de mogelijkheden daarvan met 
betrekking tot het anticiperen op crimineel gedrag.  
 
Hoofdstuk drie beschrijft de beantwoording van RQ1 aan de hand van een 
literatuuronderzoek naar anticiperende scenario methodieken. Het hoofdstuk 
begint met het definiëren van de relevante termen. Vervolgens richten we ons op 
de geschiedenis van scenarioplanning en op de ontwikkeling van scenario's. We 
besteden aandacht aan het gebruik van creatieve scenario’s en aan het concept 
van de twaalf componenten waarmee elk scenario kan worden geconstrueerd. 
Voorts worden drie proactieve modellen beschreven die in gebruik zijn binnen de 
opsporing, en wordt het verschil hiervan met anticiperende scenario modellen 
geduid. De grenzen van het anticiperen op toekomstig gedrag worden 
beschreven, en de meest waardevolle scenario methoden met betrekking tot dit 
proefschrift worden aangehaald. We sluiten het hoofdstuk af met een antwoord op 
RQ1. 
 
Het onderzoek dat vereist is voor beantwoording van RQ2, is verdeeld over de 
hoofdstukken vier en vijf. In hoofdstuk vier wordt een nieuwe manier van 
modelleren van crimineel gedrag voorgesteld, gebaseerd op de creatieve scenario 
componenten die in hoofdstuk drie werden geïntroduceerd. Allereerst richten we 
ons op de overeenkomst tussen een misdrijf en een film- of theaterproductie, en 
presenteren we de definitie van de twaalf Elementaire Scenario Componenten 
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(ESC12). Daarna illustreren we de rol van de ESC12 aan de hand van twee 
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In hoofdstuk tien worden de resultaten van onze research besproken en 
gegeneraliseerd naar conclusies over het potentieel van een ESC12 scenario 
model om crimineel gedrag te anticiperen. De beantwoording van de vier 
onderzoeksvragen leidt ons naar vier conclusies. Op basis van deze conclusies 
formuleren we een antwoord op de probleemstelling. Ter afsluiting van dit 
hoofdstuk doen we vijf aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
 
Hoofdstuk elf (“Deleted scenes”) is als uitbreiding van ons onderzoek aan dit 
proefschrift toegevoegd, omdat de vraag ontstond of tekst-mining technieken 
kunnen voorzien in de automatische extractie van de ESC12 (variabelen) uit werken 
van fictie. Omdat dit onderwerp niet past binnen de doelstelling van ons 
onderzoek, maar hier desondanks een waardevolle aanvulling op biedt, 
behandelen we dit onderwerp in een extra hoofdstuk. 
 
Zoals in de vorige hoofdstukken is betoogd, lijkt er een sterke analogie te bestaan 
tussen een creatief narratief en een terroristisch narratief. Deze analogie biedt ons 
de mogelijkheid om creatieve verhalen toe te voegen aan het ESC12 scenario 
model. Om de mogelijkheden hiertoe te onderzoeken hebben we twee claims 
geformuleerd: (1) Het combineren van gegevens uit terroristische incidenten met 
gegevens uit werken van fictie verbeteren het potentieel van het ESC12 scenario 
model. (2) Tekst-mining technieken kunnen voorzien in de automatische extractie 
van de ESC12 variabelen uit werken van fictie. Ter toetsing van eerstgenoemde 
claim, onderzoeken we het verband tussen het terroristisch en creatieve narratief 
aan de hand van verwante wetenschappelijke studies. Om de tweede claim te 
toetsen, voeren we een experiment uit waarin we tekst-mining regels toepassen op 
dertien romans van Frederick Forsyth. De resultaten van onze onderzoeken, leiden 
ons tot de conclusie dat het abstraheren van de ESC12 (variabelen) door middel 
van tekst-mining technieken, de mogelijkheden van het ESC12 scenario model 
daadwerkelijk vergroot. Aan de hand van deze conclusie formuleren we een ‘sneak 





experiment, creëren we ESP PANDORA II dat gegevens bevat van 53.289 
terroristische incidenten.  RQ4 wordt beantwoord in hoofdstuk negen. 
 
In hoofdstuk zeven beschrijven we de interne structuur van de ESP PANDORA en 
verdelen we de ESC12 onder in 98 variabelen. Daarnaast biedt dit hoofdstuk 
inzicht in de manier waarop data in het ESC12 scenario model wordt ingebracht.   
 
In hoofdstuk acht beantwoorden we RQ3. Aan de hand van een experiment 
bestuderen we hoe ESP PANDORA I gebruikt kan worden voor de analyse van lone-
operator terrorisme. Het hoofdstuk begint met een uitleg van het experiment en 
het proces van case-selection. We introduceren de Four waves of modern 
terrorism theorie van Rapoport (2004), en verdelen veertig incidenten van lone-
operator terrorisme aan de hand van deze tijdsindeling. Vervolgens bestuderen we 
de overeenkomsten en verschillen tussen de incidenten van elke wave, en brengen 
we de resultaten van de vier waves bij elkaar. Gebaseerd op de resultaten van dit 
experiment concluderen we dat een scenario gebaseerd op de ESC12, 
mogelijkheden biedt om historisch crimineel gedrag te kunnen analyseren.  
 
In hoofdstuk negen beantwoorden we RQ4. We onderzoeken in hoeverre 
datamining tools, toegepast op de dataset van ESP PANDORA II het vermogen van 
het model verbeteren om crimineel gedrag te voorspellen. We zetten daartoe een 
vergelijkend onderzoek op waarin we twee datamining classifiers toepassen op de 
ESP PANDORA II: de ZeroR classifier die we gebruiken als baseline, en de J48 
decision tree. Met deze classifiers voeren we drie experimenten uit die 
verschillende operationele situaties in de opsporing vertegenwoordigen: (1) het 
onderzoek van een terroristisch incident dat zich recentelijk heeft voorgedaan, (2) 
een actuele bedreigende situatie waarin een strategische locatie, evenement of 
belangrijk persoon moet worden beschermd tegen een mogelijke terroristische 
aanslag, en (3) het anticiperen op toekomstige terroristische aanslagen. 
Gebaseerd op de resultaten van dit experiment concluderen we dat datamining 
tools, toegepast op de ESP PANDORA II het vermogen versterken om crimineel 
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